6 Missouri opinions name it 1 courts 1977–2005 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Alabama v. Smithgreen2 sentences1999In Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 799 , 109 S.Ct. 2201, 2204 , 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989) (quoting Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, 138 , 106 S.Ct. 976, 979 , 89 L.Ed.2d 104 (1986)), the United States Supreme Court held that the Pearce presumption of vindictiveness “do[es] not apply in every case where a convicted defendant receives a higher sentence on retrial.” The Court stated that “ ‘the evil the [Pearce~[ Court sought to prevent’ was not the imposition of ‘enlarged sentences after a new trial,’ but ‘vindictiveness of a sentencing judge.’ ” Id. (quoting McCullough, 475 U.S. at 138 , 106 S.C 1999In Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 799 , 109 S.Ct. 2201, 2204 , 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989) (quoting Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, 138 , 106 S.Ct. 976, 979 , 89 L.Ed.2d 104 (1986)), the United States Supreme Court held that the Pearce presumption of vindictiveness “do[es] not apply in every case where a convicted defendant receives a higher sentence on retrial.” The Court stated that “ ‘the evil the [Pearce~[ Court sought to prevent’ was not the imposition of ‘enlarged sentences after a new trial,’ but ‘vindictiveness of a sentencing judge.’ ” Id. (quoting McCullough, 475 U.S. at 138 , 106 S.C | 1 | 2 |
North Carolina v. Pearcered2 sentences2005See id. at 725. 2005See id. at 725. | 1 | 1 |
Bolinger v. Stategreen2 sentences1996Bolinger v. State, 703 S.W.2d 25, 27 (Mo.App.1985). 1996Bolinger v. State, 703 S.W.2d 25, 27 (Mo.App.1985). | 1 | 1 |
Michigan v. Paynegreen2 sentences1985Moreover, the fact that the trial judge was the same judge who granted appellant’s relief in his first 27.26 motion, dispels any notion that the sentences imposed could have been based upon “unarticulated resentment at having been reversed on appeal, or his subjective institutional interest in discouraging meritless appeals.” See Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 53 , 93 S.Ct. 1966, 1969 , 36 L.Ed.2d 736, 743 (1973). 1985Moreover, the fact that the trial judge was the same judge who granted appellant’s relief in his first 27.26 motion, dispels any notion that the sentences imposed could have been based upon “unarticulated resentment at having been reversed on appeal, or his subjective institutional interest in discouraging meritless appeals.” See Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 53 , 93 S.Ct. 1966, 1969 , 36 L.Ed.2d 736, 743 (1973). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Johnsongreen2 sentences1977In State v. Johnson, 485 S.W.2d 106, 112-113 (Mo. 1972) it was held that the Pearce rule did not apply when the second increased sentence was imposed by the jury. . 1977In State v. Johnson, 485 S.W.2d 106, 112-113 (Mo. 1972) it was held that the Pearce rule did not apply when the second increased sentence was imposed by the jury. . | 1 | 1 |
Angus J. De Pinto, Cross-Complainant v. Hjalmar B. Landoe, Cross-Defendant, Angus J. De Pinto, Cross-Complainant v. Francis I. Sabo, Cross-Defendantgreen2 sentences1977Baggett v. State, supra, 302 So.2d at 207; Taylor v. United States, supra, 475 F.2d at 1123. 41 Second, after a careful review of this record, there is no unarticulated vindictiveness violative of the Pearce rule in the sentence imposed by the trial court. 1977Baggett v. State, supra, 302 So.2d at 207; Taylor v. United States, supra, 475 F.2d at 1123. 41 Second, after a careful review of this record, there is no unarticulated vindictiveness violative of the Pearce rule in the sentence imposed by the trial court. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Colten v. Kentucky
green
2 sentences1999The Smith Court cited Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 , 92 S.Ct. 1953 , 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972) as an example of a situation in which the Pearce presumption does not apply. 1999The Smith Court cited Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 , 92 S.Ct. 1953 , 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972) as an example of a situation in which the Pearce presumption does not apply. | 2 | 1977–1999 |
Chaffin v. Stynchcombe
green
2 sentences1999The McCullough court refused to apply the Pearce presumption when the trial court had granted the defendant’s motion for a new trial because “ ‘unlike the judge who has been reversed’, the trial judge here ‘had no motivation to engage in self-vindication.’ ” Id. at 139, 106 S.Ct. at 979 (quoting Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 27 , 93 S.Ct. at 1983 ). 1999The McCullough court refused to apply the Pearce presumption when the trial court had granted the defendant’s motion for a new trial because “ ‘unlike the judge who has been reversed’, the trial judge here ‘had no motivation to engage in self-vindication.’ ” Id. at 139, 106 S.Ct. at 979 (quoting Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 27 , 93 S.Ct. at 1983 ). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Texas v. McCullough
green
2 sentences1999In Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 799 , 109 S.Ct. 2201, 2204 , 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989) (quoting Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, 138 , 106 S.Ct. 976, 979 , 89 L.Ed.2d 104 (1986)), the United States Supreme Court held that the Pearce presumption of vindictiveness “do[es] not apply in every case where a convicted defendant receives a higher sentence on retrial.” The Court stated that “ ‘the evil the [Pearce~[ Court sought to prevent’ was not the imposition of ‘enlarged sentences after a new trial,’ but ‘vindictiveness of a sentencing judge.’ ” Id. (quoting McCullough, 475 U.S. at 138 , 106 S.C 1999In Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 799 , 109 S.Ct. 2201, 2204 , 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989) (quoting Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, 138 , 106 S.Ct. 976, 979 , 89 L.Ed.2d 104 (1986)), the United States Supreme Court held that the Pearce presumption of vindictiveness “do[es] not apply in every case where a convicted defendant receives a higher sentence on retrial.” The Court stated that “ ‘the evil the [Pearce~[ Court sought to prevent’ was not the imposition of ‘enlarged sentences after a new trial,’ but ‘vindictiveness of a sentencing judge.’ ” Id. (quoting McCullough, 475 U.S. at 138 , 106 S.C | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Commonwealth v. Pearson
green
2 sentences1977In State v. Johnson, 485 S.W.2d 106, 112-113 (Mo.1972) it was held that the Pearce rule did not apply when the second increased sentence was imposed by the jury. [41] Cf. Commonwealth v. Pearson, 450 Pa. 467 , 303 A.2d 481 (1973). 1977In State v. Johnson, 485 S.W.2d 106, 112-113 (Mo.1972) it was held that the Pearce rule did not apply when the second increased sentence was imposed by the jury. [41] Cf. Commonwealth v. Pearson, 450 Pa. 467 , 303 A.2d 481 (1973). | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.