9 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jones v. Stategreen2 sentences2018In enacting § 12-702(b) in 1973, the Maryland General Assembly "adopted not *560 only the Pearce doctrine but also significant portions of the Pearce language as the statutory policy of Maryland." Jones v. State , 307 Md. 449 , 454, 514 A.2d 1219 , 1222 (1986) ; see also Sweetwine v. State , 288 Md. 199 , 214, 421 A.2d 60 , 68 (1980) ("[ § 12-702(b) ], which incorporates the language of the Pearce opinion almost verbatim, was intended by the General Assembly to codify the Pearce due process holding."). 2018In enacting § 12-702(b) in 1973, the Maryland General Assembly "adopted not *560 only the Pearce doctrine but also significant portions of the Pearce language as the statutory policy of Maryland." Jones v. State , 307 Md. 449 , 454, 514 A.2d 1219 , 1222 (1986) ; see also Sweetwine v. State , 288 Md. 199 , 214, 421 A.2d 60 , 68 (1980) ("[ § 12-702(b) ], which incorporates the language of the Pearce opinion almost verbatim, was intended by the General Assembly to codify the Pearce due process holding."). | 1 | 3 |
Alabama v. Smithgreen2 sentences2016In that circumstance, a more severe sentence will not offend due process unless one of two situations occurs: either the record of the new sentencing hearing demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that an increased sentence was the product of actual vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing authority, or the defendant “prove[s] actual vindictiveness.” Smith, 490 U.S. at 799-800 , 109 S.Ct. 2201 . § 12-702(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article We agree with the State that whatever remains of the Pearce doctrine in Maryland, insofar as it relates to this case, would be found in § 12 2016In that circumstance, a more severe sentence will not offend due process unless one of two situations occurs: either the record of the new sentencing hearing demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that an increased sentence was the product of actual vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing authority, or the defendant “prove[s] actual vindictiveness.” Smith, 490 U.S. at 799-800 , 109 S.Ct. 2201 . § 12-702(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article We agree with the State that whatever remains of the Pearce doctrine in Maryland, insofar as it relates to this case, would be found in § 12 | 1 | 2 |
Nimon v. Stategreen2 sentences2010Maryland’s appellate courts *505 have recognized that C.J. § 12-702(b) was the Legislature’s “response to the due process holding of North Carolina v. Pearce ...” Dixon, 364 Md. at 225-26 , 772 A.2d 283 (citation omitted); see also Coley v. State, 76 Md.App. 731, 735 , 548 A.2d 161 (1988) (recognizing that C.J. § 12-702(b) codifies Pearce and “expands the Pearce doctrine to prohibit a retaliatory increase in sentence where the conviction is upheld on appeal but the sentence is vacated”); Nimon v. State, 71 Md.App. 559 , 526 A.2d 645 (1987); Hill v. State, 64 Md.App. 194, 201 , 494 A.2d 757 , c 2010Maryland’s appellate courts *505 have recognized that C.J. § 12-702(b) was the Legislature’s “response to the due process holding of North Carolina v. Pearce ...” Dixon, 364 Md. at 225-26 , 772 A.2d 283 (citation omitted); see also Coley v. State, 76 Md.App. 731, 735 , 548 A.2d 161 (1988) (recognizing that C.J. § 12-702(b) codifies Pearce and “expands the Pearce doctrine to prohibit a retaliatory increase in sentence where the conviction is upheld on appeal but the sentence is vacated”); Nimon v. State, 71 Md.App. 559 , 526 A.2d 645 (1987); Hill v. State, 64 Md.App. 194, 201 , 494 A.2d 757 , c | 1 | 2 |
Colten v. Kentuckygreen2 sentences1986In Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 , 92 S.Ct. 1953 , 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972), the Supreme Court concluded that, as a matter of due process, the Pearce rule did not apply in a de novo appeal situation. 1986In Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 , 92 S.Ct. 1953 , 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972), the Supreme Court concluded that, as a matter of due process, the Pearce rule did not apply in a de novo appeal situation. | 1 | 2 |
Sweetwine v. Stategreen2 sentences2018In enacting § 12-702(b) in 1973, the Maryland General Assembly "adopted not *560 only the Pearce doctrine but also significant portions of the Pearce language as the statutory policy of Maryland." Jones v. State , 307 Md. 449 , 454, 514 A.2d 1219 , 1222 (1986) ; see also Sweetwine v. State , 288 Md. 199 , 214, 421 A.2d 60 , 68 (1980) ("[ § 12-702(b) ], which incorporates the language of the Pearce opinion almost verbatim, was intended by the General Assembly to codify the Pearce due process holding."). 2018In enacting § 12-702(b) in 1973, the Maryland General Assembly "adopted not *560 only the Pearce doctrine but also significant portions of the Pearce language as the statutory policy of Maryland." Jones v. State , 307 Md. 449 , 454, 514 A.2d 1219 , 1222 (1986) ; see also Sweetwine v. State , 288 Md. 199 , 214, 421 A.2d 60 , 68 (1980) ("[ § 12-702(b) ], which incorporates the language of the Pearce opinion almost verbatim, was intended by the General Assembly to codify the Pearce due process holding."). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Townsend, Derrickgreen2 sentences2016See Fowler, 749 F.3d at 1023 (“[W]e adopt the aggregate package approach endorsed by the majority of our sister circuits, and contemplated by the Supreme Court, for determining whether a sentence imposed under the guidelines has become more severe for purposes of invoking the Pearce presumption.”); Weingarten, 713 F.3d at 714 (“Where one or more of several related counts have been vacated, and the district court on resentencing has increased the sentence on the remaining, related counts to maintain the same aggregate sentence as before, no presumption of vindictiveness applies.”); accord Towns 2016See Fowler, 749 F.3d at 1023 (“[W]e adopt the aggregate package approach endorsed by the majority of our sister circuits, and contemplated by the Supreme Court, for determining whether a sentence imposed under the guidelines has become more severe for purposes of invoking the Pearce presumption.”); Weingarten, 713 F.3d at 714 (“Where one or more of several related counts have been vacated, and the district court on resentencing has increased the sentence on the remaining, related counts to maintain the same aggregate sentence as before, no presumption of vindictiveness applies.”); accord Towns | 1 | 1 |
State of Iowa v. Stevie Dewayne Harringtongreen2 sentences2016See Fowler, 749 F.3d at 1023 (“[W]e adopt the aggregate package approach endorsed by the majority of our sister circuits, and contemplated by the Supreme Court, for determining whether a sentence imposed under the guidelines has become more severe for purposes of invoking the Pearce presumption.”); Weingarten, 713 F.3d at 714 (“Where one or more of several related counts have been vacated, and the district court on resentencing has increased the sentence on the remaining, related counts to maintain the same aggregate sentence as before, no presumption of vindictiveness applies.”); accord Towns 2016See Fowler, 749 F.3d at 1023 (“[W]e adopt the aggregate package approach endorsed by the majority of our sister circuits, and contemplated by the Supreme Court, for determining whether a sentence imposed under the guidelines has become more severe for purposes of invoking the Pearce presumption.”); Weingarten, 713 F.3d at 714 (“Where one or more of several related counts have been vacated, and the district court on resentencing has increased the sentence on the remaining, related counts to maintain the same aggregate sentence as before, no presumption of vindictiveness applies.”); accord Towns | 1 | 1 |
People v. Woellhafgreen2 sentences2016See Fowler, 749 F.3d at 1023 (“[W]e adopt the aggregate package approach endorsed by the majority of our sister circuits, and contemplated by the Supreme Court, for determining whether a sentence imposed under the guidelines has become more severe for purposes of invoking the Pearce presumption.”); Weingarten, 713 F.3d at 714 (“Where one or more of several related counts have been vacated, and the district court on resentencing has increased the sentence on the remaining, related counts to maintain the same aggregate sentence as before, no presumption of vindictiveness applies.”); accord Towns 2016See Fowler, 749 F.3d at 1023 (“[W]e adopt the aggregate package approach endorsed by the majority of our sister circuits, and contemplated by the Supreme Court, for determining whether a sentence imposed under the guidelines has become more severe for purposes of invoking the Pearce presumption.”); Weingarten, 713 F.3d at 714 (“Where one or more of several related counts have been vacated, and the district court on resentencing has increased the sentence on the remaining, related counts to maintain the same aggregate sentence as before, no presumption of vindictiveness applies.”); accord Towns | 1 | 1 |
State v. Larsongreen2 sentences2016See Fowler, 749 F.3d at 1023 (“[W]e adopt the aggregate package approach endorsed by the majority of our sister circuits, and contemplated by the Supreme Court, for determining whether a sentence imposed under the guidelines has become more severe for purposes of invoking the Pearce presumption.”); Weingarten, 713 F.3d at 714 (“Where one or more of several related counts have been vacated, and the district court on resentencing has increased the sentence on the remaining, related counts to maintain the same aggregate sentence as before, no presumption of vindictiveness applies.”); accord Towns 2016See Fowler, 749 F.3d at 1023 (“[W]e adopt the aggregate package approach endorsed by the majority of our sister circuits, and contemplated by the Supreme Court, for determining whether a sentence imposed under the guidelines has become more severe for purposes of invoking the Pearce presumption.”); Weingarten, 713 F.3d at 714 (“Where one or more of several related counts have been vacated, and the district court on resentencing has increased the sentence on the remaining, related counts to maintain the same aggregate sentence as before, no presumption of vindictiveness applies.”); accord Towns | 1 | 1 |
White v. Stategreen2 sentences2016See Fowler, 749 F.3d at 1023 (“[W]e adopt the aggregate package approach endorsed by the majority of our sister circuits, and contemplated by the Supreme Court, for determining whether a sentence imposed under the guidelines has become more severe for purposes of invoking the Pearce presumption.”); Weingarten, 713 F.3d at 714 (“Where one or more of several related counts have been vacated, and the district court on resentencing has increased the sentence on the remaining, related counts to maintain the same aggregate sentence as before, no presumption of vindictiveness applies.”); accord Towns 2016See Fowler, 749 F.3d at 1023 (“[W]e adopt the aggregate package approach endorsed by the majority of our sister circuits, and contemplated by the Supreme Court, for determining whether a sentence imposed under the guidelines has become more severe for purposes of invoking the Pearce presumption.”); Weingarten, 713 F.3d at 714 (“Where one or more of several related counts have been vacated, and the district court on resentencing has increased the sentence on the remaining, related counts to maintain the same aggregate sentence as before, no presumption of vindictiveness applies.”); accord Towns | 1 | 1 |
State v. Keefegreen2 sentences2016See Fowler, 749 F.3d at 1023 (“[W]e adopt the aggregate package approach endorsed by the majority of our sister circuits, and contemplated by the Supreme Court, for determining whether a sentence imposed under the guidelines has become more severe for purposes of invoking the Pearce presumption.”); Weingarten, 713 F.3d at 714 (“Where one or more of several related counts have been vacated, and the district court on resentencing has increased the sentence on the remaining, related counts to maintain the same aggregate sentence as before, no presumption of vindictiveness applies.”); accord Towns 2016See Fowler, 749 F.3d at 1023 (“[W]e adopt the aggregate package approach endorsed by the majority of our sister circuits, and contemplated by the Supreme Court, for determining whether a sentence imposed under the guidelines has become more severe for purposes of invoking the Pearce presumption.”); Weingarten, 713 F.3d at 714 (“Where one or more of several related counts have been vacated, and the district court on resentencing has increased the sentence on the remaining, related counts to maintain the same aggregate sentence as before, no presumption of vindictiveness applies.”); accord Towns | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Weingartengreen2 sentences2016See Fowler, 749 F.3d at 1023 (“[W]e adopt the aggregate package approach endorsed by the majority of our sister circuits, and contemplated by the Supreme Court, for determining whether a sentence imposed under the guidelines has become more severe for purposes of invoking the Pearce presumption.”); Weingarten, 713 F.3d at 714 (“Where one or more of several related counts have been vacated, and the district court on resentencing has increased the sentence on the remaining, related counts to maintain the same aggregate sentence as before, no presumption of vindictiveness applies.”); accord Towns 2016See Fowler, 749 F.3d at 1023 (“[W]e adopt the aggregate package approach endorsed by the majority of our sister circuits, and contemplated by the Supreme Court, for determining whether a sentence imposed under the guidelines has become more severe for purposes of invoking the Pearce presumption.”); Weingarten, 713 F.3d at 714 (“Where one or more of several related counts have been vacated, and the district court on resentencing has increased the sentence on the remaining, related counts to maintain the same aggregate sentence as before, no presumption of vindictiveness applies.”); accord Towns | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Charles Andrew Fowlergreen2 sentences2016See Fowler, 749 F.3d at 1023 (“[W]e adopt the aggregate package approach endorsed by the majority of our sister circuits, and contemplated by the Supreme Court, for determining whether a sentence imposed under the guidelines has become more severe for purposes of invoking the Pearce presumption.”); Weingarten, 713 F.3d at 714 (“Where one or more of several related counts have been vacated, and the district court on resentencing has increased the sentence on the remaining, related counts to maintain the same aggregate sentence as before, no presumption of vindictiveness applies.”); accord Towns 2016See Fowler, 749 F.3d at 1023 (“[W]e adopt the aggregate package approach endorsed by the majority of our sister circuits, and contemplated by the Supreme Court, for determining whether a sentence imposed under the guidelines has become more severe for purposes of invoking the Pearce presumption.”); Weingarten, 713 F.3d at 714 (“Where one or more of several related counts have been vacated, and the district court on resentencing has increased the sentence on the remaining, related counts to maintain the same aggregate sentence as before, no presumption of vindictiveness applies.”); accord Towns | 1 | 1 |
Coley v. Stategreen2 sentences2010Maryland’s appellate courts *505 have recognized that C.J. § 12-702(b) was the Legislature’s “response to the due process holding of North Carolina v. Pearce ...” Dixon, 364 Md. at 225-26 , 772 A.2d 283 (citation omitted); see also Coley v. State, 76 Md.App. 731, 735 , 548 A.2d 161 (1988) (recognizing that C.J. § 12-702(b) codifies Pearce and “expands the Pearce doctrine to prohibit a retaliatory increase in sentence where the conviction is upheld on appeal but the sentence is vacated”); Nimon v. State, 71 Md.App. 559 , 526 A.2d 645 (1987); Hill v. State, 64 Md.App. 194, 201 , 494 A.2d 757 , c 2010Maryland’s appellate courts *505 have recognized that C.J. § 12-702(b) was the Legislature’s “response to the due process holding of North Carolina v. Pearce ...” Dixon, 364 Md. at 225-26 , 772 A.2d 283 (citation omitted); see also Coley v. State, 76 Md.App. 731, 735 , 548 A.2d 161 (1988) (recognizing that C.J. § 12-702(b) codifies Pearce and “expands the Pearce doctrine to prohibit a retaliatory increase in sentence where the conviction is upheld on appeal but the sentence is vacated”); Nimon v. State, 71 Md.App. 559 , 526 A.2d 645 (1987); Hill v. State, 64 Md.App. 194, 201 , 494 A.2d 757 , c | 1 | 1 |
State v. Taylorgreen2 sentences1980Ed. 2d 292 (1976); State v. Taylor, 22 Wash. App. 308 , 589 P.2d 1250, 1254 (1979). 1980Ed. 2d 292 (1976); State v. Taylor, 22 Wash. App. 308 , 589 P.2d 1250, 1254 (1979). | 1 | 1 |
| Johnny R. Martinez v. W. J. Estelle, Jr., Director, Texas Department of Correctionsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hill v. State
neutral
2 sentences2010Maryland’s appellate courts *505 have recognized that C.J. § 12-702(b) was the Legislature’s “response to the due process holding of North Carolina v. Pearce ...” Dixon, 364 Md. at 225-26 , 772 A.2d 283 (citation omitted); see also Coley v. State, 76 Md.App. 731, 735 , 548 A.2d 161 (1988) (recognizing that C.J. § 12-702(b) codifies Pearce and “expands the Pearce doctrine to prohibit a retaliatory increase in sentence where the conviction is upheld on appeal but the sentence is vacated”); Nimon v. State, 71 Md.App. 559 , 526 A.2d 645 (1987); Hill v. State, 64 Md.App. 194, 201 , 494 A.2d 757 , c 2010Maryland’s appellate courts *505 have recognized that C.J. § 12-702(b) was the Legislature’s “response to the due process holding of North Carolina v. Pearce ...” Dixon, 364 Md. at 225-26 , 772 A.2d 283 (citation omitted); see also Coley v. State, 76 Md.App. 731, 735 , 548 A.2d 161 (1988) (recognizing that C.J. § 12-702(b) codifies Pearce and “expands the Pearce doctrine to prohibit a retaliatory increase in sentence where the conviction is upheld on appeal but the sentence is vacated”); Nimon v. State, 71 Md.App. 559 , 526 A.2d 645 (1987); Hill v. State, 64 Md.App. 194, 201 , 494 A.2d 757 , c | 2 | 1988–2010 |
Briggs v. State
green
2 sentences1992Subsequent to the United States Supreme Court decision in Pearce, our court adopted the Pearce standard in Cherry v. State, 9 Md.App. 416, 425 , 264 A.2d 887 , cert. granted, 259 Md. 730 (1970). 5 The Briggs Court pointed out that “[w]ith no decisions of this Court to guide them, the Court of Special Appeals in Cherry v. State, supra, elected to join those courts which had held that the principles announced in Pearce apply with equal force to a trial de novo.” Briggs, 289 Md. at 29 , 421 A.2d 1369 . 6 Shortly thereafter, “the Maryland General Assembly, by its enactment effective July 1, 1972, 1992Subsequent to the United States Supreme Court decision in Pearce, our court adopted the Pearce standard in Cherry v. State, 9 Md.App. 416, 425 , 264 A.2d 887 , cert. granted, 259 Md. 730 (1970). 5 The Briggs Court pointed out that “[w]ith no decisions of this Court to guide them, the Court of Special Appeals in Cherry v. State, supra, elected to join those courts which had held that the principles announced in Pearce apply with equal force to a trial de novo.” Briggs, 289 Md. at 29 , 421 A.2d 1369 . 6 Shortly thereafter, “the Maryland General Assembly, by its enactment effective July 1, 1972, | 2 | 1986–1992 |
United States v. Simon Hawthorne
green
2 sentences2018United States v. Hawthorne , 532 F.2d 318 , 324 (3d Cir. 1976). 2018United States v. Hawthorne , 532 F.2d 318 , 324 (3d Cir. 1976). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
cluster 11348
green
2 sentences2016See Fowler, 749 F.3d at 1023 (“[W]e adopt the aggregate package approach endorsed by the majority of our sister circuits, and contemplated by the Supreme Court, for determining whether a sentence imposed under the guidelines has become more severe for purposes of invoking the Pearce presumption.”); Weingarten, 713 F.3d at 714 (“Where one or more of several related counts have been vacated, and the district court on resentencing has increased the sentence on the remaining, related counts to maintain the same aggregate sentence as before, no presumption of vindictiveness applies.”); accord Towns 2016See Fowler, 749 F.3d at 1023 (“[W]e adopt the aggregate package approach endorsed by the majority of our sister circuits, and contemplated by the Supreme Court, for determining whether a sentence imposed under the guidelines has become more severe for purposes of invoking the Pearce presumption.”); Weingarten, 713 F.3d at 714 (“Where one or more of several related counts have been vacated, and the district court on resentencing has increased the sentence on the remaining, related counts to maintain the same aggregate sentence as before, no presumption of vindictiveness applies.”); accord Towns | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Gardner v. State
green
2 sentences2016Gardner v. State, 420 Md. 1, 14-15 , 20 A.3d 801 (2011). 2016Gardner v. State, 420 Md. 1, 14-15 , 20 A.3d 801 (2011). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
United States v. Norman John Norton
green
2 sentences2016See Fowler, 749 F.3d at 1023 (“[W]e adopt the aggregate package approach endorsed by the majority of our sister circuits, and contemplated by the Supreme Court, for determining whether a sentence imposed under the guidelines has become more severe for purposes of invoking the Pearce presumption.”); Weingarten, 713 F.3d at 714 (“Where one or more of several related counts have been vacated, and the district court on resentencing has increased the sentence on the remaining, related counts to maintain the same aggregate sentence as before, no presumption of vindictiveness applies.”); accord Towns 2016See Fowler, 749 F.3d at 1023 (“[W]e adopt the aggregate package approach endorsed by the majority of our sister circuits, and contemplated by the Supreme Court, for determining whether a sentence imposed under the guidelines has become more severe for purposes of invoking the Pearce presumption.”); Weingarten, 713 F.3d at 714 (“Where one or more of several related counts have been vacated, and the district court on resentencing has increased the sentence on the remaining, related counts to maintain the same aggregate sentence as before, no presumption of vindictiveness applies.”); accord Towns | 1 | 2016–2016 |
United States v. Peter Allen Hagler
green
2 sentences2016See Fowler, 749 F.3d at 1023 (“[W]e adopt the aggregate package approach endorsed by the majority of our sister circuits, and contemplated by the Supreme Court, for determining whether a sentence imposed under the guidelines has become more severe for purposes of invoking the Pearce presumption.”); Weingarten, 713 F.3d at 714 (“Where one or more of several related counts have been vacated, and the district court on resentencing has increased the sentence on the remaining, related counts to maintain the same aggregate sentence as before, no presumption of vindictiveness applies.”); accord Towns 2016See Fowler, 749 F.3d at 1023 (“[W]e adopt the aggregate package approach endorsed by the majority of our sister circuits, and contemplated by the Supreme Court, for determining whether a sentence imposed under the guidelines has become more severe for purposes of invoking the Pearce presumption.”); Weingarten, 713 F.3d at 714 (“Where one or more of several related counts have been vacated, and the district court on resentencing has increased the sentence on the remaining, related counts to maintain the same aggregate sentence as before, no presumption of vindictiveness applies.”); accord Towns | 1 | 2016–2016 |
United States v. Linwood Gray, United States of America v. Harry L. Staley
green
2 sentences2016See Fowler, 749 F.3d at 1023 (“[W]e adopt the aggregate package approach endorsed by the majority of our sister circuits, and contemplated by the Supreme Court, for determining whether a sentence imposed under the guidelines has become more severe for purposes of invoking the Pearce presumption.”); Weingarten, 713 F.3d at 714 (“Where one or more of several related counts have been vacated, and the district court on resentencing has increased the sentence on the remaining, related counts to maintain the same aggregate sentence as before, no presumption of vindictiveness applies.”); accord Towns 2016See Fowler, 749 F.3d at 1023 (“[W]e adopt the aggregate package approach endorsed by the majority of our sister circuits, and contemplated by the Supreme Court, for determining whether a sentence imposed under the guidelines has become more severe for purposes of invoking the Pearce presumption.”); Weingarten, 713 F.3d at 714 (“Where one or more of several related counts have been vacated, and the district court on resentencing has increased the sentence on the remaining, related counts to maintain the same aggregate sentence as before, no presumption of vindictiveness applies.”); accord Towns | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Adams v. State
green
2 sentences2016See Fowler, 749 F.3d at 1023 (“[W]e adopt the aggregate package approach endorsed by the majority of our sister circuits, and contemplated by the Supreme Court, for determining whether a sentence imposed under the guidelines has become more severe for purposes of invoking the Pearce presumption.”); Weingarten, 713 F.3d at 714 (“Where one or more of several related counts have been vacated, and the district court on resentencing has increased the sentence on the remaining, related counts to maintain the same aggregate sentence as before, no presumption of vindictiveness applies.”); accord Towns 2016See Fowler, 749 F.3d at 1023 (“[W]e adopt the aggregate package approach endorsed by the majority of our sister circuits, and contemplated by the Supreme Court, for determining whether a sentence imposed under the guidelines has become more severe for purposes of invoking the Pearce presumption.”); Weingarten, 713 F.3d at 714 (“Where one or more of several related counts have been vacated, and the district court on resentencing has increased the sentence on the remaining, related counts to maintain the same aggregate sentence as before, no presumption of vindictiveness applies.”); accord Towns | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Ronald Kelly v. E. Calvin Neubert, Administrator, and W. Carey Edwards, the Attorney General of the State of New Jersey
green
2 sentences2016See Fowler, 749 F.3d at 1023 (“[W]e adopt the aggregate package approach endorsed by the majority of our sister circuits, and contemplated by the Supreme Court, for determining whether a sentence imposed under the guidelines has become more severe for purposes of invoking the Pearce presumption.”); Weingarten, 713 F.3d at 714 (“Where one or more of several related counts have been vacated, and the district court on resentencing has increased the sentence on the remaining, related counts to maintain the same aggregate sentence as before, no presumption of vindictiveness applies.”); accord Towns 2016See Fowler, 749 F.3d at 1023 (“[W]e adopt the aggregate package approach endorsed by the majority of our sister circuits, and contemplated by the Supreme Court, for determining whether a sentence imposed under the guidelines has become more severe for purposes of invoking the Pearce presumption.”); Weingarten, 713 F.3d at 714 (“Where one or more of several related counts have been vacated, and the district court on resentencing has increased the sentence on the remaining, related counts to maintain the same aggregate sentence as before, no presumption of vindictiveness applies.”); accord Towns | 1 | 2016–2016 |
United States v. Russell Sullivan, United States of America v. Mary Ann Sullivan
green
2 sentences2016See Fowler, 749 F.3d at 1023 (“[W]e adopt the aggregate package approach endorsed by the majority of our sister circuits, and contemplated by the Supreme Court, for determining whether a sentence imposed under the guidelines has become more severe for purposes of invoking the Pearce presumption.”); Weingarten, 713 F.3d at 714 (“Where one or more of several related counts have been vacated, and the district court on resentencing has increased the sentence on the remaining, related counts to maintain the same aggregate sentence as before, no presumption of vindictiveness applies.”); accord Towns 2016See Fowler, 749 F.3d at 1023 (“[W]e adopt the aggregate package approach endorsed by the majority of our sister circuits, and contemplated by the Supreme Court, for determining whether a sentence imposed under the guidelines has become more severe for purposes of invoking the Pearce presumption.”); Weingarten, 713 F.3d at 714 (“Where one or more of several related counts have been vacated, and the district court on resentencing has increased the sentence on the remaining, related counts to maintain the same aggregate sentence as before, no presumption of vindictiveness applies.”); accord Towns | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Wasman v. United States
green
2 sentences2011See Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 , 109 S.Ct. 2201 , 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989); Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134 , 106 S.Ct. 976 , 89 L.Ed.2d 104 (1986); Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559 , 104 S.Ct. 3217 , 82 L.Ed.2d 424 (1984). 2011See Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 , 109 S.Ct. 2201 , 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989); Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134 , 106 S.Ct. 976 , 89 L.Ed.2d 104 (1986); Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559 , 104 S.Ct. 3217 , 82 L.Ed.2d 424 (1984). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Texas v. McCullough
green
2 sentences2011See Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 , 109 S.Ct. 2201 , 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989); Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134 , 106 S.Ct. 976 , 89 L.Ed.2d 104 (1986); Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559 , 104 S.Ct. 3217 , 82 L.Ed.2d 424 (1984). 2011See Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 , 109 S.Ct. 2201 , 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989); Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134 , 106 S.Ct. 976 , 89 L.Ed.2d 104 (1986); Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559 , 104 S.Ct. 3217 , 82 L.Ed.2d 424 (1984). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Dixon v. State
green
2 sentences2010Maryland’s appellate courts *505 have recognized that C.J. § 12-702(b) was the Legislature’s “response to the due process holding of North Carolina v. Pearce ...” Dixon, 364 Md. at 225-26 , 772 A.2d 283 (citation omitted); see also Coley v. State, 76 Md.App. 731, 735 , 548 A.2d 161 (1988) (recognizing that C.J. § 12-702(b) codifies Pearce and “expands the Pearce doctrine to prohibit a retaliatory increase in sentence where the conviction is upheld on appeal but the sentence is vacated”); Nimon v. State, 71 Md.App. 559 , 526 A.2d 645 (1987); Hill v. State, 64 Md.App. 194, 201 , 494 A.2d 757 , c 2010Maryland’s appellate courts *505 have recognized that C.J. § 12-702(b) was the Legislature’s “response to the due process holding of North Carolina v. Pearce ...” Dixon, 364 Md. at 225-26 , 772 A.2d 283 (citation omitted); see also Coley v. State, 76 Md.App. 731, 735 , 548 A.2d 161 (1988) (recognizing that C.J. § 12-702(b) codifies Pearce and “expands the Pearce doctrine to prohibit a retaliatory increase in sentence where the conviction is upheld on appeal but the sentence is vacated”); Nimon v. State, 71 Md.App. 559 , 526 A.2d 645 (1987); Hill v. State, 64 Md.App. 194, 201 , 494 A.2d 757 , c | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Cherry v. State
green
2 sentences1992Subsequent to the United States Supreme Court decision in Pearce, our court adopted the Pearce standard in Cherry v. State, 9 Md.App. 416, 425 , 264 A.2d 887 , cert. granted, 259 Md. 730 (1970). 5 The Briggs Court pointed out that “[w]ith no decisions of this Court to guide them, the Court of Special Appeals in Cherry v. State, supra, elected to join those courts which had held that the principles announced in Pearce apply with equal force to a trial de novo.” Briggs, 289 Md. at 29 , 421 A.2d 1369 . 6 Shortly thereafter, “the Maryland General Assembly, by its enactment effective July 1, 1972, 1992Subsequent to the United States Supreme Court decision in Pearce, our court adopted the Pearce standard in Cherry v. State, 9 Md.App. 416, 425 , 264 A.2d 887 , cert. granted, 259 Md. 730 (1970). 5 The Briggs Court pointed out that “[w]ith no decisions of this Court to guide them, the Court of Special Appeals in Cherry v. State, supra, elected to join those courts which had held that the principles announced in Pearce apply with equal force to a trial de novo.” Briggs, 289 Md. at 29 , 421 A.2d 1369 . 6 Shortly thereafter, “the Maryland General Assembly, by its enactment effective July 1, 1972, | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Owens v. Sigler green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Martinez v. Estelle green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.