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10 Louisiana opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2012 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Louisiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Michael Cataldogreen2 sentences2006United States v. Cataldo, 832 F.2d 869, 875 (5th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1022 , 108 S.Ct. 1577 , 99 L.Ed.2d 892 (1988). 2006United States v. Cataldo, 832 F.2d 869, 875 (5th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1022 , 108 S.Ct. 1577 , 99 L.Ed.2d 892 (1988). | 2 | 3 |
Texas v. McCulloughgreen2 sentences2012However, the enhanced term of 10 years’ imprisonment at hard labor, twice what defendant received before the court adjudicated and sentenced him as a third offender, may implicate Blaclcledge and the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 , 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2080 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), which held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having | ^successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial.” See also Texas v. McCullough, 475 2012However, the enhanced term of 10 years’ imprisonment at hard labor, twice what defendant received before the court adjudicated and sentenced him as a third offender, may implicate Blaclcledge and the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 , 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2080 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), which held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having | ^successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial.” See also Texas v. McCullough, 475 | 1 | 3 |
Alabama v. Smithgreen2 sentences2006Instead, by imposing sentences totaling twenty-two years at hard labor, the trial court was obviously trying to come as close to its original sentencing scheme (a total of twenty-four years at hard labor) as possible.(FN1) 1As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, the Pearce presumption is restricted to circumstances "in which there is a `reasonable likelihood' . . . that the increase in sentence is the product of actual vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing authority." Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 , 109 S.Ct. 2201, 2205 , 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989) (citations omitted). 2006Instead, by imposing sentences totaling twenty-two years at hard labor, the trial court was obviously trying to come as close to its original sentencing scheme (a total of twenty-four years at hard labor) as possible.(FN1) 1As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, the Pearce presumption is restricted to circumstances "in which there is a `reasonable likelihood' . . . that the increase in sentence is the product of actual vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing authority." Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 , 109 S.Ct. 2201, 2205 , 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989) (citations omitted). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Rutledgegreen2 sentences1987Louisiana adopted the Pearce rule in State v. Rutledge, 259 La. 543 , 250 So.2d 734 (1971) and it has been applied to cases where only sentences were vacated for failure to comply with sentencing guidelines or for excessiveness. 1987Louisiana adopted the Pearce rule in State v. Rutledge, 259 La. 543 , 250 So.2d 734 (1971) and it has been applied to cases where only sentences were vacated for failure to comply with sentencing guidelines or for excessiveness. | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Gerald Vontsteen, A/K/A Skip Vontsteengreen2 sentences1990See Vontsteen, 910 F.2d at 192-194 . 1990See Vontsteen, 910 F.2d at 192-194 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jenkinsgreen2 sentences1987State v. Franks, 391 So.2d 1133 (La.1980); State v. Jenkins, 451 So.2d 1142 (La.App. 3d Cir.1984), appeal after remand 468 So.2d 690, 691 (La.App. 3d Cir.1985). 1987State v. Franks, 391 So.2d 1133 (La.1980); State v. Jenkins, 451 So.2d 1142 (La.App. 3d Cir.1984), appeal after remand 468 So.2d 690, 691 (La.App. 3d Cir.1985). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Louisiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
North Carolina v. Pearce
red
2 sentences2012However, the enhanced term of 10 years’ imprisonment at hard labor, twice what defendant received before the court adjudicated and sentenced him as a third offender, may implicate Blaclcledge and the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 , 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2080 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), which held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having | ^successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial.” See also Texas v. McCullough, 475 2012However, the enhanced term of 10 years’ imprisonment at hard labor, twice what defendant received before the court adjudicated and sentenced him as a third offender, may implicate Blaclcledge and the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 , 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2080 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), which held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having | ^successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial.” See also Texas v. McCullough, 475 | 2 | 1989–2012 |
Cataldo v. United States
green
2 sentences2006United States v. Cataldo, 832 F.2d 869, 875 (5th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1022 , 108 S.Ct. 1577 , 99 L.Ed.2d 892 (1988). 2006United States v. Cataldo, 832 F.2d 869, 875 (5th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1022 , 108 S.Ct. 1577 , 99 L.Ed.2d 892 (1988). | 2 | 1991–2006 |
Cataldo v. United States
green
2 sentences2006United States v. Cataldo, 832 F.2d 869, 875 (5th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1022 , 108 S.Ct. 1577 , 99 L.Ed.2d 892 (1988). 2006United States v. Cataldo, 832 F.2d 869, 875 (5th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1022 , 108 S.Ct. 1577 , 99 L.Ed.2d 892 (1988). | 2 | 1991–2006 |
Chaffin v. Stynchcombe
green
2 sentences2012However, the enhanced term of 10 years’ imprisonment at hard labor, twice what defendant received before the court adjudicated and sentenced him as a third offender, may implicate Blaclcledge and the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 , 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2080 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), which held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having | ^successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial.” See also Texas v. McCullough, 475 2012However, the enhanced term of 10 years’ imprisonment at hard labor, twice what defendant received before the court adjudicated and sentenced him as a third offender, may implicate Blaclcledge and the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 , 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2080 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), which held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having | ^successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial.” See also Texas v. McCullough, 475 | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Morgan
neutral
2 sentences2010In State v. Morgan, 08-1299 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/26/09) , 15 So.3d 1026 , the court found that even though the presumption of vindictiveness did not apply because the judge who imposed the greater sentence was not the same one who imposed the original sentence, the defendant may be entitled to relief from the greater sentence if he affirmatively proves actual vindictiveness. 2010In State v. Morgan, 08-1299 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/26/09) , 15 So.3d 1026 , the court found that even though the presumption of vindictiveness did not apply because the judge who imposed the greater sentence was not the same one who imposed the original sentence, the defendant may be entitled to relief from the greater sentence if he affirmatively proves actual vindictiveness. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Bertrand
green
2 sentences2010In State v. Bertrand, 04-1496 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/15/04) , 891 So.2d 752 , this court found no Pearce violation when the same judge imposed a greater sentence on remand because the original sentence was illegally lenient. 2010In State v. Bertrand, 04-1496 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/15/04) , 891 So.2d 752 , this court found no Pearce violation when the same judge imposed a greater sentence on remand because the original sentence was illegally lenient. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Neville
green
2 sentences2009Id., 572 So.2d at 1162-66 . 2009Id., 572 So.2d at 1162-66 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Neville
neutral
2 sentences2009Id., 572 So.2d at 1162-66 . 2009Id., 572 So.2d at 1162-66 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Lucas
green
2 sentences2003State v. Lucas, 598 So.2d 338 (La.1992). 2003State v. Lucas, 598 So.2d 338 (La.1992). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
State Ex Rel. Adams v. Butler
green
2 sentences1990Adams v. Butler, 558 So.2d at 554 . [5] As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, the Pearce presumption is restricted to circumstances "in which there is a `reasonable likelihood' ... that the increase in sentence is the product of actual vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing authority." Alabama v. Smith, 109 S.Ct. at 2205 (citations omitted). 1990Adams v. Butler, 558 So.2d at 554 . [5] As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, the Pearce presumption is restricted to circumstances "in which there is a `reasonable likelihood' ... that the increase in sentence is the product of actual vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing authority." Alabama v. Smith, 109 S.Ct. at 2205 (citations omitted). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Williams v. New York
green
2 sentences1989In Pearce, 89 S.Ct. at 2079 , the court stated: A trial judge is not constitutionally precluded, in other words, from imposing a new sentence, whether greater or lesser than the original sentence, in the light of events subsequent to the first trial that may have thrown new light upon the defendant's "life, health, habits, conduct, and mental and moral propensities." Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 245 , 69 S.Ct. 1079, 1082 , 93 L.Ed. 1337 . 1989In Pearce, 89 S.Ct. at 2079 , the court stated: A trial judge is not constitutionally precluded, in other words, from imposing a new sentence, whether greater or lesser than the original sentence, in the light of events subsequent to the first trial that may have thrown new light upon the defendant's "life, health, habits, conduct, and mental and moral propensities." Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 245 , 69 S.Ct. 1079, 1082 , 93 L.Ed. 1337 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
State v. Franks
green
2 sentences1987State v. Franks, 391 So.2d 1133 (La.1980); State v. Jenkins, 451 So.2d 1142 (La.App. 3d Cir.1984), appeal after remand 468 So.2d 690, 691 (La.App. 3d Cir.1985). 1987State v. Franks, 391 So.2d 1133 (La.1980); State v. Jenkins, 451 So.2d 1142 (La.App. 3d Cir.1984), appeal after remand 468 So.2d 690, 691 (La.App. 3d Cir.1985). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
State v. Jenkins
green
2 sentences1987State v. Franks, 391 So.2d 1133 (La.1980); State v. Jenkins, 451 So.2d 1142 (La.App. 3d Cir.1984), appeal after remand 468 So.2d 690, 691 (La.App. 3d Cir.1985). 1987State v. Franks, 391 So.2d 1133 (La.1980); State v. Jenkins, 451 So.2d 1142 (La.App. 3d Cir.1984), appeal after remand 468 So.2d 690, 691 (La.App. 3d Cir.1985). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.