known rule in Indiana

1983This result is mandated by the wording of the statute which requires a ‘knowing violation’ of a rule rather than merely a violation of a known rule, and by the holdings in several Indiana cases which state that misconduct which will justify the discharge of an employee so as to make the employee ineligible for unemployment compensation is ‘wanton or willful disregard for the employer’s interests, a deliberate violation of the employer’s rules, or a wrongful intent.’ (emphasis added) Merkle v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, (1950) 120 Ind.App. 108, 112 , 90 N.E.2d 524

1983This result is mandated by the wording of the statute which requires a ‘knowing violation’ of a rule rather than merely a violation of a known rule, and by the holdings in several Indiana cases which state that misconduct which will justify the discharge of an employee so as to make the employee ineligible for unemployment compensation is ‘wanton or willful disregard for the employer’s interests, a deliberate violation of the employer’s rules, or a wrongful intent.’ (emphasis added) Merkle v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division, (1950) 120 Ind.App. 108, 112 , 90 N.E.2d 524

2017Id. [23] The Employer presented evidence that J.G. had received a copy of the employee handbook which included the workplace rules 1, 10, and 14.

2011Id.

1894“Where a new right is created, and a specific mode of relief provided, the remedy is confined to the mode prescribed.” Ryan v. Ray, 105 Ind. 101 . ‘ 'When a statute creates a new right, and prescribes a mode of enforcing it, that mode must be pursued to the exclusion of all other remedies. ,This is a well known rule, and under it this court held in the case of Storms v. Stevens, 104 Ind. 46 , that a ditch assessment could be collected in no other mode than that prescribed by the above statute,” says Coeeey, J., in Edgerton v. Huntington School Tp., 126 Ind. 261 .

1890This is a well known rule, and under it this court held in the case of Storms v. Stevens, 104 Ind. 46 , that a ditch assessment could be collected in no other mode than that prescribed by the above statute. * If, therefore, the assessments against the land described in the complaint constitute a lien thereon, such lien is to be enforced by an advertisement and sale of the land for such sum as it will bring at public auction, as other lands are sold for delinquent taxes.

1894Brown v. Buzan, 24 Ind. 194 ; Anderson v. Caldwell, 91 Ind. 451 ; State, ex rel., v. Insurance Co., etc., 115 Ind. 257 ; State, ex rel., v. Denny, Mayor, 118 Ind. 382 ; Parker v. State, ex rel., 133 Ind. 178 .

1892Parker v. State, ex rel., 133 Ind. 178 .

2019This is known as the doctrine of "continuing wrong." Id.

2014Id. at 1020 .

2010Id. at 185 .

2005INS Investigations Bureau, 784 N.E.2d at 578 .

2000Id.

2000Id.

1989Foster, 428 N.E.2d at 1355 .

1986Henry, 217 Ind. at 36 , 24 N.E.2d at 920 .

1985Furthermore, the Morgan court determined that their holding did not “violate the well known rule that a party in a criminal case shall not be compelled to furnish evidence against himself, for as we have seen, when prosecuted criminally, his conduct in refusing to testify in the civil case can not be given in evidence against him.” Id. at 461 , 24 N.E. at 145 .

1985Furthermore, the Morgan court determined that their holding did not “violate the well known rule that a party in a criminal case shall not be compelled to furnish evidence against himself, for as we have seen, when prosecuted criminally, his conduct in refusing to testify in the civil case can not be given in evidence against him.” Id. at 461 , 24 N.E. at 145 .

1981Otte v. Tessman, (1980) Ind.App., 412 N.E.2d 1223 .

1980State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Shuman (1st Dist. 1977) Ind.App., 370 N.E.2d 941, 945 . *7 The underlying purpose of the trial rules is that “[t]hey shall be construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.” T.R. 1.

1980Trial § 64 (1960); Fuller v. Fuller, (1913) 52 Ind.App. 488 , 100 N.E. 869 ; Gradison v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 688 , 300 N.E.2d 67 .

1980Trial § 64 (1960); Fuller v. Fuller, (1913) 52 Ind.App. 488 , 100 N.E. 869 ; Gradison v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 688 , 300 N.E.2d 67 .

1980Trial § 64 (1960); Fuller v. Fuller, (1913) 52 Ind.App. 488 , 100 N.E. 869 ; Gradison v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 688 , 300 N.E.2d 67 .

1980Trial § 64 (1960); Fuller v. Fuller, (1913) 52 Ind.App. 488 , 100 N.E. 869 ; Gradison v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 688 , 300 N.E.2d 67 .

1970It "... precludes parties or their privies from relitigating a cause of action that has been finally determined by a court of competent jurisdiction." [5] Our problem is to determine whether the court below, in extending the doctrine of res judicata so as to conclude the insurer from litigating (or relitigating) the issues of liability and damage adjudicated in the prior action (in which the insurer was not a party and did not participate), denied the insurer its day in court. *328 As we said in Bastin v. Myers (1924), 82 Ind. App. 325, 343 , 144 N.E. 425 , 431: "It is elementary that a judgme

1970It "... precludes parties or their privies from relitigating a cause of action that has been finally determined by a court of competent jurisdiction." [5] Our problem is to determine whether the court below, in extending the doctrine of res judicata so as to conclude the insurer from litigating (or relitigating) the issues of liability and damage adjudicated in the prior action (in which the insurer was not a party and did not participate), denied the insurer its day in court. *328 As we said in Bastin v. Myers (1924), 82 Ind. App. 325, 343 , 144 N.E. 425 , 431: "It is elementary that a judgme

1967We reaffirm the Indiana Supreme Court, holding in Keeshin Motor Express Co. v. Glassman (1942), 219 Ind. 538 , 38 N. E. (2d) 847, at p. 553: “While this court has long recognized the well known principle that frequent and unnecessary repetition of correct statements of law in instructions may be reversible error, it has been reluctant to reverse a judgment solely on that ground . . .

1959Winfrey v. State Life Insurance Co. (1949), 227 Ind. 449 , 85 N. E. 2d 821 ; Metropolitan Life Ins.

1959Winfrey v. State Life Insurance Co. (1949), 227 Ind. 449 , 85 N. E. 2d 821 ; Metropolitan Life Ins.

1934Masonic Accident Insurance Company v. Jackson (1929), 200 Ind. 472, 482 , 164 N. E. 628 .

1934Masonic Accident Insurance Company v. Jackson (1929), 200 Ind. 472, 482 , 164 N. E. 628 .

1921McAllister, supra, ( 14 Ind. 12 ) holds a different doctrine, but that case is at variance with the later case, and is in conflict with the well known rule that equity only acts upon the person.

1921McAllister, supra, ( 14 Ind. 12 ) holds a different doctrine, but that case is at variance with the later case, and is in conflict with the well known rule that equity only acts upon the person.

1921In Vail v. Jones, 31 Ind. 467 , the case of Parker v. McAllister, supra, is incidentally referred to as still authoritative, but it is evident that the question was not considered. * * * But, whatever may be said as to the present force of the decision in Parker v. McAllister, supra, it is clear that it does not conflict with our conclusion, that independent of statute, suits to reform contracts, or to enforce specific performance, may be brought where the defendants reside.

1918Co. v. Reesman (1894), 60 Fed. 370 ; 9 C.

1917Co. v. Clancy (1892), 83 Tex. 113 , 18 S. W. 439 .

1917Co. v. Clancy (1892), 83 Tex. 113 , 18 S. W. 439 .