6 New York opinions name it 2 courts 1977–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Van Peltgreen2 sentences2015This Court adopted the Pearce presumption in cases where a defendant is successful on appeal and after a retrial receives a much greater sentence than his original one (see People v Van Pelt, 76 NY2d 156 [1990]). 2015This Court adopted the Pearce presumption in cases where a defendant is successful on appeal and after a retrial receives a much greater sentence than his original one (see People v Van Pelt, 76 NY2d 156 [1990]). | 1 | 3 |
Wasman v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1987In such a case, where the presumption is inapplicable, the defendant has the burden of proving actual vindictiveness upon resentencing (see, Texas v McCullough, supra, at —, at 980; Wasman v United States, supra at 569). 1987In such a case, where the presumption is inapplicable, the defendant has the burden of proving actual vindictiveness upon resentencing (see, Texas v McCullough, supra, at —, at 980; Wasman v United States, supra at 569). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Texas v. McCullough
green
2 sentences1999Under Federal constitutional law, that alone would be fatal to defendant’s claim, because the Pearce presumption does not apply where a different Judge imposes the longer sentence (see, Texas v McCullough, supra, 475 US 134 ; Chaffin v Stynchcombe, 412 US 17 ). 1999Under Federal constitutional law, that alone would be fatal to defendant’s claim, because the Pearce presumption does not apply where a different Judge imposes the longer sentence (see, Texas v McCullough, supra, 475 US 134 ; Chaffin v Stynchcombe, 412 US 17 ). | 3 | 1987–1999 |
People v. Young
green
2 sentences2023As a matter of State constitutional law, however, that 'a different Judge imposes the second sentence is but a factor to be weighed with others in assaying whether the presumption has been overcome'" ( People v Young , 94 NY2d at 178 , quoting People v Van Pelt , 76 NY2d 156, 161 [citation omitted]). 2023As a matter of State constitutional law, however, that 'a different Judge imposes the second sentence is but a factor to be weighed with others in assaying whether the presumption has been overcome'" ( People v Young , 94 NY2d at 178 , quoting People v Van Pelt , 76 NY2d 156, 161 [citation omitted]). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Chaffin v. Stynchcombe
green
2 sentences1999Under Federal constitutional law, that alone would be fatal to defendant’s claim, because the Pearce presumption does not apply where a different Judge imposes the longer sentence (see, Texas v McCullough, supra, 475 US 134 ; Chaffin v Stynchcombe, 412 US 17 ). 1999Under Federal constitutional law, that alone would be fatal to defendant’s claim, because the Pearce presumption does not apply where a different Judge imposes the longer sentence (see, Texas v McCullough, supra, 475 US 134 ; Chaffin v Stynchcombe, 412 US 17 ). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Miller v. Elrod
green
2 sentences1990In People v Miller (65 NY2d 502, cert denied 474 US 951 ), we applied the Pearce rule in a somewhat different procedural setting. 1990In People v Miller (65 NY2d 502, cert denied 474 US 951 ), we applied the Pearce rule in a somewhat different procedural setting. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
People v. P. J. Video, Inc.
green
2 sentences1990Video, 68 NY2d 296, 303 ). 1990Video, 68 NY2d 296, 303 ). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
People v. Richardson
neutral
2 sentences1977(See People v Richardson, 51 AD2d 462, 465 .) However, the trial court appears to have concluded that the sentence of Cwikla on the burglary charge at the first trial was merely incidental to the sentence of 15 years to life Cwikla received on the murder charge, and, therefore, that at the end of the second trial it had the right to disregard the limits of the sentence imposed for burglary at the first trial and impose a sentence for that crime which matched the totality of the circumstances of the case. 1977(See People v Richardson, 51 AD2d 462, 465 .) However, the trial court appears to have concluded that the sentence of Cwikla on the burglary charge at the first trial was merely incidental to the sentence of 15 years to life Cwikla received on the murder charge, and, therefore, that at the end of the second trial it had the right to disregard the limits of the sentence imposed for burglary at the first trial and impose a sentence for that crime which matched the totality of the circumstances of the case. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
North Carolina v. Pearce
red
2 sentences1977As the Supreme Court declared: "Due process of the law * * * requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial.” (North Carolina v Pearce, 395 US 711, 725 , supra.) If we were to find this sentence valid, we would be, in effect, penalizing the defendant for interposing a successful defense to the charge of murder, after a successful appeal. 1977As the Supreme Court declared: "Due process of the law * * * requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial.” (North Carolina v Pearce, 395 US 711, 725 , supra.) If we were to find this sentence valid, we would be, in effect, penalizing the defendant for interposing a successful defense to the charge of murder, after a successful appeal. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.