8 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Chavezgreen2 sentences1995Lopez admits that State v. Chavez, 175 Wis. 2d 366, 371 , 498 N.W.2d 887, 889 (Ct. App. *727 1993), and State v. Issa, 186 Wis. 2d 199 , 519 N.W.2d 741 (Ct. App. 1994), allow a trial court to go outside the plea hearing record and determine the error to be harmless. 1995Lopez admits that State v. Chavez, 175 Wis. 2d 366, 371 , 498 N.W.2d 887, 889 (Ct. App. *727 1993), and State v. Issa, 186 Wis. 2d 199 , 519 N.W.2d 741 (Ct. App. 1994), allow a trial court to go outside the plea hearing record and determine the error to be harmless. | 1 | 1 |
Harris v. Kelleygreen2 sentences1980We also note that “[i]t is an acknowledged principle of law that a classification, though discriminatory, is not arbitrary or capricious, and therefore not violative of the equal protection requirement, if any statement of facts reasonably can be conceived which will sustain it.” Harris v. Kelley, 70 Wis.2d 242, 254-55 , 234 N.W.2d 628, 633 (1975). 1980We also note that “[i]t is an acknowledged principle of law that a classification, though discriminatory, is not arbitrary or capricious, and therefore not violative of the equal protection requirement, if any statement of facts reasonably can be conceived which will sustain it.” Harris v. Kelley, 70 Wis.2d 242, 254-55 , 234 N.W.2d 628, 633 (1975). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Cross
green
1 sentence2024However, the court relied on our supreme court’s decision in Cross for the proposition that an incorrectly communicated sentence does not constitute a Bangert violation “where the sentence communicated to the defendant is higher, but not substantially higher, than that authorized by law.” See Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, ¶40 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
People v. McPherson
green
2 sentences2020The court acknowledged the defense’s reliance on People v. McPherson, 271 N.W.2d 228 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978), which held, in the context of a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge to a criminal conviction for breaking and entering, that canine handler testimony regarding the activities of a tracking dog was not enough, standing alone, to sustain the conviction.20 Id. at 230 . 2020The court acknowledged the defense’s reliance on People v. McPherson, 271 N.W.2d 228 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978), which held, in the context of a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge to a criminal conviction for breaking and entering, that canine handler testimony regarding the activities of a tracking dog was not enough, standing alone, to sustain the conviction.20 Id. at 230 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Clarendon National Insurance v. TIG Reinsurance Co.
green
2 sentences2004The court described the case as presenting "extraordinary circumstances." Clarendon, 183 F.R.D. at 118 . 2004The court described the case as presenting "extraordinary circumstances." Clarendon, 183 F.R.D. at 118 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Smith v. Katz
green
1 sentence2003However, in the same breath, the court acknowledged that this rule was not absolute and that a complaint making "some reference to loss of use" could suffice as an allegation of "property damage." Id. at 817 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Morissette v. United States
green
2 sentences1997The Court acknowledged that the presumption did not exist for "sex offenses, such as rape, in which the victim's *187 actual age was determinative despite defendant's reasonable belief that the girl had reached the age of consent." Id. at 72 n.2 (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 , 251 n.8 (1952)). 1997The Court explained the rationale for the exception is that a "perpetrator confronts the underage victim personally and may reasonably be required to ascertain that victim's age." Id. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Zarnke
green
1 sentence1997The Court acknowledged that the presumption did not exist for "sex offenses, such as rape, in which the victim's *187 actual age was determinative despite defendant's reasonable belief that the girl had reached the age of consent." Id. at 72 n.2 (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 , 251 n.8 (1952)). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Issa
green
2 sentences1995Lopez admits that State v. Chavez, 175 Wis. 2d 366, 371 , 498 N.W.2d 887, 889 (Ct. App. *727 1993), and State v. Issa, 186 Wis. 2d 199 , 519 N.W.2d 741 (Ct. App. 1994), allow a trial court to go outside the plea hearing record and determine the error to be harmless. 1995Lopez admits that State v. Chavez, 175 Wis. 2d 366, 371 , 498 N.W.2d 887, 889 (Ct. App. *727 1993), and State v. Issa, 186 Wis. 2d 199 , 519 N.W.2d 741 (Ct. App. 1994), allow a trial court to go outside the plea hearing record and determine the error to be harmless. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
McGowan v. Maryland
green
2 sentences1975See: McGowan v. Maryland (1961), 366 U. S. 420 , 81 Sup. Ct. 1101, 6 L. 1975See: McGowan v. Maryland (1961), 366 U. S. 420 , 81 Sup. Ct. 1101, 6 L. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.