adversarial hearing in District of Columbia

2016Reasonableness Our resolution of this case must turn not on whether there is probable cause (or even suspicion) that G.B. is guilty of a crime, and not (solely) on his status as a third-party victim, but rather on the reasonableness of the proposed search. “[T]he „touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness[.]‟” King, 133 S. Ct. at 18 We are inclined to agree with the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts that before a warrant issues to permit a bodily search of a third party who is not a suspect, the third party “must be given notice and an opportunity to be heard at an adversary h

2016Reasonableness Our resolution of this case must turn not on whether there is probable cause (or even suspicion) that G.B. is guilty of a crime, and not (solely) on his status as a third-party victim, but rather on the reasonableness of the . proposed search. “[T]he ‘touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness!!]’ ” King, 133 S.Ct. at 1970 (quoting Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 , 855 n. 4, 126 S.Ct. 2193 , 165 L.Ed.2d 250 (2006)); see also Sheffield v. United States, 111 A.3d 611, 622 (D.C.2015) (“[Reasonableness is the overarching and underlying principle” of Fourth Amendment cas

2016Reasonableness Our resolution of this case must turn not on whether there is probable cause (or even suspicion) that G.B. is guilty of a crime, and not (solely) on his status as a third-party victim, but rather on the reasonableness of the . proposed search. “[T]he ‘touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness!!]’ ” King, 133 S.Ct. at 1970 (quoting Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 , 855 n. 4, 126 S.Ct. 2193 , 165 L.Ed.2d 250 (2006)); see also Sheffield v. United States, 111 A.3d 611, 622 (D.C.2015) (“[Reasonableness is the overarching and underlying principle” of Fourth Amendment cas

2016Reasonableness Our resolution of this case must turn not on whether there is probable cause (or even suspicion) that G.B. is guilty of a crime, and not (solely) on his status as a third-party victim, but rather on the reasonableness of the proposed search. “[T]he „touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness[.]‟” King, 133 S. Ct. at 18 We are inclined to agree with the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts that before a warrant issues to permit a bodily search of a third party who is not a suspect, the third party “must be given notice and an opportunity to be heard at an adversary h

2016Reasonableness Our resolution of this case must turn not on whether there is probable cause (or even suspicion) that G.B. is guilty of a crime, and not (solely) on his status as a third-party victim, but rather on the reasonableness of the . proposed search. “[T]he ‘touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness!!]’ ” King, 133 S.Ct. at 1970 (quoting Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 , 855 n. 4, 126 S.Ct. 2193 , 165 L.Ed.2d 250 (2006)); see also Sheffield v. United States, 111 A.3d 611, 622 (D.C.2015) (“[Reasonableness is the overarching and underlying principle” of Fourth Amendment cas

2016Reasonableness Our resolution of this case must turn not on whether there is probable cause (or even suspicion) that G.B. is guilty of a crime, and not (solely) on his status as a third-party victim, but rather on the reasonableness of the proposed search. “[T]he „touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness[.]‟” King, 133 S. Ct. at 18 We are inclined to agree with the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts that before a warrant issues to permit a bodily search of a third party who is not a suspect, the third party “must be given notice and an opportunity to be heard at an adversary h

1999In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 120 , 95 S.Ct. 854 , 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975), for example, the Supreme Court held that the existence of probable cause for the purpose of setting a criminal defendant’s conditions of release “can be determined reliably without an adversarial hearing.” A court may likewise grant interim relief in a civil case, without hearing live testimony or providing an opportunity for cross-examination,, so long as the resulting order is of limited duration.

1999In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 120 , 95 S.Ct. 854 , 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975), for example, the Supreme Court held that the existence of probable cause for the purpose of setting a criminal defendant’s conditions of release “can be determined reliably without an adversarial hearing.” A court may likewise grant interim relief in a civil case, without hearing live testimony or providing an opportunity for cross-examination,, so long as the resulting order is of limited duration.

1992Indeed, in Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 607 , 99 S.Ct. 2493, 2507 , 61 L.Ed.2d 101 (1979), the Supreme Court held in a somewhat comparable context that, although such a hearing may be required as a matter of state law, “due process is not violated by the use of informal, traditional medical investigative techniques.” In Charters, supra, the court, relying on Parham , explicitly held that no adversarial hearing is constitutionally required. 24 We reach the same conclusion in this case. 25 D.

1992Indeed, in Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 607 , 99 S.Ct. 2493, 2507 , 61 L.Ed.2d 101 (1979), the Supreme Court held in a somewhat comparable context that, although such a hearing may be required as a matter of state law, “due process is not violated by the use of informal, traditional medical investigative techniques.” In Charters, supra, the court, relying on Parham , explicitly held that no adversarial hearing is constitutionally required. 24 We reach the same conclusion in this case. 25 D.