7 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2011 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
McWhorter v. CNA Insurance Companiesgreen2 sentences1994Co., 868 P.2d 1128, 1130 (Colo.App. 1993) ("Inasmuch as claimant requested an evidentiary hearing at the time he appealed the Director's order, his request for hearing should be treated as a request for hearing under § 8-43-207."). [6] By ordering a "change of provider," the Director complied with the statutory requirements. 1994Co., 868 P.2d 1128, 1130 (Colo.App.1993) ("Inasmuch as claimant requested an evidentiary hearing at the time he appealed the Director's order, his request for hearing should be treated as a request for hearing under § 8-43-207.”). . | 1 | 1 |
Donn v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the Stategreen2 sentences1994See Donn v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office. 865 P.2d 873, 876 (Colo.App. 1993) ("[A] party adversely affected by a termination of previously authorized health care under § 8-43-501 can request that the matter be litigated de novo in an adversarial hearing pursuant to the regular hearing process under § 8-43-207...."); see also McWhorter v. CNA Ins. 1994See Donn v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office, 865 P.2d 873, 876 (Colo.App.1993) (“[A] party adversely affected by a termination of previously authorized health care under § 8-43-501 can request that the matter be litigated de novo in an adversarial hearing pursuant to the regular hearing process under § 8-43-207...."); see also McWhorter v. CNA Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Ridgeway v. Kiowa School District C-2green2 sentences1990See Ridgeway v. Kiowa School District C-2, 794 P.2d 1020 (Colo. App.1989) (allowing a disputed issue of fact to be disposed of in an adversarial hearing prior to entry of summary judgment). 1990See Ridgeway v. Kiowa School District C-2, 794 P.2d 1020 (Colo. App.1989) (allowing a disputed issue of fact to be disposed of in an adversarial hearing prior to entry of summary judgment). | 1 | 1 |
Demetry v. COLORADO CIVIL RIGHTS COM'Ngreen1 sentence1989See Demetry v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 752 P.2d 1070 (Colo.App.1988). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Colorado. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Addington v. Texas
green
2 sentences2011This elevated burden of proof in an adversarial hearing "adequately conveys to the factfinder the [necessary] level of subjective certainty about his factual conclusions," Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , and helps alleviate "the possible risk that a fact-finder might decide to [deprive] an individual {of his or her liberty interest] based solely on a few isolated instances of unusual conduct [or] ... idiosyneratie behavior." Id. at 764 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979)). 2011This elevated burden of proof in an adversarial hearing "adequately conveys to the factfinder the [necessary] level of subjective certainty about his factual conclusions," Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , and helps alleviate "the possible risk that a fact-finder might decide to [deprive] an individual {of his or her liberty interest] based solely on a few isolated instances of unusual conduct [or] ... idiosyneratie behavior." Id. at 764 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979)). | 3 | 2011–2011 |
Santosky v. Kramer
green
2 sentences2011This elevated burden of proof in an adversarial hearing "adequately conveys to the factfinder the [necessary] level of subjective certainty about his factual conclusions," Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , and helps alleviate "the possible risk that a fact-finder might decide to [deprive] an individual {of his or her liberty interest] based solely on a few isolated instances of unusual conduct [or] ... idiosyneratie behavior." Id. at 764 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979)). 2011This elevated burden of proof in an adversarial hearing "adequately conveys to the factfinder the [necessary] level of subjective certainty about his factual conclusions," Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , and helps alleviate "the possible risk that a fact-finder might decide to [deprive] an individual {of his or her liberty interest] based solely on a few isolated instances of unusual conduct [or] ... idiosyneratie behavior." Id. at 764 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 427 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979)). | 3 | 2011–2011 |
Hargett v. Director, Division of Labor
green
1 sentence1993In Hargett v. Director, Division of Labor, supra, we held that a party adversely affected by a termination of previously authorized health care under § 8-43-501 can request that the matter be litigated de novo in an adversarial hearing pursuant to the regular hearing process under § 8-43-207, C.R.S. (1992 Cum.Supp.). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.