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21 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1904–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Daniel Joe Chischillygreen1 sentence2020This is known as the defense fallacy, and it ‘‘understat[es] the tendency of a reported match to strengthen source probability and narrow the group of potential suspects. . . . [T]he real source probability will reflect the relative strength of circum- stantial evidence connecting the defendant and other persons with matching DNA to the scene of the crime.’’ (Emphasis omitted; footnote omitted.) United States v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144, 1157 (9th Cir. 1994) (overruled in part on other grounds by United States v. Preston, 751 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2014)), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1132 , 115 S. Ct. | 1 | 1 |
Bigelow Co. v. Waselikgreen2 sentences2010Wilful misconduct includes deliberate disobedience or the intentional violation of a known rule.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Todd v. Administrator, supra, 5 Conn. App. 312 ; see also Bigelow Co. v. Waselik, 133 Conn. 304, 308 , 50 A.2d 769 (1946) (“The breach of a rule by one who knows at the time that he is breaking the rule is a wilful breach .... 2010Wilful misconduct includes deliberate disobedience or the intentional violation of a known rule.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Todd v. Administrator, supra, 5 Conn. App. 312 ; see also Bigelow Co. v. Waselik, 133 Conn. 304, 308 , 50 A.2d 769 (1946) (“The breach of a rule by one who knows at the time that he is breaking the rule is a wilful breach .... | 1 | 1 |
State v. Davisgreen2 sentences2008See State v. Davis, 255 Conn. 782, 794-96 , 772 A.2d 559 (2001). 22 “[Wjaiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Corona, 69 Conn. App. 267, 274-75 , 794 A.2d 565 , cert. denied, 260 Conn. 935 , 802 A.2d 88 (2002). 2008See State v. Davis, 255 Conn. 782, 794-96 , 772 A.2d 559 (2001). 22 “[Wjaiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Corona, 69 Conn. App. 267, 274-75 , 794 A.2d 565 , cert. denied, 260 Conn. 935 , 802 A.2d 88 (2002). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Francisgreen2 sentences2008See State v. Davis, 255 Conn. 782, 794-96 , 772 A.2d 559 (2001). 22 “[Wjaiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Corona, 69 Conn. App. 267, 274-75 , 794 A.2d 565 , cert. denied, 260 Conn. 935 , 802 A.2d 88 (2002). 2008See State v. Davis, 255 Conn. 782, 794-96 , 772 A.2d 559 (2001). 22 “[Wjaiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Corona, 69 Conn. App. 267, 274-75 , 794 A.2d 565 , cert. denied, 260 Conn. 935 , 802 A.2d 88 (2002). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Coronagreen2 sentences2008See State v. Davis, 255 Conn. 782, 794-96 , 772 A.2d 559 (2001). 22 “[Wjaiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Corona, 69 Conn. App. 267, 274-75 , 794 A.2d 565 , cert. denied, 260 Conn. 935 , 802 A.2d 88 (2002). 2008See State v. Davis, 255 Conn. 782, 794-96 , 772 A.2d 559 (2001). 22 “[Wjaiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Corona, 69 Conn. App. 267, 274-75 , 794 A.2d 565 , cert. denied, 260 Conn. 935 , 802 A.2d 88 (2002). | 1 | 1 |
Todd v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Actgreen1 sentence1998Todd, 5 Conn. App. at 312 (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Johnson v. Zerbst
green
2 sentences1999Although the right to have counsel present during interrogation can be waived by the suspect, such “[a] valid waiver is defined, in accordance with the well known test of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S. Ct. 1019 , 82 L. 1999Although the right to have counsel present during interrogation can be waived by the suspect, such “[a] valid waiver is defined, in accordance with the well known test of Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 , 58 S. Ct. 1019 , 82 L. | 5 | 1987–1999 |
Hama Hama Co. v. Shorelines Hearings Board
green
2 sentences2022For example, in Hama Hama Co. v. Shorelines Hearings Board, 85 Wn. 2d 441 , 536 P.2d 157 (1975), the Washing- ton Supreme Court reasoned that, ‘‘when a statute is ambiguous . . . there is the well known rule of statu- tory interpretation that the construction placed [on] a statute by an administrative agency charged with its administration and enforcement, while not absolutely controlling [on] the courts, should be given great weight in determining legislative intent. . . . 2022For example, in Hama Hama Co. v. Shorelines Hearings Board, 85 Wn. 2d 441 , 536 P.2d 157 (1975), the Washing- ton Supreme Court reasoned that, ‘‘when a statute is ambiguous . . . there is the well known rule of statu- tory interpretation that the construction placed [on] a statute by an administrative agency charged with its administration and enforcement, while not absolutely controlling [on] the courts, should be given great weight in determining legislative intent. . . . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Marquard v. Florida
green
1 sentence2020This is known as the defense fallacy, and it ‘‘understat[es] the tendency of a reported match to strengthen source probability and narrow the group of potential suspects. . . . [T]he real source probability will reflect the relative strength of circum- stantial evidence connecting the defendant and other persons with matching DNA to the scene of the crime.’’ (Emphasis omitted; footnote omitted.) United States v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144, 1157 (9th Cir. 1994) (overruled in part on other grounds by United States v. Preston, 751 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2014)), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1132 , 115 S. Ct. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
White v. United States
green
1 sentence2020This is known as the defense fallacy, and it ‘‘understat[es] the tendency of a reported match to strengthen source probability and narrow the group of potential suspects. . . . [T]he real source probability will reflect the relative strength of circum- stantial evidence connecting the defendant and other persons with matching DNA to the scene of the crime.’’ (Emphasis omitted; footnote omitted.) United States v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144, 1157 (9th Cir. 1994) (overruled in part on other grounds by United States v. Preston, 751 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2014)), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1132 , 115 S. Ct. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Wagoner v. United States
green
1 sentence2020This is known as the defense fallacy, and it ‘‘understat[es] the tendency of a reported match to strengthen source probability and narrow the group of potential suspects. . . . [T]he real source probability will reflect the relative strength of circum- stantial evidence connecting the defendant and other persons with matching DNA to the scene of the crime.’’ (Emphasis omitted; footnote omitted.) United States v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144, 1157 (9th Cir. 1994) (overruled in part on other grounds by United States v. Preston, 751 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2014)), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1132 , 115 S. Ct. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
United States v. Tymond Preston
green
1 sentence2020This is known as the defense fallacy, and it ‘‘understat[es] the tendency of a reported match to strengthen source probability and narrow the group of potential suspects. . . . [T]he real source probability will reflect the relative strength of circum- stantial evidence connecting the defendant and other persons with matching DNA to the scene of the crime.’’ (Emphasis omitted; footnote omitted.) United States v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144, 1157 (9th Cir. 1994) (overruled in part on other grounds by United States v. Preston, 751 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2014)), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1132 , 115 S. Ct. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Williams v. Williams
green
2 sentences2019In determin- ing whether a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reason- able presumption in favor of the correctness of its action.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Williams v. Williams, 276 Conn. 491 , 496–97, 886 A.2d 817 (2005). 2019In determin- ing whether a trial court has abused its broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reason- able presumption in favor of the correctness of its action.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Williams v. Williams, 276 Conn. 491 , 496–97, 886 A.2d 817 (2005). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Scribner v. O'Brien, Inc.
green
1 sentence2003An "agent is not liable where, acting within the scope of his authority, he contracts with a third party for a known principle." Scribner v. O'Brien, Inc. , 169 Conn. 389 , 404 , 363 A.2d 106 (1975). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
State v. Barrett
green
2 sentences1999Ed. 1461 (1938), as the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” State v. Barrett, 205 Conn. 437, 450 , 534 A.2d 219 (1987). 1999Ed. 1461 (1938), as the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.” State v. Barrett, 205 Conn. 437, 450 , 534 A.2d 219 (1987). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Bailey v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act
green
1 sentence1997Bailey, Supra . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Berkowitz v. Berkowitz
green
2 sentences1996The burden of proof, in such a situation, is shifted, and there is imposed upon the beneficiary the obligation of disproving, by a clear preponderance of evidence, the exertion of undue influence by him." Berkowitz v. Berkowitz, 147 Conn. 474 , 476-77 , 162 A.2d 709 (1960) (Internal citations omitted). 1996The burden of proof, in such a situation, is shifted, and there is imposed upon the beneficiary the obligation of disproving, by a clear preponderance of evidence, the exertion of undue influence by him." Berkowitz v. Berkowitz, 147 Conn. 474 , 476-77 , 162 A.2d 709 (1960) (Internal citations omitted). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Klein v. Chatfield
green
1 sentence1993She had no power to "terminate" by withdrawing the "consideration." The principal case relied on by the defendant, Klein v. Chatfield, 166 Conn. 76 (1974) stands only for the well known principle of contract law that an offer can be withdrawn before its acceptance is communicated. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Town of West Hartford v. Gelinas
green
2 sentences1992The court in West Hartford v. Gelinas, 18 Conn. App. 688 , 559 A.2d 1176 (1989), stated: If the plaintiffs were not a municipality and its officers, their laxity in enforcement of a known violation might give rise to a defense of laches. 1992The court in West Hartford v. Gelinas, 18 Conn. App. 688 , 559 A.2d 1176 (1989), stated: If the plaintiffs were not a municipality and its officers, their laxity in enforcement of a known violation might give rise to a defense of laches. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
McCarthy v. Tierney
neutral
2 sentences1950“It is a well known rule of testamentary interpretation that where the intention of the testator is expressed in an ambiguous or obscure manner, such a construction should be adopted, if consistent with other testamentary rules, as will dispose of the prop *594 erty in a just, natural and reasonable manner.” McCarthy v. Tierney, 113 Conn. 316, 322 , 155 A. 226 . 1950“It is a well known rule of testamentary interpretation that where the intention of the testator is expressed in an ambiguous or obscure manner, such a construction should be adopted, if consistent with other testamentary rules, as will dispose of the prop *594 erty in a just, natural and reasonable manner.” McCarthy v. Tierney, 113 Conn. 316, 322 , 155 A. 226 . | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Lepard v. Clapp
neutral
2 sentences1940“It is a well known rule in the construction of wills, that where the testator shows a particular and also a general intent, which are inconsistent with each other, the general intent will be established and the particular one disregarded, if the will can fairly be so read, considered as a whole.” Walsh v. McCutcheon, 71 Conn. 283, 286 , 41 Atl. 813 ; Hurd v. Shelton, 64 Conn. 496, 500 , 30 Atl. 766 ; Pinney v. Newton, 66 Conn. 141, 152 , 33 Atl. 591 ; Lepard v. Clapp, 80 Conn. 29, 32 , 66 Atl. 780 . 1940“It is a well known rule in the construction of wills, that where the testator shows a particular and also a general intent, which are inconsistent with each other, the general intent will be established and the particular one disregarded, if the will can fairly be so read, considered as a whole.” Walsh v. McCutcheon, 71 Conn. 283, 286 , 41 Atl. 813 ; Hurd v. Shelton, 64 Conn. 496, 500 , 30 Atl. 766 ; Pinney v. Newton, 66 Conn. 141, 152 , 33 Atl. 591 ; Lepard v. Clapp, 80 Conn. 29, 32 , 66 Atl. 780 . | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Hurd v. Shelton
neutral
2 sentences1940“It is a well known rule in the construction of wills, that where the testator shows a particular and also a general intent, which are inconsistent with each other, the general intent will be established and the particular one disregarded, if the will can fairly be so read, considered as a whole.” Walsh v. McCutcheon, 71 Conn. 283, 286 , 41 Atl. 813 ; Hurd v. Shelton, 64 Conn. 496, 500 , 30 Atl. 766 ; Pinney v. Newton, 66 Conn. 141, 152 , 33 Atl. 591 ; Lepard v. Clapp, 80 Conn. 29, 32 , 66 Atl. 780 . 1940“It is a well known rule in the construction of wills, that where the testator shows a particular and also a general intent, which are inconsistent with each other, the general intent will be established and the particular one disregarded, if the will can fairly be so read, considered as a whole.” Walsh v. McCutcheon, 71 Conn. 283, 286 , 41 Atl. 813 ; Hurd v. Shelton, 64 Conn. 496, 500 , 30 Atl. 766 ; Pinney v. Newton, 66 Conn. 141, 152 , 33 Atl. 591 ; Lepard v. Clapp, 80 Conn. 29, 32 , 66 Atl. 780 . | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Pinney v. Newton
neutral
2 sentences1940“It is a well known rule in the construction of wills, that where the testator shows a particular and also a general intent, which are inconsistent with each other, the general intent will be established and the particular one disregarded, if the will can fairly be so read, considered as a whole.” Walsh v. McCutcheon, 71 Conn. 283, 286 , 41 Atl. 813 ; Hurd v. Shelton, 64 Conn. 496, 500 , 30 Atl. 766 ; Pinney v. Newton, 66 Conn. 141, 152 , 33 Atl. 591 ; Lepard v. Clapp, 80 Conn. 29, 32 , 66 Atl. 780 . 1940“It is a well known rule in the construction of wills, that where the testator shows a particular and also a general intent, which are inconsistent with each other, the general intent will be established and the particular one disregarded, if the will can fairly be so read, considered as a whole.” Walsh v. McCutcheon, 71 Conn. 283, 286 , 41 Atl. 813 ; Hurd v. Shelton, 64 Conn. 496, 500 , 30 Atl. 766 ; Pinney v. Newton, 66 Conn. 141, 152 , 33 Atl. 591 ; Lepard v. Clapp, 80 Conn. 29, 32 , 66 Atl. 780 . | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Walsh v. McCutcheon
green
2 sentences1940“It is a well known rule in the construction of wills, that where the testator shows a particular and also a general intent, which are inconsistent with each other, the general intent will be established and the particular one disregarded, if the will can fairly be so read, considered as a whole.” Walsh v. McCutcheon, 71 Conn. 283, 286 , 41 Atl. 813 ; Hurd v. Shelton, 64 Conn. 496, 500 , 30 Atl. 766 ; Pinney v. Newton, 66 Conn. 141, 152 , 33 Atl. 591 ; Lepard v. Clapp, 80 Conn. 29, 32 , 66 Atl. 780 . 1940“It is a well known rule in the construction of wills, that where the testator shows a particular and also a general intent, which are inconsistent with each other, the general intent will be established and the particular one disregarded, if the will can fairly be so read, considered as a whole.” Walsh v. McCutcheon, 71 Conn. 283, 286 , 41 Atl. 813 ; Hurd v. Shelton, 64 Conn. 496, 500 , 30 Atl. 766 ; Pinney v. Newton, 66 Conn. 141, 152 , 33 Atl. 591 ; Lepard v. Clapp, 80 Conn. 29, 32 , 66 Atl. 780 . | 1 | 1940–1940 |
Connecticut Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Chase
green
2 sentences1935Leake v. Watson, 60 Conn. 498, 506 , 21 Atl. 1075 ; Connecticut Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Chase, 75 Conn. 683, 692 , 55 Atl. 171 ; Bartlett v. Sears, 81 Conn. 34, 39 , 70 Atl. 33 . 1935Leake v. Watson, 60 Conn. 498, 506 , 21 Atl. 1075 ; Connecticut Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Chase, 75 Conn. 683, 692 , 55 Atl. 171 ; Bartlett v. Sears, 81 Conn. 34, 39 , 70 Atl. 33 . | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Bartlett v. Sears
green
2 sentences1935Leake v. Watson, 60 Conn. 498, 506 , 21 Atl. 1075 ; Connecticut Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Chase, 75 Conn. 683, 692 , 55 Atl. 171 ; Bartlett v. Sears, 81 Conn. 34, 39 , 70 Atl. 33 . 1935Leake v. Watson, 60 Conn. 498, 506 , 21 Atl. 1075 ; Connecticut Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Chase, 75 Conn. 683, 692 , 55 Atl. 171 ; Bartlett v. Sears, 81 Conn. 34, 39 , 70 Atl. 33 . | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Leake v. Watson
green
2 sentences1935Leake v. Watson, 60 Conn. 498, 506 , 21 Atl. 1075 ; Connecticut Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Chase, 75 Conn. 683, 692 , 55 Atl. 171 ; Bartlett v. Sears, 81 Conn. 34, 39 , 70 Atl. 33 . 1935Leake v. Watson, 60 Conn. 498, 506 , 21 Atl. 1075 ; Connecticut Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Chase, 75 Conn. 683, 692 , 55 Atl. 171 ; Bartlett v. Sears, 81 Conn. 34, 39 , 70 Atl. 33 . | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Tingier v. Woodruff
neutral
2 sentences1931Willcox v. Beecher, 27 Conn. 134, 139 ; Tingier v. Woodruff, 84 Conn. 684, 688 , 81 Atl. 967 ; 40 Cyc. p. 1411, and cases cited. 1931Willcox v. Beecher, 27 Conn. 134, 139 ; Tingier v. Woodruff, 84 Conn. 684, 688 , 81 Atl. 967 ; 40 Cyc. p. 1411, and cases cited. | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Willcox v. Beecher
green
1 sentence1931Willcox v. Beecher, 27 Conn. 134, 139 ; Tingier v. Woodruff, 84 Conn. 684, 688 , 81 Atl. 967 ; 40 Cyc. p. 1411, and cases cited. | 1 | 1931–1931 |
Phelps v. Robbins
neutral
1 sentence1904The English rule appears to prevail in many of our sister States; but the question whether it prevails in this State, and if so, with what limitations and under what conditions, was left undetermined in Phelps v. Robbins, 40 Conn. 250 , and has never been passed upon since. | 1 | 1904–1904 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.