adversarial hearing in Illinois

2025In Key Outdoor v. Dept. of Transportation, 322 Ill.

2025Id. (quoting Illinois Wood Energy Partners, LP v. County of Cook, 281 Ill.

2023Id. ¶ 14 In People v. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d 68, 78 (2003), our supreme court stated that “[t]he operative concern for the reviewing court is whether the trial court conducted an adequate inquiry into the defendant’s pro se allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel.” The court iterated that, in so evaluating defendant’s claim, the court can question trial counsel, have a discussion with the defendant, or “base its evaluation of the defendant’s pro se allegations of ineffective assistance on its knowledge of defense counsel’s performance at trial and the insufficiency of the defendant’s alle

2021People v. Reed, 2018 IL App (1st) 160609, ¶ 52 . ¶ 53 We find that Krankel counsel, in properly dispensing her obligations after being appointed, preserved the claim that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object to the trial court’s entry of judgment on counts I and II. ¶ 54 The trial court’s ruling on a motion for new trial will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.

2018However, we did not find persuasive defendant’s claims (1) that the State’s evidence was insufficient to prove residential burglary and aggravated battery or (2) that his sentence for residential burglary was excessive. ¶3 In addition, we remanded for a new Krankel hearing before a different judge, finding that “the State’s participation changed the preliminary Krankel hearing from an objective or neutral inquiry into an adversarial inquiry.” People v. Robinson, 2015 IL App (1st) 130837, ¶ 81 .

2017However, we did not find persuasive defendant's claims (1) that the State's evidence was insufficient to prove residential burglary and aggravated battery or (2) that his sentence for residential burglary was excessive. ¶ 3 In addition, we remanded for a new Krankel hearing before a different judge, finding that "the State's participation changed the preliminary Krankel hearing from an objective or neutral inquiry into an adversarial inquiry." People v. Robinson , 2015 IL App (1st) 130837 , ¶ 81, 394 Ill.Dec. 126 , 35 N.E.3d 1095 .

2000Accordingly, “ ‘the full panoply of judicial procedure’ does not apply to the fact-finding investigation, including ‘rights of discovery, confrontation, cross-examination, and other elements of due process involved in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings.’ ” Petersen, 302 Ill.

2000Accordingly, " 'the full panoply of judicial procedure' does not apply to the fact-finding investigation, including 'rights of discovery, confrontation, cross-examination, and other elements of due process involved in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings.' " Petersen , 302 Ill.

1998Relying on Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442-43 , 4 L.

1998Relying on Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442-43 , 4 L.

2025Moreover, a verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the record is - 21 - more likely to have been affected by errors than one with overwhelming record support.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695-66 . ¶ 54 Here, the trial court conducted an adversarial hearing with witness testimony following Krankel counsel’s motion and reached a decision on the merits of the ineffective assistance claims.

2025To overturn an agency’s decision under the Administrative Procedure Act when mixed questions are presented, the reviewing court must be “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. ¶ 11 In administrative review cases involving the Department’s denial or revocation of a permit, a full adversarial hearing is not necessarily required.

2025Instead, the State was allowed to file a motion to dismiss, which would not have been allowed had the Krankel procedure been afforded to the defendant. ¶ 49 In People v. Custer, 2019 IL 123339 , our supreme court had the opportunity to review the differences between the common law Krankel procedure developed by Illinois courts and the Post- Conviction Hearing Act.

2025Instead, the State was allowed to file a motion to dismiss, which would not have been allowed had the Krankel procedure been afforded to the defendant. ¶ 49 In People v. Custer, 2019 IL 123339 , our supreme court had the opportunity to review the differences between the common law Krankel procedure developed by Illinois courts and the Post- Conviction Hearing Act.

2020He appeals that dismissal, contending that he presented arguable claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that (1) the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce, at his second sentencing hearing, the transcript of his testimony at his first sentencing hearing, as he was denied his right against self-incrimination when he testified at that earlier hearing; and (2) the court erred in conducting an adversarial hearing pursuant to People v. Krankel, 2020 IL App (2d) 180108-U 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984), without first appointing new counsel to represent defendant.

2014Respondent points to nothing to establish “a reasonable probability that *** the outcome [of the proceedings] would have been different.” Id.

2014Respondent points to nothing to establish “a - 23 - 2014 IL App (2d) 130372 reasonable probability that *** the outcome [of the proceedings] would have been different.” Id.

2014Respondent points to nothing to establish “a - 23 - 2014 IL App (2d) 130372 reasonable probability that *** the outcome [of the proceedings] would have been different.” Id.

2012Adkins, 239 Ill. 2d at 43 .

2000Accordingly, "`the full panoply of judicial procedure' does not apply to the fact-finding investigation, including `rights of discovery, confrontation, cross-examination, and other elements of due process involved in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings.'" Petersen, 302 Ill.App.3d at 468 , 236 Ill.Dec. 305 , 707 N.E.2d 150 , quoting Jabbari v. Human Rights Comm'n, 173 Ill.App.3d 227, 233 , 123 Ill.Dec. 17 , 527 N.E.2d 480 (1988).

2000Accordingly, "`the full panoply of judicial procedure' does not apply to the fact-finding investigation, including `rights of discovery, confrontation, cross-examination, and other elements of due process involved in judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings.'" Petersen, 302 Ill.App.3d at 468 , 236 Ill.Dec. 305 , 707 N.E.2d 150 , quoting Jabbari v. Human Rights Comm'n, 173 Ill.App.3d 227, 233 , 123 Ill.Dec. 17 , 527 N.E.2d 480 (1988).

1994Stat. 1989, ch. 38, pars. 104—16, 104—21.) Defendant therefore asserts that he was deprived of all rights afforded him pursuant to the statutes concerning fitness to stand trial. "[A] court is required to order an adversarial hearing to determine a defendant’s fitness to stand trial only if it is apprised of facts which raise a bona fide question of defendant’s fitness.” (People v. Ivory (1985), 139 Ill.

1994App. 3d 448, 451 , 487 N.E.2d 1035, 1037 .) The determination as to whether a bona fide question of defendant’s fitness to stand trial rests generally within the sound discretion of the trial court.

1992Ed. 2d 34, 51 , 109 S. Ct. 916, 927 .) Large scale confiscations of books and films have been invalidated by the Court where the seizure occurred prior to an adversarial hearing on the obscenity of the materials.

1992Ed. 2d at 378 , 105 S. Ct. at 2783 .) Regardless of whether the police returned the boxes taken from the store or whether the seizure of multiple copies from the store’s shelves was inadvertent, the result was that “a great number” of magazines were removed from circulation for an extended period of time before an adversarial hearing on the obscenity issue was held.