adversarial hearing in Michigan

2017The Williams Court held that “[w]henever sentence enhancement is authorized, due process does not require that the prosecution separately charge the defendant as a second-time offender, nor is the defendant entitled to an adversarial hearing before the prior convictions are used for sentencing purposes.” Id. at 236 .

2017The Williams Court held that “[w]henever sentence enhancement is authorized, due process does not require that the prosecution separately charge the defendant as a second-time offender, nor is the defendant entitled to an adversarial hearing before the prior convictions are used for sentencing purposes.” Id. at 236 .

2018ANALYSIS A. PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS While "the Fourth Amendment requires a timely judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to detention," Gerstein v. Pugh , 420 U.S. 103 , 126, 95 S.Ct. 854 , 43 L.Ed. 2d 54 (1975), a defendant has no constitutional right to an adversarial hearing to challenge the existence of probable cause, id . at 120, 95 S.Ct. 854 .

2018ANALYSIS A. PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS While "the Fourth Amendment requires a timely judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to detention," Gerstein v. Pugh , 420 U.S. 103 , 126, 95 S.Ct. 854 , 43 L.Ed. 2d 54 (1975), a defendant has no constitutional right to an adversarial hearing to challenge the existence of probable cause, id . at 120, 95 S.Ct. 854 .

1996Id. at 233-234 .

1990As I interpret Specht v Patterson, 386 US 605, 610 ; 87 S Ct 1209 ; 18 L Ed 2d 326 (1967), and McMillan v Pennsylvania, 477 US 79 ; 106 S Ct 2411 ; 91 L Ed 2d 67 (1986), before an enhanced penalty under § 7413(2) may be imposed, a defendant is entitled to contest his alleged prior-offender status at an adversarial hearing where the prosecution carries the burden of proving the sentence-enhancing fact by at least a preponderance of the evidence, and where the defendant has the right to be represented by counsel, to present evidence, and to confront and cross-examine any witnesses against him.

1990As I interpret Specht v Patterson, 386 US 605, 610 ; 87 S Ct 1209 ; 18 L Ed 2d 326 (1967), and McMillan v Pennsylvania, 477 US 79 ; 106 S Ct 2411 ; 91 L Ed 2d 67 (1986), before an enhanced penalty under § 7413(2) may be imposed, a defendant is entitled to contest his alleged prior-offender status at an adversarial hearing where the prosecution carries the burden of proving the sentence-enhancing fact by at least a preponderance of the evidence, and where the defendant has the right to be represented by counsel, to present evidence, and to confront and cross-examine any witnesses against him.

1990As I interpret Specht v Patterson, 386 US 605, 610 ; 87 S Ct 1209 ; 18 L Ed 2d 326 (1967), and McMillan v Pennsylvania, 477 US 79 ; 106 S Ct 2411 ; 91 L Ed 2d 67 (1986), before an enhanced penalty under § 7413(2) may be imposed, a defendant is entitled to contest his alleged prior-offender status at an adversarial hearing where the prosecution carries the burden of proving the sentence-enhancing fact by at least a preponderance of the evidence, and where the defendant has the right to be represented by counsel, to present evidence, and to confront and cross-examine any witnesses against him.

1990As I interpret Specht v Patterson, 386 US 605, 610 ; 87 S Ct 1209 ; 18 L Ed 2d 326 (1967), and McMillan v Pennsylvania, 477 US 79 ; 106 S Ct 2411 ; 91 L Ed 2d 67 (1986), before an enhanced penalty under § 7413(2) may be imposed, a defendant is entitled to contest his alleged prior-offender status at an adversarial hearing where the prosecution carries the burden of proving the sentence-enhancing fact by at least a preponderance of the evidence, and where the defendant has the right to be represented by counsel, to present evidence, and to confront and cross-examine any witnesses against him.

1989Khabar, supra . *193 If error was committed by the reading of the alibi notice to the jury rather than cross-examining the defendant as to its contents, [1] we hold that such an error was harmless in view of the overwhelming evidence of guilt.

1989Khabar, supra. If error was committed by the reading of the alibi notice to the jury rather than cross-examining the defendant as to its contents, 1 we hold that such an error was harmless in view of the overwhelming evidence of guilt.