52 Wisconsin opinions name it 3 courts 1932–2025 16 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Nordnessgreen2 sentences2025Specifically, Hull argues that “[i]f Mr. Hull operated a motor vehicle, there is nothing to support that Mr. Hull was under the influence of any intoxicants when doing so.” ¶16 In the context of a refusal hearing, “[p]robable cause exists where the totality of the circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge at the time of the arrest would lead a reasonable police officer to believe … that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant.” State v. Nordness, 128 Wis. 2d 15, 35 , 381 N.W.2d 300 (1986). “‘The evidence need not reach the level of pr 2025Specifically, Hull argues that “[i]f Mr. Hull operated a motor vehicle, there is nothing to support that Mr. Hull was under the influence of any intoxicants when doing so.” ¶16 In the context of a refusal hearing, “[p]robable cause exists where the totality of the circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge at the time of the arrest would lead a reasonable police officer to believe … that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant.” State v. Nordness, 128 Wis. 2d 15, 35 , 381 N.W.2d 300 (1986). “‘The evidence need not reach the level of pr | 6 | 15 |
State v. Willegreen2 sentences2025See, e.g., State v. Blatterman, 2015 WI 46, ¶17 , 362 Wis. 2d 138 , 864 N.W.2d 26 (“the State bears the burden of proving that the seizure complied with the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 11” of the Wisconsin Constitution); State v. Wille, 185 Wis. 2d 673, 682 , 518 N.W.2d 325 (Ct. App. 1994) (“the State’s burden of persuasion at a suppression hearing is significantly greater than … at a refusal hearing”). 2025See, e.g., State v. Blatterman, 2015 WI 46, ¶17 , 362 Wis. 2d 138 , 864 N.W.2d 26 (“the State bears the burden of proving that the seizure complied with the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 11” of the Wisconsin Constitution); State v. Wille, 185 Wis. 2d 673, 682 , 518 N.W.2d 325 (Ct. App. 1994) (“the State’s burden of persuasion at a suppression hearing is significantly greater than … at a refusal hearing”). | 6 | 11 |
State v. Anagnosgreen2 sentences2024See State v. Anagnos, 2012 WI 64, ¶27 , 341 Wis. 2d 576 , 815 N.W.2d 675 ; § 343.305(9)(a)5., (c). 8 No. 2023AP353 ¶21 The State’s burden of proof at a refusal hearing is to show that the arresting officer’s “account is plausible, and the [circuit] court will not weigh the evidence for and against probable cause or determine the credibility of the witnesses.” See Wille, 185 Wis. 2d at 681 . 2024See State v. Anagnos, 2012 WI 64, ¶27 , 341 Wis. 2d 576 , 815 N.W.2d 675 ; § 343.305(9)(a)5., (c). 8 No. 2023AP353 ¶21 The State’s burden of proof at a refusal hearing is to show that the arresting officer’s “account is plausible, and the [circuit] court will not weigh the evidence for and against probable cause or determine the credibility of the witnesses.” See Wille, 185 Wis. 2d at 681 . | 3 | 4 |
State v. Woodsgreen2 sentences2024See State v. Woods, 117 Wis. 2d 701, 710 , 345 N.W.2d 457 (1984) (whether there was “probable cause … is a question of law that is subject to independent review on appeal”). ¶19 At a refusal hearing, “[p]robable cause, although not easily reducible to a stringent, mechanical definition, generally refers to ‘that quantum of evidence which would lead a reasonable police officer to believe that the defendant probably committed a crime.’” State v. Nordness, 128 Wis. 2d 15, 35 , 381 N.W.2d 300 (1986) (quoted source omitted). 2024See State v. Woods, 117 Wis. 2d 701, 710 , 345 N.W.2d 457 (1984) (whether there was “probable cause … is a question of law that is subject to independent review on appeal”). ¶19 At a refusal hearing, “[p]robable cause, although not easily reducible to a stringent, mechanical definition, generally refers to ‘that quantum of evidence which would lead a reasonable police officer to believe that the defendant probably committed a crime.’” State v. Nordness, 128 Wis. 2d 15, 35 , 381 N.W.2d 300 (1986) (quoted source omitted). | 2 | 3 |
State v. Schoeppgreen2 sentences2013See State v. Schoepp, 204 Wis. 2d 266, 268, 272 , 554 N.W.2d 236 (Ct. App. 1996) (concluding that civil discovery procedures applied to a prior version of the refusal hearing statute because the prior statute neither provided for a different means of discovery nor provided that discovery is unavailable). 2013See State v. Schoepp, 204 Wis. 2d 266, 268, 272 , 554 N.W.2d 236 (Ct. App. 1996) (concluding that civil discovery procedures applied to a prior version of the refusal hearing statute because the prior statute neither provided for a different means of discovery nor provided that discovery is unavailable). | 2 | 3 |
Village of Elm Grove v. Richard K. Brefkagreen2 sentences2020See Village of Elm Grove v. Brefka, 2013 WI 54 , 348 Wis. 2d 282 , 832 N.W.2d 121 (2013). 2020See Village of Elm Grove v. Brefka, 2013 WI 54 , 348 Wis. 2d 282 , 832 N.W.2d 121 (2013). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Blackmangreen2 sentences2017The court of appeals wrote: "The fact that Blackman could have prevailed at a refusal hearing due to the legislature's failure to amend the refusal hearing statute does not transform Blackman's freely given actual consent under Wisconsin's implied consent law into a coerced submittal." Blackman, 371 Wis. 2d 635, ¶12 (emphasis added). 19 No. 2015AP450-CR B ¶52 We next determine whether Blackman's consent to the blood draw was obtained through misrepresentation, rendering his consent coerced, that is, not voluntarily and freely given under the Fourth Amendment. ¶53 Blood draws are searches under 2017The court of appeals wrote: "The fact that Blackman could have prevailed at a refusal hearing due to the legislature's failure to amend the refusal hearing statute does not transform Blackman's freely given actual consent under Wisconsin's implied consent law into a coerced submittal." Blackman, 371 Wis. 2d 635, ¶12 (emphasis added). 19 No. 2015AP450-CR B ¶52 We next determine whether Blackman's consent to the blood draw was obtained through misrepresentation, rendering his consent coerced, that is, not voluntarily and freely given under the Fourth Amendment. ¶53 Blood draws are searches under | 2 | 2 |
Schmerber v. Californiagreen2 sentences2017The court of appeals wrote: "The fact that Blackman could have prevailed at a refusal hearing due to the legislature's failure to amend the refusal hearing statute does not transform Blackman's freely given actual consent under Wisconsin's implied consent law into a coerced submittal." Blackman, 371 Wis. 2d 635, ¶12 (emphasis added). 19 No. 2015AP450-CR B ¶52 We next determine whether Blackman's consent to the blood draw was obtained through misrepresentation, rendering his consent coerced, that is, not voluntarily and freely given under the Fourth Amendment. ¶53 Blood draws are searches under 2017The court of appeals wrote: "The fact that Blackman could have prevailed at a refusal hearing due to the legislature's failure to amend the refusal hearing statute does not transform Blackman's freely given actual consent under Wisconsin's implied consent law into a coerced submittal." Blackman, 371 Wis. 2d 635, ¶12 (emphasis added). 19 No. 2015AP450-CR B ¶52 We next determine whether Blackman's consent to the blood draw was obtained through misrepresentation, rendering his consent coerced, that is, not voluntarily and freely given under the Fourth Amendment. ¶53 Blood draws are searches under | 2 | 2 |
Village of Elkhart Lake v. Borzyskowskigreen2 sentences1988In Village of Elkhart Lake v. Borzyskowski, 123 Wis. 2d 185, 193-94 , 366 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Ct. App. 1985), we said: Section 343.305(8)(b), Stats., merely directs trial courts to render a decision as to the issues involved within five days of the refusal hearing. 1988In Village of Elkhart Lake v. Borzyskowski, 123 Wis. 2d 185, 193-94 , 366 N.W.2d 506, 510 (Ct. App. 1985), we said: Section 343.305(8)(b), Stats., merely directs trial courts to render a decision as to the issues involved within five days of the refusal hearing. | 2 | 2 |
Washburn County v. Smithgreen2 sentences2024In this case, Schumacher challenges the circuit court’s conclusions that the officer had probable cause to arrest him—and therefore that the arrest was lawful—and that he “refused to permit the test” when he had agreed to instead provide a urine sample. ¶18 “In the context of a refusal hearing following an arrest for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, ‘probable cause’ refers generally to that quantum of evidence that would lead a reasonable law enforcement officer to believe that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant.” Washburn County 2024In this case, Schumacher challenges the circuit court’s conclusions that the officer had probable cause to arrest him—and therefore that the arrest was lawful—and that he “refused to permit the test” when he had agreed to instead provide a urine sample. ¶18 “In the context of a refusal hearing following an arrest for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, ‘probable cause’ refers generally to that quantum of evidence that would lead a reasonable law enforcement officer to believe that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant.” Washburn County | 1 | 5 |
State v. Adam M. Blackmangreen2 sentences2025STAT. § 343.305(4).” State v. Blackman, 2017 WI 77 , ¶17 n.4, 377 Wis. 2d 339 , 898 N.W.2d 774 . 10 No. 2023AP169-CR under sub. (3)(a), the officer had placed the person under arrest for” an OWI violation “or had requested the person to take a test under sub. (3)(ar).” Sec. 343.305(9)(a)1. ¶24 A driver may request a refusal hearing on the revocation.8 WIS. 2025STAT. § 343.305(4).” State v. Blackman, 2017 WI 77 , ¶17 n.4, 377 Wis. 2d 339 , 898 N.W.2d 774 . 10 No. 2023AP169-CR under sub. (3)(a), the officer had placed the person under arrest for” an OWI violation “or had requested the person to take a test under sub. (3)(ar).” Sec. 343.305(9)(a)1. ¶24 A driver may request a refusal hearing on the revocation.8 WIS. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Brooksgreen2 sentences2025See State v. Brooks, 113 Wis. 2d 347, 348-49 , 335 N.W.2d 354 (1983) (holding that circuit courts have discretion to dismiss an improper refusal charge where a defendant pleads guilty to an associated OWI charge and has timely requested a refusal hearing). 2025See State v. Brooks, 113 Wis. 2d 347, 348-49 , 335 N.W.2d 354 (1983) (holding that circuit courts have discretion to dismiss an improper refusal charge where a defendant pleads guilty to an associated OWI charge and has timely requested a refusal hearing). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Dean M. Blattermangreen2 sentences2025See, e.g., State v. Blatterman, 2015 WI 46, ¶17 , 362 Wis. 2d 138 , 864 N.W.2d 26 (“the State bears the burden of proving that the seizure complied with the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 11” of the Wisconsin Constitution); State v. Wille, 185 Wis. 2d 673, 682 , 518 N.W.2d 325 (Ct. App. 1994) (“the State’s burden of persuasion at a suppression hearing is significantly greater than … at a refusal hearing”). 2025See, e.g., State v. Blatterman, 2015 WI 46, ¶17 , 362 Wis. 2d 138 , 864 N.W.2d 26 (“the State bears the burden of proving that the seizure complied with the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 11” of the Wisconsin Constitution); State v. Wille, 185 Wis. 2d 673, 682 , 518 N.W.2d 325 (Ct. App. 1994) (“the State’s burden of persuasion at a suppression hearing is significantly greater than … at a refusal hearing”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Navdeep S. Brargreen2 sentences2024However, “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all state-initiated searches and seizures; it merely proscribes those which are unreasonable.” Brar, 376 Wis. 2d 685, ¶15 (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991)). “‘[A] search conducted pursuant to consent’” is a “‘well-established exception to the warrant requirement[.]’” Brar, 376 Wis. 2d 685, ¶16 (citation omitted). ¶10 After hearing testimony at the refusal hearing and viewing the body camera footage, the circuit court found that Hernandez did not consent to Benson’s request that he submit to an evidentiary test. 2024However, “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all state-initiated searches and seizures; it merely proscribes those which are unreasonable.” Brar, 376 Wis. 2d 685, ¶15 (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991)). “‘[A] search conducted pursuant to consent’” is a “‘well-established exception to the warrant requirement[.]’” Brar, 376 Wis. 2d 685, ¶16 (citation omitted). ¶10 After hearing testimony at the refusal hearing and viewing the body camera footage, the circuit court found that Hernandez did not consent to Benson’s request that he submit to an evidentiary test. | 1 | 1 |
Florida v. Jimenogreen1 sentence2024However, “[t]he Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all state-initiated searches and seizures; it merely proscribes those which are unreasonable.” Brar, 376 Wis. 2d 685, ¶15 (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991)). “‘[A] search conducted pursuant to consent’” is a “‘well-established exception to the warrant requirement[.]’” Brar, 376 Wis. 2d 685, ¶16 (citation omitted). ¶10 After hearing testimony at the refusal hearing and viewing the body camera footage, the circuit court found that Hernandez did not consent to Benson’s request that he submit to an evidentiary test. | 1 | 1 |
County of Ozaukee v. Quellegreen2 sentences2024See Quelle, 198 Wis. 2d at 280 . ¶14 This court agrees that, generally speaking, evidence as to whether Rodriguez received additional, misleading information, which he says impacted his ability to make a choice regarding chemical testing, is relevant at a refusal hearing. 2024See id. | 1 | 1 |
| Northern States Power Co. v. Bughergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. McCrossengreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. James R. Huntgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Padleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Bollinggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wolff v. McDonnellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Illinois v. Batcheldergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Borowskigreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. O'CONNELLgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hempton v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| Pickens v. Statered | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Lange
green
2 sentences2022It is “that quantum of evidence … that would lead a reasonable law enforcement officer to believe that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant.” State v. Lange, 2009 WI 49, ¶19 , 317 Wis. 2d 383 , 766 N.W.2d 551 . 8 No. 2021AP1095 ¶16 Wisconsin cases have explained that “[t]he State’s burden of persuasion at a refusal hearing is substantially less than at a suppression hearing.” State v. Wille, 185 Wis. 2d 673, 681 , 518 N.W.2d 325 (Ct. App. 1994). 2022It is “that quantum of evidence … that would lead a reasonable law enforcement officer to believe that the defendant was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant.” State v. Lange, 2009 WI 49, ¶19 , 317 Wis. 2d 383 , 766 N.W.2d 551 . 8 No. 2021AP1095 ¶16 Wisconsin cases have explained that “[t]he State’s burden of persuasion at a refusal hearing is substantially less than at a suppression hearing.” State v. Wille, 185 Wis. 2d 673, 681 , 518 N.W.2d 325 (Ct. App. 1994). | 2 | 2019–2022 |
South Dakota v. Neville
green
2 sentences2020STAT. § 343.305, essentially on the grounds that (1) the Supreme Court in Mitchell and Birchfield cast doubt on the lawfulness of state implied- consent laws that impose civil penalties on drivers who refuse to submit to a request for a blood draw; and (2) Wisconsin’s statutory rule limiting the scope of issues at a refusal hearing, as interpreted in Nordness in 1986, is fatally inconsistent with discussion by the Supreme Court in South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983). 1988Despite the lack of a prior refusal hearing, the evidence of a refusal to submit to a chemical test is admissible at the substantive OWI trial to establish "consciousness of guilt." State v. Zielke , 137 Wis.2d 39 , 47-48 , 403 N.W.2d 427 (1987); State v. Crandall , 133 Wis.2d 251 , 257-60 , 394 N.W.2d 905 (1986), citing among others, South Dakota v. Neville , 459 U.S. 553 (1983), and State v. Albright , 98 Wis.2d 663 , 668-69 , 298 N.W.2d 196 (Ct.App. 1980). | 2 | 1988–2020 |
State v. Gautschi
green
2 sentences2019State v. Gautschi , 2000 WI App 274 , ¶9, 240 Wis. 2d 83 , 622 N.W.2d 24 . 2019State v. Gautschi , 2000 WI App 274 , ¶9, 240 Wis. 2d 83 , 622 N.W.2d 24 . | 2 | 2012–2019 |
State v. Krause
green
2 sentences2019State v. Krause, 2006 WI App 43, ¶¶11-12 , 289 Wis. 2d 573 , 712 N.W.2d 67 . 2019State v. Krause, 2006 WI App 43, ¶¶11-12 , 289 Wis. 2d 573 , 712 N.W.2d 67 . | 2 | 2012–2019 |
Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Philip A. Shepherd
green
2 sentences2018See In re Disciplinary 6 We dismiss counts 1, 6, and 7 of the OLR complaint, which alleged that: by failing to take steps to accurately ascertain the status of the matter after receiving N.B.'s inquiries into the status of her driver's license, and by failing to take any steps to mitigate the consequences of the untimely filed demand for a refusal hearing, Attorney Tjader violated SCR 20:1.3 (Diligence) (Count 1); by failing to timely address the restitution issue after L.H.'s sentencing, Attorney Tjader violated SCR 20:1.3 (Count 6); and by failing to inform L.H. that a restitution order had 2018See In re Disciplinary 6 We dismiss counts 1, 6, and 7 of the OLR complaint, which alleged that: by failing to take steps to accurately ascertain the status of the matter after receiving N.B.'s inquiries into the status of her driver's license, and by failing to take any steps to mitigate the consequences of the untimely filed demand for a refusal hearing, Attorney Tjader violated SCR 20:1.3 (Diligence) (Count 1); by failing to timely address the restitution issue after L.H.'s sentencing, Attorney Tjader violated SCR 20:1.3 (Count 6); and by failing to inform L.H. that a restitution order had | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Robert J. Smead
green
2 sentences2018See In re Disciplinary 6 We dismiss counts 1, 6, and 7 of the OLR complaint, which alleged that: by failing to take steps to accurately ascertain the status of the matter after receiving N.B.'s inquiries into the status of her driver's license, and by failing to take any steps to mitigate the consequences of the untimely filed demand for a refusal hearing, Attorney Tjader violated SCR 20:1.3 (Diligence) (Count 1); by failing to timely address the restitution issue after L.H.'s sentencing, Attorney Tjader violated SCR 20:1.3 (Count 6); and by failing to inform L.H. that a restitution order had 2018See In re Disciplinary 6 We dismiss counts 1, 6, and 7 of the OLR complaint, which alleged that: by failing to take steps to accurately ascertain the status of the matter after receiving N.B.'s inquiries into the status of her driver's license, and by failing to take any steps to mitigate the consequences of the untimely filed demand for a refusal hearing, Attorney Tjader violated SCR 20:1.3 (Diligence) (Count 1); by failing to timely address the restitution issue after L.H.'s sentencing, Attorney Tjader violated SCR 20:1.3 (Count 6); and by failing to inform L.H. that a restitution order had | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Birchfield v. N. Dakota. William Robert Bernard
green
2 sentences2017The court of appeals wrote: "The fact that Blackman could have prevailed at a refusal hearing due to the legislature's failure to amend the refusal hearing statute does not transform Blackman's freely given actual consent under Wisconsin's implied consent law into a coerced submittal." Blackman, 371 Wis. 2d 635, ¶12 (emphasis added). 19 No. 2015AP450-CR B ¶52 We next determine whether Blackman's consent to the blood draw was obtained through misrepresentation, rendering his consent coerced, that is, not voluntarily and freely given under the Fourth Amendment. ¶53 Blood draws are searches under 2017The court of appeals wrote: "The fact that Blackman could have prevailed at a refusal hearing due to the legislature's failure to amend the refusal hearing statute does not transform Blackman's freely given actual consent under Wisconsin's implied consent law into a coerced submittal." Blackman, 371 Wis. 2d 635, ¶12 (emphasis added). 19 No. 2015AP450-CR B ¶52 We next determine whether Blackman's consent to the blood draw was obtained through misrepresentation, rendering his consent coerced, that is, not voluntarily and freely given under the Fourth Amendment. ¶53 Blood draws are searches under | 2 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Albright
green
2 sentences1988Despite the lack of a prior refusal hearing, the evidence of a refusal to submit to a chemical test is admissible at the substantive OWI trial to establish "consciousness of guilt." State v. Zielke , 137 Wis.2d 39 , 47-48 , 403 N.W.2d 427 (1987); State v. Crandall , 133 Wis.2d 251 , 257-60 , 394 N.W.2d 905 (1986), citing among others, South Dakota v. Neville , 459 U.S. 553 (1983), and State v. Albright , 98 Wis.2d 663 , 668-69 , 298 N.W.2d 196 (Ct.App. 1980). 1988Despite the lack of a prior refusal hearing, the evidence of a refusal to submit to a chemical test is admissible at the substantive OWI trial to establish "consciousness of guilt." State v. Zielke , 137 Wis.2d 39 , 47-48 , 403 N.W.2d 427 (1987); State v. Crandall , 133 Wis.2d 251 , 257-60 , 394 N.W.2d 905 (1986), citing among others, South Dakota v. Neville , 459 U.S. 553 (1983), and State v. Albright , 98 Wis.2d 663 , 668-69 , 298 N.W.2d 196 (Ct.App. 1980). | 2 | 1985–1988 |
State v. Jenkins
green
2 sentences2024State v. Jenkins, 2007 WI 96, ¶33 , 303 Wis. 2d 157 , 736 N.W.2d 24 . ¶22 The circuit court’s finding that Sharpe’s “self-serving testimony” at the refusal hearing was “unconvincing”—i.e., incredible—is not clearly erroneous. 2024State v. Jenkins, 2007 WI 96, ¶33 , 303 Wis. 2d 157 , 736 N.W.2d 24 . ¶22 The circuit court’s finding that Sharpe’s “self-serving testimony” at the refusal hearing was “unconvincing”—i.e., incredible—is not clearly erroneous. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| State v. Mayo green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Peppertree Resort Villas, Inc.
green
2 sentences2024The circuit court, “acting as the trier of fact, assesses the credibility of the two sides and determines as a matter of fact whether the erroneous extra information caused the defendant to refuse to take the test.” Ludwigson, 212 Wis. 2d at 876 . 8 Nos. 2021AP1543 2022AP307 ¶21 In this case, the circuit court found that Sharpe’s “self-serving testimony at the refusal hearing that he ‘definitely would have considered’ submitting to a blood test was unconvincing.” “When the circuit court acts as the finder of fact, it is the ultimate arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to 2024The circuit court, “acting as the trier of fact, assesses the credibility of the two sides and determines as a matter of fact whether the erroneous extra information caused the defendant to refuse to take the test.” Ludwigson, 212 Wis. 2d at 876 . 8 Nos. 2021AP1543 2022AP307 ¶21 In this case, the circuit court found that Sharpe’s “self-serving testimony at the refusal hearing that he ‘definitely would have considered’ submitting to a blood test was unconvincing.” “When the circuit court acts as the finder of fact, it is the ultimate arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Pfaff
green
2 sentences2024The City’s burden of persuasion is “substantially less [at a refusal hearing] than at a suppression hearing,” see State v. Pfaff, 2004 WI App 31, ¶16 , 269 Wis. 2d 786 , 676 N.W.2d 562 ; it “only [must] show that the officer’s account is plausible,” see State v. Wille, 185 Wis. 2d 673, 681 , 518 N.W.2d 325 (Ct. App. 1994). 2024The City’s burden of persuasion is “substantially less [at a refusal hearing] than at a suppression hearing,” see State v. Pfaff, 2004 WI App 31, ¶16 , 269 Wis. 2d 786 , 676 N.W.2d 562 ; it “only [must] show that the officer’s account is plausible,” see State v. Wille, 185 Wis. 2d 673, 681 , 518 N.W.2d 325 (Ct. App. 1994). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Kasian
green
2 sentences2024This court is not bound by an officer’s “subjective assessment or motivation.” State v. Kasian, 207 Wis. 2d 611, 621 , 558 N.W.2d 687 (Ct. App. 1996). ¶20 Here, the information available to the officer at the time of arrest would lead a reasonable police officer to believe that Ahmed had been operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. 2024This court is not bound by an officer’s “subjective assessment or motivation.” State v. Kasian, 207 Wis. 2d 611, 621 , 558 N.W.2d 687 (Ct. App. 1996). ¶20 Here, the information available to the officer at the time of arrest would lead a reasonable police officer to believe that Ahmed had been operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Ludwigson
green
2 sentences2024The circuit court, “acting as the trier of fact, assesses the credibility of the two sides and determines as a matter of fact whether the erroneous extra information caused the defendant to refuse to take the test.” Ludwigson, 212 Wis. 2d at 876 . 8 Nos. 2021AP1543 2022AP307 ¶21 In this case, the circuit court found that Sharpe’s “self-serving testimony at the refusal hearing that he ‘definitely would have considered’ submitting to a blood test was unconvincing.” “When the circuit court acts as the finder of fact, it is the ultimate arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to 2024As such, the court implicitly determined that Sharpe had failed to make a prima facie showing of a causal connection between the officers’ misinformation and his refusal to submit to chemical testing. ¶28 In any event, as noted above, “[a]t the end, the [circuit court], acting as the trier of fact, assesses the credibility of the two sides and determines as a matter of fact whether the erroneous extra information caused the defendant to refuse to take the test.” Id. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Douglas-Hanson Co., Inc. v. BF Goodrich Co. green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Hughes
green
2 sentences2024See Wille, 185 Wis. 2d at 681-82 (circuit court in a refusal hearing “‘simply must ascertain the plausibility of a police officer’s account’” (quoting State v. Nordness, 128 Wis. 2d 15, 36 , 381 N.W.2d 300 (1986))); State v. Hughes, 2000 WI 24 , ¶2 n.1, 233 Wis. 2d 280 , 607 N.W.2d 621 (appellate court “will uphold a [circuit] court’s determination of credibility unless that determination goes against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence”). 2024See Wille, 185 Wis. 2d at 681-82 (circuit court in a refusal hearing “‘simply must ascertain the plausibility of a police officer’s account’” (quoting State v. Nordness, 128 Wis. 2d 15, 36 , 381 N.W.2d 300 (1986))); State v. Hughes, 2000 WI 24 , ¶2 n.1, 233 Wis. 2d 280 , 607 N.W.2d 621 (appellate court “will uphold a [circuit] court’s determination of credibility unless that determination goes against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence”). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| State v. Pires green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. Dawn J. Levanduski green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Baratka green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| County of Dane v. Sharpee green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Mitchell v. Wisconsin green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Brandon H. Bentdahl neutral | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Thompson v. Village of Hales Corners green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Casper v. American International South Insurance green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| State v. Ryan green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Village of Trempealeau v. Mikrut green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| State v. Piddington green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| State v. Castillo green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| State v. Anagnos green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| State v. Swanson green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| State v. Seibel green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| State v. Jakubowski green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| State v. Klessig green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Angela Stroe and Marin Stroe v. Immigration and Naturalization Service green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Archie D. Wright v. W. J. Estelle, Jr., Director, Texas Department of Corrections green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| State v. Dyess green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| In Interest of TMS green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Hutter v. Lake View Trust & Savings Bank green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Lister v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Neely v. State green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.