21 Massachusetts opinions name it 4 courts 1841–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.green2 sentences2009Id. at 25 , citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94 . 2009Id. at 25 , citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94 . | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Lanigangreen2 sentences2008Id. 2008Lanigan, 419 Mass. at 26 . | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Bizanowiczgreen1 sentence2014The defendant did not object to the closing argument, or to Drugan’s testimony about the back left pocket. 20 Because “DNA evidence that a particular individual could not be excluded as a potential contributor of the DNA at issue should not be admitted without accompanying statistical evidence of the likelihood that the test could not exclude other individuals in a given population,” Commonwealth v. Bizanowicz, 459 Mass. 400, 409-410 (2011), citing Commonwealth v. Mattei, 455 Mass. 840, 851-855 (2010), we consider the issues raised by the lack of such evidence to determine whether “there is a | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Matteigreen1 sentence2014The defendant did not object to the closing argument, or to Drugan’s testimony about the back left pocket. 20 Because “DNA evidence that a particular individual could not be excluded as a potential contributor of the DNA at issue should not be admitted without accompanying statistical evidence of the likelihood that the test could not exclude other individuals in a given population,” Commonwealth v. Bizanowicz, 459 Mass. 400, 409-410 (2011), citing Commonwealth v. Mattei, 455 Mass. 840, 851-855 (2010), we consider the issues raised by the lack of such evidence to determine whether “there is a | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Amaralgreen1 sentence2002“We start our discussion by restating the well known rule that warrantless entries are per se unreasonable unless they fall within one of the few narrowly drawn exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirements.” Commonwealth v. Amaral, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 230, 233 (1983). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Gregorygreen1 sentence2001We reference the well known standard for introducing and instructing on witness silence: “[Bjefore the Commonwealth [may] question a witness on pretrial silence and thereby implicate that witness as having recently fabricated testimony, the Commonwealth must establish that ‘the witness knew of the pending charges in sufficient detail to realize that he possessed exculpatory information, that the witness had reason to make the information available, that he was familiar with the means of reporting it to the proper authorities, and that the defendant or his lawyer, or both, did not ask the witne | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Robertsgreen1 sentence2001We reference the well known standard for introducing and instructing on witness silence: “[Bjefore the Commonwealth [may] question a witness on pretrial silence and thereby implicate that witness as having recently fabricated testimony, the Commonwealth must establish that ‘the witness knew of the pending charges in sufficient detail to realize that he possessed exculpatory information, that the witness had reason to make the information available, that he was familiar with the means of reporting it to the proper authorities, and that the defendant or his lawyer, or both, did not ask the witne | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Browngreen1 sentence2001We reference the well known standard for introducing and instructing on witness silence: “[Bjefore the Commonwealth [may] question a witness on pretrial silence and thereby implicate that witness as having recently fabricated testimony, the Commonwealth must establish that ‘the witness knew of the pending charges in sufficient detail to realize that he possessed exculpatory information, that the witness had reason to make the information available, that he was familiar with the means of reporting it to the proper authorities, and that the defendant or his lawyer, or both, did not ask the witne | 1 | 1 |
Katz v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1983Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). | 1 | 1 |
Cluff v. Mutual Benefit Life Insurancegreen1 sentence1976Co., 13 Allen 308 , 309 (1866), S.C. 99 Mass. 317, 333 (1868), involved a policy which was to be void if the insured should die “in the known violation of any law of these states.” He died in an attempt to seize the property of another; on the fourth trial it was left to the jury whether he had a felonious intent, and this court upheld a jury verdict for the beneficiary. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Reab v. Moor
neutral
2 sentences1851The case of Read v. Moor, 19 Johns. 337 , was like this in being an entire contract for a sum to be paid for a year’s service, and the court held that the plaintiff, having left the service within the year, could not recover pro rata. 1851The case of Reab v. Moor, 19 Johns. 337 , was like this in being an entire contract for a sum to be paid for a year’s service, and the court held that the plaintiff, having left the service within the year, could not recover pro rata. | 2 | 1851–1851 |
Lewis v. Ariens Co.
green
1 sentence2001As noted by the Appeals Court, this motion “had no basis in a known rule of civil procedure.” Lewis v. Ariens Co., 49 Mass. App. Ct. 301 , 304 n.7 (2000). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Gordon v. O'Brien
green
1 sentence1970Gordon v. O’Brien, 320 Mass. 739, 740 . | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Mariano v. Building Inspector of Marlborough
green
1 sentence1970We apply the well known standard of review “testing whether the order for dismissal is warranted by the judge’s findings subject to their being supported by the reported evidence.” Mariano v. Building Inspector of Marlborough, 353 Mass. 663, 665 . | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Board of Assessors v. Suffolk Law School
green
1 sentence1960In Assessors of Boston v. Suffolk Law School, 295 Mass. 489 , a taxpayer made application to the assessors for an abatement of a real estate tax but did not use a form approved by the commissioner of corporations and taxation as required by St. 1933, c. 266, § 1, amending G. | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Hiller v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.
neutral
1 sentence1959Co. 324 Mass. 24, 25 ; and the defendant has not argued that any of the other counts are bad. | 1 | 1959–1959 |
Kraiterman v. City of Boston
green
1 sentence1948In that case, the court, citing Bolster v. Lawrence, supra, repeated the well known principle that “there is no such exoneration of a municipality from liability for negligent acts of its officers or employees in the performance of functions commercial in character, undertaken for its own profit or to protect or benefit its corporate interests.” Recovery was also denied in Kraiterman v. Boston, 303 Mass. 209 , because “there was nothing in the record to show, and it cannot be assumed, that the paving division of the department of public works was engaged in work voluntarily undertaken, in part | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Baumgardner v. City of Boston
green
1 sentence1948In that case, the court, citing Bolster v. Lawrence, supra, repeated the well known principle that “there is no such exoneration of a municipality from liability for negligent acts of its officers or employees in the performance of functions commercial in character, undertaken for its own profit or to protect or benefit its corporate interests.” Recovery was also denied in Kraiterman v. Boston, 303 Mass. 209 , because “there was nothing in the record to show, and it cannot be assumed, that the paving division of the department of public works was engaged in work voluntarily undertaken, in part | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Minot v. Thompson
neutral
1 sentence1938Minot v. Thompson, 106 Mass. 583, 585 . | 1 | 1938–1938 |
Carter v. Towne
green
1 sentence1922Carter v. Towne, 98 Mass. 567 . | 1 | 1922–1922 |
Boston Music Hall Ass'n v. Cory
green
1 sentence1896Boston Music Hall Association v. Cory, 129 Mass. 435 , Chase v. Hubbard, 153 Mass. 91 . | 1 | 1896–1896 |
Chase v. Hubbard
green
1 sentence1896Boston Music Hall Association v. Cory, 129 Mass. 435 , Chase v. Hubbard, 153 Mass. 91 . | 1 | 1896–1896 |
Inhabitants of Townsend v. Inhabitants of Billerica
neutral
1 sentence1850J., says: “ Setting out with the known principle, that any man having a legal settlement in any town in the state, does not lose it but by gaining a settlement in some other town in the state.” In the case of Townsend v. Billerica, 10 Mass. 411,413 , the court say: “ The general principle, that a settlement in a town in this commonwealth is not lost until another settlement in some other town within the commonwealth is gained, applies in this case. | 1 | 1850–1850 |
Stokes v. Kirkpatrick
neutral
1 sentence1844The case is then brought within the well known rule, that where a new right is conferred by statute, and a special remedy is provided, the special remedy must be pursued. 1 Met. 138, 139 . | 1 | 1844–1844 |
Bickford v. Page
green
1 sentence1841In the case of Bickford v. Page, 2 Mass. 455 , it was decided that the covenant of seizin, having been broken immediately on the execution of the deed, was then a chose in action, and not assignable. | 1 | 1841–1841 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.