acknowledged principle in Ohio

2023Cuyahoga No. 111743, 2023-Ohio-222 , to find that there was insufficient evidence to sustain Dunn’s conviction for gross sexual imposition.

2023Conduct of Person Seeking Reinterment {¶ 88} The fourth factor is “the conduct of the person seeking reinterment, especially as it may relate to the circumstances of the original interment.” Frobose, 163 Ohio App.3d 739 , 2005-Ohio-5025 , 840 N.E.2d 249, at ¶ 16 . {¶ 89} In this regard, the court acknowledged the presumption that the decedents would not wish for their remains to be disturbed but stressed that all three children could not be buried with their parents.

2023Conduct of Person Seeking Reinterment {¶ 88} The fourth factor is “the conduct of the person seeking reinterment, especially as it may relate to the circumstances of the original interment.” Frobose, 163 Ohio App.3d 739 , 2005-Ohio-5025 , 840 N.E.2d 249, at ¶ 16 . {¶ 89} In this regard, the court acknowledged the presumption that the decedents would not wish for their remains to be disturbed but stressed that all three children could not be buried with their parents.

2019It maintains that Euler has proffered no challenge to any specific finding of the court. {¶ 28} An appellate court will not modify or vacate a sentence unless it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the sentence is contrary to law or that the record does not support any relevant findings under “division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code.” State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516 , 2016-Ohio-1002 , 59 N.E.3d 1231 , ¶ 22; R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).

2019It maintains that Euler has proffered no challenge to any specific finding of the court. {¶ 28} An appellate court will not modify or vacate a sentence unless it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the sentence is contrary to law or that the record does not support any relevant findings under “division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code.” State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516 , 2016-Ohio-1002 , 59 N.E.3d 1231 , ¶ 22; R.C. 2953.08(G)(2).

2017The court acknowledged the doctrine of the law of the case, noting that "[t]he judgment of the reviewing court is controlling upon the lower court as to all matters within the compass of the judgment." Id. at 97 , 378 N.E.2d 162 .

2017The court acknowledged the doctrine of the law of the case, noting that "[t]he judgment of the reviewing court is controlling upon the lower court as to all matters within the compass of the judgment." Id. at 97 , 378 N.E.2d 162 .

2017But the court granted the writ upon the "general rule" that an appeal from a judgment of conviction divests a trial court of jurisdiction over the case, unless the appellate court remands the case to the trial court for a ruling on a pending motion, or the trial court's exercise of jurisdiction is in aid of the appeal or is otherwise "not inconsistent with [the jurisdiction] of the appellate court to review, affirm, modify or reverse the appealed judgment." Id. at 97 , 378 N.E.2d 162 , citing In re Kurtzhalz , 141 Ohio St. 432 , 48 N.E.2d 657 (1943), paragraph two of the syllabus.

2017But the court granted the writ upon the "general rule" that an appeal from a judgment of conviction divests a trial court of jurisdiction over the case, unless the appellate court remands the case to the trial court for a ruling on a pending motion, or the trial court's exercise of jurisdiction is in aid of the appeal or is otherwise "not inconsistent with [the jurisdiction] of the appellate court to review, affirm, modify or reverse the appealed judgment." Id. at 97 , 378 N.E.2d 162 , citing In re Kurtzhalz , 141 Ohio St. 432 , 48 N.E.2d 657 (1943), paragraph two of the syllabus.

2016Franklin No. 08AP-591, 2008-Ohio-4464 , 2008 WL 4078446 , the Tenth District Court of Appeals held that requiring petition advocates to submit a petition summary to the attorney general for approval facilitates the process because it “arguably helps potential signers understand the content of the law more efficiently,” id. at ¶ 46, and deters fraud by circulators who might misrepresent the effect of the law, id. at ¶ 47. {¶ 18} Although the court acknowledged that the requirement reduced the available time to solicit supplemental signatures, the appellate court stressed the benefits of the sum

2015Based on our holding in Selvage, I disagree. {¶ 6} In considering whether Clemons’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated under Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), this court acknowledged the principle that the date that a formal accusation was made determines whether Clemons bears the burden of establishing that he suffered prejudice due to the delay in prosecution or if the state instead bears the burden of establishing that he was not prejudiced.

2015Based on our holding in Selvage, I disagree. {¶ 6} In considering whether Clemons’s constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated under Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), this court acknowledged the principle that the date that a formal accusation was made determines whether Clemons bears the burden of establishing that he suffered prejudice due to the delay in prosecution or if the state instead bears the burden of establishing that he was not prejudiced.

2014In State v. Lilly, 87 Ohio St.3d 97 , 717 N.E.2d 322 (1999), on which the trial court relied, the Ohio Supreme Court held that marriage is not a license to enter a spouse’s residence.

2014In State v. Lilly, 87 Ohio St.3d 97 , 717 N.E.2d 322 (1999), on which the trial court relied, the Ohio Supreme Court held that marriage is not a license to enter a spouse’s residence.

2014State v. Newell, 93 Ohio App.3d 609, 611 , 639 N.E.2d 513 (1st Dist.1994). {¶17} In finding Casey guilty of aggravated burglary, the court acknowledged that privilege was a pivotal issue, noting that Casey had previously possessed a key to the premises and that he stored belongings on the premises.

2014State v. Newell, 93 Ohio App.3d 609, 611 , 639 N.E.2d 513 (1st Dist.1994). {¶17} In finding Casey guilty of aggravated burglary, the court acknowledged that privilege was a pivotal issue, noting that Casey had previously possessed a key to the premises and that he stored belongings on the premises.

2010Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 .

2010Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 .

2004No. 98 CA 135, when we held that "[i]t is axiomatic that a party may not appeal a judgment to which it has agreed." citing Jackson, supra, and In re Annexation of Riveredge Twp. to Fairview Park (1988), 46 Ohio App.3d 29 , 31-32 , 545 N.E.2d 1287 . {¶ 31} Next, as to the issue of appealability, Teague acknowledges that the high-low settlement agreement references Cincinnati's intention to seek appellate review of the denial of their motion for summary judgment.

2004No. 98 CA 135, when we held that "[i]t is axiomatic that a party may not appeal a judgment to which it has agreed." citing Jackson, supra, and In re Annexation of Riveredge Twp. to Fairview Park (1988), 46 Ohio App.3d 29 , 31-32 , 545 N.E.2d 1287 . {¶ 31} Next, as to the issue of appealability, Teague acknowledges that the high-low settlement agreement references Cincinnati's intention to seek appellate review of the denial of their motion for summary judgment.

1996Id. at 555 , 668 N.E.2d at 915 .

1996Id. at 555 , 668 N.E.2d at 915 .

1905“This rule is applicable not only to contracts, wills and other instruments, but to statutes and proceedings under them. ’ ’ In the opinion in this case the court referred to Sands v. Lyon, supra, and used this language in reference to that case: ‘ ‘ This was in accordance with the acknowledged rule for the construction of mercantile contracts; and the court proceeded to say, ‘that instruments shall be so construed, if possible, as they and the rights depending upon them, shall be upheld, and not destroyed; the presumption being, that instruments are designed to be effectual, and not futile.’

1903In Carmony v. Hoober, 5 Pa. St. 305, the court say, on page 301 of the opinion: “On the contrary, it has been held as an acknowledged principle, that when it can be gathered from the record, the merits of the controversy were not passed upon in the first action, but the determination proceeded upon some technical objection not affecting the plaintiff’s ultimate right to sue, the first judgment will constitute no bar to the second suit.” In Foster v. The Richard Busteed, 100 Mass. 409, 412 , the supreme court of Massachusetts says: “The doctrine of res judicata is plain and intelligible, and am