known rule in Illinois

2007Blake, 149 Ariz. at 271 , 718 P.2d at 173 .

2007Blake, 149 Ariz. at 271 , 718 P.2d at 173 .

1962(Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Public Service Com. of Missouri, 248 U.S. 67 .) Virtual or moral duress is sufficient to prevent a payment made under its influence from being voluntary.

1933(Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Public Service Com. of Missouri, 248 U. S. 67 .) Virtual or moral duress is sufficient to prevent a payment made under its influence from being voluntary.

1962(Chicago and Eastern Illinois Railway Co. v. Miller, 309 Ill. 257 .) That case clearly held to the well known rule that a person who accepts the benefits of a statute is generally barred thereafter from challenging its validity, provided no question of public policy or public morals is involved; but where there is an involuntary acceptance of the statutory provisions, or where money is paid under the pressure of severe statutory penalties or to avoid disastrous effects to business, the payment is involuntary and money paid may be recovered.

1933(Chicago and Eastern Illinois Railway Co. v. Miller, 309 Ill. 257 .) That case clearly hdd to the well known rule that a person who accepts the benefits of a statute is generally barred thereafter from challenging its validity, provided no question of public policy or public morals is involved; but where there is an involuntary acceptance of the statutory provisions, or. where money is paid under the pressure of severe statutory penalties or to avoid disastrous effects to business, the payment is involuntary and money paid may be recovered.

1937(Otis v. Gardner, 105 Ill. 436 ; Hemstreet v. Burdick, 90 id. 444 ; Mason v. Bauman, 62 id. 76.)” So far as the foreclosure of the interest in the real estate securing* the $500 note is concerned, the Federal Reserve Life Insurance Company has no interest or equity in this note.

1937(Otis v. Gardner, 105 Ill. 436 ; Hemstreet v. Burdick, 90 id. 444 ; Mason v. Bauman, 62 id. 76.)” So far as the foreclosure of the interest in the real estate securing* the $500 note is concerned, the Federal Reserve Life Insurance Company has no interest or equity in this note.

1930(Wright v. Brosseau, 73 Ill. 381 ; Charles v. Remick, 156 id. 327; Hodson v. Eugene Glass Co., 156 id. 397; Merchants’ Loan, and Trust Co. v. Welter, 205 id. 647; Hide and Leather Bank v. Alexander, 184 id. 416.) The title of the payee was not defective because of anything occurring in connection with the obtaining of the note.

1923(Wright v. Brosseau, 73 Ill. 381 ; Charles v. Remick, 156 id. 327; Hodson v. Eugene Glass Co. id. 397; Merchants’ Loan and Trust Co. v. Welter, 205 id. 647; Hide and Leather Bank v. Alexander, 184 id. 416.) The title of the payee was not defective because of anything occurring in connection with the obtaining of the note.

2026Id. at 60 .

2021Id. at 12 . ¶ 92 Defendant argues that the trial court “repeatedly cited” both his possession of a gun and his two qualifying convictions.

1992Consistent with Robinson is People v. Harrison (1962), 26 Ill. 2d 377 , 186 N.E.2d 657 , cert. denied (1963), 373 U.S. 928 , 10 L.

1992Consistent with Robinson is People v. Harrison (1962), 26 Ill. 2d 377 , 186 N.E.2d 657 , cert. denied (1963), 373 U.S. 928 , 10 L.

1992Consistent with Robinson is People v. Harrison (1962), 26 Ill. 2d 377 , 186 N.E.2d 657 , cert. denied (1963), 373 U.S. 928 , 10 L.

1976(Emery v. Hennessy, 331 Ill. 296, 303 ; 8 Ill.

1976(People v. Hairston, 46 Ill. 2d 348 , 263 N.E.2d 840 ; People v. Carr, 114 Ill.

1976(People v. Hairston, 46 Ill. 2d 348 , 263 N.E.2d 840 ; People v. Carr, 114 Ill.

1976(People v. Hairston, 46 Ill. 2d 348 , 263 N.E.2d 840 ; People v. Carr, 114 Ill.

1974This is particularly true of an ordinance proposed toward contradictory rezoning, after years of original zoning upon which concerned persons have come to depend.” Raabe v. City of Walker (1970), 383 Mich. 165, 178 , 174 N.W.2d 789 ; see Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. (1926), 272 U.S. 365 , 71 L.Ed. 303 , 47 S.Ct. 114 .

1974This is particularly true of an ordinance proposed toward contradictory rezoning, after years of original zoning upon which concerned persons have come to depend.” Raabe v. City of Walker (1970), 383 Mich. 165, 178 , 174 N.W.2d 789 ; see Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. (1926), 272 U.S. 365 , 71 L.Ed. 303 , 47 S.Ct. 114 .

1972(Davidson v. Davidson, 2 Ill.2d 197, 201 ; Harris Trust and Savings Bank v. Jackson, 412 Ill. 261, 266 .) The joint will of Ralph B. and Nellie R.

1972(Davidson v. Davidson, 2 Ill.2d 197, 201 ; Harris Trust and Savings Bank v. Jackson, 412 Ill. 261, 266 .) The joint will of Ralph B. and Nellie R.

1967A recent case emphasizing the importance of the attestation clause is In re Estate of Velie v. Valdes, 25 Ill2d 188, 183 NE2d 515 .

1953Poyer v. Village of Des Plaines, 123 Ill. 111 .

1949We find upon our examination that the rule is not as contended for . . . but quite the contrary. ’ ’ In somewhat similar language the Supreme Court of the United States expressed itself in the case of Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165 .

1947In holding the defendant not liable the court said: “No authority is given by law to the municipality to pay damages in any such case, and no provision is made by law or otherwise to levy and collect taxes or other funds to be applied to such purpose and under the well known rule that municipalities can only exercise such powers as are specially conferred by statutes, or such as may be inferred from the express grant, we are constrained to hold that park districts of the nature of appellee are not liable in damages for the negligent acts of its officers, such as are charged in the declaration

1944In the case of McInness v. Wilson Printing Co., 258 Ill.

1942People v. Lieber, 357 Ill. 423 .

1942(Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Ames, 364 Ill. 362 .) It is a well known rule of statutory construction, that a statute must be interpreted according to the legislative intention, and not-always according to the literal meaning of the language used.

1938Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Central Trust Co., 312 Ill. 396 .

1936In the case of National Time Recorder Co. v. Feypel, 93 Ill.

1934In Kingman v. Draper, 14 Ill.

1933(Mammina v. Alexander Auto Service Co. 333 Ill. 158 ; Standidge v. Chicago Railways Co. 254 id. 524; West Chicago Park Comrs. v. Western Granite Co. 200 id. 527; Knapp, Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey, 178 id. 107; Cairo and Vincennes Railroad Co. v. Fackney, 78 id. 116.) Having given to the council authority to act, and having declared the manner in which the power to act should be exercised, by a well known rule of construction the statute excluded the power of every other body.

1931(Clinton Wire Cloth Co. v. Gardner, 99 Ill. 151 ; Goldsborough v. Gable, 140 Ill. 269 ; Condon v. Brockway, 157 Ill. 90 .) Plaintiffs contend that the statute in question does not change the rule of the common law, but grants an additional and cumulative right, and they cite a number of authorities which state in substance the rule to be that where a statute grants a right or remedy other than that given by the common law but does not expressly by its terms or necessarily by implication supersede or limit the common law, such right or remedy is held to be additional and cumulative.

1931(See People v. Ahrling, 279 Ill. 70, 80 , and cases cited therein.) This vital principle of law was not stated in the said instruction of the State nor in any instruction given to the jury.