pattern jury instruction in South Dakota

2024The court declined Pfeiffer’s requests to add language to the elements or criminal intent instructions, concluding that the court’s proposed instructions align with instructions approved by this Court in State v. Birdshead, 2015 S.D. 77 , 871 N.W.2d 62 and State v. Mulligan, 2007 S.D. 67 , 736 N.W.2d 808 . [¶35.] The circuit court also refused to give Pfeiffer’s requested instruction defining recklessness and instead instructed the jury in accord with the pattern jury instruction on recklessness.

2024The court declined Pfeiffer’s requests to add language to the elements or criminal intent instructions, concluding that the court’s proposed instructions align with instructions approved by this Court in State v. Birdshead, 2015 S.D. 77 , 871 N.W.2d 62 and State v. Mulligan, 2007 S.D. 67 , 736 N.W.2d 808 . [¶35.] The circuit court also refused to give Pfeiffer’s requested instruction defining recklessness and instead instructed the jury in accord with the pattern jury instruction on recklessness.

2024The court found some support in our decision in State v. Ladu, 2016 S.D. 14 , 876 N.W.2d 505 , though the court acknowledged the value issue had not been squarely presented in Ladu. [¶17.] This instruction, along with South Dakota Pattern Jury Instruction No. 3-25-5, were included in the circuit court’s proposed jury instructions as Instructions No. 20 and 21.

2024In fact, we recently held in State v. Nelson, 2022 S.D. 12, ¶ 51 , 970 N.W.2d 814 , 830, that a pattern jury instruction did not “accurately reflect the law[.]” Therefore, the circuit court’s decision here to defer to the language of Instruction 45 simply because it was a pattern instruction would not, by itself, justify refusing Belt’s request to modify the instruction. [¶32.] However, Belt’s argument on the merits that Instruction 45 replicated the unfairness of a prosecutor’s community conscience argument is less persuasive.

2024In fact, we recently held in State v. Nelson, 2022 S.D. 12, ¶ 51 , 970 N.W.2d 814 , 830, that a pattern jury instruction did not “accurately reflect the law[.]” Therefore, the circuit court’s decision here to defer to the language of Instruction 45 simply because it was a pattern instruction would not, by itself, justify refusing Belt’s request to modify the instruction. [¶32.] However, Belt’s argument on the merits that Instruction 45 replicated the unfairness of a prosecutor’s community conscience argument is less persuasive.

2016The circuit court abused its discretion when it modified the pattern jury instruction to instruct the jury to determine the value of the property before and after “the project” rather than “the taking.” 4.The circuit court abused its discretion when it allowed testimony on how the diversion of traffic to and from Cliff Avenue diminished the value of Miller and Walsh’s property- STANDARD OF REVIEW [¶ 23,] Our standard of review of evidentiary rulings is well settled: “This Court reviews a decision to admit or deny evidence under the abuse of discretion standard.” Ferebee v. Hobart, 2009 S.D. 10

1989See Ballard v. Happy Jacks Supper Club, 425 N.W.2d 385 (S.D.1988) (Miller, J., concurring specially); see also Wang v. Wang, 393 N.W.2d 771 (S.D.1986); Runge v. Prairie States Life Ins. of Sioux Falls, 393 N.W.2d 538 (S.D.1986); Kappenman v. Action, Inc., 392 N.W.2d 410 (S.D. 1986).

1989See Ballard v. Happy Jacks Supper Club, 425 N.W.2d 385 (S.D.1988) (Miller, J., concurring specially); see also Wang v. Wang, 393 N.W.2d 771 (S.D.1986); Runge v. Prairie States Life Ins. of Sioux Falls, 393 N.W.2d 538 (S.D.1986); Kappenman v. Action, Inc., 392 N.W.2d 410 (S.D. 1986).

1987In State v. Brewer, 86 S.D. 434 , 197 N.W.2d 409 (S.D.1972), we held that the pattern jury instruction dealing with the definition of “beyond a reasonable doubt” need not require that the jury be convinced of defendant’s guilt “beyond a moral certainty.” We are equally persuaded at this time that the jury need not be instructed that to warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence the circumstances must point to a “moral certainty” that the accused committed the crime.

1987In State v. Brewer, 86 S.D. 434 , 197 N.W.2d 409 (S.D.1972), we held that the pattern jury instruction dealing with the definition of “beyond a reasonable doubt” need not require that the jury be convinced of defendant’s guilt “beyond a moral certainty.” We are equally persuaded at this time that the jury need not be instructed that to warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence the circumstances must point to a “moral certainty” that the accused committed the crime.

1987The foregoing language had previously been specifically cited with approval by this court in Luna, supra. The current pattern jury instruction, as the result of the 1985-86 revision, reads in its entirety as follows: Direct evidence means evidence that directly proves a fact, without an inference, and which in itself, if true establishes that fact.

1975Although the unexplained possession of recently stolen property is a sufficient circumstance upon which to base a conviction, see State v. Larkin, 87 S.D. 61 , 202 N.W.2d 862 , and cases cited therein, it is the element of recency that gives the circumstance of unexplained possession its probative value and justifies an inference of guilt on the part of the possessor. 50 Am.Jur.2d, Larceny, § 162; State v. Dancyger, 29 N.J. 76 , 148 A.2d 155 .

1975Although the unexplained possession of recently stolen property is a sufficient circumstance upon which to base a conviction, see State v. Larkin, 87 S.D. 61 , 202 N.W.2d 862 , and cases cited therein, it is the element of recency that gives the circumstance of unexplained possession its probative value and justifies an inference of guilt on the part of the possessor. 50 Am.Jur.2d, Larceny, § 162; State v. Dancyger, 29 N.J. 76 , 148 A.2d 155 .

1975Although the unexplained possession of recently stolen property is a sufficient circumstance upon which to base a conviction, see State v. Larkin, 87 S.D. 61 , 202 N.W.2d 862 , and cases cited therein, it is the element of recency that gives the circumstance of unexplained possession its probative value and justifies an inference of guilt on the part of the possessor. 50 Am.Jur.2d, Larceny, § 162; State v. Dancyger, 29 N.J. 76 , 148 A.2d 155 .

1975Although the unexplained possession of recently stolen property is a sufficient circumstance upon which to base a conviction, see State v. Larkin, 87 S.D. 61 , 202 N.W.2d 862 , and cases cited therein, it is the element of recency that gives the circumstance of unexplained possession its probative value and justifies an inference of guilt on the part of the possessor. 50 Am.Jur.2d, Larceny, § 162; State v. Dancyger, 29 N.J. 76 , 148 A.2d 155 .