known rule (Connecticut) · Go Syfert
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known rule in Connecticut

21 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1904–2022 1 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (6)

CaseFollowedCited
United States v. Daniel Joe Chischillygreen
ca9 · 1994 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
1 sentence

2020This is known as the defense fallacy, and it ‘‘understat[es] the tendency of a reported match to strengthen source probability and narrow the group of potential suspects. . . . [T]he real source probability will reflect the relative strength of circum- stantial evidence connecting the defendant and other persons with matching DNA to the scene of the crime.’’ (Emphasis omitted; footnote omitted.) United States v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144, 1157 (9th Cir. 1994) (overruled in part on other grounds by United States v. Preston, 751 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2014)), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1132 , 115 S. Ct.

11
Bigelow Co. v. Waselikgreen
conn · 1946 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2010–2010
2 sentences

2010Wilful misconduct includes deliberate disobedience or the intentional violation of a known rule.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Todd v. Administrator, supra, 5 Conn. App. 312 ; see also Bigelow Co. v. Waselik, 133 Conn. 304, 308 , 50 A.2d 769 (1946) (“The breach of a rule by one who knows at the time that he is breaking the rule is a wilful breach ....

2010Wilful misconduct includes deliberate disobedience or the intentional violation of a known rule.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Todd v. Administrator, supra, 5 Conn. App. 312 ; see also Bigelow Co. v. Waselik, 133 Conn. 304, 308 , 50 A.2d 769 (1946) (“The breach of a rule by one who knows at the time that he is breaking the rule is a wilful breach ....

11
State v. Davisgreen
conn · 2001 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008
2 sentences

2008See State v. Davis, 255 Conn. 782, 794-96 , 772 A.2d 559 (2001). 22 “[Wjaiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Corona, 69 Conn. App. 267, 274-75 , 794 A.2d 565 , cert. denied, 260 Conn. 935 , 802 A.2d 88 (2002).

2008See State v. Davis, 255 Conn. 782, 794-96 , 772 A.2d 559 (2001). 22 “[Wjaiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Corona, 69 Conn. App. 267, 274-75 , 794 A.2d 565 , cert. denied, 260 Conn. 935 , 802 A.2d 88 (2002).

11
State v. Francisgreen
conn · 2002 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008
2 sentences

2008See State v. Davis, 255 Conn. 782, 794-96 , 772 A.2d 559 (2001). 22 “[Wjaiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Corona, 69 Conn. App. 267, 274-75 , 794 A.2d 565 , cert. denied, 260 Conn. 935 , 802 A.2d 88 (2002).

2008See State v. Davis, 255 Conn. 782, 794-96 , 772 A.2d 559 (2001). 22 “[Wjaiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Corona, 69 Conn. App. 267, 274-75 , 794 A.2d 565 , cert. denied, 260 Conn. 935 , 802 A.2d 88 (2002).

11
State v. Coronagreen
connappct · 2002 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008
2 sentences

2008See State v. Davis, 255 Conn. 782, 794-96 , 772 A.2d 559 (2001). 22 “[Wjaiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Corona, 69 Conn. App. 267, 274-75 , 794 A.2d 565 , cert. denied, 260 Conn. 935 , 802 A.2d 88 (2002).

2008See State v. Davis, 255 Conn. 782, 794-96 , 772 A.2d 559 (2001). 22 “[Wjaiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Corona, 69 Conn. App. 267, 274-75 , 794 A.2d 565 , cert. denied, 260 Conn. 935 , 802 A.2d 88 (2002).

11
Todd v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Actgreen
connappct · 1985 · cited in 1 Connecticut opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998
1 sentence

1998Todd, 5 Conn. App. at 312 (citations omitted).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (24)

CaseCitedYears
Johnson v. Zerbst green
scotus · 1938
2 sentences

1999Although the right to have counsel present during interrogation can be waived by the suspect, such “[a] valid waiver is defined, in accordance with the well known test of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S. Ct. 1019 , 82 L.

1999Although the right to have counsel present during interrogation can be waived by the suspect, such “[a] valid waiver is defined, in accordance with the well known test of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S. Ct. 1019 , 82 L.

51987–1999
Hama Hama Co. v. Shorelines Hearings Board green
wash · 1975
2 sentences

2022For example, in Hama Hama Co. v. Shorelines Hearings Board, 85 Wn. 2d 441 , 536 P.2d 157 (1975), the Washing- ton Supreme Court reasoned that, ‘‘when a statute is ambiguous . . . there is the well known rule of statu- tory interpretation that the construction placed [on] a statute by an administrative agency charged with its administration and enforcement, while not absolutely controlling [on] the courts, should be given great weight in determining legislative intent. . . .

2022For example, in Hama Hama Co. v. Shorelines Hearings Board, 85 Wn. 2d 441 , 536 P.2d 157 (1975), the Washing- ton Supreme Court reasoned that, ‘‘when a statute is ambiguous . . . there is the well known rule of statu- tory interpretation that the construction placed [on] a statute by an administrative agency charged with its administration and enforcement, while not absolutely controlling [on] the courts, should be given great weight in determining legislative intent. . . .

12022–2022
Marquard v. Florida green
scotus · 1995
1 sentence

2020This is known as the defense fallacy, and it ‘‘understat[es] the tendency of a reported match to strengthen source probability and narrow the group of potential suspects. . . . [T]he real source probability will reflect the relative strength of circum- stantial evidence connecting the defendant and other persons with matching DNA to the scene of the crime.’’ (Emphasis omitted; footnote omitted.) United States v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144, 1157 (9th Cir. 1994) (overruled in part on other grounds by United States v. Preston, 751 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2014)), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1132 , 115 S. Ct.

12020–2020
White v. United States green
scotus · 1995
1 sentence

2020This is known as the defense fallacy, and it ‘‘understat[es] the tendency of a reported match to strengthen source probability and narrow the group of potential suspects. . . . [T]he real source probability will reflect the relative strength of circum- stantial evidence connecting the defendant and other persons with matching DNA to the scene of the crime.’’ (Emphasis omitted; footnote omitted.) United States v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144, 1157 (9th Cir. 1994) (overruled in part on other grounds by United States v. Preston, 751 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2014)), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1132 , 115 S. Ct.

12020–2020
Wagoner v. United States green
scotus · 1995
1 sentence

2020This is known as the defense fallacy, and it ‘‘understat[es] the tendency of a reported match to strengthen source probability and narrow the group of potential suspects. . . . [T]he real source probability will reflect the relative strength of circum- stantial evidence connecting the defendant and other persons with matching DNA to the scene of the crime.’’ (Emphasis omitted; footnote omitted.) United States v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144, 1157 (9th Cir. 1994) (overruled in part on other grounds by United States v. Preston, 751 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2014)), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1132 , 115 S. Ct.

12020–2020
United States v. Tymond Preston green
ca9 · 2014
1 sentence

2020This is known as the defense fallacy, and it ‘‘understat[es] the tendency of a reported match to strengthen source probability and narrow the group of potential suspects. . . . [T]he real source probability will reflect the relative strength of circum- stantial evidence connecting the defendant and other persons with matching DNA to the scene of the crime.’’ (Emphasis omitted; footnote omitted.) United States v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144, 1157 (9th Cir. 1994) (overruled in part on other grounds by United States v. Preston, 751 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2014)), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1132 , 115 S. Ct.

12020–2020
Williams v. Williams green
conn · 2005
2 sentences

2019In determin- ing whether a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reason- able presumption in favor of the correctness of its action.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Williams v. Williams, 276 Conn. 491 , 496–97, 886 A.2d 817 (2005).

2019In determin- ing whether a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reason- able presumption in favor of the correctness of its action.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Williams v. Williams, 276 Conn. 491 , 496–97, 886 A.2d 817 (2005).

12019–2019
Scribner v. O'Brien, Inc. green
conn · 1975
1 sentence

2003An "agent is not liable where, acting within the scope of his authority, he contracts with a third party for a known principle." Scribner v. O'Brien, Inc. , 169 Conn. 389 , 404 , 363 A.2d 106 (1975).

12003–2003
State v. Barrett green
conn · 1987
2 sentences

1999Ed. 1461 (1938), as the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” State v. Barrett, 205 Conn. 437, 450 , 534 A.2d 219 (1987).

1999Ed. 1461 (1938), as the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” State v. Barrett, 205 Conn. 437, 450 , 534 A.2d 219 (1987).

11999–1999
Bailey v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act green
connappct · 1985
1 sentence

1997Bailey, Supra .

11997–1997
Berkowitz v. Berkowitz green
conn · 1960
2 sentences

1996The burden of proof, in such a situation, is shifted, and there is imposed upon the beneficiary the obligation of disproving, by a clear preponderance of evidence, the exertion of undue influence by him." Berkowitz v. Berkowitz, 147 Conn. 474 , 476-77 , 162 A.2d 709 (1960) (Internal citations omitted).

1996The burden of proof, in such a situation, is shifted, and there is imposed upon the beneficiary the obligation of disproving, by a clear preponderance of evidence, the exertion of undue influence by him." Berkowitz v. Berkowitz, 147 Conn. 474 , 476-77 , 162 A.2d 709 (1960) (Internal citations omitted).

11996–1996
Klein v. Chatfield green
conn · 1974
1 sentence

1993She had no power to "terminate" by withdrawing the "consideration." The principal case relied on by the defendant, Klein v. Chatfield, 166 Conn. 76 (1974) stands only for the well known principle of contract law that an offer can be withdrawn before its acceptance is communicated.

11993–1993
Town of West Hartford v. Gelinas green
connappct · 1989
2 sentences

1992The court in West Hartford v. Gelinas, 18 Conn. App. 688 , 559 A.2d 1176 (1989), stated: If the plaintiffs were not a municipality and its officers, their laxity in enforcement of a known violation might give rise to a defense of laches.

1992The court in West Hartford v. Gelinas, 18 Conn. App. 688 , 559 A.2d 1176 (1989), stated: If the plaintiffs were not a municipality and its officers, their laxity in enforcement of a known violation might give rise to a defense of laches.

11992–1992
McCarthy v. Tierney neutral
conn · 1931
2 sentences

1950“It is a well known rule of testamentary interpretation that where the intention of the testator is expressed in an ambiguous or obscure manner, such a construction should be adopted, if consistent with other testamentary rules, as will dispose of the prop *594 erty in a just, natural and reasonable manner.” McCarthy v. Tierney, 113 Conn. 316, 322 , 155 A. 226 .

1950“It is a well known rule of testamentary interpretation that where the intention of the testator is expressed in an ambiguous or obscure manner, such a construction should be adopted, if consistent with other testamentary rules, as will dispose of the prop *594 erty in a just, natural and reasonable manner.” McCarthy v. Tierney, 113 Conn. 316, 322 , 155 A. 226 .

11950–1950
Lepard v. Clapp neutral
· 1907
2 sentences

1940“It is a well known rule in the construction of wills, that where the testator shows a particular and also a general intent, which are inconsistent with each other, the general intent will be established and the particular one disregarded, if the will can fairly be so read, considered as a whole.” Walsh v. McCutcheon, 71 Conn. 283, 286 , 41 Atl. 813 ; Hurd v. Shelton, 64 Conn. 496, 500 , 30 Atl. 766 ; Pinney v. Newton, 66 Conn. 141, 152 , 33 Atl. 591 ; Lepard v. Clapp, 80 Conn. 29, 32 , 66 Atl. 780 .

1940“It is a well known rule in the construction of wills, that where the testator shows a particular and also a general intent, which are inconsistent with each other, the general intent will be established and the particular one disregarded, if the will can fairly be so read, considered as a whole.” Walsh v. McCutcheon, 71 Conn. 283, 286 , 41 Atl. 813 ; Hurd v. Shelton, 64 Conn. 496, 500 , 30 Atl. 766 ; Pinney v. Newton, 66 Conn. 141, 152 , 33 Atl. 591 ; Lepard v. Clapp, 80 Conn. 29, 32 , 66 Atl. 780 .

11940–1940
Hurd v. Shelton neutral
conn · 1894
2 sentences

1940“It is a well known rule in the construction of wills, that where the testator shows a particular and also a general intent, which are inconsistent with each other, the general intent will be established and the particular one disregarded, if the will can fairly be so read, considered as a whole.” Walsh v. McCutcheon, 71 Conn. 283, 286 , 41 Atl. 813 ; Hurd v. Shelton, 64 Conn. 496, 500 , 30 Atl. 766 ; Pinney v. Newton, 66 Conn. 141, 152 , 33 Atl. 591 ; Lepard v. Clapp, 80 Conn. 29, 32 , 66 Atl. 780 .

1940“It is a well known rule in the construction of wills, that where the testator shows a particular and also a general intent, which are inconsistent with each other, the general intent will be established and the particular one disregarded, if the will can fairly be so read, considered as a whole.” Walsh v. McCutcheon, 71 Conn. 283, 286 , 41 Atl. 813 ; Hurd v. Shelton, 64 Conn. 496, 500 , 30 Atl. 766 ; Pinney v. Newton, 66 Conn. 141, 152 , 33 Atl. 591 ; Lepard v. Clapp, 80 Conn. 29, 32 , 66 Atl. 780 .

11940–1940
Pinney v. Newton neutral
conn · 1895
2 sentences

1940“It is a well known rule in the construction of wills, that where the testator shows a particular and also a general intent, which are inconsistent with each other, the general intent will be established and the particular one disregarded, if the will can fairly be so read, considered as a whole.” Walsh v. McCutcheon, 71 Conn. 283, 286 , 41 Atl. 813 ; Hurd v. Shelton, 64 Conn. 496, 500 , 30 Atl. 766 ; Pinney v. Newton, 66 Conn. 141, 152 , 33 Atl. 591 ; Lepard v. Clapp, 80 Conn. 29, 32 , 66 Atl. 780 .

1940“It is a well known rule in the construction of wills, that where the testator shows a particular and also a general intent, which are inconsistent with each other, the general intent will be established and the particular one disregarded, if the will can fairly be so read, considered as a whole.” Walsh v. McCutcheon, 71 Conn. 283, 286 , 41 Atl. 813 ; Hurd v. Shelton, 64 Conn. 496, 500 , 30 Atl. 766 ; Pinney v. Newton, 66 Conn. 141, 152 , 33 Atl. 591 ; Lepard v. Clapp, 80 Conn. 29, 32 , 66 Atl. 780 .

11940–1940
Walsh v. McCutcheon green
conn · 1898
2 sentences

1940“It is a well known rule in the construction of wills, that where the testator shows a particular and also a general intent, which are inconsistent with each other, the general intent will be established and the particular one disregarded, if the will can fairly be so read, considered as a whole.” Walsh v. McCutcheon, 71 Conn. 283, 286 , 41 Atl. 813 ; Hurd v. Shelton, 64 Conn. 496, 500 , 30 Atl. 766 ; Pinney v. Newton, 66 Conn. 141, 152 , 33 Atl. 591 ; Lepard v. Clapp, 80 Conn. 29, 32 , 66 Atl. 780 .

1940“It is a well known rule in the construction of wills, that where the testator shows a particular and also a general intent, which are inconsistent with each other, the general intent will be established and the particular one disregarded, if the will can fairly be so read, considered as a whole.” Walsh v. McCutcheon, 71 Conn. 283, 286 , 41 Atl. 813 ; Hurd v. Shelton, 64 Conn. 496, 500 , 30 Atl. 766 ; Pinney v. Newton, 66 Conn. 141, 152 , 33 Atl. 591 ; Lepard v. Clapp, 80 Conn. 29, 32 , 66 Atl. 780 .

11940–1940
Connecticut Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Chase green
· 1903
2 sentences

1935Leake v. Watson, 60 Conn. 498, 506 , 21 Atl. 1075 ; Connecticut Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Chase, 75 Conn. 683, 692 , 55 Atl. 171 ; Bartlett v. Sears, 81 Conn. 34, 39 , 70 Atl. 33 .

1935Leake v. Watson, 60 Conn. 498, 506 , 21 Atl. 1075 ; Connecticut Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Chase, 75 Conn. 683, 692 , 55 Atl. 171 ; Bartlett v. Sears, 81 Conn. 34, 39 , 70 Atl. 33 .

11935–1935
Bartlett v. Sears green
conn · 1908
2 sentences

1935Leake v. Watson, 60 Conn. 498, 506 , 21 Atl. 1075 ; Connecticut Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Chase, 75 Conn. 683, 692 , 55 Atl. 171 ; Bartlett v. Sears, 81 Conn. 34, 39 , 70 Atl. 33 .

1935Leake v. Watson, 60 Conn. 498, 506 , 21 Atl. 1075 ; Connecticut Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Chase, 75 Conn. 683, 692 , 55 Atl. 171 ; Bartlett v. Sears, 81 Conn. 34, 39 , 70 Atl. 33 .

11935–1935
Leake v. Watson green
conn · 1891
2 sentences

1935Leake v. Watson, 60 Conn. 498, 506 , 21 Atl. 1075 ; Connecticut Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Chase, 75 Conn. 683, 692 , 55 Atl. 171 ; Bartlett v. Sears, 81 Conn. 34, 39 , 70 Atl. 33 .

1935Leake v. Watson, 60 Conn. 498, 506 , 21 Atl. 1075 ; Connecticut Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Chase, 75 Conn. 683, 692 , 55 Atl. 171 ; Bartlett v. Sears, 81 Conn. 34, 39 , 70 Atl. 33 .

11935–1935
Tingier v. Woodruff neutral
· 1911
2 sentences

1931Willcox v. Beecher, 27 Conn. 134, 139 ; Tingier v. Woodruff, 84 Conn. 684, 688 , 81 Atl. 967 ; 40 Cyc. p. 1411, and cases cited.

1931Willcox v. Beecher, 27 Conn. 134, 139 ; Tingier v. Woodruff, 84 Conn. 684, 688 , 81 Atl. 967 ; 40 Cyc. p. 1411, and cases cited.

11931–1931
Willcox v. Beecher green
· 1858
1 sentence

1931Willcox v. Beecher, 27 Conn. 134, 139 ; Tingier v. Woodruff, 84 Conn. 684, 688 , 81 Atl. 967 ; 40 Cyc. p. 1411, and cases cited.

11931–1931
Phelps v. Robbins neutral
conn · 1873
1 sentence

1904The English rule appears to prevail in many of our sister States; but the question whether it prevails in this State, and if so, with what limitations and under what conditions, was left undetermined in Phelps v. Robbins, 40 Conn. 250 , and has never been passed upon since.

11904–1904

Statutes the citing opinions construe

CT § Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-70 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

IL 57 (1878–2026) PA 46 (1836–2025) KY 44 (1912–2024) MO 43 (1885–2024) IN 43 (1857–2020) CA 42 (1911–2022) TX 41 (1893–2025) AL 39 (1837–1998) NY 38 (1846–2023) WV 32 (1894–2024) IA 23 (1866–2025) TN 22 (1900–2021) WA 22 (1889–2021) MA 21 (1841–2014) CT 21 (1904–2022) OR 21 (1923–2022) GA 20 (1895–2016) FL 20 (1920–2016) LA 18 (1843–2012) AR 16 (1910–2002) NJ 16 (1913–2019) ID 16 (1926–2019) CO 15 (1909–2019) MD 14 (1903–2025) MS 14 (1940–2019) OH 11 (1895–2019) MN 11 (1918–2025) NC 11 (1903–2008) VA 10 (1896–2008) MI 9 (1975–2022) WY 9 (1928–2014) AZ 8 (1924–2000) WI 8 (1912–2020) KS 7 (1922–2020) ME 7 (1845–2019) OK 6 (1905–1996) VT 5 (1919–2016) DE 4 (1995–2020) SC 4 (1938–2026) RI 4 (2000–2022) MT 3 (1944–2008) UT 3 (2003–2025) DC 3 (1984–2021) AK 2 (2019–2019) NE 2 (1957–2025) NM 2 (1940–1967) PR 2 (1936–1967) HI 2 (1921–2008)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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