Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
8 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2009 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Heinrich v. Titus-Will Sales, Inc.green2 sentences2004See, e.g., Heinrich v. Titus-Will Sales, Inc., 73 Wash.App. 147, 164-65 , 868 P.2d 169 (1994) (the court acknowledged the principle but did not apply it because the parties did not raise the issue of whether the agent was the sole representative of the principal); Plywood Mktg. 2004App. 147, 164-65 , 868 P.2d 169 (1994) (the court acknowledged the principle but did not apply it because the parties did not raise the issue of whether the agent was the sole representative of the principal); Plywood Mktg. | 1 | 2 |
Wyatt v. Interstate & Ocean Transport Co.green1 sentence1993Va. 1977), the court acknowledged a presumption that arbitration clauses are exclusive of other remedies: "contract grievance procedures including arbitration must, unless specified as nonexclusive, be exhausted before direct legal redress is sought." Wyatt , at 1312. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Northwest Magnesite Co.green2 sentences1984See State v. Northwest Magnesite Co., 28 Wn.2d 1 , 182 P.2d 643 (1947). 1984See State v. Northwest Magnesite Co., 28 Wn.2d 1 , 182 P.2d 643 (1947). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Leschner v. Department of Labor & Industries
green
2 sentences2009Although it is the worker’s responsibility to file an initial claim with the Department, Leschner v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 27 Wn.2d 911 , 185 P.2d 113 (1947), once a claim is made, the worker’s chosen physician becomes an intricate part of the process until the claim is closed. 2009Although it is the worker’s responsibility to file an initial claim with the Department, Leschner v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 27 Wn.2d 911 , 185 P.2d 113 (1947), once a claim is made, the worker’s chosen physician becomes an intricate part of the process until the claim is closed. | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Plywood Marketing Associates v. Astoria Plywood Corp.
green
2 sentences2004Assocs. v. Astoria Plywood Corp., 16 Wash.App. 566, 575 , 558 P.2d 283 (1976) (the court applied the principle but held that the agent was not the sole representative of the principal). 2004Assocs. v. Astoria Plywood Corp., 16 Wn. | 2 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Chandler
neutral
2 sentences2003In reversing the trial court and dismissing the case, the Supreme Court held: “JuCR 7.8(e)(3) has no application here because it only authorizes a trial court to continue the case after it has been set within the time frame set forth in JuCR 7.8(b).” Id. at 490 . 2003In response, the court acknowledged that the hearing date was outside the 60-day period, but the court reasoned that under JuCR 7.8(e)(3), “ ‘[t]he court on its own motion may continue the case when required in the due administration of justice and the alleged juvenile offender will not be substantially prejudiced in the presentation of his or her defense.’ ” Chandler, 143 Wn.2d at 488 (quoting JuCR 7.8(e)(3)). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Old Chief v. United States
green
1 sentence1998Old Chief, 117 S. Ct. at 651 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Beggs v. City of Pasco
green
2 sentences1984For instance, in Beggs v. Pasco, 93 Wn.2d 682 , 611 P.2d 1252 (1980), this court acknowledged that the doctrine of estoppel applied to municipalities and then applied it in what appears to be an affirmative manner. 8 Moreover, many cases mingle promissory estoppel with equitable estoppel. 1984For instance, in Beggs v. Pasco, 93 Wn.2d 682 , 611 P.2d 1252 (1980), this court acknowledged that the doctrine of estoppel applied to municipalities and then applied it in what appears to be an affirmative manner. 8 Moreover, many cases mingle promissory estoppel with equitable estoppel. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.