pattern jury instruction in Washington

2026State v. Studd, 137 Wn.2d 533, 551 , 973 P.2d 1049 (1999); In the re Involuntary Treatment of A.J., 196 Wn.

2019In the context of lesser included offense analysis, our 166 Wn.2d 856 , 215 P.3d 177 (2009). 37 38 KvIlo, 166 Wn.2d at 867 . 39 KvIlo, 166 Wn.2d at 868-69 . 40 State v. Studd, 137 Wn.2d 533, 551 , 973 P.2d 1049 (1999)(invited error doctrine precluded reversal even though a jury instruction erroneously defined "self-defense"). 41 Studd 137 Wn.2d at 551 . -13 No. 78037-9-1/14 courts have described the elements of unlawful display of a weapon as those set forth in subsection (1), consistent with the pattern instructions.42 In State v. Owens,43 a case Jefferson does not mention, in addition to the

2015This pattern jury instruction is based on State v. Barnett, 104 Wn.

2015This pattern jury instruction is based on State v. Barnett, 104 Wn.

2018While our Supreme Court has distinguished Studd in situations where, at the time the instruction was offered, there existed case law that "should have 3 See DeNeer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 60 Wn.2d 122, 126 , 372 P.2d 193 (1962)("Where no authorities are cited in support of a proposition, the court is not required to search out authorities, but may assume that counsel, after diligent search, has found none"). 4 At issue was the pattern jury instruction for self-defense that the Supreme Court held erroneous in State v. LeFaber, 128 Wn.2d 896 , 913 P.2d 369 (1996), abrogated on other groun

2018While our Supreme Court has distinguished Studd in situations where, at the time the instruction was offered, there existed case law that "should have 3 See DeNeer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 60 Wn.2d 122, 126 , 372 P.2d 193 (1962)("Where no authorities are cited in support of a proposition, the court is not required to search out authorities, but may assume that counsel, after diligent search, has found none"). 4 At issue was the pattern jury instruction for self-defense that the Supreme Court held erroneous in State v. LeFaber, 128 Wn.2d 896 , 913 P.2d 369 (1996), abrogated on other groun

2015Restraint of Jagana, No. 89992-4 adequate research would have shown that a former pattern jury instruction misstated the law on self-defense); State v. Aha, 137 Wn.2d 736, 745-46 , 975 P.2d 512 (1999) (deficient performance where reasonably adequate research would have prevented the possibility of conviction based on acts predating the relevant statute's effective date).

2015See, e.g., id. at 865-69 (deficient performance where reasonably adequate research would have shown that a former pattern jury instruction misstated the law on self-defense); State v. Aho, 137 Wn.2d 736, 745-46 , 975 P.2d 512 (1999) (deficient performance where reasonably adequate research would have prevented the possibility of conviction based on acts predating the relevant statute’s effective date); cf. State v. Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036 , 136 N.M. 533 , 101 P.3d 799, 805 (holding that the failure to advise a noncitizen defendant about immigration consequences as required by N.M.

2015Restraint of Jagana, No. 89992-4 adequate research would have shown that a former pattern jury instruction misstated the law on self-defense); State v. Aha, 137 Wn.2d 736, 745-46 , 975 P.2d 512 (1999) (deficient performance where reasonably adequate research would have prevented the possibility of conviction based on acts predating the relevant statute's effective date).

2015See, e.g., id. at 865-69 (deficient performance where reasonably adequate research would have shown that a former pattern jury instruction misstated the law on self-defense); State v. Aho, 137 Wn.2d 736, 745-46 , 975 P.2d 512 (1999) (deficient performance where reasonably adequate research would have prevented the possibility of conviction based on acts predating the relevant statute’s effective date); cf. State v. Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036 , 136 N.M. 533 , 101 P.3d 799, 805 (holding that the failure to advise a noncitizen defendant about immigration consequences as required by N.M.

2015App. 191,203 , 16 P.3d 74 (2001).

2015App. 191, 203 , 16 P.3d 74 (2001).

2004Studd, 137 Wn.2d at 546-47 ; State v. Summers, 107 Wn.

2004Studd, 137 Wash.2d at 546-47 , 973 P.2d 1049 ; State v. Summers, 107 Wash.App. 373, 381 , 28 P.3d 780 (2001).

2026State v. Studd, 137 Wn.2d 533, 551 , 973 P.2d 1049 (1999); In the re Involuntary Treatment of A.J., 196 Wn.

2018First, the A.J. court did not hold WPI 360.06 to be defective; it only explained that the instruction "could be improved" upon. 196 Wn.

2019In the context of lesser included offense analysis, our 166 Wn.2d 856 , 215 P.3d 177 (2009). 37 38 KvIlo, 166 Wn.2d at 867 . 39 KvIlo, 166 Wn.2d at 868-69 . 40 State v. Studd, 137 Wn.2d 533, 551 , 973 P.2d 1049 (1999)(invited error doctrine precluded reversal even though a jury instruction erroneously defined "self-defense"). 41 Studd 137 Wn.2d at 551 . -13 No. 78037-9-1/14 courts have described the elements of unlawful display of a weapon as those set forth in subsection (1), consistent with the pattern instructions.42 In State v. Owens,43 a case Jefferson does not mention, in addition to the

2013State v. Kvllo. 166 Wn.2d 856, 868-69 , 215 P.3d 177 (2009).

2018While our Supreme Court has distinguished Studd in situations where, at the time the instruction was offered, there existed case law that "should have 3 See DeNeer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 60 Wn.2d 122, 126 , 372 P.2d 193 (1962)("Where no authorities are cited in support of a proposition, the court is not required to search out authorities, but may assume that counsel, after diligent search, has found none"). 4 At issue was the pattern jury instruction for self-defense that the Supreme Court held erroneous in State v. LeFaber, 128 Wn.2d 896 , 913 P.2d 369 (1996), abrogated on other groun

2011O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d at 99-100 . ¶34 On the contrary, placing ourselves in the shoes of the trial court—as instructed by O’Hara—it is unlikely that the trial court would have corrected the instructional error that Grimes raises because the trial court used the pattern jury instruction for deliberations on sentence enhancements for controlled substance crimes.

2014State v. Blilie, 132 Wn.2d 484, 489 , 939 P.2d 691 (1997). ¶15 Under RCW 9A.08.020(3)(a)(ii), an individual may be convicted as an accomplice if, acting “[w]ith knowledge that it will promote or facilitate the commission of the crime,” the individual “[a]ids or agrees to aid such other person in planning or committing it.” The statute does not define “aid,” but Washington decisions have long accepted the pattern jury instruction’s definition of “aid.” See State v. McKeown, 23 Wn.

2014State v. Bli/ie, 132 Wn.2d 484 .489. 939 P.2d 691 (1997). 5 No. 32155-0-111 State v. Holcomb Under RCW 9A.08.020(3)(a)(ii), an individual may be convicted as an accomplice if he or she, acting "[wJith knowledge that it will promote or facilitate the commission of the crime," the individual "[a]ids or agrees to aid such other person in planning or committing it." The statute does not define "aid" but Washington decisions have long accepted the pattern jury instruction's definition of "aid." See State v. McKeown, 23 Wn.

2014State v. Blilie, 132 Wn.2d 484, 489 , 939 P.2d 691 (1997). ¶15 Under RCW 9A.08.020(3)(a)(ii), an individual may be convicted as an accomplice if, acting “[w]ith knowledge that it will promote or facilitate the commission of the crime,” the individual “[a]ids or agrees to aid such other person in planning or committing it.” The statute does not define “aid,” but Washington decisions have long accepted the pattern jury instruction’s definition of “aid.” See State v. McKeown, 23 Wn.

2014State v. Bli/ie, 132 Wn.2d 484 .489. 939 P.2d 691 (1997). 5 No. 32155-0-111 State v. Holcomb Under RCW 9A.08.020(3)(a)(ii), an individual may be convicted as an accomplice if he or she, acting "[wJith knowledge that it will promote or facilitate the commission of the crime," the individual "[a]ids or agrees to aid such other person in planning or committing it." The statute does not define "aid" but Washington decisions have long accepted the pattern jury instruction's definition of "aid." See State v. McKeown, 23 Wn.

2013App. 693, 696 , 958 P.2d 319 (1998), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Recuenco, 154 Wn.2d 156 , 110 P.3d 188 (2005), rev'd, 548 U.S. 212 , 126 S. Ct. 2546 , 165 L.

2013App. 693, 696 , 958 P.2d 319 (1998), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Recuenco, 154 Wn.2d 156 , 110 P.3d 188 (2005), rev'd, 548 U.S. 212 , 126 S. Ct. 2546 , 165 L.

2013App. 693, 696 , 958 P.2d 319 (1998), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Recuenco, 154 Wn.2d 156 , 110 P.3d 188 (2005), rev'd, 548 U.S. 212 , 126 S. Ct. 2546 , 165 L.

2013App. 693, 696 , 958 P.2d 319 (1998), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Recuenco, 154 Wn.2d 156 , 110 P.3d 188 (2005), rev'd, 548 U.S. 212 , 126 S. Ct. 2546 , 165 L.

2013App. 693, 696 , 958 P.2d 319 (1998), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Recuenco, 154 Wn.2d 156 , 110 P.3d 188 (2005), rev'd, 548 U.S. 212 , 126 S. Ct. 2546 , 165 L.

2013App. 693, 696 , 958 P.2d 319 (1998), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Recuenco, 154 Wn.2d 156 , 110 P.3d 188 (2005), rev'd, 548 U.S. 212 , 126 S. Ct. 2546 , 165 L.

2013Mr. Zuvela contends that the language of the pattern jury instruction misstates the law, "provid[ing] a level of coercion for the jury to return a guilty verdict, deceiv[ing] the jurors about their power to acquit in the face of sufficient evidence~ and fail[ing] to make the correct legal standard manifestly apparent to the average juror." Br. of Appellant Zuvela at 26-27 (citation omitted).3 At the time Mr. Zuvela filed his opening brief, this very argument had already been rejected by Division One of this court in State v. Meggyesy, 90 Wn.

2013Mr. Zuvela contends that the language of the pattern jury instruction misstates the law, "provid[ing] a level of coercion for the jury to return a guilty verdict, deceiv[ing] the jurors about their power to acquit in the face of sufficient evidence~ and fail[ing] to make the correct legal standard manifestly apparent to the average juror." Br. of Appellant Zuvela at 26-27 (citation omitted).3 At the time Mr. Zuvela filed his opening brief, this very argument had already been rejected by Division One of this court in State v. Meggyesy, 90 Wn.

2011For this reason, and also because the cases Flora cited predated a significant amendment to the statute in 2003, the trial court declined to give a definitional instruction. ¶ 7 "Parties are entitled to instructions that, when taken as a whole, properly instruct the jury on the applicable law, are not misleading, and allow each party the opportunity to argue their theory of the case." State v. Redmond, 150 Wash.2d 489, 493 , 78 P.3d 1001 (2003).

2011For this reason, and also because the cases Flora cited predated a significant amendment to the statute in 2003, the trial court declined to give a definitional instruction. ¶7 “Parties are entitled to instructions that, when taken as a whole, properly instruct the jury on the applicable law, are not misleading, and allow each party the opportunity to argue their theory of the case.” State v. Redmond, 150 Wn.2d 489, 493 , 78 P.3d 1001 (2003).

2011For this reason, and also because the cases Flora cited predated a significant amendment to the statute in 2003, the trial court declined to give a definitional instruction. ¶ 7 "Parties are entitled to instructions that, when taken as a whole, properly instruct the jury on the applicable law, are not misleading, and allow each party the opportunity to argue their theory of the case." State v. Redmond, 150 Wash.2d 489, 493 , 78 P.3d 1001 (2003).

2011For this reason, and also because the cases Flora cited predated a significant amendment to the statute in 2003, the trial court declined to give a definitional instruction. ¶7 “Parties are entitled to instructions that, when taken as a whole, properly instruct the jury on the applicable law, are not misleading, and allow each party the opportunity to argue their theory of the case.” State v. Redmond, 150 Wn.2d 489, 493 , 78 P.3d 1001 (2003).

2010State v. Brown, 132 Wash.2d 529, 611 , 940 P.2d 546 (1997).

2010State v. Brown, 132 Wn.2d 529, 611 , 940 P.2d 546 (1997).

2010State v. Brown, 132 Wash.2d 529, 611 , 940 P.2d 546 (1997).

2010State v. Brown, 132 Wn.2d 529, 611 , 940 P.2d 546 (1997).

2009The Court of Appeals said that "there was no strategic or tactical reason for counsel's proposal of an instruction that incorrectly stated the law [and] eased the State of its proper burden of proof on self-defense." Woods, 138 Wash.App. at 201-02 , 156 P.3d 309 . ¶ 33 Similarly, in Rodriguez, where an ineffectiveness claim was also raised, the court could not conceive of any reason why the defendant's lawyer would propose the defective instructions, since they decreased the State's burden to disprove self-defense.

2009The Court of Appeals said that “there was no strategic or tactical reason for counsel’s proposal of an instruction that incorrectly stated the law [and] eased the State of its proper burden of proof on self-defense.” Woods, 138 Wn.

2004Studd, 137 Wash.2d at 546-47 , 973 P.2d 1049 ; State v. Summers, 107 Wash.App. 373, 381 , 28 P.3d 780 (2001).

2002In State v. Summers, 107 *108 Wn.App. 373, 380-82, 28 P.3d 780 , 43 P.3d 526 (2001, 2002), the defendant advanced virtually identical arguments in challenging his conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm under a jury instruction that was subsequently held defective in State v. Anderson, 141 Wash.2d 357, 366 , 5 P.3d 1247 (2000). [9] This court rejected Summers's claim as invited error, explaining that [r]epresentation is deemed constitutionally sufficient unless (1) considering all the circumstances, the attorney's performance was below objective standards of reasonableness, and (2) wit