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5 Kansas opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No positive-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. | ||
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Rinck
green
2 sentences2022The court has applied the presumption of vindictiveness in two cases: State v. Rinck, 260 Kan. 634 , 923 P.2d 67 (1996), and more recently in State v. Brown, 309 Kan. 369, 375 , 435 P.3d 546 (2019). 2022The court has applied the presumption of vindictiveness in two cases: State v. Rinck, 260 Kan. 634 , 923 P.2d 67 (1996), and more recently in State v. Brown, 309 Kan. 369, 375 , 435 P.3d 546 (2019). | 2 | 2003–2022 |
State v. Brown
green
2 sentences2022The court has applied the presumption of vindictiveness in two cases: State v. Rinck, 260 Kan. 634 , 923 P.2d 67 (1996), and more recently in State v. Brown, 309 Kan. 369, 375 , 435 P.3d 546 (2019). 2022The court has applied the presumption of vindictiveness in two cases: State v. Rinck, 260 Kan. 634 , 923 P.2d 67 (1996), and more recently in State v. Brown, 309 Kan. 369, 375 , 435 P.3d 546 (2019). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Alabama v. Smith
green
2 sentences2007Ed. 2d 865 , 109 S. Ct. 2201 [1989], held that the Pearce presumption of vindictiveness does not apply when a sentence imposed after trial is greater than that previously imposed after a guilty plea.). *371 Finding that Pearce was factually distinguishable, the Phillpot court noted that the Kansas inmates were not sentenced to more severe sentences. 2007Ed. 2d 865 , 109 S. Ct. 2201 [1989], held that the Pearce presumption of vindictiveness does not apply when a sentence imposed after trial is greater than that previously imposed after a guilty plea.). *371 Finding that Pearce was factually distinguishable, the Phillpot court noted that the Kansas inmates were not sentenced to more severe sentences. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Phillpot v. Shelton
green
2 sentences2007In addition, postrelease supervision is mandatory and distinct from imprisonment. 19 Kan. 2007In addition, postrelease supervision is mandatory and distinct from imprisonment. 19 Kan. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Chaffin v. Stynchcombe
green
1 sentence1996Ed. 2d 714 , 93 S. Ct. 1977 (1973), the Court rejected the need for the prophylactic Pearce presumption because the Court perceived as “de minimis” the possibility that an increased sentence by a jüiy upbri reconviction after a new trial would be motivated by'vindictivbnéss.' Was-man notes in its ■ consideration of Chaffin th&t not only was the second jury unaware of the prior conviction but in contrast to the judge and the prosecutor in Péarce and Blaekledge; it was unlikely that a jury would consider itself to have á "“personal stake” in'"a prior conviction or a motivation to engage in- self | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Bordenkircher v. Hayes
green
2 sentences1996Ed. 2d 714 , 93 S. Ct. 1977 (1973), the Court rejected the need for the prophylactic Pearce presumption because the Court perceived as “de minimis” the possibility that an increased sentence by a jüiy upbri reconviction after a new trial would be motivated by'vindictivbnéss.' Was-man notes in its ■ consideration of Chaffin th&t not only was the second jury unaware of the prior conviction but in contrast to the judge and the prosecutor in Péarce and Blaekledge; it was unlikely that a jury would consider itself to have á "“personal stake” in'"a prior conviction or a motivation to engage in- self 1996Ed. 2d 714 , 93 S. Ct. 1977 (1973), the Court rejected the need for the prophylactic Pearce presumption because the Court perceived as “de minimis” the possibility that an increased sentence by a jüiy upbri reconviction after a new trial would be motivated by'vindictivbnéss.' Was-man notes in its ■ consideration of Chaffin th&t not only was the second jury unaware of the prior conviction but in contrast to the judge and the prosecutor in Péarce and Blaekledge; it was unlikely that a jury would consider itself to have á "“personal stake” in'"a prior conviction or a motivation to engage in- self | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Wasman v. United States
green
1 sentence1996Ed. 2d 714 , 93 S. Ct. 1977 (1973), the Court rejected the need for the prophylactic Pearce presumption because the Court perceived as “de minimis” the possibility that an increased sentence by a jüiy upbri reconviction after a new trial would be motivated by'vindictivbnéss.' Was-man notes in its ■ consideration of Chaffin th&t not only was the second jury unaware of the prior conviction but in contrast to the judge and the prosecutor in Péarce and Blaekledge; it was unlikely that a jury would consider itself to have á "“personal stake” in'"a prior conviction or a motivation to engage in- self | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Blackledge v. Perry
green
1 sentence1982In Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 , the Pearce principle was extended to prosecutors and the manner in which they conduct their affairs. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.