pattern jury instruction in Indiana

2020Gravens v. State, 836 N.E.2d 490, 493 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).

2008However, the “preferred practice is to use the pattern jury instruction.” Gravens v. State, 836 N.E.2d 490, 493 (Ind.Ct.App.2005).

2019Buckner v. State, 857 N.E.2d 1011, 1015 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). [21] In addition to the pattern jury instruction for self-defense, Lawson requested that the jury be instructed that “a person does not give up her right to self- defense by trespassing.

2014See, e.g., Passwater v. State, 989 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind.2013) (approving a pattern jury instruction on the consequences of not guilty by reason of insanity or guilty but mentally ill verdicts that synthesized the wording of several statutory provisions); Buckner v. State, 857 N.E.2d 1011, 1016 (Ind.Ct.App.2006) (declining to find error in the trial court giving a pattern jury instruction that elaborated on the wording in a provision of the Indiana Jury Rules).

2016Boney v. State, 880 N.E.2d 279, 294 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). [24] Here, Lloyd directs us to no authority that the failure to use a pattern jury instruction is necessarily error, much less fundamental error.

2014We have said that the words “aid” and “participate” “denote affirmative conduct or action,” Boney v. State, 880 N.E.2d 279, 294 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied, and thus we do not find the trial court’s instruction deficient in that respect.3 Finally, Gallagher contends that trial counsel should have tendered the pattern jury instruction on accomplice liability, which would have included the names of his accomplices as well as the elements of the conspiracy and dealing charges.

2013See Davis v. State, 691 N.E.2d 1285, 1289-90 (Ind.Ct.App.1998).

2012See Davis v. State, 691 N.E.2d 1285, 1289-90 (Ind.Ct.App.1998). 1 Indeed, it is difficult to read Shaw as anything other than an implicit disapproval of French , at least to the extent French holds that a jury must be instructed that a defendant claiming self-defense or defense of another “will not be accountable for an error in *96 judgment as to the amount of force necessary, provided he acted honestly,” and that the reasonableness of a defendant’s actions “can only be determined from the standpoint of the defendant, at the time and under the then existing circumstances.” French, 273 Ind. at

2012See id. (noting that the pattern jury instruction is based on the holding in Baird, 604 N.E.2d at 1176 ).

2012See id. (noting that the pattern jury instruction is based on the holding in Baird, 604 N.E.2d at 1176 ).

1999United States v. Martinez , 869 F. Supp. 202 , 203 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); See also United States v. Scarborough , 128 F.3d 1373, 1377 (10th Cir. 1997); Commonwealth v. Pinto , 702 N.E.2d 32, 35 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998). 2: In relevant part the pattern jury instruction reads as follows: To convict the Defendant of attempted [ name object crime ], the State must have proved each of the following elements: The Defendant 1. acting with the specific intent to commit [ name object crime ] by [ set out elements of object crime as charged ] 2. did [ set out conduct charged as substantial step ] 3. which wa

1999United States v. Martinez, 869 F.Supp. 202 , 203 n. 2 (S.D.N.Y.1994); See also United States v. Scarborough, 128 F.3d 1373, 1377 (10th Cir. 1997); Commonwealth v. Pinto, 45 Mass.App.Ct. 790 , 702 N.E.2d 32, 35 (1998). [2] In relevant part the pattern jury instruction reads as follows: To convict the Defendant of attempted [ name object crime ], the State must have proved each of the following elements: The Defendant 1. acting with the specific intent to commit [ name object crime ] by [ set out elements of object crime as charged ] 2. did [ set out conduct charged as substantial step ] 3. whic

1999United States v. Martinez , 869 F. Supp. 202 , 203 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); See also United States v. Scarborough , 128 F.3d 1373, 1377 (10th Cir. 1997); Commonwealth v. Pinto , 702 N.E.2d 32, 35 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998). 2: In relevant part the pattern jury instruction reads as follows: To convict the Defendant of attempted [ name object crime ], the State must have proved each of the following elements: The Defendant 1. acting with the specific intent to commit [ name object crime ] by [ set out elements of object crime as charged ] 2. did [ set out conduct charged as substantial step ] 3. which wa

1999United States v. Martinez, 869 F.Supp. 202 , 203 n. 2 (S.D.N.Y.1994); See also United States v. Scarborough, 128 F.3d 1373, 1377 (10th Cir. 1997); Commonwealth v. Pinto, 45 Mass.App.Ct. 790 , 702 N.E.2d 32, 35 (1998). [2] In relevant part the pattern jury instruction reads as follows: To convict the Defendant of attempted [ name object crime ], the State must have proved each of the following elements: The Defendant 1. acting with the specific intent to commit [ name object crime ] by [ set out elements of object crime as charged ] 2. did [ set out conduct charged as substantial step ] 3. whic

1998See Holmes v. State, 671 N.E.2d 841, 858 (Ind.1996); Sweany v. State, 607 N.E.2d 387, 389 (Ind. 1993); Jenkins v. State, 677 N.E.2d 624, 628 (Ind.Ct.App.1997).

1997See Sweany v. State, 607 N.E.2d 387, 389 (Ind.1993).

2025Cf. Batchelor, 119 N.E.3d at 563 (trial court should have given only Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-537 | February 19, 2025 Page 13 of 20 the pattern jury instruction, rather than also giving instruction comprised of appellate language from a sufficiency-of-evidence case). 3.

2019Id. at 563 .

2023Trial counsel did not lodge a separate objection to the inclusion of Class A felony voluntary manslaughter in the instruction. 7 In Young v. State, 30 N.E.3d 719, 728 (Ind. 2015), the Court addressed the principle that defendants must have “fair notice” of the charges of which they may be convicted, including inherently or factually included lesser offenses.

2020(See Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 205 (final instruction 7, which provides three elements of tort claim); and at 210 (final instruction 12, which provides a definition of “responsible cause”).) We Leaseshares, Inc. v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 470 N.E.2d 1383, 1390-91 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (based on evidence presented without objection, issue tried by consent), and Homemakers Fin.

2018Henson v. State, 786 N.E.2d 274, 277 (Ind. 2003). “‘In determining whether a trial court abused its discretion by declining to give a tendered instruction, we consider the following: (1) whether the tendered instruction correctly states the law; (2) whether there was evidence presented at trial to support giving the instruction; and (3) whether the substance of the instruction was covered by other instructions that were given.’” Id. (quoting Lampkins v. State, 778 N.E.2d 1248, 1253 (Ind. 2002)).

2018Henson v. State, 786 N.E.2d 274, 277 (Ind. 2003). “‘In determining whether a trial court abused its discretion by declining to give a tendered instruction, we consider the following: (1) whether the tendered instruction correctly states the law; (2) whether there was evidence presented at trial to support giving the instruction; and (3) whether the substance of the instruction was covered by other instructions that were given.’” Id. (quoting Lampkins v. State, 778 N.E.2d 1248, 1253 (Ind. 2002)).

2018Henson v. State, 786 N.E.2d 274, 277 (Ind. 2003). “‘In determining whether a trial court abused its discretion by declining to give a tendered instruction, we consider the following: (1) whether the tendered instruction correctly states the law; (2) whether there was evidence presented at trial to support giving the instruction; and (3) whether the substance of the instruction was covered by other instructions that were given.’” Id. (quoting Lampkins v. State, 778 N.E.2d 1248, 1253 (Ind. 2002)).

2017See, e.g., Brooks, 895 N.E.2d at 134 (record supported giving of instruction on accomplice liability when evidence permitted inference Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 42A04-1703-CR-606 | December 7, 2017 Page 7 of 10 Brooks was working in concert with associate who possessed drugs to be sold).

2017See, e.g., Townsend v. State, 934 N.E.2d 118, 130 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (no error in declining tendered instructions when substance covered by other instructions given), trans. denied.

2016See id. at 345 .

2015“Phase II Preliminary Instruction No. 6” reads as follows: “You are not permitted to consider any circumstances as weighing in favor of the sentence of life imprisonment without parole other Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Opinion 29A02-1407-PC-484 | March 6, 2015 Page 13 of 22 than those specifically charged by the State of Indiana in the Charging Information.” Id. at 376. [20] Lucio acknowledges that Instruction 4 is a pattern jury instruction, but he asserts that the instruction was “wrong because jurors are prohibited from considering non-statutory, uncharged aggravators in determ

2015But our supreme court has explicitly “approved the incorporation of all the trial evidence for penalty phase consideration,” and it has held that trial counsel is not ineffective “for failing to challenge the trial court’s instruction of the jury to consider all guilt phase evidence at the penalty phase.” Matheny v. State, 688 N.E.2d 883, 902 (Ind. 1997) (citing Smith v. State, 475 N.E.2d 1139 (Ind. 1985)).

2015Coy v. State, 999 N.E.2d 937, 943 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). [6] Huesgen did not tender a written instruction or cite the relevant pattern jury instruction.

2014Rather, “[t]he purpose of a jury instruction ‘is to inform the jury of the law applicable to the facts without misleading the jury and to enable it to comprehend the case clearly and arrive at a just, fair, and correct verdict.’ ” Dill v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (Ind.2001) (quoting Chandler v. State, 581 N.E.2d 1233, 1236 (Ind.1991)).

2014Rather, “[t]he purpose of a jury instruction ‘is to inform the jury of the law applicable to the facts without misleading the jury and to enable it to comprehend the case clearly and arrive at a just, fair, and correct verdict.’ ” Dill v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1230, 1232 (Ind.2001) (quoting Chandler v. State, 581 N.E.2d 1233, 1236 (Ind.1991)).

2014See, e.g., Passwater v. State, 989 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind.2013) (approving a pattern jury instruction on the consequences of not guilty by reason of insanity or guilty but mentally ill verdicts that synthesized the wording of several statutory provisions); Buckner v. State, 857 N.E.2d 1011, 1016 (Ind.Ct.App.2006) (declining to find error in the trial court giving a pattern jury instruction that elaborated on the wording in a provision of the Indiana Jury Rules).