13 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1987–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Calfee v. Usmangreen2 sentences2000See Calfee v. Usman , 224 Conn. 29 , 33-34 , 616 A.2d 250 (1992); see also Sassone v. Lapore , 226 Conn. 773 , 781 , 629, A.2d 357 (1993) (concluding that a judicial finding of probable cause in a tort action, after an adversarial hearing pursuant to § 52-278d , provides constitutionally significant protection against an erroneous depravation of the owner's property interests). 2000See Calfee v. Usman , 224 Conn. 29 , 33-34 , 616 A.2d 250 (1992); see also Sassone v. Lapore , 226 Conn. 773 , 781 , 629, A.2d 357 (1993) (concluding that a judicial finding of probable cause in a tort action, after an adversarial hearing pursuant to § 52-278d , provides constitutionally significant protection against an erroneous depravation of the owner's property interests). | 1 | 3 |
Sassone v. Leporegreen1 sentence2000See Calfee v. Usman , 224 Conn. 29 , 33-34 , 616 A.2d 250 (1992); see also Sassone v. Lapore , 226 Conn. 773 , 781 , 629, A.2d 357 (1993) (concluding that a judicial finding of probable cause in a tort action, after an adversarial hearing pursuant to § 52-278d , provides constitutionally significant protection against an erroneous depravation of the owner's property interests). | 1 | 1 |
Armstrong v. Manzogreen2 sentences1988See, e.g., Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 , 85 S. Ct. 1187 , 14 L. 1988See, e.g., Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 , 85 S. Ct. 1187 , 14 L. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Parkergreen2 sentences1987For example, certain hearsay testimony, such as a dying declaration; Mattox v. United States, supra, 244; State v. Onofrio, 179 Conn. 23, 43 , 425 A.2d 560 (1979); or testimony presented at a prior adversarial hearing; Ohio v. Roberts, supra, 68-70 ; California v. Green, supra, 164 ; see State v. Parker, 161 Conn. 500, 504 , 289 A.2d 894 (1971); is admissible even though the defendant does not have an opportunity to cross-examine or confront the declarant, who is unavailable to testify at trial. 1987For example, certain hearsay testimony, such as a dying declaration; Mattox v. United States, supra, 244; State v. Onofrio, 179 Conn. 23, 43 , 425 A.2d 560 (1979); or testimony presented at a prior adversarial hearing; Ohio v. Roberts, supra, 68-70 ; California v. Green, supra, 164 ; see State v. Parker, 161 Conn. 500, 504 , 289 A.2d 894 (1971); is admissible even though the defendant does not have an opportunity to cross-examine or confront the declarant, who is unavailable to testify at trial. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Davis
green
2 sentences2008Following this adversarial hearing, “[i]f the trial court determines that the evidence has established a violation of a condition of probation, then it proceeds to the second component of probation revocation, the determination of whether the defendant’s probationary status should be revoked.” State v. Davis, 229 Conn. 285, 290 , 641 A.2d 370 (1994). 2008Following this adversarial hearing, “[i]f the trial court determines that the evidence has established a violation of a condition of probation, then it proceeds to the second component of probation revocation, the determination of whether the defendant’s probationary status should be revoked.” State v. Davis, 229 Conn. 285, 290 , 641 A.2d 370 (1994). | 2 | 1996–2008 |
TOWN OF BOZRAH v. Chmurynski
green
2 sentences2016Although this court noted that "an injunction hearing offers greater safeguards" than a search warrant because it "is an adversary proceeding that affords both parties the opportunity to be heard," nowhere in our decision did we suggest that an adversarial hearing was required prior to the issuance of a judicial order authorizing an administrative search. 22 Id., at 696 , 36 A.3d 210 . 2016Although this court noted that "an injunction hearing offers greater safeguards" than a search warrant because it "is an adversary proceeding that affords both parties the opportunity to be heard," nowhere in our decision did we suggest that an adversarial hearing was required prior to the issuance of a judicial order authorizing an administrative search. 22 Id., at 696 , 36 A.3d 210 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Gerstein v. Pugh
green
2 sentences2009Id., 120 . 2009Id., at 120 , 95 S.Ct. 854 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Michael Robert O'ROuRke Jeff Rosenzweig, as Next Friend of Michael Robert O'ROuRke v. Roger Endell, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction
green
2 sentences2005It did not address the question of what constitutes a sufficient showing to require an adversarial hearing in the first instance. 13 We also believe that the plaintiff in error’s reliance on O’Rourke v. Endell, supra, 153 F.3d 560 , is misplaced. 2005It did not address the question of what constitutes a sufficient showing to require an adversarial hearing in the first instance. 13 We also believe that the plaintiff in error’s reliance on O’Rourke v. Endell, supra, 153 F.3d 560 , is misplaced. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Bria v. Ventana Corp.
green
1 sentence2000Earlier this year, the Appellate Court held that such a claim in a termination of parental rights proceeding is best brought in "an adversarial hearing allowing for cross-examination similar to that of a habeas corpus proceeding." In re Amanda A., supra, 58 Conn. App. 461 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Miner v. Miner
green
2 sentences2000A petition for a new trial provides for such a hearing; Miner v. Miner, 137 Conn. 642 , 645 , 80 A.2d 512 (1951). 2000A petition for a new trial provides for such a hearing; Miner v. Miner, 137 Conn. 642 , 645 , 80 A.2d 512 (1951). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Union Trust Co. v. Heggelund
green
2 sentences1992Shawmut Bank, N.A. v. Valley Farms, 222 Conn. 361, 373 , 610 A.2d 652 (1992); Union Trust Co. v. Heggelund, 219 Conn. 620 , 624 n.3, 594 A.2d 464 (1991). 4 When there is no ex parte impairment of the defendant’s property rights, a judicial finding of probable cause suffices to satisfy the defendant’s constitutional right to due process. 1992Shawmut Bank, N.A. v. Valley Farms, 222 Conn. 361, 373 , 610 A.2d 652 (1992); Union Trust Co. v. Heggelund, 219 Conn. 620 , 624 n.3, 594 A.2d 464 (1991). 4 When there is no ex parte impairment of the defendant’s property rights, a judicial finding of probable cause suffices to satisfy the defendant’s constitutional right to due process. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Shawmut Bank, N.A. v. Valley Farms
green
2 sentences1992Shawmut Bank, N.A. v. Valley Farms, 222 Conn. 361, 373 , 610 A.2d 652 (1992); Union Trust Co. v. Heggelund, 219 Conn. 620 , 624 n.3, 594 A.2d 464 (1991). 4 When there is no ex parte impairment of the defendant’s property rights, a judicial finding of probable cause suffices to satisfy the defendant’s constitutional right to due process. 1992Shawmut Bank, N.A. v. Valley Farms, 222 Conn. 361, 373 , 610 A.2d 652 (1992); Union Trust Co. v. Heggelund, 219 Conn. 620 , 624 n.3, 594 A.2d 464 (1991). 4 When there is no ex parte impairment of the defendant’s property rights, a judicial finding of probable cause suffices to satisfy the defendant’s constitutional right to due process. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Hernandez v. Monterey Village Associates Ltd. Partnership
green
1 sentence1991Cf. Hernandez v. Monterey Village Associates Limited Partnership, 17 Conn. App. 421 , 425-26 (1989). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
State v. Onofrio
green
2 sentences1987For example, certain hearsay testimony, such as a dying declaration; Mattox v. United States, supra, 244; State v. Onofrio, 179 Conn. 23, 43 , 425 A.2d 560 (1979); or testimony presented at a prior adversarial hearing; Ohio v. Roberts, supra, 68-70 ; California v. Green, supra, 164 ; see State v. Parker, 161 Conn. 500, 504 , 289 A.2d 894 (1971); is admissible even though the defendant does not have an opportunity to cross-examine or confront the declarant, who is unavailable to testify at trial. 1987For example, certain hearsay testimony, such as a dying declaration; Mattox v. United States, supra, 244; State v. Onofrio, 179 Conn. 23, 43 , 425 A.2d 560 (1979); or testimony presented at a prior adversarial hearing; Ohio v. Roberts, supra, 68-70 ; California v. Green, supra, 164 ; see State v. Parker, 161 Conn. 500, 504 , 289 A.2d 894 (1971); is admissible even though the defendant does not have an opportunity to cross-examine or confront the declarant, who is unavailable to testify at trial. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.