pattern jury instruction in Maryland

2019App. 128, 157 , cert. denied, 445 Md. 6 (2015), we stated that “we do not hesitate to conclude that the pattern instruction on unlawful act involuntary manslaughter accurately states Maryland law on this crime.” Although Johnson had not properly preserved his argument that the pattern instruction was defective, we “note[d] for the benefit of the trial bench and bar that the pattern jury instruction on unlawful act involuntary manslaughter does not misstate the law.” 223 Md.

2019App. 128, 157 , cert. denied, 445 Md. 6 (2015), we stated that “we do not hesitate to conclude that the pattern instruction on unlawful act involuntary manslaughter accurately states Maryland law on this crime.” Although Johnson had not properly preserved his argument that the pattern instruction was defective, we “note[d] for the benefit of the trial bench and bar that the pattern jury instruction on unlawful act involuntary manslaughter does not misstate the law.” 223 Md.

2021App. Div. 2016) (holding that a consciousness of guilt instruction was warranted by evidence “that after the subject robbery was committed the defendant went home and altered his appearance by changing his clothes before going out again”); Jackson v. State, 17 P.3d 998, 1000-01 (Nev. 2001) (holding that a change in appearance instruction was warranted when an incarcerated defendant significantly altered his hairstyle while being transported for a lineup); Commonwealth v. Carrion, 552 N.E.2d 558, 566-67 (Mass. 1990) (holding that a consciousness of guilt instruction was warranted when the defen

2019App. 157 , 161 n. 1, 849 A.2d 1058 , 1060 n.1 (2004) ("Appellate courts in Maryland strongly favor the use of pattern jury instructions."). 7 Taylor v. State , 352 Md. 338 , 722 A.2d 65 (1998) ; State v. Stanley , 351 Md. 733 , 720 A.2d 323 (1998) ; Pinkney v. State , 350 Md. 201 , 711 A.2d 205 (1998) ; Ware v. State , 348 Md. 19 , 702 A.2d 699 (1997). 8 The question presented on certiorari was: Does a circuit court abuse its discretion in denying a motion for new trial where the court gave a pattern jury instruction and, after the jury renders its verdict, the court, prosecution, and defense

2019See Johnson v. State, 223 Md. App. 128, 152 (2015) (noting that “it is 29 well-established that a trial court is strongly encouraged to use the pattern jury instructions.”); See also Yates v. State, 202 Md. App. 700, 724 (2011) (holding that “the circuit court’s use of a pattern jury instruction, without objection, weighs heavily against plain error review of the instructions given.”).

2018App. 700 , 724, 33 A.3d 1071 (2011) (recognizing that, when the law did not change during the pendency of appeal, the "use of a pattern jury instruction, without objection, weighs heavily against plain error review of the instructions given").

2011Our next step is to evaluate whether the pattern jury instruction fairly covered the issue of whether Stanley had probable cause to arrest Arthur. “[A] requested instruction need not be given where other instructions ‘fairly cover’ the subject matter of the requested instruction.” See Gunning v. State, 347 Md. 332, 348 , 701 A.2d 374, 382 (1997).

2011Our next step is to evaluate whether the pattern jury instruction fairly covered the issue of whether Stanley had probable cause to arrest Arthur. “[A] requested instruction need not be given where other instructions ‘fairly cover’ the subject matter of the requested instruction.” See Gunning v. State, 347 Md. 332, 348 , 701 A.2d 374, 382 (1997).

2022App. 442, 459 , 901 A.2d 846, 856 (2006) (“In regard to the issue of lawyerly diligence, defense counsel had a good reason, based on trial tactics, not to object to the court’s change of the pattern jury instruction.”).

2022App. 442, 459 , 901 A.2d 846, 856 (2006) (“In regard to the issue of lawyerly diligence, defense counsel had a good reason, based on trial tactics, not to object to the court’s change of the pattern jury instruction.”).

2015United States v. Roach, 502 F.3d 425, 439 (6th Cir.2007) (“We generally prefer the usage of the Sixth Circuit pattern jury instruction and ‘its use will, in most instances, insulate a resulting verdict’ from challenge on appeal.”) (quoting United, States v. Clinton, 338 F.3d 483, 488 (6th Cir.2003)); United States v. Reff, 479 F.3d 396, 402 (5th Cir.2007) (“We previously have stated that the use of an unobjected-to pattern jury instruction rarely will rise to the level of plain error.”); Price v. State, 725 So.2d 1003, 1058 (Ala.Crim.App. 1997) (“A trial court’s following of an accepted patter

2011United States v. Roach, 502 F.3d 425, 439 (6th Cir.2007) (“We generally prefer the usage of the Sixth Circuit pattern jury instruction and ‘its use will, in most instances, insulate a resulting verdict’ from challenge on appeal.”) (quoting United States v. Clinton, 338 F.3d 483, 488 (6th Cir.2003)), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1006 , 128 S.Ct. 2051 , 170 L.Ed.2d 797 (2008); United States v. Reff, 479 F.3d 396, 402 (5th Cir.) (“We previously have stated that the use of an unobjected-to pattern jury instruction rarely will rise to the level of plain error.”), cert. denied, 551 U.S. 1139 , 127 S.Ct. 2

2015United States v. Roach, 502 F.3d 425, 439 (6th Cir.2007) (“We generally prefer the usage of the Sixth Circuit pattern jury instruction and ‘its use will, in most instances, insulate a resulting verdict’ from challenge on appeal.”) (quoting United, States v. Clinton, 338 F.3d 483, 488 (6th Cir.2003)); United States v. Reff, 479 F.3d 396, 402 (5th Cir.2007) (“We previously have stated that the use of an unobjected-to pattern jury instruction rarely will rise to the level of plain error.”); Price v. State, 725 So.2d 1003, 1058 (Ala.Crim.App. 1997) (“A trial court’s following of an accepted patter

2011United States v. Roach, 502 F.3d 425, 439 (6th Cir.2007) (“We generally prefer the usage of the Sixth Circuit pattern jury instruction and ‘its use will, in most instances, insulate a resulting verdict’ from challenge on appeal.”) (quoting United States v. Clinton, 338 F.3d 483, 488 (6th Cir.2003)), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1006 , 128 S.Ct. 2051 , 170 L.Ed.2d 797 (2008); United States v. Reff, 479 F.3d 396, 402 (5th Cir.) (“We previously have stated that the use of an unobjected-to pattern jury instruction rarely will rise to the level of plain error.”), cert. denied, 551 U.S. 1139 , 127 S.Ct. 2

2015United States v. Roach, 502 F.3d 425, 439 (6th Cir.2007) (“We generally prefer the usage of the Sixth Circuit pattern jury instruction and ‘its use will, in most instances, insulate a resulting verdict’ from challenge on appeal.”) (quoting United, States v. Clinton, 338 F.3d 483, 488 (6th Cir.2003)); United States v. Reff, 479 F.3d 396, 402 (5th Cir.2007) (“We previously have stated that the use of an unobjected-to pattern jury instruction rarely will rise to the level of plain error.”); Price v. State, 725 So.2d 1003, 1058 (Ala.Crim.App. 1997) (“A trial court’s following of an accepted patter

2011United States v. Roach, 502 F.3d 425, 439 (6th Cir.2007) (“We generally prefer the usage of the Sixth Circuit pattern jury instruction and ‘its use will, in most instances, insulate a resulting verdict’ from challenge on appeal.”) (quoting United States v. Clinton, 338 F.3d 483, 488 (6th Cir.2003)), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1006 , 128 S.Ct. 2051 , 170 L.Ed.2d 797 (2008); United States v. Reff, 479 F.3d 396, 402 (5th Cir.) (“We previously have stated that the use of an unobjected-to pattern jury instruction rarely will rise to the level of plain error.”), cert. denied, 551 U.S. 1139 , 127 S.Ct. 2

2015United States v. Roach, 502 F.3d 425, 439 (6th Cir.2007) (“We generally prefer the usage of the Sixth Circuit pattern jury instruction and ‘its use will, in most instances, insulate a resulting verdict’ from challenge on appeal.”) (quoting United, States v. Clinton, 338 F.3d 483, 488 (6th Cir.2003)); United States v. Reff, 479 F.3d 396, 402 (5th Cir.2007) (“We previously have stated that the use of an unobjected-to pattern jury instruction rarely will rise to the level of plain error.”); Price v. State, 725 So.2d 1003, 1058 (Ala.Crim.App. 1997) (“A trial court’s following of an accepted patter

2011United States v. Roach, 502 F.3d 425, 439 (6th Cir.2007) (“We generally prefer the usage of the Sixth Circuit pattern jury instruction and ‘its use will, in most instances, insulate a resulting verdict’ from challenge on appeal.”) (quoting United States v. Clinton, 338 F.3d 483, 488 (6th Cir.2003)), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1006 , 128 S.Ct. 2051 , 170 L.Ed.2d 797 (2008); United States v. Reff, 479 F.3d 396, 402 (5th Cir.) (“We previously have stated that the use of an unobjected-to pattern jury instruction rarely will rise to the level of plain error.”), cert. denied, 551 U.S. 1139 , 127 S.Ct. 2

2019This Court's holding in State v. Brady , 393 Md. 502 , 507-08, 903 A.2d 870 , 873 (2006) does not support the Majority's determination that Williams's counsel was without fault in not discovering the error in the jury instruction at trial.

2019This Court's holding in State v. Brady , 393 Md. 502 , 507-08, 903 A.2d 870 , 873 (2006) does not support the Majority's determination that Williams's counsel was without fault in not discovering the error in the jury instruction at trial.

2018Syed was charged with, inter alia , first degree murder, and the trial court properly instructed the jury as follows: "In order to convict the Defendant of first degree murder, the State must prove that the conduct of the Defendant caused the death of the victim, Ms. [Hae] Lee, and that the killing was willful, deliberate, and premeditated." See, e.g. , Willey v. State , 328 Md. 126 , 132, 613 A.2d 956 (1992) (approving this portion of the pattern jury instruction).

2018Syed was charged with, inter alia , first degree murder, and the trial court properly instructed the jury as follows: "In order to convict the Defendant of first degree murder, the State must prove that the conduct of the Defendant caused the death of the victim, Ms. [Hae] Lee, and that the killing was willful, deliberate, and premeditated." See, e.g. , Willey v. State , 328 Md. 126 , 132, 613 A.2d 956 (1992) (approving this portion of the pattern jury instruction).

2011See Arthur v. State, 420 Md. 512, 528 , 24 A.3d 667 (2011) (reversing conviction based on trial court’s refusal to grant defendant's request to modify the paltern jury instruction); Green v. State, 119 Md.App. 547, 564 , 705 A.2d 133 (1998) (same); Rajnic v. State, 106 Md.App. 286, 297 , 664 A.2d 432 (1995) (reversing conviction based on trial court’s refusal to give defendant’s requested instruction).

2011See Arthur v. State, 420 Md. 512, 528 , 24 A.3d 667 (2011) (reversing conviction based on trial court’s refusal to grant defendant's request to modify the paltern jury instruction); Green v. State, 119 Md.App. 547, 564 , 705 A.2d 133 (1998) (same); Rajnic v. State, 106 Md.App. 286, 297 , 664 A.2d 432 (1995) (reversing conviction based on trial court’s refusal to give defendant’s requested instruction).

2008Appellant believes that this is one of those compelling instances because a proper explication of the reasonable doubt standard is an “indispensable component” of criminal proceedings and any deviation from the pattern jury instruction “was likely to have misled the jury.” The Court of Appeals, in Ruffin v. State, 394 Md. 355 , 906 A.2d 360 (2006), changed Maryland common law principles with regard to the toleration of deviations from the pattern jury instructions on the reasonable doubt standard. 2 In Ruffin , the trial judge modified the *484 MPJI-CR 2:02 in three different instances.

2008Appellant believes that this is one of those compelling instances because a proper explication of the reasonable doubt standard is an “indispensable component” of criminal proceedings and any deviation from the pattern jury instruction “was likely to have misled the jury.” The Court of Appeals, in Ruffin v. State, 394 Md. 355 , 906 A.2d 360 (2006), changed Maryland common law principles with regard to the toleration of deviations from the pattern jury instructions on the reasonable doubt standard. 2 In Ruffin , the trial judge modified the *484 MPJI-CR 2:02 in three different instances.

2026See Carroll, 428 Md. at 685-86 n.1, 690 (holding that the court’s use of the pattern jury instruction on the State’s burden of proof, which notes that the State is not “required to negate every conceivable circumstance of innocence[,]” in conjunction with the instruction that the State “must prove” each offense was sufficient to adequately instruct the jury).

2026See, e.g., Carroll v. State, 428 Md. 679 , 685-86 n.1, 690 (2012) (holding that the trial court’s use of the pattern jury instruction on the State’s burden of proof, which notes that the State is not “required to negate every conceivable circumstance of innocence[,]” in conjunction with the instruction that the State “must prove” each offense, was sufficient to adequately instruct the jury); Smith, 374 Md. at 534 (noting a factfinder’s “ability to choose among differing inferences that might possibly be made from a factual situation” and that deference is owed “to the inferences a fact-finder

2026Therefore, we shall similarly assume, without deciding, that the pattern jury instruction requested is a correct statement of the law. 11 words, in the context of an instruction on perfect and imperfect defense of others, a defendant need only produce “‘some evidence’ on the issue of mitigation or [defense of others] . . . sufficient to give rise to a jury issue.” 4 Dykes v. State, 319 Md. 206, 215 (1990) 3F (quoting Simmons v. State, 313 Md. 33, 39-40 (1988)).

2026See, e.g., Carroll v. State, 428 Md. 679 , 685-86 n.1, 690 (2012) (holding that the trial court’s use of the pattern jury instruction on the State’s burden of proof, which notes that the State is not “required to negate every conceivable circumstance of innocence[,]” in conjunction with the instruction that the State “must prove” each offense, was sufficient to adequately instruct the jury); Smith, 374 Md. at 534 (noting a factfinder’s “ability to choose among differing inferences that might possibly be made from a factual situation” and that deference is owed “to the inferences a fact-finder

2026“A ‘humane practice’ instruction is required where a defendant’s statements are offered in evidence, and the voluntariness of those statements is a ‘live issue at trial.’” Commonwealth. v. Carter, 58 N.E.3d 318, 329 (Mass. 2016) (quoting Com. v. Tavares, 430 N.E.2d 1198, 1205 (Mass. 1982)).

2026Therefore, we shall similarly assume, without deciding, that the pattern jury instruction requested is a correct statement of the law. 11 words, in the context of an instruction on perfect and imperfect defense of others, a defendant need only produce “‘some evidence’ on the issue of mitigation or [defense of others] . . . sufficient to give rise to a jury issue.” 4 Dykes v. State, 319 Md. 206, 215 (1990) 3F (quoting Simmons v. State, 313 Md. 33, 39-40 (1988)).

2026“A ‘humane practice’ instruction is required where a defendant’s statements are offered in evidence, and the voluntariness of those statements is a ‘live issue at trial.’” Commonwealth. v. Carter, 58 N.E.3d 318, 329 (Mass. 2016) (quoting Com. v. Tavares, 430 N.E.2d 1198, 1205 (Mass. 1982)).

2025See Lee, 193 Md.

2025Perfect defense of others is a complete defense and, if successful, “entitle[s a defendant] to an acquittal on [all] charge[s].” Lee v. State, 193 Md.

2025Thus, for example, in Hollins v. State, 489 Md. at 316, the Court held that a trial judge had abused her discretion in refusing to give a requested instruction simply because it was not a pattern jury instruction.