41 Texas opinions name it 4 courts 1893–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ryland Group, Inc. v. Hoodgreen2 sentences2025This failure to notify amounts to a conceal- ment of a known violation of the specifications and industry practice.” Id. at 122 . 2025The Court held that the affiant’s “understanding” was not sufficient to show per- sonal knowledge and his statement that the “‘failure to notify amounts to conceal- ment or a known violation of the specifications and industry practice’ [was] conclu- sory” and “[t]herefore … d[id] not raise a fact issue.” Id. | 2 | 4 |
TX Far West, Ltd. v. Texas Investments Management, Inc.green2 sentences2011Mgmt., Inc., 127 S.W.3d 295, 307-08 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, no pet.) (holding that affiant’s opinion that restrictive covenant had neither been abandoned nor its enforcement waived stated only legal conclusion and thus could not support summary judgment). 2011Mgmt., Inc. , 127 S.W.3d 295 , 307–08 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.) (holding that affiant’s opinion that restrictive covenant had neither been abandoned nor its enforcement waived stated only legal conclusion and thus could not support summary judgment). | 1 | 2 |
Farmers' & Mechanics' National Bank v. Hanksgreen2 sentences1999Hanks, 137 S.W. 1120,1123-24 (Tex. 1911); accordSfanfordv. 1999Hanks , 137 S.W. 1120 , 1123-24 (Tex. 1911); accord Stanford v . | 1 | 2 |
Realty Portfolio, Inc. v. Hamiltongreen1 sentence2015Woodward v. Ortiz, 237 S.W.2d 286, 289 (Tex. 1951); Realty Portfolio, Inc. v. Hamilton (In re Hamilton), 125 F.3d 292, 299 (5th Cir. 1997) (“A hypothetical purchaser on inquiry notice is chargeable with imputed knowledge of facts that would have been discovered by a reasonably diligent inquiry.”). | 1 | 1 |
Woodward v. Ortizgreen1 sentence2015Woodward v. Ortiz, 237 S.W.2d 286, 289 (Tex. 1951); Realty Portfolio, Inc. v. Hamilton (In re Hamilton), 125 F.3d 292, 299 (5th Cir. 1997) (“A hypothetical purchaser on inquiry notice is chargeable with imputed knowledge of facts that would have been discovered by a reasonably diligent inquiry.”). | 1 | 1 |
GP Plastics Corp. v. Interboro Packaging Corp.green1 sentence2015No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 7 Giant Eagle's Motion to Strike Page 21 R482 Wellogix, Inc. v. SAP America, Inc., 58 F.Supp.3d 766 (2014) waiver inquiry: that a party cannot waive its forum-selection clause right[ ] unless that party possessed an actual intent When addressing waiver of a forum-selection clause, 39 however, the Fifth Circuit applied Texas law and concluded to relinquish that right.” Although there is some support *774 for this proposition, the correct source of the governing that waiver requires an intent to relinquish a known rule remains unclear. right. 40 See GP | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Stategreen1 sentence2013Self- defense is inapplicable if the actor said or did something to provoke the other’s use or attempted use of unlawful force as a pretext for inflicting harm upon the other; this is known as the doctrine of provocation or ―provoking the difficulty.‖ Id. § 9.31(b)(4); Smith v. State, 965 S.W.2d 509, 512 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Southmark Corp. v. Trotter, Smith & Jacobsgreen2 sentences1997See Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414, 417 (3rd Cir.1988)(where debtor failed to disclose counterclaim against the very bank whose acts led to bankruptcy, “the silence ... is deafening”); Southmark Corp. v. Trotter, Smith & Jacobs, 212 Ga.App. 454 , 442 S.E.2d 265, 267 (1994)(where there was no reference to any claim against defendants, no later assertion of those claims would be allowed); Hyre v. Denise, 214 Ga.App. 552 , 449 S.E.2d 120, 125 (1994)(Georgia court applies Southmark without discussion); but see Cleasby v. Security Federal Savings Bank, 243 Mont. 306 1997See Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414, 417 (3rd Cir.1988)(where debtor failed to disclose counterclaim against the very bank whose acts led to bankruptcy, “the silence ... is deafening”); Southmark Corp. v. Trotter, Smith & Jacobs, 212 Ga.App. 454 , 442 S.E.2d 265, 267 (1994)(where there was no reference to any claim against defendants, no later assertion of those claims would be allowed); Hyre v. Denise, 214 Ga.App. 552 , 449 S.E.2d 120, 125 (1994)(Georgia court applies Southmark without discussion); but see Cleasby v. Security Federal Savings Bank, 243 Mont. 306 | 1 | 1 |
cluster 507099green1 sentence1997See Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414, 417 (3rd Cir.1988)(where debtor failed to disclose counterclaim against the very bank whose acts led to bankruptcy, “the silence ... is deafening”); Southmark Corp. v. Trotter, Smith & Jacobs, 212 Ga.App. 454 , 442 S.E.2d 265, 267 (1994)(where there was no reference to any claim against defendants, no later assertion of those claims would be allowed); Hyre v. Denise, 214 Ga.App. 552 , 449 S.E.2d 120, 125 (1994)(Georgia court applies Southmark without discussion); but see Cleasby v. Security Federal Savings Bank, 243 Mont. 306 | 1 | 1 |
Hyre v. Denisegreen2 sentences1997See Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414, 417 (3rd Cir.1988)(where debtor failed to disclose counterclaim against the very bank whose acts led to bankruptcy, “the silence ... is deafening”); Southmark Corp. v. Trotter, Smith & Jacobs, 212 Ga.App. 454 , 442 S.E.2d 265, 267 (1994)(where there was no reference to any claim against defendants, no later assertion of those claims would be allowed); Hyre v. Denise, 214 Ga.App. 552 , 449 S.E.2d 120, 125 (1994)(Georgia court applies Southmark without discussion); but see Cleasby v. Security Federal Savings Bank, 243 Mont. 306 1997See Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414, 417 (3rd Cir.1988)(where debtor failed to disclose counterclaim against the very bank whose acts led to bankruptcy, “the silence ... is deafening”); Southmark Corp. v. Trotter, Smith & Jacobs, 212 Ga.App. 454 , 442 S.E.2d 265, 267 (1994)(where there was no reference to any claim against defendants, no later assertion of those claims would be allowed); Hyre v. Denise, 214 Ga.App. 552 , 449 S.E.2d 120, 125 (1994)(Georgia court applies Southmark without discussion); but see Cleasby v. Security Federal Savings Bank, 243 Mont. 306 | 1 | 1 |
Rodriguez v. Naylor Industries, Inc.green1 sentence1995Rodriguez v. Naylor Ind., Inc., 763 S.W.2d 411, 413 (Tex.1989). | 1 | 1 |
Roark v. Allengreen1 sentence1982Dr. McMillin’s liability was also predicated upon the jury’s findings that he failed to explain to appellee the operative procedure or those risks, complications, dangers, or hazards of the Devine patch graft urethro-plasty which would have been explained by a reasonable medical practitioner of the same school and community, and situated under the same or similar circumstances; and that had he done so appellee would not have permitted the operation. 1 This is known as the doctrine of informed consent. *841 Roark v. Allen, 633 S.W.2d 804, 808 (Tex.1982). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cleasby v. Security Federal Savings Bankyellow2 sentences1997See Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414, 417 (3rd Cir.1988)(where debtor failed to disclose counterclaim against the very bank whose acts led to bankruptcy, “the silence ... is deafening”); Southmark Corp. v. Trotter, Smith & Jacobs, 212 Ga.App. 454 , 442 S.E.2d 265, 267 (1994)(where there was no reference to any claim against defendants, no later assertion of those claims would be allowed); Hyre v. Denise, 214 Ga.App. 552 , 449 S.E.2d 120, 125 (1994)(Georgia court applies Southmark without discussion); but see Cleasby v. Security Federal Savings Bank, 243 Mont. 306 1997See Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414, 417 (3rd Cir.1988)(where debtor failed to disclose counterclaim against the very bank whose acts led to bankruptcy, “the silence ... is deafening”); Southmark Corp. v. Trotter, Smith & Jacobs, 212 Ga.App. 454 , 442 S.E.2d 265, 267 (1994)(where there was no reference to any claim against defendants, no later assertion of those claims would be allowed); Hyre v. Denise, 214 Ga.App. 552 , 449 S.E.2d 120, 125 (1994)(Georgia court applies Southmark without discussion); but see Cleasby v. Security Federal Savings Bank, 243 Mont. 306 | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Babbitt v. Norfolk & Western Railway Company
green
2 sentences2022But under Section 5, that release could only go so far: “To be valid, a release must reflect a bargained-for settlement of a known claim for a specific injury, as contrasted with an attempt to extinguish potential future claims the employee might have arising from injuries known or unknown by him.” Id. 2022The release would bar the plaintiffs’ claims only if it “was clearly executed as a settlement for” their “specific injuries in controversy.” Id. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Wellogix, Inc. v. SAP America, Inc.
green
1 sentence2015No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 7 Giant Eagle's Motion to Strike Page 21 R482 Wellogix, Inc. v. SAP America, Inc., 58 F.Supp.3d 766 (2014) waiver inquiry: that a party cannot waive its forum-selection clause right[ ] unless that party possessed an actual intent When addressing waiver of a forum-selection clause, 39 however, the Fifth Circuit applied Texas law and concluded to relinquish that right.” Although there is some support *774 for this proposition, the correct source of the governing that waiver requires an intent to relinquish a known rule remains unclear. right. 40 See GP | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Cuellar v. State
green
1 sentence1987Cuellar v. State, 521 S.W.2d 277 (Tex.Crim.App. 1975); International Fidelity Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey v. Sheriff of Dallas County, 476 S.W.2d 115 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Attorney General Opinion Nos. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
International Fidelity Insurance Co. of Newark v. Sheriff of Dallas County
green
1 sentence1987Cuellar v. State, 521 S.W.2d 277 (Tex.Crim.App. 1975); International Fidelity Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey v. Sheriff of Dallas County, 476 S.W.2d 115 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Attorney General Opinion Nos. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Thomas v. State
green
1 sentence1986This is known as the doctrine of “curative admissibility.” See and cf. Thomas v. State, 572 S.W.2d 507 (Tex.Cr.App.1978). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Jackson v. Virginia
red
2 sentences1985Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Wilson v. State, 654 S.W.2d 465 (Tex.Crim.App.1983). 1985Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Wilson v. State, 654 S.W.2d 465 (Tex.Crim.App.1983). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Wilson v. State
green
1 sentence1985Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Wilson v. State, 654 S.W.2d 465 (Tex.Crim.App.1983). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Bonner v. State
green
1 sentence1984The appellant cites and relies solely on Bonner v. State, 426 S.W.2d 869 (Tex.Cr. *393 App.1968), which stated the well known rule that: "`Where the state introduces statements in evidence which are exculpatory, it is ordinarily incumbent upon the court to instruct the jury that the exculpatory statements are regarded as true unless disproved. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Stockton v. State
neutral
2 sentences1979If not ruled directly by Stockton v. State, 146 Tex.Cr.R. 164 , 171 S.W.2d 877 (1943), that decision is enough to persuade me that the argument was improper. 1979If not ruled directly by Stockton v. State, 146 Tex.Cr.R. 164 , 171 S.W.2d 877 (1943), that decision is enough to persuade me that the argument was improper. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Cullers v. Platt
green
2 sentences1976Cullers v. Platt, 81 Tex. 258 , 16 S.W. 1003 (1891); 19 Tex.Jur.2d Deeds § 114 (1960). 1976Cullers v. Platt, 81 Tex. 258 , 16 S.W. 1003 (1891); 19 Tex.Jur.2d Deeds § 114 (1960). | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Colunga v. State
green
2 sentences1973The well known test for determining the evidence required to support a conviction in addition to the testimony of an accomplice witness has recently been stated in Colunga v. State, 481 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. Cr.App.1972) in the following language: "The test of the sufficiency of such corroboration is to eliminate the evidence of the accomplice from consideration and then to examine the evidence of other witnesses to determine if there is inculpatory evidence, evidence of an incriminating nature which tends to connect the accused with the commission of the offense. 1973The well known test for determining the evidence required to support a conviction in addition to the testimony of an accomplice witness has recently been stated in Colunga v. State, 481 S.W.2d 866 (Tex.Cr.App.1972) in the following language: “The test of the sufficiency of such corroboration is to eliminate the evidence of the accomplice from consideration and then to examine the evidence of other witnesses to determine if there is inculpatory evidence, evidence of an incriminating nature which tends to connect the accused with the commission of the offense. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Von Hutchins v. Pope green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Lobley v. Gilbert
green
2 sentences1969It is argued that even if the notary did not sign the certificate of acknowledgment the deed was nevertheless valid since no acknowledgment was necessary, citing Webb v. Webb, 148 Tex. 405 , 224 S.W.2d 868 (1949) ; Masterson v. Bouldin, 151 SW.2d 301 (Tex.Civ.App., Eastland 1941, writ ref’d); Lobley v. Gilbert, 149 Tex. 493 , 236 S.W.2d 121 (1951); Hearne v. Bradshaw, 158 Tex. 453 , 312 S.W.2d 948 (1958); Von Hutchins v. Pope Lumber Co., 351 S.W.2d 642 (Tex.Civ.App., Houston 1961, writ ref’d n. r. e.); Clements v. Ewing, 71 Tex. 370 , 9 S.W. 312 (1888); and Bennett v. Montgomery, 3 Tex.Civ.App 1969It is argued that even if the notary did not sign the certificate of acknowledgment the deed was nevertheless valid since no acknowledgment was necessary, citing Webb v. Webb, 148 Tex. 405 , 224 S.W.2d 868 (1949) ; Masterson v. Bouldin, 151 SW.2d 301 (Tex.Civ.App., Eastland 1941, writ ref’d); Lobley v. Gilbert, 149 Tex. 493 , 236 S.W.2d 121 (1951); Hearne v. Bradshaw, 158 Tex. 453 , 312 S.W.2d 948 (1958); Von Hutchins v. Pope Lumber Co., 351 S.W.2d 642 (Tex.Civ.App., Houston 1961, writ ref’d n. r. e.); Clements v. Ewing, 71 Tex. 370 , 9 S.W. 312 (1888); and Bennett v. Montgomery, 3 Tex.Civ.App | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Hearne v. Bradshaw
green
1 sentence1969It is argued that even if the notary did not sign the certificate of acknowledgment the deed was nevertheless valid since no acknowledgment was necessary, citing Webb v. Webb, 148 Tex. 405 , 224 S.W.2d 868 (1949) ; Masterson v. Bouldin, 151 SW.2d 301 (Tex.Civ.App., Eastland 1941, writ ref’d); Lobley v. Gilbert, 149 Tex. 493 , 236 S.W.2d 121 (1951); Hearne v. Bradshaw, 158 Tex. 453 , 312 S.W.2d 948 (1958); Von Hutchins v. Pope Lumber Co., 351 S.W.2d 642 (Tex.Civ.App., Houston 1961, writ ref’d n. r. e.); Clements v. Ewing, 71 Tex. 370 , 9 S.W. 312 (1888); and Bennett v. Montgomery, 3 Tex.Civ.App | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Bennett v. Montgomery
green
2 sentences1969It is argued that even if the notary did not sign the certificate of acknowledgment the deed was nevertheless valid since no acknowledgment was necessary, citing Webb v. Webb, 148 Tex. 405 , 224 S.W.2d 868 (1949) ; Masterson v. Bouldin, 151 SW.2d 301 (Tex.Civ.App., Eastland 1941, writ ref’d); Lobley v. Gilbert, 149 Tex. 493 , 236 S.W.2d 121 (1951); Hearne v. Bradshaw, 158 Tex. 453 , 312 S.W.2d 948 (1958); Von Hutchins v. Pope Lumber Co., 351 S.W.2d 642 (Tex.Civ.App., Houston 1961, writ ref’d n. r. e.); Clements v. Ewing, 71 Tex. 370 , 9 S.W. 312 (1888); and Bennett v. Montgomery, 3 Tex.Civ.App 1969It is argued that even if the notary did not sign the certificate of acknowledgment the deed was nevertheless valid since no acknowledgment was necessary, citing Webb v. Webb, 148 Tex. 405 , 224 S.W.2d 868 (1949) ; Masterson v. Bouldin, 151 SW.2d 301 (Tex.Civ.App., Eastland 1941, writ ref’d); Lobley v. Gilbert, 149 Tex. 493 , 236 S.W.2d 121 (1951); Hearne v. Bradshaw, 158 Tex. 453 , 312 S.W.2d 948 (1958); Von Hutchins v. Pope Lumber Co., 351 S.W.2d 642 (Tex.Civ.App., Houston 1961, writ ref’d n. r. e.); Clements v. Ewing, 71 Tex. 370 , 9 S.W. 312 (1888); and Bennett v. Montgomery, 3 Tex.Civ.App | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Masterson v. Bouldin green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Clements v. Ewing
green
2 sentences1969It is argued that even if the notary did not sign the certificate of acknowledgment the deed was nevertheless valid since no acknowledgment was necessary, citing Webb v. Webb, 148 Tex. 405 , 224 S.W.2d 868 (1949) ; Masterson v. Bouldin, 151 SW.2d 301 (Tex.Civ.App., Eastland 1941, writ ref’d); Lobley v. Gilbert, 149 Tex. 493 , 236 S.W.2d 121 (1951); Hearne v. Bradshaw, 158 Tex. 453 , 312 S.W.2d 948 (1958); Von Hutchins v. Pope Lumber Co., 351 S.W.2d 642 (Tex.Civ.App., Houston 1961, writ ref’d n. r. e.); Clements v. Ewing, 71 Tex. 370 , 9 S.W. 312 (1888); and Bennett v. Montgomery, 3 Tex.Civ.App 1969It is argued that even if the notary did not sign the certificate of acknowledgment the deed was nevertheless valid since no acknowledgment was necessary, citing Webb v. Webb, 148 Tex. 405 , 224 S.W.2d 868 (1949) ; Masterson v. Bouldin, 151 SW.2d 301 (Tex.Civ.App., Eastland 1941, writ ref’d); Lobley v. Gilbert, 149 Tex. 493 , 236 S.W.2d 121 (1951); Hearne v. Bradshaw, 158 Tex. 453 , 312 S.W.2d 948 (1958); Von Hutchins v. Pope Lumber Co., 351 S.W.2d 642 (Tex.Civ.App., Houston 1961, writ ref’d n. r. e.); Clements v. Ewing, 71 Tex. 370 , 9 S.W. 312 (1888); and Bennett v. Montgomery, 3 Tex.Civ.App | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Webb v. Webb
green
2 sentences1969It is argued that even if the notary did not sign the certificate of acknowledgment the deed was nevertheless valid since no acknowledgment was necessary, citing Webb v. Webb, 148 Tex. 405 , 224 S.W.2d 868 (1949) ; Masterson v. Bouldin, 151 SW.2d 301 (Tex.Civ.App., Eastland 1941, writ ref’d); Lobley v. Gilbert, 149 Tex. 493 , 236 S.W.2d 121 (1951); Hearne v. Bradshaw, 158 Tex. 453 , 312 S.W.2d 948 (1958); Von Hutchins v. Pope Lumber Co., 351 S.W.2d 642 (Tex.Civ.App., Houston 1961, writ ref’d n. r. e.); Clements v. Ewing, 71 Tex. 370 , 9 S.W. 312 (1888); and Bennett v. Montgomery, 3 Tex.Civ.App 1969It is argued that even if the notary did not sign the certificate of acknowledgment the deed was nevertheless valid since no acknowledgment was necessary, citing Webb v. Webb, 148 Tex. 405 , 224 S.W.2d 868 (1949) ; Masterson v. Bouldin, 151 SW.2d 301 (Tex.Civ.App., Eastland 1941, writ ref’d); Lobley v. Gilbert, 149 Tex. 493 , 236 S.W.2d 121 (1951); Hearne v. Bradshaw, 158 Tex. 453 , 312 S.W.2d 948 (1958); Von Hutchins v. Pope Lumber Co., 351 S.W.2d 642 (Tex.Civ.App., Houston 1961, writ ref’d n. r. e.); Clements v. Ewing, 71 Tex. 370 , 9 S.W. 312 (1888); and Bennett v. Montgomery, 3 Tex.Civ.App | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Hearne v. Bradshaw
green
1 sentence1969It is argued that even if the notary did not sign the certificate of acknowledgment the deed was nevertheless valid since no acknowledgment was necessary, citing Webb v. Webb, 148 Tex. 405 , 224 S.W.2d 868 (1949) ; Masterson v. Bouldin, 151 SW.2d 301 (Tex.Civ.App., Eastland 1941, writ ref’d); Lobley v. Gilbert, 149 Tex. 493 , 236 S.W.2d 121 (1951); Hearne v. Bradshaw, 158 Tex. 453 , 312 S.W.2d 948 (1958); Von Hutchins v. Pope Lumber Co., 351 S.W.2d 642 (Tex.Civ.App., Houston 1961, writ ref’d n. r. e.); Clements v. Ewing, 71 Tex. 370 , 9 S.W. 312 (1888); and Bennett v. Montgomery, 3 Tex.Civ.App | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Stanford v. Butler green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Employers' Casualty Co. v. Stewart Abstract Co. green | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| In Re King's Estate green | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| Johnson v. Ashby neutral | 1 | 1955–1955 |
| Bradshaw v. McDonald green | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| Clifton George Co. v. Great Southern Life Ins. Co. neutral | 1 | 1947–1947 |
| Corporation of San Felipe De Austin v. State green | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| Weatherly v. Jackson green | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| South Texas Coaches, Inc. v. Eastland green | 1 | 1940–1940 |
| Gladewater Lumber & Supply Co. v. City of Gladewater neutral | 1 | 1939–1939 |
| Hurd v. McClellan green | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| Casas v. State neutral | 1 | 1930–1930 |
| Lehman v. State neutral | 1 | 1930–1930 |
| Ex Parte Massey neutral | 1 | 1930–1930 |
| State v. Moore green | 1 | 1930–1930 |
| Jupe v. State neutral | 1 | 1928–1928 |
| Middleton v. State green | 1 | 1922–1922 |
| People v. Scott green | 1 | 1920–1920 |
| Jordan v. State green | 1 | 1913–1913 |
| Moore v. Hardison neutral | 1 | 1912–1912 |
| Burns v. Town of La Grange green | 1 | 1912–1912 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.