44 California opinions name it 3 courts 1971–2026 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Fukuda v. City of Angelsgreen2 sentences2016(See Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 32 , 44- 45; Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 143-144 .) The trial court acknowledged this rule, but did not acknowledge the further requirement that it indulge a “strong presumption of correctness” with respect to the Commission’s findings, as mandated by Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 808, 817, 819-822 (Fukuda).) In Fukuda, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pages 823-824, a public employer defended its decision to discipline a police officer by contending, among other things, that the burden was on the 2016(See Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 32 , 44- 45; Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 143-144 .) The trial court acknowledged this rule, but did not acknowledge the further requirement that it indulge a “strong presumption of correctness” with respect to the Commission’s findings, as mandated by Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 808, 817, 819-822 (Fukuda).) In Fukuda, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pages 823-824, a public employer defended its decision to discipline a police officer by contending, among other things, that the burden was on the | 3 | 3 |
Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co.green2 sentences1991(See, e.g., Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 263, 269 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 104 , 419 P.2d 168 ].) The court acknowledged this rule, but apparently found it was outweighed by “the general rule that existing and valid statutory provisions enter into and form a part of all policies of insurance to which they are pertinent and applicable as fully as if such provisions were written into said policies[.]” ( 614 S.W.2d at p. 282 .) Since the court cited no Missouri authority in which this “general rule” had been invoked to construe an ambiguous policy term against an insured, it may be doubted 1991(See, e.g., Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 263, 269 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 104 , 419 P.2d 168 ].) The court acknowledged this rule, but apparently found it was outweighed by “the general rule that existing and valid statutory provisions enter into and form a part of all policies of insurance to which they are pertinent and applicable as fully as if such provisions were written into said policies[.]” ( 614 S.W.2d at p. 282 .) Since the court cited no Missouri authority in which this “general rule” had been invoked to construe an ambiguous policy term against an insured, it may be doubted | 2 | 2 |
Bixby v. Piernogreen2 sentences2016(See Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 32 , 44- 45; Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 143-144 .) The trial court acknowledged this rule, but did not acknowledge the further requirement that it indulge a “strong presumption of correctness” with respect to the Commission’s findings, as mandated by Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 808, 817, 819-822 (Fukuda).) In Fukuda, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pages 823-824, a public employer defended its decision to discipline a police officer by contending, among other things, that the burden was on the 2016(See Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 32, 44-45 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 805 , 520 P.2d 29 ]; Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 143-144 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 234 , 481 P.2d 242 ].) The trial court acknowledged this rule, but did not acknowledge the further requirement that it indulge a “strong presumption of correctness” with respect to the Commission’s findings, as mandated by Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 817 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 696 , 977 P.2d 693 ] (Fukuda). | 1 | 3 |
Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn.green2 sentences2016(See Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 32 , 44- 45; Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 143-144 .) The trial court acknowledged this rule, but did not acknowledge the further requirement that it indulge a “strong presumption of correctness” with respect to the Commission’s findings, as mandated by Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 808, 817, 819-822 (Fukuda).) In Fukuda, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pages 823-824, a public employer defended its decision to discipline a police officer by contending, among other things, that the burden was on the 2016(See Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 32, 44-45 [ 112 Cal.Rptr. 805 , 520 P.2d 29 ]; Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 143-144 [ 93 Cal.Rptr. 234 , 481 P.2d 242 ].) The trial court acknowledged this rule, but did not acknowledge the further requirement that it indulge a “strong presumption of correctness” with respect to the Commission’s findings, as mandated by Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 817 [ 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 696 , 977 P.2d 693 ] (Fukuda). | 1 | 3 |
Carroll v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc.green2 sentences2016For the exception to apply, the attorney’s misconduct must be sufficiently gross to effectively abrogate the attorney-client relationship, thereby leaving the client essentially unrepresented at a critical juncture in the litigation.” ( Garcia, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at pp. 682-683; see Carroll v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 892, 898 [ 187 Cal.Rptr. 592 , 654 P.2d 775 ]; Daley v. County of Butte (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 380, 391 [ 38 Cal.Rptr. 693 ].) Minick has not argued the client abandonment exception, in the trial court or on appeal. 5 These cases are in line with other appella 2016For the exception to apply, the attorney’s misconduct must be sufficiently gross to effectively abrogate the attorney-client relationship, thereby leaving the client essentially unrepresented at a critical juncture in the litigation.” ( Garcia, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at pp. 682-683; see Carroll v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 892, 898 [ 187 Cal.Rptr. 592 , 654 P.2d 775 ]; Daley v. County of Butte (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 380, 391 [ 38 Cal.Rptr. 693 ].) Minick has not argued the client abandonment exception, in the trial court or on appeal. 5 These cases are in line with other appella | 1 | 1 |
Huens v. Tatumgreen2 sentences2016For the exception to apply, the attorney’s misconduct must be sufficiently gross to effectively abrogate the attorney-client relationship, thereby leaving the client essentially unrepresented at a critical juncture in the litigation.” ( Garcia, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at pp. 682-683; see Carroll v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 892, 898 [ 187 Cal.Rptr. 592 , 654 P.2d 775 ]; Daley v. County of Butte (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 380, 391 [ 38 Cal.Rptr. 693 ].) Minick has not argued the client abandonment exception, in the trial court or on appeal. 5 These cases are in line with other appella 2016For the exception to apply, the attorney’s misconduct must be sufficiently gross to effectively abrogate the attorney-client relationship, thereby leaving the client essentially unrepresented at a critical juncture in the litigation.” ( Garcia, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at pp. 682-683; see Carroll v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 892, 898 [ 187 Cal.Rptr. 592 , 654 P.2d 775 ]; Daley v. County of Butte (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 380, 391 [ 38 Cal.Rptr. 693 ].) Minick has not argued the client abandonment exception, in the trial court or on appeal. 5 These cases are in line with other appella | 1 | 1 |
English v. Ikon Business Solutions, Inc.green2 sentences2016Inc. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 130, 138-142 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 93 ] (English) (parsing the statutory history and case law interpretation of the mandatory “attorney fault” provision in § 473, subd. (b), which was added by amendment in 1988 as a narrow exception to the broader discretionary relief provision, which in turn has been part of the statute since its enactment in 1851). 4 After explaining that ordinary professional neglect cannot be recognized as excusable, the court acknowledged an exception for circumstances “where the attorney’s neglect, although inexcusable, was so extreme as to constit 2016Inc. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 130, 138-142 [ 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 93 ] (English) (parsing the statutory history and case law interpretation of the mandatory “attorney fault” provision in § 473, subd. (b), which was added by amendment in 1988 as a narrow exception to the broader discretionary relief provision, which in turn has been part of the statute since its enactment in 1851). 4 After explaining that ordinary professional neglect cannot be recognized as excusable, the court acknowledged an exception for circumstances “where the attorney’s neglect, although inexcusable, was so extreme as to constit | 1 | 1 |
Daley v. County of Buttegreen2 sentences2016For the exception to apply, the attorney’s misconduct must be sufficiently gross to effectively abrogate the attorney-client relationship, thereby leaving the client essentially unrepresented at a critical juncture in the litigation.” ( Garcia, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at pp. 682-683; see Carroll v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 892, 898 [ 187 Cal.Rptr. 592 , 654 P.2d 775 ]; Daley v. County of Butte (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 380, 391 [ 38 Cal.Rptr. 693 ].) Minick has not argued the client abandonment exception, in the trial court or on appeal. 5 These cases are in line with other appella 2016For the exception to apply, the attorney’s misconduct must be sufficiently gross to effectively abrogate the attorney-client relationship, thereby leaving the client essentially unrepresented at a critical juncture in the litigation.” ( Garcia, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at pp. 682-683; see Carroll v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 892, 898 [ 187 Cal.Rptr. 592 , 654 P.2d 775 ]; Daley v. County of Butte (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 380, 391 [ 38 Cal.Rptr. 693 ].) Minick has not argued the client abandonment exception, in the trial court or on appeal. 5 These cases are in line with other appella | 1 | 1 |
Brady v. Marylandgreen2 sentences2014Although the trial court acknowledged the privilege that applies to ongoing investigations, it concluded that the defense would have to demonstrate more specificity than the mere fact that ―they were prostitutes killed during the same timeframe.‖ The court also noted the prosecution‘s duty to produce all exculpatory evidence (§ 1054.1, subd. (e); Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83, 87 ; see People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 952-954), and ordered the prosecution to divulge all exculpatory information. 2014Although the trial court acknowledged the privilege that applies to ongoing investigations, it concluded that the defense would have to demonstrate more specificity than the mere fact that “they were prostitutes killed during the same timeframe.” The court also noted the prosecution’s duty to produce all exculpatory evidence (§ 1054.1, subd. (e); Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83, 87 [ 10 L.Ed.2d 215 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 ]; see People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 952-954), and ordered the prosecution to divulge all exculpatory information. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Jenkinsgreen1 sentence2014Although the trial court acknowledged the privilege that applies to ongoing investigations, it concluded that the defense would have to demonstrate more specificity than the mere fact that ―they were prostitutes killed during the same timeframe.‖ The court also noted the prosecution‘s duty to produce all exculpatory evidence (§ 1054.1, subd. (e); Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83, 87 ; see People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 952-954), and ordered the prosecution to divulge all exculpatory information. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Loygreen2 sentences2014(Ibid.) The court acknowledged the principle, asserted by the Attorney General—and by appellant here—that “‘Expert testimony may … be premised on material that is not admitted into evidence so long as it is material of a type that is reasonably relied upon by 11 experts in the particular field in forming their opinions.…’” (Loy, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 68 .) However, the court held that “Faulkner’s testimony regarding the date the samples were collected does not come within this rule” because “when the sample was collected was a simple question of fact that the jury could decide for itself wit 2014(Ibid.) The court acknowledged the principle, asserted by the Attorney General—and by appellant here—that “‘Expert testimony may … be premised on material that is not admitted into evidence so long as it is material of a type that is reasonably relied upon by 11 experts in the particular field in forming their opinions.…’” (Loy, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 68 .) However, the court held that “Faulkner’s testimony regarding the date the samples were collected does not come within this rule” because “when the sample was collected was a simple question of fact that the jury could decide for itself wit | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Lewisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Navarettegreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Wintersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Powers v. City of Richmondgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Moncharsh v. Heily & Blasegreen | 1 | 1 |
| City of San Jose v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Vasquez v. Superior Courtred | 1 | 1 |
| Lambert v. Conradgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. Zerbstgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brookhart v. Janisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Truslow v. Woodruffgreen1 sentence2017This will save the judge the undue amount of time required to locate the earlier filed document in the court file." (Italics omitted.) 11 court"]; but see Truslow v. Woodruff (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 158 , 164–165.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c now expressly contemplates incorporation by reference in summary judgment papers. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.
red
2 sentences2019The court noted that the forum selection clause was not a geographical clause, but was more aptly characterized as "a 'sovereign selection clause.' " ( Id. at p. 564.) Similar to appellant here, the passengers argued that the "new forum-selection clause *221 effectively dictates not only the location where a passenger may sue, but also contractually constrains *681 the 'subject matter jurisdiction' of the available courts within that jurisdiction." ( Ibid. ) The court acknowledged that the clause "disrupt[ed] the participation of this state's 'trial and appellate courts as an otherwise indispe 2019The court noted that the forum selection clause was not a geographical clause, but was more aptly characterized as "a 'sovereign selection clause.' " ( Id. at p. 564.) Similar to appellant here, the passengers argued that the "new forum-selection clause *221 effectively dictates not only the location where a passenger may sue, but also contractually constrains *681 the 'subject matter jurisdiction' of the available courts within that jurisdiction." ( Ibid. ) The court acknowledged that the clause "disrupt[ed] the participation of this state's 'trial and appellate courts as an otherwise indispe | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America
green
2 sentences2018Although the trial court's conclusion was based on Nightingale, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th 99 , 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 149 , and Andre, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th 532 , 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 891 , those cases do not require the result reached by the trial court. 2018Although the trial court's conclusion was based on Nightingale, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th 99 , 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 149 , and Andre, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th 532 , 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 891 , those cases do not require the result reached by the trial court. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Andre v. City of West Sacramento
green
2 sentences2018Although the trial court's conclusion was based on Nightingale, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th 99 , 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 149 , and Andre, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th 532 , 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 891 , those cases do not require the result reached by the trial court. 2018Although the trial court's conclusion was based on Nightingale, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th 99 , 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 149 , and Andre, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th 532 , 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 891 , those cases do not require the result reached by the trial court. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Verdugo v. Target Corp.
green
2 sentences2018In Verdugo , the Supreme Court attempted to discern legislative intent from the scope of the legislation, in this case the statutes governing automated external defibrillators (AED's) for use in a medical emergency. ( Verdugo, supra , 59 Cal.4th at pp. 325-334, 173 Cal.Rptr.3d 662 , 327 P.3d 774 .) The court acknowledged the presumption that a statute does not impliedly supplant the common law. ( Id. at p. 317, 173 Cal.Rptr.3d 662 , 327 P.3d 774 .) The question was whether the statutes were sufficiently comprehensive to evince a legislative intent to occupy the field. 2018In Verdugo , the Supreme Court attempted to discern legislative intent from the scope of the legislation, in this case the statutes governing automated external defibrillators (AED's) for use in a medical emergency. ( Verdugo, supra , 59 Cal.4th at pp. 325-334, 173 Cal.Rptr.3d 662 , 327 P.3d 774 .) The court acknowledged the presumption that a statute does not impliedly supplant the common law. ( Id. at p. 317, 173 Cal.Rptr.3d 662 , 327 P.3d 774 .) The question was whether the statutes were sufficiently comprehensive to evince a legislative intent to occupy the field. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Null v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
green
2 sentences1991(See, e.g., Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 263, 269 [ 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 , 419 P.2d 168 ].) The court acknowledged this rule, but apparently found it was outweighed by "the general rule that existing and valid statutory provisions enter into and form a part of all policies of insurance to which they are pertinent and applicable as fully as if such provisions were written into said policies[.]" ( 614 S.W.2d at p. 282 .) Since the court cited no Missouri authority in which this "general rule" had been invoked to construe an ambiguous policy term against an insured, it may be doubte 1991(See, e.g., Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 263, 269 [ 54 Cal.Rptr. 104 , 419 P.2d 168 ].) The court acknowledged this rule, but apparently found it was outweighed by “the general rule that existing and valid statutory provisions enter into and form a part of all policies of insurance to which they are pertinent and applicable as fully as if such provisions were written into said policies[.]” ( 614 S.W.2d at p. 282 .) Since the court cited no Missouri authority in which this “general rule” had been invoked to construe an ambiguous policy term against an insured, it may be doubted | 2 | 1991–1991 |
Brendan O. v. Merced County Human Services Agency
green
1 sentence2026Indeed, as the court acknowledged at the hearing, “[its] goal was to promote the children’s best interests, which at this point were permanency and stability . . . .” (Mickel O., supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 617 ; see § 388 subd. (a).) The court did just that. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Sacramento County Department of Health & Human Services v. Carrie F.
green
1 sentence2025The court then quoted the following passage from In re A.F. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 283 (A.F.): 21 “‘Jurisdictional findings in a dependency case are prima facie evidence that the children cannot safely remain in the home.’” Relying again on A.F., the court reiterated that it had to find by clear and convincing evidence that there was a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of Nav., Nia., Nolan, and Nori if they were returned to their parents’ custody. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Shiver v. Laramee
green
1 sentence2024(Shiver, supra, 24 Cal.App.5th at p. 397 .) The trial court acknowledged the doctrine rarely applies on summary judgment (id. at p. 397), but granted the motion, noting: “A freeway driver with the right of way is not required to anticipate an act of road rage that unexpectedly causes merging traffic in front of him to come to almost a dead stop.” (Id. at p. 397.) “‘“The general rule is that every person has a right to presume that every other person will perform his duty and obey the law, and in the absence of reasonable ground to think otherwise it is not negligence to assume that he is not e | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Martinez
green
1 sentence2023(People v. Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 957 .) Indeed, that presumption is a crucial underpinning of our constitutional system of trial by jury. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
People v. Carmony
green
1 sentence2022(People v. Superior Court (Du) (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 822, 831 .) As our Supreme Court observed in People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367 , “a trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (Id. at p. 377.) “ ‘[I]t is not enough to show that reasonable people might disagree about whether to strike one or more’ prior conviction allegations.” (Id. at p. 378.) In ruling on the Romero motion, the trial court acknowledged the factors it needed to consider under People v. Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 161 | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Williams
green
1 sentence2022(People v. Superior Court (Du) (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 822, 831 .) As our Supreme Court observed in People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367 , “a trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (Id. at p. 377.) “ ‘[I]t is not enough to show that reasonable people might disagree about whether to strike one or more’ prior conviction allegations.” (Id. at p. 378.) In ruling on the Romero motion, the trial court acknowledged the factors it needed to consider under People v. Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 161 | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Superior Court (Du)
green
1 sentence2022(People v. Superior Court (Du) (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 822, 831 .) As our Supreme Court observed in People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367 , “a trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (Id. at p. 377.) “ ‘[I]t is not enough to show that reasonable people might disagree about whether to strike one or more’ prior conviction allegations.” (Id. at p. 378.) In ruling on the Romero motion, the trial court acknowledged the factors it needed to consider under People v. Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 161 | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Chhoun
green
2 sentences2021Indeed, even [the defendant] acknowledges that, on its face, 3 the instruction is ‘superficially neutral.’” (Ibid.) 3 Despite finding no due process violation, the court acknowledged the instruction’s potential to mislead jurors about the relationship between certainty and accuracy and therefore used its supervisory powers to direct “trial courts to omit the certainty factor from CALCRIM No. 315 until the Judicial Council has the opportunity to consider how the language might be better worded to minimize juror confusion on this point.” (Lemcke, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 669 .) 8 The court also n 2021Specifically, the trial court had instructed the jury that “‘[p]eople sometimes honestly . . . make mistakes about what they remember,’” and that they were responsible for “‘judg[ing] the credibility or believability of the witnesses.’” (Lemcke, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 658 .) Additionally, CALCRIM No. 315 itself emphasizes that “[t]he People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that it was the defendant who committed the crime” and if they “have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty.” (Lemcke, at p. 658.) Based on all of these considerations, the court con | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute
green
2 sentences2019Instead, as the United States Supreme Court explained in Shute , there are "several reasons" for finding such a clause enforceable. ( Shute , supra , 499 U.S. at p. 593 , 111 S.Ct. 1522 .) These include the advantages of dispelling confusion about where suits must be brought and the possibility that "passengers who purchase tickets containing a forum clause ... benefit in the form of reduced fares reflecting the savings that the cruise line enjoys by limiting the fora in which it may be sued. [Citation.]" ( Id. at p. 594, 111 S.Ct. 1522 .) The designation of a federal forum was a matter of con 2019Instead, as the United States Supreme Court explained in Shute , there are "several reasons" for finding such a clause enforceable. ( Shute , supra , 499 U.S. at p. 593 , 111 S.Ct. 1522 .) These include the advantages of dispelling confusion about where suits must be brought and the possibility that "passengers who purchase tickets containing a forum clause ... benefit in the form of reduced fares reflecting the savings that the cruise line enjoys by limiting the fora in which it may be sued. [Citation.]" ( Id. at p. 594, 111 S.Ct. 1522 .) The designation of a federal forum was a matter of con | 1 | 2019–2019 |
National Auto Lenders, Inc. v. Syslocate, Inc.
green
1 sentence2019Instead, as the United States Supreme Court explained in Shute , there are "several reasons" for finding such a clause enforceable. ( Shute , supra , 499 U.S. at p. 593 , 111 S.Ct. 1522 .) These include the advantages of dispelling confusion about where suits must be brought and the possibility that "passengers who purchase tickets containing a forum clause ... benefit in the form of reduced fares reflecting the savings that the cruise line enjoys by limiting the fora in which it may be sued. [Citation.]" ( Id. at p. 594, 111 S.Ct. 1522 .) The designation of a federal forum was a matter of con | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Johnson v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2019The court acknowledged the rule from Responsible Citizens that "mere representation of a partnership does not per se constitute representation of the individual partners" and reviewed the factors enumerated in that case to determine whether the attorney had formed an attorney-client relationship with the limited partners. ( Id. at pp. 476-478, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 312 .) The limited partners alleged that in the course of representing the partnership, *735 the attorney performed services that benefitted the general partner to the detriment of the partnership, which violated the attorney's duty of car 2019The court acknowledged the rule from Responsible Citizens that "mere representation of a partnership does not per se constitute representation of the individual partners" and reviewed the factors enumerated in that case to determine whether the attorney had formed an attorney-client relationship with the limited partners. ( Id. at pp. 476-478, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 312 .) The limited partners alleged that in the course of representing the partnership, *735 the attorney performed services that benefitted the general partner to the detriment of the partnership, which violated the attorney's duty of car | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Action Apartment Ass'n v. City of Santa Monica
green
1 sentence2017(Action Apartment, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 1239-1240.) Although our Supreme Court stated the litigation privilege is broad, the court acknowledged the privilege “is not without limit[s]” and cited claims for malicious prosecution, certain criminal prosecutions and regulatory enforcement proceedings, as examples of actions that are exempt from the litigation privilege. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
NICKOLAS F. v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2016(Nickolas F., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 110 .) As discussed, we reject the Department’s contention that the error made in Kern County was harmless, and conclude that because the notice provisions of section 241.1 and rule 5.512 were not followed, the Imperial County juvenile court was authorized to revisit the section 241.1 assessment to allow the participation of Ray’s dependency counsel. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Carrillo v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| People v. Miller green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| People v. Black green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Patent Scaffolding Co. v. William Simpson Construction Co. green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| City of Oakland v. Schenck green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| People v. Burnett green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Silverhart v. Mount Zion Hospital green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Henrioulle v. Marin Ventures, Inc. green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Remy v. Exley Produce Express, Inc. green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Pazderka v. Caballeros Dimas Alang, Inc. green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| People v. Mazurette green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| City of Burlington v. Dague green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| West v. Superior Court of Sacramento County green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Karin T. v. Michael T. green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Nancy S. v. Michele G. green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Town of Wolfeboro v. Smith green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Frank Casilio & Sons v. Zoning Hearing Board green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Union Quarries, Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Windeler v. Scheers Jewelers green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Crisci v. Security Insurance green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| George v. Beaty green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.