acknowledged rule in Oregon

2023To the extent defendant’s Eighth Amendment challenge to the sentence is a live dispute, it fails for the same reasons that her Article I, section 16, challenge ultimately fails. 2 In Ryan, 361 Or at 622 , the court acknowledged that the test is inherently difficult to apply: “The fact that a comparison of the gravity of an offense and the severity of its penalty involves factual considerations does not mean that it is unmoored in principle.

2023To the extent defendant’s Eighth Amendment challenge to the sentence is a live dispute, it fails for the same reasons that her Article I, section 16, challenge ultimately fails. 2 In Ryan, 361 Or at 622 , the court acknowledged that the test is inherently difficult to apply: “The fact that a comparison of the gravity of an offense and the severity of its penalty involves factual considerations does not mean that it is unmoored in principle.

2018In analyzing those facts, this court acknowledged the rule of law from Wintzingerode , but drew a distinction between permissible "mere adjuration" and "adjuration accompanied by inducement." Linn, 179 Or. at 510 , 173 P.2d 305 (citations omitted).

2018In analyzing those facts, this court acknowledged the rule of law from Wintzingerode , but drew a distinction between permissible "mere adjuration" and "adjuration accompanied by inducement." Linn, 179 Or. at 510 , 173 P.2d 305 (citations omitted).

2012The employee contended that that provision violated his constitutional right to a jury trial because the overall claim was, in essence, one for damages for personal injuries. 8 The court acknowledged that a claim for personal injuries was “known to the common law” and at common law would have been tried to a jury, but, after observing that workers’ compensation is a creation of the legislature and not the common law, the court concluded that “it should be the nature of the particular issue in the proceeding, rather than that of the entire proceeding, which should dictate whether this issue is

2007The court concluded that it was clear from the relevant statutes — which, it noted, Charles had neglected to consider — that “[t]he legislature did not intend to require a person to retreat before using deadly force to defend against the imminent use of deadly force by another.” Sandoval, 342 Or at 512-14 .

2005The court acknowledged the rule that the court will not infer a contract from legislation if the law “does not unambiguously express an intention to create a contract[.]” Id. at 14 .

2005The court acknowledged the rule that the court will not infer a contract from legislation if the law "does not unambiguously express an intention to create a contract[.]" Id. at 14 , 838 P.2d 1018 .

1999In its decision on plaintiffs motion to recall the mandate, this court acknowledged the rule set out in Compton that interest on a judgment runs only from entry of the modified judgment in the trial court. 260 Or at 608-09 .

1999Id. at 94, 515 P2d at 596 .

1998There, the Court acknowledged that the challenge was based on a "general `fairness' approach." Id. at 565 , 87 S.Ct. 648 .

1998There, the Court acknowledged that the challenge was based on a "general `fairness' approach." Id. at 565 , 87 S.Ct. 648 .