adversarial hearing in New Jersey

1993Court of Eighth Judicial Dist., [ 192 Mont. 341 ], 628 P. 2d 662 (Mont. 1981); State v. Meacham, 93 Wash. 2d 735 , 612 P. 2d 795 (Wash. 1980), we are of the view that documentary submissions may be sufficient.

1993Court of Eighth Judicial Dist., [ 192 Mont. 341 ], 628 P. 2d 662 (Mont. 1981); State v. Meacham, 93 Wash. 2d 735 , 612 P. 2d 795 (Wash. 1980), we are of the view that documentary submissions may be sufficient.

1993Court of Eighth Judicial Dist., [ 192 Mont. 341 ], 628 P. 2d 662 (Mont. 1981); State v. Meacham, 93 Wash. 2d 735 , 612 P. 2d 795 (Wash. 1980), we are of the view that documentary submissions may be sufficient.

1993Court of Eighth Judicial Dist., [ 192 Mont. 341 ], 628 P. 2d 662 (Mont. 1981); State v. Meacham, 93 Wash. 2d 735 , 612 P. 2d 795 (Wash. 1980), we are of the view that documentary submissions may be sufficient.

2022We now hold that defendant, who was sentenced to life in prison without a specified period of parole ineligibility and has been incarcerated for over forty years for crimes committed when a juvenile, has a blemish-free disciplinary record, has received numerous positive psychological evaluations, and has completed rehabilitative programs while incarcerated, is entitled to the same type of hearing adopted in Comer—an adversarial hearing in the Criminal Part to provide a "meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation" achieved while imprisoned, Zuber,

2022Considering the record in this matter, nothing less than an adversarial hearing in the Criminal Part will afford defendant the "meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation" envisioned by Graham, 560 U.S. at 75, Comer, ___ N.J. at ___ (slip op. at 6-7), and Zuber, 227 N.J. at 452 .

1993Super. at 12 , 578 A. 2d 381 , by the Appellate Division which stated: While several decisions in other jurisdictions have required a full adversarial hearing, see e.g., Rose v. Dist.

1993This argument, however, was specifically rejected in S.S. v. E.S., supra, 243 N.J.Super. at 12 , 578 A.2d 381 , by the Appellate Division which stated: While several decisions in other jurisdictions have required a full adversarial hearing, see e.g., Rose v. Dist.

2022In an issue of first impression, we hold that defendant, who has now been imprisoned for more than four decades even though his sentence did not impose a specified period of parole ineligibility, has the constitutional right to an adversarial hearing to determine whether defendant "still fails to appreciate 1 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012). 2 A-4368-19 risks and consequences, and whether he has matured or been rehabilitated," utilizing the procedure recently adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Comer, ___ N.J. ___, ___ (2022) (slip op. at 6-7).

2020Byrne offers a better approach: notice, an opportunity to be heard and respond, and a written statement of reasons. 93 N.J. at 211 ; see also S.C. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, ___ N.J. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op. at 33, 43- 44) (holding that the minimal requirements of due process -- “notice and opportunity to be heard” -- could be satisfied without an adversarial hearing in the context of an investigatory finding that an allegation of child abuse was “not established” but stressing that the notice given must set forth the basis of the finding, rather than rely on a conclusory statement, and

2020Byrne offers a better approach: notice, an opportunity to be heard and respond, and a written statement of reasons. 93 N.J. at 211 ; see also S.C. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, ___ N.J. ___, ___ (2020) (slip op. at 33, 43- 44) (holding that the minimal requirements of due process -- “notice and opportunity to be heard” -- could be satisfied without an adversarial hearing in the context of an investigatory finding that an allegation of child abuse was “not established” but stressing that the notice given must set forth the basis of the finding, rather than rely on a conclusory statement, and

2006Id. at 16 , 350 A.2d 58 . 5 *470 Following Cunningham, supra, the Appellate Division has held that landowners objecting to the development of neighboring property do not have a particularized property interest warranting an adversarial hearing before an administrative law judge.

1985Id. at 1069 .

1983Super. 397 (App.Div. 1979), certif. den. 82 N.J. 286 (1980), we found that a township was not entitled to an adversarial hearing on an application which had been made for the registration of a solid waste disposal facility in the township.

1983In so doing, we pointed out that cases on which the township relied, Juzek v. Hackensack Water Co., 48 N.J. 302 (1966) and In re Borough of Peapack-Gladstone, 11 N.J.

1983In so doing, we pointed out that cases on which the township relied, Juzek v. Hackensack Water Co., 48 N.J. 302 (1966) and In re Borough of Peapack-Gladstone, 11 N.J.