Pearce presumption in Pennsylvania

2022In Alabama v. Smith, the Supreme Court held that the Pearce presumption “does not apply in every case where a convicted defendant receives a higher sentence on retrial.” 490 U.S. at 799 (cleaned up).

2022In Alabama v. Smith, the Supreme Court held that the Pearce presumption “does not apply in every case where a convicted defendant receives a higher sentence on retrial.” 490 U.S. at 799 (cleaned up).

2022Alternatively, to the extent an explanation is needed to rebut a presumption of vindictiveness, see McCullough, 475 U.S. at 980 (observing that, even where such a presumption applies, a rational explanation stated on the record can overcome it); Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 569-70 (1984) (finding the Pearce presumption applied but the judge’s explanation rebutted it), the Commonwealth expressed at the time of resentencing that it wanted to avoid a result it found unpalatable, namely, that Appellant would be given a sentence significantly lower than that which, in the Commonwealth’s j

2022Alternatively, to the extent an explanation is needed to rebut a presumption of vindictiveness, see McCullough, 475 U.S. at 980 (observing that, even where such a presumption applies, a rational explanation stated on the record can overcome it); Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 569-70 (1984) (finding the Pearce presumption applied but the judge’s explanation rebutted it), the Commonwealth expressed at the time of resentencing that it wanted to avoid a result it found unpalatable, namely, that Appellant would be given a sentence significantly lower than that which, in the Commonwealth’s j

2026Thus, the Court held that the Pearce presumption applies only in “circumstances . . . in which there is a ‘reasonable likelihood’ [. . .] that the increase in sentence is the product of actual vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing authority.” Id. (citing United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 373 , 102 S.Ct. 2485 , 73 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982)).

2026Thus, the Court held that the Pearce presumption applies only in “circumstances . . . in which there is a ‘reasonable likelihood’ [. . .] that the increase in sentence is the product of actual vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing authority.” Id. (citing United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 373 , 102 S.Ct. 2485 , 73 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982)).

2017See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hermankevich, 286 A.2d 644, 646 (Pa. Super. 1971).

2017See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hermankevich, 286 A.2d 644, 646 (Pa. Super. 1971).

2022Stated differently, the lengthier sentence is deemed presumptively unconstitutional in the absence of an on-the- record statement that the increased term of incarceration was the product of “objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding.” Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726 . [J-31-2022] - 16 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions narrowed the reach of Pearce’s presumption of vindictiveness.

2014The Court subsequently refined the Pearce standard: The presumption of vindictiveness "may be overcome only by objective infonnation in the record justifying the increased sentence," Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 374, 102 S.Ct. 2485 , that sheds "new light upon the defendant's life, health, habits, conduct, and mental and moral propensities." Pearce, 395 U.S. at 723 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 .

2022And if we do not know whether Appellant’s vindictiveness claim is valid, see id. (“We are not tasked with assessing the accuracy of [Appellant’s] vindictiveness claim at this juncture.”), it is difficult to discern a basis on which to direct the Superior Court to overlook waiver, see id. (remanding for the Superior Court to consider the merits of Appellant’s Pearce claim). [J-31-2022] [MO: Wecht, J.] - 13 sentence, Appellant declined the opportunity to expand the factual record associated with his resentencing, and the PCRA court determined the new sentence was not motivated by vindictiveness.

2022And if we do not know whether Appellant’s vindictiveness claim is valid, see id. (“We are not tasked with assessing the accuracy of [Appellant’s] vindictiveness claim at this juncture.”), it is difficult to discern a basis on which to direct the Superior Court to overlook waiver, see id. (remanding for the Superior Court to consider the merits of Appellant’s Pearce claim). [J-31-2022] [MO: Wecht, J.] - 13 sentence, Appellant declined the opportunity to expand the factual record associated with his resentencing, and the PCRA court determined the new sentence was not motivated by vindictiveness.

2022And when it does, it acts as a “prophylactic” measure that “forbid[s] . . . the imposition of a greater punishment than was imposed after the first trial, absent specified findings.” Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 115 (1972). [J-31-2022] - 17 This legal paradigm emanates from the protections safeguarded to individuals by the Due Process Clause.

2022And when it does, it acts as a “prophylactic” measure that “forbid[s] . . . the imposition of a greater punishment than was imposed after the first trial, absent specified findings.” Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 115 (1972). [J-31-2022] - 17 This legal paradigm emanates from the protections safeguarded to individuals by the Due Process Clause.

2022Alternatively, to the extent an explanation is needed to rebut a presumption of vindictiveness, see McCullough, 475 U.S. at 980 (observing that, even where such a presumption applies, a rational explanation stated on the record can overcome it); Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 569-70 (1984) (finding the Pearce presumption applied but the judge’s explanation rebutted it), the Commonwealth expressed at the time of resentencing that it wanted to avoid a result it found unpalatable, namely, that Appellant would be given a sentence significantly lower than that which, in the Commonwealth’s j

2022Alternatively, to the extent an explanation is needed to rebut a presumption of vindictiveness, see McCullough, 475 U.S. at 980 (observing that, even where such a presumption applies, a rational explanation stated on the record can overcome it); Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 569-70 (1984) (finding the Pearce presumption applied but the judge’s explanation rebutted it), the Commonwealth expressed at the time of resentencing that it wanted to avoid a result it found unpalatable, namely, that Appellant would be given a sentence significantly lower than that which, in the Commonwealth’s j

2018Commonwealth v. Tapp, 997 A.2d 1201, 1205 (Pa. Super. 2010); Tex. v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, 140 (1986) (no presumption of vindictiveness where different judge imposed original sentence and judge on resentencing provided non-vindictive reasons on the record for the increased sentence).

2018Commonwealth v. Tapp, 997 A.2d 1201, 1205 (Pa. Super. 2010); Tex. v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, 140 (1986) (no presumption of vindictiveness where different judge imposed original sentence and judge on resentencing provided non-vindictive reasons on the record for the increased sentence).

2018Subsequently, the Pearce presumption has been limited to instances in which there is a “reasonable likelihood” that the increased sentence was “the product of actual vindictiveness.” Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 799 (1989); Speight, 854 A.2d at 455 (“The inquiry is whether there is a reasonable danger a state may have retaliated against the accused for exercising a legal right”).

2018Subsequently, the Pearce presumption has been limited to instances in which there is a “reasonable likelihood” that the increased sentence was “the product of actual vindictiveness.” Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 799 (1989); Speight, 854 A.2d at 455 (“The inquiry is whether there is a reasonable danger a state may have retaliated against the accused for exercising a legal right”).

2015See Commonwealth v. Jones, 554 A.2d 50, 52 (Pa. 1989); Commonwealth v. Greer, 554 A.2d 980, 987 (Pa. Super. 1989). - 13 - J-A24039-15 The holding of Pearce was subsequently modified by Smith, in which the Court held that the Pearce presumption should be applied only if there is a “reasonable likelihood ... that the increase in sentence is the product of actual vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing authority.” Smith, 490 U.S. at 799 .

2015See Commonwealth v. Jones, 554 A.2d 50, 52 (Pa. 1989); Commonwealth v. Greer, 554 A.2d 980, 987 (Pa. Super. 1989). - 13 - J-A24039-15 The holding of Pearce was subsequently modified by Smith, in which the Court held that the Pearce presumption should be applied only if there is a “reasonable likelihood ... that the increase in sentence is the product of actual vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing authority.” Smith, 490 U.S. at 799 .

2015See Commonwealth v. Jones, 554 A.2d 50, 52 (Pa. 1989); Commonwealth v. Greer, 554 A.2d 980, 987 (Pa. Super. 1989). - 13 - J-A24039-15 The holding of Pearce was subsequently modified by Smith, in which the Court held that the Pearce presumption should be applied only if there is a “reasonable likelihood ... that the increase in sentence is the product of actual vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing authority.” Smith, 490 U.S. at 799 .

2015See Commonwealth v. Jones, 554 A.2d 50, 52 (Pa. 1989); Commonwealth v. Greer, 554 A.2d 980, 987 (Pa. Super. 1989). - 13 - J-A24039-15 The holding of Pearce was subsequently modified by Smith, in which the Court held that the Pearce presumption should be applied only if there is a “reasonable likelihood ... that the increase in sentence is the product of actual vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing authority.” Smith, 490 U.S. at 799 .

2007Commonwealth v. Edmondson, 553 Pa. 160 , 718 A.2d 751, 753 (1998). .We respectfully urge our Supreme Court to provide further guidance on this complex and recurring issue. .The Serrano Court expanded the Pearce rule.

2007Commonwealth v. Edmondson, 553 Pa. 160 , 718 A.2d 751, 753 (1998). .We respectfully urge our Supreme Court to provide further guidance on this complex and recurring issue. .The Serrano Court expanded the Pearce rule.

2007See United States v. Murray, 144 F.3d 270, 275 (3d Cir.1998) (rejecting a due process claim based on Pearce because the appellant’s new federal sentence, to life imprisonment, did not exceed the total length of his original sentence and there was no evidence of judicial vindictiveness); Kelly v. Neubert, 898 F.2d 15 (3d Cir.1990) (rejecting a Pearce challenge to a sentence imposed by a New Jersey state court, which, following the vacation of two of the defendant’s convictions, had re-sentenced him to a lesser total aggregate sentence than originally imposed, but had increased the sentences on

2007See United States v. Murray, 144 F.3d 270, 275 (3d Cir.1998) (rejecting a due process claim based on Pearce because the appellant’s new federal sentence, to life imprisonment, did not exceed the total length of his original sentence and there was no evidence of judicial vindictiveness); Kelly v. Neubert, 898 F.2d 15 (3d Cir.1990) (rejecting a Pearce challenge to a sentence imposed by a New Jersey state court, which, following the vacation of two of the defendant’s convictions, had re-sentenced him to a lesser total aggregate sentence than originally imposed, but had increased the sentences on

2004Commonwealth v. Grispino, 361 Pa.Super. 107 , 521 A.2d 950, 952 (1987), and Commonwealth v. Broadie, 339 Pa.Super. 394 , 489 A.2d 218, 220-21 (1985), held that an increased sentence resulting from a Commonwealth appeal or motion to modify sentence does not violate double jeopardy principles.

2004Commonwealth v. Grispino, 361 Pa.Super. 107 , 521 A.2d 950, 952 (1987), and Commonwealth v. Broadie, 339 Pa.Super. 394 , 489 A.2d 218, 220-21 (1985), held that an increased sentence resulting from a Commonwealth appeal or motion to modify sentence does not violate double jeopardy principles.

2004Commonwealth v. Grispino, 361 Pa.Super. 107 , 521 A.2d 950, 952 (1987), and Commonwealth v. Broadie, 339 Pa.Super. 394 , 489 A.2d 218, 220-21 (1985), held that an increased sentence resulting from a Commonwealth appeal or motion to modify sentence does not violate double jeopardy principles.

2004Commonwealth v. Grispino, 361 Pa.Super. 107 , 521 A.2d 950, 952 (1987), and Commonwealth v. Broadie, 339 Pa.Super. 394 , 489 A.2d 218, 220-21 (1985), held that an increased sentence resulting from a Commonwealth appeal or motion to modify sentence does not violate double jeopardy principles.

2004See Martorano, 535 Pa. at 196-97 , 634 A.2d at 1071-72 (explaining Pearce presumption inapplicable where (1) second jury imposes harsher punishment than prior jury, second jury has no motivation to engage in “self-vindication;” (2) sentences imposed by different sentencers, or (3) new trial not result of error by court); Sattazahn, 563 Pa. 533, 550-51 , 763 A.2d at 368-69 (reaffirming Martorano).

2004See Martorano, 535 Pa. at 196-97 , 634 A.2d at 1071-72 (explaining Pearce presumption inapplicable where (1) second jury imposes harsher punishment than prior jury, second jury has no motivation to engage in “self-vindication;” (2) sentences imposed by different sentencers, or (3) new trial not result of error by court); Sattazahn, 563 Pa. 533, 550-51 , 763 A.2d at 368-69 (reaffirming Martorano).

2004See Martorano, 535 Pa. at 196-97 , 634 A.2d at 1071-72 (explaining Pearce presumption inapplicable where (1) second jury imposes harsher punishment than prior jury, second jury has no motivation to engage in “self-vindication;” (2) sentences imposed by different sentencers, or (3) new trial not result of error by court); Sattazahn, 563 Pa. 533, 550-51 , 763 A.2d at 368-69 (reaffirming Martorano).

1976See Thurman v. United States, 423 F.2d 988 (9th Cir. 1970).” United States v. Clutterbuck, supra at 840. 4 Likewise, in the instant appeal, North Carolina v. Pearce, supra, does not compel us to accept the appellant’s contention.

1976See Thurman v. United States, 423 F.2d 988 (9th Cir. 1970).” United States v. Clutterbuck, supra at 840. 4 Likewise, in the instant appeal, North Carolina v. Pearce, supra, does not compel us to accept the appellant’s contention.