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7 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Alabama v. Smithgreen2 sentences2023This argument fails because the Supreme Court has since restricted the Pearce presumption of judicial vindictiveness to only those cases in which “there is a ‘reasonable likelihood’ that the increase in sentence is the product of actual vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing authority.” Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 799 , 109 S. Ct. 2201 , 104 L. 2023This argument fails because the Supreme Court has since restricted the Pearce presumption of judicial vindictiveness to only those cases in which “there is a ‘reasonable likelihood’ that the increase in sentence is the product of actual vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing authority.” Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 799 , 109 S. Ct. 2201 , 104 L. | 1 | 4 |
State v. Browngreen2 sentences2023Ed. 2d 74 (1982) (internal citation omitted); see also Brown, 193 Wn.2d at 288-90 (acknowledging the line of cases limiting the Pearce presumption of 8 No. 84430-0-I/9 vindictiveness). 2023Ed. 2d 74 (1982) (internal citation omitted); see also Brown, 193 Wn.2d at 288-90 (acknowledging the line of cases limiting the Pearce presumption of 8 No. 84430-0-I/9 vindictiveness). | 1 | 1 |
Texas v. McCulloughgreen2 sentences2019See, e.g., *290 McCullough, 475 U.S. 134 , 106 S.Ct. 976 , 89 L.Ed.2d 104 (holding the presumption does not apply where retrial that resulted in the harsher sentence was initiated because the trial judge herself concluded a new trial was warranted based on prosecutorial misconduct); Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 , 93 S.Ct. 1977 , 36 L.Ed.2d 714 (1973) ( Pearce presumption does not apply when new jury at retrial imposes a harsher penalty than the original jury); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 , 92 S.Ct. 1953 , 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972) (presumption does not apply where de novo trial in gene 2019See, e.g., *290 McCullough, 475 U.S. 134 , 106 S.Ct. 976 , 89 L.Ed.2d 104 (holding the presumption does not apply where retrial that resulted in the harsher sentence was initiated because the trial judge herself concluded a new trial was warranted based on prosecutorial misconduct); Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 , 93 S.Ct. 1977 , 36 L.Ed.2d 714 (1973) ( Pearce presumption does not apply when new jury at retrial imposes a harsher penalty than the original jury); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 , 92 S.Ct. 1953 , 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972) (presumption does not apply where de novo trial in gene | 1 | 1 |
cluster 11348green1 sentence2014App. 323, 328 , 783 P.2d 1093 (1989) (no Pearce presumption arose where "revised aggregate sentence is less severe than [defendant's] original aggregate sentence" and revised sentence "is fully explained by the trial court's original sentencing intent"); United States v. Campbell, 106 F.3d 64, 69 (5th Cir. 1997) (no presumption of vindictiveness arose where defendant's original sentence was 51 months and sentence following appeal was 40 months); United States v. Bay, 820 F.2d 1511, 1514 (9th Cir. 1987) (no presumption of vindictiveness where total sentence reduced). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Thaeeb Baygreen1 sentence2014App. 323, 328 , 783 P.2d 1093 (1989) (no Pearce presumption arose where "revised aggregate sentence is less severe than [defendant's] original aggregate sentence" and revised sentence "is fully explained by the trial court's original sentencing intent"); United States v. Campbell, 106 F.3d 64, 69 (5th Cir. 1997) (no presumption of vindictiveness arose where defendant's original sentence was 51 months and sentence following appeal was 40 months); United States v. Bay, 820 F.2d 1511, 1514 (9th Cir. 1987) (no presumption of vindictiveness where total sentence reduced). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Garland Claude Cochrangreen2 sentences1989See United States v. Cochran, 883 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1989) (concurrent sentences improperly enhanced to 30 years originally, replaced on remand with unenhanced concurrent and consecutive sentences totaling 25 years); United States v. Pimienta-Redondo, 874 F.2d 9 (1st Cir.) (en banc) (consecutive sentences replaced on remand with doubled single sentences after appellate court ruled that two crimes charged constituted a single offense), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 233 (1989); United States v. Gray, 852 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1988) (25-year aggregate term, including 3- and 5-year concurrent *327 sente 1989See United States v. Cochran, 883 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1989) (concurrent sentences improperly enhanced to 30 years originally, replaced on remand with unenhanced concurrent and consecutive sentences totaling 25 years); United States v. Pimienta-Redondo, 874 F.2d 9 (1st Cir.) (en banc) (consecutive sentences replaced on remand with doubled single sentences after appellate court ruled that two crimes charged constituted a single offense), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 233 (1989); United States v. Gray, 852 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1988) (25-year aggregate term, including 3- and 5-year concurrent *327 sente | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Ameline
green
2 sentences2019The defendant raised a presumption of vindictiveness argument, and the Court of Appeals rejected it, stating the "revised aggregate sentence [was] less severe than his original aggregate sentence." Id. at 328 , 783 P.2d 1093 . ¶27 Similarly, Division Two, in State v. Ameline, addressed the Pearce presumption. 118 Wash. App. 128 , 75 P.3d 589 (2003). 2019The defendant raised a presumption of vindictiveness argument, and the Court of Appeals rejected it, stating the "revised aggregate sentence [was] less severe than his original aggregate sentence." Id. at 328 , 783 P.2d 1093 . ¶27 Similarly, Division Two, in State v. Ameline, addressed the Pearce presumption. 118 Wash. App. 128 , 75 P.3d 589 (2003). | 4 | 2004–2019 |
Chaffin v. Stynchcombe
green
2 sentences2019See, e.g., *290 McCullough, 475 U.S. 134 , 106 S.Ct. 976 , 89 L.Ed.2d 104 (holding the presumption does not apply where retrial that resulted in the harsher sentence was initiated because the trial judge herself concluded a new trial was warranted based on prosecutorial misconduct); Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 , 93 S.Ct. 1977 , 36 L.Ed.2d 714 (1973) ( Pearce presumption does not apply when new jury at retrial imposes a harsher penalty than the original jury); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 , 92 S.Ct. 1953 , 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972) (presumption does not apply where de novo trial in gene 2019See, e.g., *290 McCullough, 475 U.S. 134 , 106 S.Ct. 976 , 89 L.Ed.2d 104 (holding the presumption does not apply where retrial that resulted in the harsher sentence was initiated because the trial judge herself concluded a new trial was warranted based on prosecutorial misconduct); Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 , 93 S.Ct. 1977 , 36 L.Ed.2d 714 (1973) ( Pearce presumption does not apply when new jury at retrial imposes a harsher penalty than the original jury); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 , 92 S.Ct. 1953 , 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972) (presumption does not apply where de novo trial in gene | 3 | 2004–2019 |
State v. Larson
green
2 sentences2019The defendant raised a presumption of vindictiveness argument, and the Court of Appeals rejected it, stating the "revised aggregate sentence [was] less severe than his original aggregate sentence." Id. at 328 , 783 P.2d 1093 . ¶27 Similarly, Division Two, in State v. Ameline, addressed the Pearce presumption. 118 Wash. App. 128 , 75 P.3d 589 (2003). 2019The defendant raised a presumption of vindictiveness argument, and the Court of Appeals rejected it, stating the "revised aggregate sentence [was] less severe than his original aggregate sentence." Id. at 328 , 783 P.2d 1093 . ¶27 Similarly, Division Two, in State v. Ameline, addressed the Pearce presumption. 118 Wash. App. 128 , 75 P.3d 589 (2003). | 3 | 2014–2019 |
Blackledge v. Perry
green
2 sentences2019Id. at 28-29 , 94 S.Ct. 2098 . ¶30 The Pearce presumption does not apply to all cases where a prosecutor brings more serious charges. 2019Id. at 28-29 , 94 S.Ct. 2098 . ¶30 The Pearce presumption does not apply to all cases where a prosecutor brings more serious charges. | 2 | 2018–2019 |
State v. Ameline
green
2 sentences2019The defendant raised a presumption of vindictiveness argument, and the Court of Appeals rejected it, stating the "revised aggregate sentence [was] less severe than his original aggregate sentence." Id. at 328 , 783 P.2d 1093 . ¶27 Similarly, Division Two, in State v. Ameline, addressed the Pearce presumption. 118 Wash. App. 128 , 75 P.3d 589 (2003). 2019The defendant raised a presumption of vindictiveness argument, and the Court of Appeals rejected it, stating the "revised aggregate sentence [was] less severe than his original aggregate sentence." Id. at 328 , 783 P.2d 1093 . ¶27 Similarly, Division Two, in State v. Ameline, addressed the Pearce presumption. 118 Wash. App. 128 , 75 P.3d 589 (2003). | 2 | 2004–2019 |
United States v. Goodwin
green
2 sentences2023Ed. 2d 865 (1989) (quoting U.S. v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 373 , 102 S. Ct. 2485 , 73 L. 2023Ed. 2d 865 (1989) (quoting U.S. v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 373 , 102 S. Ct. 2485 , 73 L. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
United States v. James R. Monaco and Eugene O. Hicks
green
2 sentences2019Id. 2019Id. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Colten v. Kentucky
green
2 sentences2019See, e.g., *290 McCullough, 475 U.S. 134 , 106 S.Ct. 976 , 89 L.Ed.2d 104 (holding the presumption does not apply where retrial that resulted in the harsher sentence was initiated because the trial judge herself concluded a new trial was warranted based on prosecutorial misconduct); Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 , 93 S.Ct. 1977 , 36 L.Ed.2d 714 (1973) ( Pearce presumption does not apply when new jury at retrial imposes a harsher penalty than the original jury); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 , 92 S.Ct. 1953 , 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972) (presumption does not apply where de novo trial in gene 2019See, e.g., *290 McCullough, 475 U.S. 134 , 106 S.Ct. 976 , 89 L.Ed.2d 104 (holding the presumption does not apply where retrial that resulted in the harsher sentence was initiated because the trial judge herself concluded a new trial was warranted based on prosecutorial misconduct); Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 , 93 S.Ct. 1977 , 36 L.Ed.2d 714 (1973) ( Pearce presumption does not apply when new jury at retrial imposes a harsher penalty than the original jury); Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 , 92 S.Ct. 1953 , 32 L.Ed.2d 584 (1972) (presumption does not apply where de novo trial in gene | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Jonah P. Anders, and All Others Similarly Situated v. Hometown Mortgage Services, Inc., Mortgage Brokers Group of Tuscaloosa
green
2 sentences2019"Because Monaco arose and was decided before the sentencing guidelines existed, it could not, and did not purport to, decide what approach should be used to determine when the Pearce *293 presumption applies to a new sentence imposed under the guidelines regime." Id. ¶26 Our court has never considered which approach to adopt in determining a Pearce presumption of vindictiveness. 2019"Because Monaco arose and was decided before the sentencing guidelines existed, it could not, and did not purport to, decide what approach should be used to determine when the Pearce *293 presumption applies to a new sentence imposed under the guidelines regime." Id. ¶26 Our court has never considered which approach to adopt in determining a Pearce presumption of vindictiveness. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Bordenkircher v. Hayes
green
2 sentences2019In Bordenkircher v. Hayes, the Supreme Court determined that the presumption does not apply in the pretrial context during plea negotiations when the prosecution threatens and executes additional charges when plea negotiations do *971 not result in a guilty plea. 434 U.S. 357 , 98 S.Ct. 663 , 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978). 2019In Bordenkircher v. Hayes, the Supreme Court determined that the presumption does not apply in the pretrial context during plea negotiations when the prosecution threatens and executes additional charges when plea negotiations do *971 not result in a guilty plea. 434 U.S. 357 , 98 S.Ct. 663 , 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Tili
green
2 sentences2018The United States Supreme Court has extended the Pearce presumption to review of prosecutorial conduct directed against a defendant who has 79 id. 17 No. 75458-1-1/18 exercised his right to challenge his conviction.80 It has concluded that such a defendant "convicted of an offense is entitled to pursue his statutory right to a trial de novo, without apprehension that the State will retaliate by substituting a more serious charge for the original one, thus subjecting him to a significantly increased potential period of incarceration "81 The supreme court has further explained that a prosecutori 2018The United States Supreme Court has extended the Pearce presumption to review of prosecutorial conduct directed against a defendant who has 79 id. 17 No. 75458-1-1/18 exercised his right to challenge his conviction.80 It has concluded that such a defendant "convicted of an offense is entitled to pursue his statutory right to a trial de novo, without apprehension that the State will retaliate by substituting a more serious charge for the original one, thus subjecting him to a significantly increased potential period of incarceration "81 The supreme court has further explained that a prosecutori | 1 | 2018–2018 |
United States v. David Bentley
green
2 sentences1989See United States v. Cochran, 883 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1989) (concurrent sentences improperly enhanced to 30 years originally, replaced on remand with unenhanced concurrent and consecutive sentences totaling 25 years); United States v. Pimienta-Redondo, 874 F.2d 9 (1st Cir.) (en banc) (consecutive sentences replaced on remand with doubled single sentences after appellate court ruled that two crimes charged constituted a single offense), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 233 (1989); United States v. Gray, 852 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1988) (25-year aggregate term, including 3- and 5-year concurrent *327 sente 1989See United States v. Cochran, 883 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1989) (concurrent sentences improperly enhanced to 30 years originally, replaced on remand with unenhanced concurrent and consecutive sentences totaling 25 years); United States v. Pimienta-Redondo, 874 F.2d 9 (1st Cir.) (en banc) (consecutive sentences replaced on remand with doubled single sentences after appellate court ruled that two crimes charged constituted a single offense), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 233 (1989); United States v. Gray, 852 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1988) (25-year aggregate term, including 3- and 5-year concurrent *327 sente | 1 | 1989–1989 |
United States v. Linwood Gray, United States of America v. Harry L. Staley
green
2 sentences1989See United States v. Cochran, 883 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1989) (concurrent sentences improperly enhanced to 30 years originally, replaced on remand with unenhanced concurrent and consecutive sentences totaling 25 years); United States v. Pimienta-Redondo, 874 F.2d 9 (1st Cir.) (en banc) (consecutive sentences replaced on remand with doubled single sentences after appellate court ruled that two crimes charged constituted a single offense), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 233 (1989); United States v. Gray, 852 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1988) (25-year aggregate term, including 3- and 5-year concurrent *327 sente 1989See United States v. Cochran, 883 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1989) (concurrent sentences improperly enhanced to 30 years originally, replaced on remand with unenhanced concurrent and consecutive sentences totaling 25 years); United States v. Pimienta-Redondo, 874 F.2d 9 (1st Cir.) (en banc) (consecutive sentences replaced on remand with doubled single sentences after appellate court ruled that two crimes charged constituted a single offense), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 233 (1989); United States v. Gray, 852 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1988) (25-year aggregate term, including 3- and 5-year concurrent *327 sente | 1 | 1989–1989 |
United States v. Juan Pimienta-Redondo, United States of America v. Alfredo Pupo
green
2 sentences1989See United States v. Cochran, 883 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1989) (concurrent sentences improperly enhanced to 30 years originally, replaced on remand with unenhanced concurrent and consecutive sentences totaling 25 years); United States v. Pimienta-Redondo, 874 F.2d 9 (1st Cir.) (en banc) (consecutive sentences replaced on remand with doubled single sentences after appellate court ruled that two crimes charged constituted a single offense), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 233 (1989); United States v. Gray, 852 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1988) (25-year aggregate term, including 3- and 5-year concurrent *327 sente 1989See United States v. Cochran, 883 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1989) (concurrent sentences improperly enhanced to 30 years originally, replaced on remand with unenhanced concurrent and consecutive sentences totaling 25 years); United States v. Pimienta-Redondo, 874 F.2d 9 (1st Cir.) (en banc) (consecutive sentences replaced on remand with doubled single sentences after appellate court ruled that two crimes charged constituted a single offense), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 233 (1989); United States v. Gray, 852 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1988) (25-year aggregate term, including 3- and 5-year concurrent *327 sente | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Ferkins v. Scully
green
2 sentences1989See United States v. Cochran, 883 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1989) (concurrent sentences improperly enhanced to 30 years originally, replaced on remand with unenhanced concurrent and consecutive sentences totaling 25 years); United States v. Pimienta-Redondo, 874 F.2d 9 (1st Cir.) (en banc) (consecutive sentences replaced on remand with doubled single sentences after appellate court ruled that two crimes charged constituted a single offense), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 233 (1989); United States v. Gray, 852 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1988) (25-year aggregate term, including 3- and 5-year concurrent *327 sente 1989See United States v. Cochran, 883 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1989) (concurrent sentences improperly enhanced to 30 years originally, replaced on remand with unenhanced concurrent and consecutive sentences totaling 25 years); United States v. Pimienta-Redondo, 874 F.2d 9 (1st Cir.) (en banc) (consecutive sentences replaced on remand with doubled single sentences after appellate court ruled that two crimes charged constituted a single offense), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 233 (1989); United States v. Gray, 852 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1988) (25-year aggregate term, including 3- and 5-year concurrent *327 sente | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Reaves v. Western Union Telegraph Co.
green
2 sentences1989See United States v. Cochran, 883 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1989) (concurrent sentences improperly enhanced to 30 years originally, replaced on remand with unenhanced concurrent and consecutive sentences totaling 25 years); United States v. Pimienta-Redondo, 874 F.2d 9 (1st Cir.) (en banc) (consecutive sentences replaced on remand with doubled single sentences after appellate court ruled that two crimes charged constituted a single offense), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 233 (1989); United States v. Gray, 852 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1988) (25-year aggregate term, including 3- and 5-year concurrent *327 sente 1989See United States v. Cochran, 883 F.2d 1012 (11th Cir. 1989) (concurrent sentences improperly enhanced to 30 years originally, replaced on remand with unenhanced concurrent and consecutive sentences totaling 25 years); United States v. Pimienta-Redondo, 874 F.2d 9 (1st Cir.) (en banc) (consecutive sentences replaced on remand with doubled single sentences after appellate court ruled that two crimes charged constituted a single offense), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 233 (1989); United States v. Gray, 852 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1988) (25-year aggregate term, including 3- and 5-year concurrent *327 sente | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.