42 California opinions name it 3 courts 1911–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Nealgreen2 sentences1958It does not require proof of the intent to ‘deprive the owner’ of either the ‘title to or possession of such vehicle.’ (People v. Neal, 40 Cal.App.2d 115, 118 [ 104 P.2d 555 ].) The misdemeanor designated by section 499b of the Penal Code may be accomplished by merely taking the machine for the temporary use or pleasure of the accused person for a ‘joy-ride.’ If it be assumed that the offenses, or the penalties, provided for in section 503 of the Vehicle Code and section 499b of the Penal Code, are irreconcilably conflicting, which we do not concede, then, under the well known rule of construc 1958It does not require proof of the intent to ‘deprive the owner’ of either the ‘title to or possession of such vehicle.’ (People v. Neal, 40 Cal.App.2d 115, 118 [ 104 P.2d 555 ].) The misdemeanor designated by section 499b of the Penal Code may be accomplished by merely taking the machine for the temporary use or pleasure of the accused person for a ‘joy-ride.’ If it be assumed that the offenses, or the penalties, provided for in section 503 of the Vehicle Code and section 499b of the Penal Code, are irreconcilably conflicting, which we do not concede, then, under the well known rule of construc | 2 | 2 |
Huff v. Wilkinsgreen1 sentence2021(See, e.g., Doe v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Children & Family Services (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 675, 689 ; Huff v. Wilkins (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 732, 765 [“‘even if a good amendment is proposed in proper form, unwarranted delay in presenting it may—of itself—be a valid reason for denial’”]; Record v. Reason (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 472, 486 ; Melican, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at 175 ; see also Green v. Rancho Santa Margarita Mortgage Co. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 686, 692 [“There is a platoon of authority to the effect that a long unexcused delay is sufficient to uphold a trial judge’s decision to den | 1 | 1 |
Green v. Rancho Santa Margarita Mortgage Co.green1 sentence2021(See, e.g., Doe v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Children & Family Services (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 675, 689 ; Huff v. Wilkins (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 732, 765 [“‘even if a good amendment is proposed in proper form, unwarranted delay in presenting it may—of itself—be a valid reason for denial’”]; Record v. Reason (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 472, 486 ; Melican, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at 175 ; see also Green v. Rancho Santa Margarita Mortgage Co. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 686, 692 [“There is a platoon of authority to the effect that a long unexcused delay is sufficient to uphold a trial judge’s decision to den | 1 | 1 |
Babbitt v. Norfolk & Western Railway Companygreen1 sentence2020In Babbitt, the Sixth Circuit held that “[t]o be valid, a release must reflect a bargained-for settlement of a known claim for a specific injury, as contrasted with an attempt to extinguish potential future claims the employee might have arising from injuries known or unknown by him.” (Babbitt, supra, 104 F.3d at p. 93.) The court in that case considered the validity of general releases the plaintiffs had provided in connection with an early retirement program. | 1 | 1 |
Olszewski v. Scripps Healthgreen2 sentences2016Voice for Animals v. Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, Inc., supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 939.)” ( Brown, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 1059-1060.) “[W]hen Congress has made its intent known through explicit statutory language, the courts’ task is an easy one.” (English v. General Electric Co., supra, 496 U.S. at p. 79 .) There is also a second rule that may be relevant to an analysis in preemption cases, namely, “ ‘ “ ‘the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’ ” ’ [Citations. 2016Voice for Animals v. Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, Inc., supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 939.)” ( Brown, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 1059-1060.) “[W]hen Congress has made its intent known through explicit statutory language, the courts’ task is an easy one.” (English v. General Electric Co., supra, 496 U.S. at p. 79 .) There is also a second rule that may be relevant to an analysis in preemption cases, namely, “ ‘ “ ‘the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’ ” ’ [Citations. | 1 | 1 |
People Ex Rel. Harris v. Pac Anchor Transportation, Inc.green2 sentences2014Harris v. PAC Anchor Transportation, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 772, 778 [ 174 Cal.Rptr.3d 626 , 329 P.3d 180 ] (PAC Anchor).) Regulation of wages and hours is, of course, an area of traditional state regulation. 2014Harris v. PAC Anchor Transportation, Inc. (2014) 59 Cal.4th 772, 778 [ 174 Cal.Rptr.3d 626 , 329 P.3d 180 ] (PAC Anchor).) Regulation of wages and hours is, of course, an area of traditional state regulation. | 1 | 1 |
Chern v. Bank of Americagreen2 sentences1978(Chern v. Bank of America (1976) 15 Cal.3d 866, 875 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 544 P.2d 1310 ]; People v. Fox (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 178, 182 [ 140 Cal.Rptr. 615 ]; County of Sacramento v. Superior Court (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 135, 141 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 602 ].) Nor is there any merit to the Attorney General’s attempt to bring his request within the well known doctrine that an issue that has become moot as to the particular parties may nevertheless be judicially resolved if it is of general public interest and is likely to recur. 1978(Chern v. Bank of America (1976) 15 Cal.3d 866, 875 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 544 P.2d 1310 ]; People v. Fox (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 178, 182 [ 140 Cal.Rptr. 615 ]; County of Sacramento v. Superior Court (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 135, 141 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 602 ].) Nor is there any merit to the Attorney General’s attempt to bring his request within the well known doctrine that an issue that has become moot as to the particular parties may nevertheless be judicially resolved if it is of general public interest and is likely to recur. | 1 | 1 |
County of Sacramento v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1978(Chern v. Bank of America (1976) 15 Cal.3d 866, 875 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 544 P.2d 1310 ]; People v. Fox (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 178, 182 [ 140 Cal.Rptr. 615 ]; County of Sacramento v. Superior Court (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 135, 141 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 602 ].) Nor is there any merit to the Attorney General’s attempt to bring his request within the well known doctrine that an issue that has become moot as to the particular parties may nevertheless be judicially resolved if it is of general public interest and is likely to recur. 1978(Chern v. Bank of America (1976) 15 Cal.3d 866, 875 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 544 P.2d 1310 ]; People v. Fox (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 178, 182 [ 140 Cal.Rptr. 615 ]; County of Sacramento v. Superior Court (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 135, 141 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 602 ].) Nor is there any merit to the Attorney General’s attempt to bring his request within the well known doctrine that an issue that has become moot as to the particular parties may nevertheless be judicially resolved if it is of general public interest and is likely to recur. | 1 | 1 |
Green v. Laytongreen2 sentences1978(See, e.g., Green v. Layton (1975) 14 Cal.3d 922, 925 [ 123 Cal.Rptr. 97 , 538 P.2d 225 ], and cases cited.) In all such instances the question addressed was at one time a live issue in the case, and only became moot because of events occurring after the judicial process was initiated. 1978(See, e.g., Green v. Layton (1975) 14 Cal.3d 922, 925 [ 123 Cal.Rptr. 97 , 538 P.2d 225 ], and cases cited.) In all such instances the question addressed was at one time a live issue in the case, and only became moot because of events occurring after the judicial process was initiated. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Foxgreen2 sentences1978(Chern v. Bank of America (1976) 15 Cal.3d 866, 875 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 544 P.2d 1310 ]; People v. Fox (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 178, 182 [ 140 Cal.Rptr. 615 ]; County of Sacramento v. Superior Court (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 135, 141 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 602 ].) Nor is there any merit to the Attorney General’s attempt to bring his request within the well known doctrine that an issue that has become moot as to the particular parties may nevertheless be judicially resolved if it is of general public interest and is likely to recur. 1978(Chern v. Bank of America (1976) 15 Cal.3d 866, 875 [ 127 Cal.Rptr. 110 , 544 P.2d 1310 ]; People v. Fox (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 178, 182 [ 140 Cal.Rptr. 615 ]; County of Sacramento v. Superior Court (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 135, 141 [ 116 Cal.Rptr. 602 ].) Nor is there any merit to the Attorney General’s attempt to bring his request within the well known doctrine that an issue that has become moot as to the particular parties may nevertheless be judicially resolved if it is of general public interest and is likely to recur. | 1 | 1 |
Marble Mortgage Co. v. Franchise Tax Boardgreen2 sentences1974(Marble Mortgage Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 26, 35 [ 50 Cal.Rptr. 345 ].) The findings to which objection is made would be material if plaintiff were *538 entitled to a refund as they deal primarily with the amount of the refund to which plaintiff would be entitled, but in view of our holding that it is not so entitled, they are immaterial. 1974(Marble Mortgage Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 26, 35 [ 50 Cal.Rptr. 345 ].) The findings to which objection is made would be material if plaintiff were *538 entitled to a refund as they deal primarily with the amount of the refund to which plaintiff would be entitled, but in view of our holding that it is not so entitled, they are immaterial. | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Estate of Hassellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Estate of Loydgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In re the Estate of Stevensgreen | 1 | 1 |
Rhoton v. Blevingreen2 sentences1973We reiterated the well known rule that under section 90, a child of the testator is disinherited only when the intent to disinherit the child ap *79 pears in strong and convincing language on the face of the will. ( 54 Cal.2d at p. 249 ; Estate of Trickett, 197 Cal. 20, 23 [ 239 P. 406 ]; Estate of Lindsay, 176 Cal. 238, 239 [ 168 P. 113 ]; Estate of Hassell, 168 Cal. 287, 288 [ 142 P. 838 ]; Estate of Ross, 140 Cal. 282, 291 [ 73 P. 976 ]; In re Salmon, 107 Cal. 614, 616-617 [ 40 P. 1030 ]; Rhoton v. Blevin, 99 Cal. 645, 646-648 [ 34 P. 513 ]; In re Stevens, 83 Cal. 322, 329 [ 23 P. 379 ].) W 1973We reiterated the well known rule that under section 90, a child of the testator is disinherited only when the intent to disinherit the child ap *79 pears in strong and convincing language on the face of the will. ( 54 Cal.2d at p. 249 ; Estate of Trickett, 197 Cal. 20, 23 [ 239 P. 406 ]; Estate of Lindsay, 176 Cal. 238, 239 [ 168 P. 113 ]; Estate of Hassell, 168 Cal. 287, 288 [ 142 P. 838 ]; Estate of Ross, 140 Cal. 282, 291 [ 73 P. 976 ]; In re Salmon, 107 Cal. 614, 616-617 [ 40 P. 1030 ]; Rhoton v. Blevin, 99 Cal. 645, 646-648 [ 34 P. 513 ]; In re Stevens, 83 Cal. 322, 329 [ 23 P. 379 ].) W | 1 | 1 |
In re Estate of Salmongreen2 sentences1973We reiterated the well known rule that under section 90, a child of the testator is disinherited only when the intent to disinherit the child ap *79 pears in strong and convincing language on the face of the will. ( 54 Cal.2d at p. 249 ; Estate of Trickett, 197 Cal. 20, 23 [ 239 P. 406 ]; Estate of Lindsay, 176 Cal. 238, 239 [ 168 P. 113 ]; Estate of Hassell, 168 Cal. 287, 288 [ 142 P. 838 ]; Estate of Ross, 140 Cal. 282, 291 [ 73 P. 976 ]; In re Salmon, 107 Cal. 614, 616-617 [ 40 P. 1030 ]; Rhoton v. Blevin, 99 Cal. 645, 646-648 [ 34 P. 513 ]; In re Stevens, 83 Cal. 322, 329 [ 23 P. 379 ].) W 1973We reiterated the well known rule that under section 90, a child of the testator is disinherited only when the intent to disinherit the child ap *79 pears in strong and convincing language on the face of the will. ( 54 Cal.2d at p. 249 ; Estate of Trickett, 197 Cal. 20, 23 [ 239 P. 406 ]; Estate of Lindsay, 176 Cal. 238, 239 [ 168 P. 113 ]; Estate of Hassell, 168 Cal. 287, 288 [ 142 P. 838 ]; Estate of Ross, 140 Cal. 282, 291 [ 73 P. 976 ]; In re Salmon, 107 Cal. 614, 616-617 [ 40 P. 1030 ]; Rhoton v. Blevin, 99 Cal. 645, 646-648 [ 34 P. 513 ]; In re Stevens, 83 Cal. 322, 329 [ 23 P. 379 ].) W | 1 | 1 |
Estate of Lindsaygreen2 sentences1973We reiterated the well known rule that under section 90, a child of the testator is disinherited only when the intent to disinherit the child ap *79 pears in strong and convincing language on the face of the will. ( 54 Cal.2d at p. 249 ; Estate of Trickett, 197 Cal. 20, 23 [ 239 P. 406 ]; Estate of Lindsay, 176 Cal. 238, 239 [ 168 P. 113 ]; Estate of Hassell, 168 Cal. 287, 288 [ 142 P. 838 ]; Estate of Ross, 140 Cal. 282, 291 [ 73 P. 976 ]; In re Salmon, 107 Cal. 614, 616-617 [ 40 P. 1030 ]; Rhoton v. Blevin, 99 Cal. 645, 646-648 [ 34 P. 513 ]; In re Stevens, 83 Cal. 322, 329 [ 23 P. 379 ].) W 1973We reiterated the well known rule that under section 90, a child of the testator is disinherited only when the intent to disinherit the child ap *79 pears in strong and convincing language on the face of the will. ( 54 Cal.2d at p. 249 ; Estate of Trickett, 197 Cal. 20, 23 [ 239 P. 406 ]; Estate of Lindsay, 176 Cal. 238, 239 [ 168 P. 113 ]; Estate of Hassell, 168 Cal. 287, 288 [ 142 P. 838 ]; Estate of Ross, 140 Cal. 282, 291 [ 73 P. 976 ]; In re Salmon, 107 Cal. 614, 616-617 [ 40 P. 1030 ]; Rhoton v. Blevin, 99 Cal. 645, 646-648 [ 34 P. 513 ]; In re Stevens, 83 Cal. 322, 329 [ 23 P. 379 ].) W | 1 | 1 |
In Re Estate of Trickettgreen2 sentences1973We reiterated the well known rule that under section 90, a child of the testator is disinherited only when the intent to disinherit the child ap *79 pears in strong and convincing language on the face of the will. ( 54 Cal.2d at p. 249 ; Estate of Trickett, 197 Cal. 20, 23 [ 239 P. 406 ]; Estate of Lindsay, 176 Cal. 238, 239 [ 168 P. 113 ]; Estate of Hassell, 168 Cal. 287, 288 [ 142 P. 838 ]; Estate of Ross, 140 Cal. 282, 291 [ 73 P. 976 ]; In re Salmon, 107 Cal. 614, 616-617 [ 40 P. 1030 ]; Rhoton v. Blevin, 99 Cal. 645, 646-648 [ 34 P. 513 ]; In re Stevens, 83 Cal. 322, 329 [ 23 P. 379 ].) W 1973We reiterated the well known rule that under section 90, a child of the testator is disinherited only when the intent to disinherit the child ap *79 pears in strong and convincing language on the face of the will. ( 54 Cal.2d at p. 249 ; Estate of Trickett, 197 Cal. 20, 23 [ 239 P. 406 ]; Estate of Lindsay, 176 Cal. 238, 239 [ 168 P. 113 ]; Estate of Hassell, 168 Cal. 287, 288 [ 142 P. 838 ]; Estate of Ross, 140 Cal. 282, 291 [ 73 P. 976 ]; In re Salmon, 107 Cal. 614, 616-617 [ 40 P. 1030 ]; Rhoton v. Blevin, 99 Cal. 645, 646-648 [ 34 P. 513 ]; In re Stevens, 83 Cal. 322, 329 [ 23 P. 379 ].) W | 1 | 1 |
Estate of Rossgreen2 sentences1973We reiterated the well known rule that under section 90, a child of the testator is disinherited only when the intent to disinherit the child ap *79 pears in strong and convincing language on the face of the will. ( 54 Cal.2d at p. 249 ; Estate of Trickett, 197 Cal. 20, 23 [ 239 P. 406 ]; Estate of Lindsay, 176 Cal. 238, 239 [ 168 P. 113 ]; Estate of Hassell, 168 Cal. 287, 288 [ 142 P. 838 ]; Estate of Ross, 140 Cal. 282, 291 [ 73 P. 976 ]; In re Salmon, 107 Cal. 614, 616-617 [ 40 P. 1030 ]; Rhoton v. Blevin, 99 Cal. 645, 646-648 [ 34 P. 513 ]; In re Stevens, 83 Cal. 322, 329 [ 23 P. 379 ].) W 1973We reiterated the well known rule that under section 90, a child of the testator is disinherited only when the intent to disinherit the child ap *79 pears in strong and convincing language on the face of the will. ( 54 Cal.2d at p. 249 ; Estate of Trickett, 197 Cal. 20, 23 [ 239 P. 406 ]; Estate of Lindsay, 176 Cal. 238, 239 [ 168 P. 113 ]; Estate of Hassell, 168 Cal. 287, 288 [ 142 P. 838 ]; Estate of Ross, 140 Cal. 282, 291 [ 73 P. 976 ]; In re Salmon, 107 Cal. 614, 616-617 [ 40 P. 1030 ]; Rhoton v. Blevin, 99 Cal. 645, 646-648 [ 34 P. 513 ]; In re Stevens, 83 Cal. 322, 329 [ 23 P. 379 ].) W | 1 | 1 |
| Bloom v. Bendergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Custodio v. Bauergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Widney v. Southern Pacific Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Nicholson v. Nicholsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Pattersongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Harmongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Codinagreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Marquisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Rodriquezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Thornegreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Robinsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Foxgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gardiner v. Burketgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dobbins v. Horsfallgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Buckner v. A. Leon & Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Grantham v. Ordwaygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jenkins v. Andersongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Berniker v. Bernikergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Vaccarezza v. Sanguinettigreen | 1 | 1 |
| Export Leaf Tobacco Co. v. County of Los Angelesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Meinberg v. Jordangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People Ex Rel. Harris v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.
neutral
1 sentence2022Harris v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 884, 895 .) “There is also a second rule that may be relevant to an analysis in preemption cases, namely, ‘“‘“the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”’”’” (Ibid.) “This is known as the presumption against preemption . . . .” (Ibid.) 2. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Melican v. Regents of the University of California
green
2 sentences2021(See, e.g., Doe v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Children & Family Services (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 675, 689 ; Huff v. Wilkins (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 732, 765 [“‘even if a good amendment is proposed in proper form, unwarranted delay in presenting it may—of itself—be a valid reason for denial’”]; Record v. Reason (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 472, 486 ; Melican, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at 175 ; see also Green v. Rancho Santa Margarita Mortgage Co. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 686, 692 [“There is a platoon of authority to the effect that a long unexcused delay is sufficient to uphold a trial judge’s decision to den 2021(See, e.g., Doe v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Children & Family Services (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 675, 689 ; Huff v. Wilkins (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 732, 765 [“‘even if a good amendment is proposed in proper form, unwarranted delay in presenting it may—of itself—be a valid reason for denial’”]; Record v. Reason (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 472, 486 ; Melican, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at 175 ; see also Green v. Rancho Santa Margarita Mortgage Co. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 686, 692 [“There is a platoon of authority to the effect that a long unexcused delay is sufficient to uphold a trial judge’s decision to den | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Record v. Reason
green
1 sentence2021(See, e.g., Doe v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Children & Family Services (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 675, 689 ; Huff v. Wilkins (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 732, 765 [“‘even if a good amendment is proposed in proper form, unwarranted delay in presenting it may—of itself—be a valid reason for denial’”]; Record v. Reason (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 472, 486 ; Melican, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at 175 ; see also Green v. Rancho Santa Margarita Mortgage Co. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 686, 692 [“There is a platoon of authority to the effect that a long unexcused delay is sufficient to uphold a trial judge’s decision to den | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Doe v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs.
green
1 sentence2021(See, e.g., Doe v. Los Angeles County Dept. of Children & Family Services (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 675, 689 ; Huff v. Wilkins (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 732, 765 [“‘even if a good amendment is proposed in proper form, unwarranted delay in presenting it may—of itself—be a valid reason for denial’”]; Record v. Reason (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 472, 486 ; Melican, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at 175 ; see also Green v. Rancho Santa Margarita Mortgage Co. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 686, 692 [“There is a platoon of authority to the effect that a long unexcused delay is sufficient to uphold a trial judge’s decision to den | 1 | 2021–2021 |
English v. General Electric Co.
green
1 sentence2016Voice for Animals v. Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, Inc., supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 939.)” ( Brown, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 1059-1060.) “[W]hen Congress has made its intent known through explicit statutory language, the courts’ task is an easy one.” (English v. General Electric Co., supra, 496 U.S. at p. 79 .) There is also a second rule that may be relevant to an analysis in preemption cases, namely, “ ‘ “ ‘the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’ ” ’ [Citations. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Brown v. Mortensen
green
1 sentence2016Voice for Animals v. Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, Inc., supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 939.)” ( Brown, supra, 51 Cal.4th at pp. 1059-1060.) “[W]hen Congress has made its intent known through explicit statutory language, the courts’ task is an easy one.” (English v. General Electric Co., supra, 496 U.S. at p. 79 .) There is also a second rule that may be relevant to an analysis in preemption cases, namely, “ ‘ “ ‘the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’ ” ’ [Citations. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
United States v. Benabe
green
1 sentence2015These theories should be rejected summarily, however they are presented.” (U.S. v. Benabe, supra, 654 F.3d at p. 767 .) As this discussion clarifies, defendant intentionally pursued a known defense strategy. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Placer County Probation Department v. Patricia C.
green
1 sentence2013(In re Bernadette C. (1982) 127 Cal.App.3d 618, 625 .) The lack of clarity in the record raised the concern, not that the court misunderstood the standard, but that the orders for the two hearings were conflated, thereby potentially affecting the adequacy of the ICWA findings. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Haight
green
1 sentence2013The question is not who owns the vehicle . . . , or whether the employee receives reimbursement by the employer for the vehicle . . . , or whether the employee performs a personal errand while driving home.‖ (Haight, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d at p. 241 , citations omitted, italics added & omitted.) ―The evidence is uncontradicted [that the employee‘s] use of the company vehicle in his job clearly gave [the employer] an incidental benefit. [The employee] was driving a company vehicle with company equipment in the van and returning to his home from engaging in company activity. [The employee] had du | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Gottschalk v. Draper Companies
green
1 sentence2011The court stated: “[W]hile ordinarily whatever discharges the principal debtor will discharge the surety too, this rule does not apply where the discharge is by operation of law or where the defense is personal. . . .” (Gottschalk, supra, 23 Cal.App.3d at p. 831 , italics added.) The court found a discharge of the buyer’s liability under Code of Civil Procedure section 580b was a discharge by operation of law under Civil Code section 2825: “[A]ny discharge of [the buyer’s] liability, if at all, took place by a mere application of the relevant code provision (Code Civ. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
City of Lafayette v. East Bay Municipal Utility District
green
1 sentence2006Utility Dist. (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 1005 , 1017 .) Consistent with this principle, we find that the Legislature's use of the word "specify," and not the word "appoint," in section 65101 fails to meet the test of specifically providing for non-mayoral appointments of planning commission members as required by section 40605. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Torregano v. Torregano green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
In Re Estate of Sankey
green
2 sentences1973Not only did the no contest provision fail to show the requisite intention in strong and convincing language, but also it could not be construed to include a pretermitted heir who asserts a claim to take despite the will and does not contest the will. ( 54 Cal.2d at p. 251 ; Estate of Sankey, 199 Cal. 391 , 403 et seq. [ 249 P. 517 ]; Estate of Loyd, 175 Cal. 699, 703-704 [ 167 P. 157 ]; see Cal. Will Drafting (Cont.Ed.Bar 1965) § 7.31.) We also held in Torre gano that extrinsic evidence is admissible in a case of pretermission to establish a lack of intent to omit to provide for an heir as a 1973Not only did the no contest provision fail to show the requisite intention in strong and convincing language, but also it could not be construed to include a pretermitted heir who asserts a claim to take despite the will and does not contest the will. ( 54 Cal.2d at p. 251 ; Estate of Sankey, 199 Cal. 391 , 403 et seq. [ 249 P. 517 ]; Estate of Loyd, 175 Cal. 699, 703-704 [ 167 P. 157 ]; see Cal. Will Drafting (Cont.Ed.Bar 1965) § 7.31.) We also held in Torre gano that extrinsic evidence is admissible in a case of pretermission to establish a lack of intent to omit to provide for an heir as a | 1 | 1973–1973 |
People v. Butts
green
2 sentences1973It is a well known rule of law that mere knowledge of his codefendant’s criminal intent without sharing the same does not make a defendant criminally liable either on the basis of conspiracy (People v. Gilbert, supra), or aiding and abetting (People v. Butts (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 817 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 362 ]; People v. Demes (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 423 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 896 ]). 1973It is a well known rule of law that mere knowledge of his codefendant’s criminal intent without sharing the same does not make a defendant criminally liable either on the basis of conspiracy (People v. Gilbert, supra), or aiding and abetting (People v. Butts (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 817 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 362 ]; People v. Demes (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 423 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 896 ]). | 1 | 1973–1973 |
People v. Demes
green
2 sentences1973It is a well known rule of law that mere knowledge of his codefendant’s criminal intent without sharing the same does not make a defendant criminally liable either on the basis of conspiracy (People v. Gilbert, supra), or aiding and abetting (People v. Butts (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 817 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 362 ]; People v. Demes (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 423 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 896 ]). 1973It is a well known rule of law that mere knowledge of his codefendant’s criminal intent without sharing the same does not make a defendant criminally liable either on the basis of conspiracy (People v. Gilbert, supra), or aiding and abetting (People v. Butts (1965) 236 Cal.App.2d 817 [ 46 Cal.Rptr. 362 ]; People v. Demes (1963) 220 Cal.App.2d 423 [ 33 Cal.Rptr. 896 ]). | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Frascona v. Los Angeles Railway Corp. green | 1 | 1970–1970 |
| W. J. Wallace & Co. v. Growers Security Bank green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Caton v. Caton green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Essig v. Seaman neutral | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Dickey v. Pattison green | 1 | 1959–1959 |
| McIntyre v. Doe & Roe green | 1 | 1959–1959 |
| People v. Marshall green | 1 | 1958–1958 |
| People v. Bender green | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| People v. Grasso green | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| Sheller v. Seattle Title Trust Co. neutral | 1 | 1956–1956 |
| Bates v. Northern Bond & Mortgage Co. neutral | 1 | 1956–1956 |
| Varcoe v. Lee green | 1 | 1954–1954 |
| People v. Tossetti green | 1 | 1954–1954 |
| Hunt v. Robinson neutral | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| Claim of Schwartz v. Jones neutral | 1 | 1952–1952 |
| Claim of Bowen v. Saratoga Springs Commission neutral | 1 | 1952–1952 |
| Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Manufacturing Co. v. Walker green | 1 | 1952–1952 |
| Estate of Bianchi v. Rodríguez green | 1 | 1946–1946 |
| Herbert v. Lankershim green | 1 | 1946–1946 |
| Lundberg v. Katz green | 1 | 1946–1946 |
| Ferrari v. Mambretti green | 1 | 1946–1946 |
| People v. Dobbins green | 1 | 1946–1946 |
| Kling v. Crown Finance Corp. green | 1 | 1945–1945 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.