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7 North Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1947–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Alabama v. Smithgreen2 sentences2009See, e.g., Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 799 , 109 S.Ct. 2201, 2204 , 104 L.Ed.2d 865, 872 (1989); Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 384 , 102 S.Ct. at 2494 , 73 L.Ed.2d at 87 . 2009See, e.g., Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 799 , 109 S.Ct. 2201, 2204 , 104 L.Ed.2d 865, 872 (1989); Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 384 , 102 S.Ct. at 2494 , 73 L.Ed.2d at 87 . | 1 | 1 |
Cox v. Coxgreen1 sentence2009App. 221, 233 , 515 S.E.2d 61, 69 (1999) (“The trial court’s refusal to *251 enter a permanent order has deprived defendant of appellate review and the refusal was error.”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Williams
green
1 sentence2019Id. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Smithwick v. Crutchfield
green
1 sentence2013Defendant’s argument also appears to be partially premised upon the rule that “ ‘no appeal lies from one Superior Court judge to another; that one Superior Court judge may not correct another’s errors of law; and that ordinarily one judge may not modify, overrule, or change the judgment of another Superior Court judge previously made in the same action.’ ” Smithwick v. Crutchfield, 87 N.C. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Mutch v. Jarratt
green
1 sentence2009Indeed, our Supreme Court has specifically upheld a trial court's refusal to rule on a motion in limine seeking to preclude the State from cross-examining the defendant on certain facts because, even though the evidence appeared inadmissible, "the trial court could not know if defendant would `open the door' to cross-examination about [those facts] until defendant testified." State v. White, 340 N.C. 264, 289 , 457 S.E.2d 841, 855 , cert denied, 516 U.S. 994 , 133 L. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Pinder v. Johnson
green
1 sentence2009Ed. 2d 436 , 116 S. Ct. 530 (1995). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Veneri v. White
green
1 sentence2009Indeed, our Supreme Court has specifically upheld a trial court's refusal to rule on a motion in limine seeking to preclude the State from cross-examining the defendant on certain facts because, even though the evidence appeared inadmissible, "the trial court could not know if defendant would `open the door' to cross-examination about [those facts] until defendant testified." State v. White, 340 N.C. 264, 289 , 457 S.E.2d 841, 855 , cert denied, 516 U.S. 994 , 133 L. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. White
green
2 sentences2009Indeed, our Supreme Court has specifically upheld a trial court's refusal to rule on a motion in limine seeking to preclude the State from cross-examining the defendant on certain facts because, even though the evidence appeared inadmissible, "the trial court could not know if defendant would `open the door' to cross-examination about [those facts] until defendant testified." State v. White, 340 N.C. 264, 289 , 457 S.E.2d 841, 855 , cert denied, 516 U.S. 994 , 133 L. 2009Indeed, our Supreme Court has specifically upheld a trial court's refusal to rule on a motion in limine seeking to preclude the State from cross-examining the defendant on certain facts because, even though the evidence appeared inadmissible, "the trial court could not know if defendant would `open the door' to cross-examination about [those facts] until defendant testified." State v. White, 340 N.C. 264, 289 , 457 S.E.2d 841, 855 , cert denied, 516 U.S. 994 , 133 L. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
United States v. Goodwin
green
2 sentences2009See, e.g., Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 799 , 109 S.Ct. 2201, 2204 , 104 L.Ed.2d 865, 872 (1989); Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 384 , 102 S.Ct. at 2494 , 73 L.Ed.2d at 87 . 2009See, e.g., Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 799 , 109 S.Ct. 2201, 2204 , 104 L.Ed.2d 865, 872 (1989); Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 384 , 102 S.Ct. at 2494 , 73 L.Ed.2d at 87 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Darbo v. Old Keller Farm Property Owners' Ass'n
green
2 sentences2008However, we began our analysis by stating that “the issues presented in this case are issues that are properly addressed to and resolved by county or municipal planning and inspections departments as an initial matter, rather than our courts.” Id. at 593 , 621 S.E.2d at 283 . 2008However, we began our analysis by stating that “the issues presented in this case are issues that are properly addressed to and resolved by county or municipal planning and inspections departments as an initial matter, rather than our courts.” Id. at 593 , 621 S.E.2d at 283 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Williams v. . Thomas
neutral
2 sentences1947Sharpe, would be guilty of any negligence in this case.” The general rule, as stated in Huddy (7 Ed.), Section 373, is as follows: “The mere fact of skidding of a car is not of itself such evidence of negligence as to render the owner liable for an injury in consequence thereof.” Springs v. Doll, 197 N. C., 240 , 148 S. E., 251 ; Butner v. Whitlow, 201 N. C., 749 , 161 S. E., 389 ; Waller v. Hipp, 208 N. C., 117 , 179 S. E., 428 ; Taylor v. Rierson, 210 N. C., 185 , 185 S. E., 627 ; Hewitt v. Urich, supra; Clodfeller v. Wells, 212 N. C., 823 , 195 S. E., 11 ; Williams v. Thomas, 219 N. C., 727 1947Sharpe, would be guilty of any negligence in this case.” The general rule, as stated in Huddy (7 Ed.), Section 373, is as follows: “The mere fact of skidding of a car is not of itself such evidence of negligence as to render the owner liable for an injury in consequence thereof.” Springs v. Doll, 197 N. C., 240 , 148 S. E., 251 ; Butner v. Whitlow, 201 N. C., 749 , 161 S. E., 389 ; Waller v. Hipp, 208 N. C., 117 , 179 S. E., 428 ; Taylor v. Rierson, 210 N. C., 185 , 185 S. E., 627 ; Hewitt v. Urich, supra; Clodfeller v. Wells, 212 N. C., 823 , 195 S. E., 11 ; Williams v. Thomas, 219 N. C., 727 | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Waller v. . Hipp
neutral
2 sentences1947Sharpe, would be guilty of any negligence in this case.” The general rule, as stated in Huddy (7 Ed.), Section 373, is as follows: “The mere fact of skidding of a car is not of itself such evidence of negligence as to render the owner liable for an injury in consequence thereof.” Springs v. Doll, 197 N. C., 240 , 148 S. E., 251 ; Butner v. Whitlow, 201 N. C., 749 , 161 S. E., 389 ; Waller v. Hipp, 208 N. C., 117 , 179 S. E., 428 ; Taylor v. Rierson, 210 N. C., 185 , 185 S. E., 627 ; Hewitt v. Urich, supra; Clodfeller v. Wells, 212 N. C., 823 , 195 S. E., 11 ; Williams v. Thomas, 219 N. C., 727 1947Sharpe, would be guilty of any negligence in this case.” The general rule, as stated in Huddy (7 Ed.), Section 373, is as follows: “The mere fact of skidding of a car is not of itself such evidence of negligence as to render the owner liable for an injury in consequence thereof.” Springs v. Doll, 197 N. C., 240 , 148 S. E., 251 ; Butner v. Whitlow, 201 N. C., 749 , 161 S. E., 389 ; Waller v. Hipp, 208 N. C., 117 , 179 S. E., 428 ; Taylor v. Rierson, 210 N. C., 185 , 185 S. E., 627 ; Hewitt v. Urich, supra; Clodfeller v. Wells, 212 N. C., 823 , 195 S. E., 11 ; Williams v. Thomas, 219 N. C., 727 | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Head v. . Insurance Co.
neutral
1 sentence1947Sharpe, would be guilty of any negligence in this case.” The general rule, as stated in Huddy (7 Ed.), Section 373, is as follows: “The mere fact of skidding of a car is not of itself such evidence of negligence as to render the owner liable for an injury in consequence thereof.” Springs v. Doll, 197 N. C., 240 , 148 S. E., 251 ; Butner v. Whitlow, 201 N. C., 749 , 161 S. E., 389 ; Waller v. Hipp, 208 N. C., 117 , 179 S. E., 428 ; Taylor v. Rierson, 210 N. C., 185 , 185 S. E., 627 ; Hewitt v. Urich, supra; Clodfeller v. Wells, 212 N. C., 823 , 195 S. E., 11 ; Williams v. Thomas, 219 N. C., 727 | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Springs v. . Doll
green
2 sentences1947Sharpe, would be guilty of any negligence in this case.” The general rule, as stated in Huddy (7 Ed.), Section 373, is as follows: “The mere fact of skidding of a car is not of itself such evidence of negligence as to render the owner liable for an injury in consequence thereof.” Springs v. Doll, 197 N. C., 240 , 148 S. E., 251 ; Butner v. Whitlow, 201 N. C., 749 , 161 S. E., 389 ; Waller v. Hipp, 208 N. C., 117 , 179 S. E., 428 ; Taylor v. Rierson, 210 N. C., 185 , 185 S. E., 627 ; Hewitt v. Urich, supra; Clodfeller v. Wells, 212 N. C., 823 , 195 S. E., 11 ; Williams v. Thomas, 219 N. C., 727 1947Sharpe, would be guilty of any negligence in this case.” The general rule, as stated in Huddy (7 Ed.), Section 373, is as follows: “The mere fact of skidding of a car is not of itself such evidence of negligence as to render the owner liable for an injury in consequence thereof.” Springs v. Doll, 197 N. C., 240 , 148 S. E., 251 ; Butner v. Whitlow, 201 N. C., 749 , 161 S. E., 389 ; Waller v. Hipp, 208 N. C., 117 , 179 S. E., 428 ; Taylor v. Rierson, 210 N. C., 185 , 185 S. E., 627 ; Hewitt v. Urich, supra; Clodfeller v. Wells, 212 N. C., 823 , 195 S. E., 11 ; Williams v. Thomas, 219 N. C., 727 | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Clodfelter v. . Wells
green
2 sentences1947Sharpe, would be guilty of any negligence in this case.” The general rule, as stated in Huddy (7 Ed.), Section 373, is as follows: “The mere fact of skidding of a car is not of itself such evidence of negligence as to render the owner liable for an injury in consequence thereof.” Springs v. Doll, 197 N. C., 240 , 148 S. E., 251 ; Butner v. Whitlow, 201 N. C., 749 , 161 S. E., 389 ; Waller v. Hipp, 208 N. C., 117 , 179 S. E., 428 ; Taylor v. Rierson, 210 N. C., 185 , 185 S. E., 627 ; Hewitt v. Urich, supra; Clodfeller v. Wells, 212 N. C., 823 , 195 S. E., 11 ; Williams v. Thomas, 219 N. C., 727 1947Sharpe, would be guilty of any negligence in this case.” The general rule, as stated in Huddy (7 Ed.), Section 373, is as follows: “The mere fact of skidding of a car is not of itself such evidence of negligence as to render the owner liable for an injury in consequence thereof.” Springs v. Doll, 197 N. C., 240 , 148 S. E., 251 ; Butner v. Whitlow, 201 N. C., 749 , 161 S. E., 389 ; Waller v. Hipp, 208 N. C., 117 , 179 S. E., 428 ; Taylor v. Rierson, 210 N. C., 185 , 185 S. E., 627 ; Hewitt v. Urich, supra; Clodfeller v. Wells, 212 N. C., 823 , 195 S. E., 11 ; Williams v. Thomas, 219 N. C., 727 | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Mitchell v. . Melts
green
2 sentences1947Sharpe, would be guilty of any negligence in this case.” The general rule, as stated in Huddy (7 Ed.), Section 373, is as follows: “The mere fact of skidding of a car is not of itself such evidence of negligence as to render the owner liable for an injury in consequence thereof.” Springs v. Doll, 197 N. C., 240 , 148 S. E., 251 ; Butner v. Whitlow, 201 N. C., 749 , 161 S. E., 389 ; Waller v. Hipp, 208 N. C., 117 , 179 S. E., 428 ; Taylor v. Rierson, 210 N. C., 185 , 185 S. E., 627 ; Hewitt v. Urich, supra; Clodfeller v. Wells, 212 N. C., 823 , 195 S. E., 11 ; Williams v. Thomas, 219 N. C., 727 1947Sharpe, would be guilty of any negligence in this case.” The general rule, as stated in Huddy (7 Ed.), Section 373, is as follows: “The mere fact of skidding of a car is not of itself such evidence of negligence as to render the owner liable for an injury in consequence thereof.” Springs v. Doll, 197 N. C., 240 , 148 S. E., 251 ; Butner v. Whitlow, 201 N. C., 749 , 161 S. E., 389 ; Waller v. Hipp, 208 N. C., 117 , 179 S. E., 428 ; Taylor v. Rierson, 210 N. C., 185 , 185 S. E., 627 ; Hewitt v. Urich, supra; Clodfeller v. Wells, 212 N. C., 823 , 195 S. E., 11 ; Williams v. Thomas, 219 N. C., 727 | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Taylor v. . Rierson
neutral
1 sentence1947Sharpe, would be guilty of any negligence in this case.” The general rule, as stated in Huddy (7 Ed.), Section 373, is as follows: “The mere fact of skidding of a car is not of itself such evidence of negligence as to render the owner liable for an injury in consequence thereof.” Springs v. Doll, 197 N. C., 240 , 148 S. E., 251 ; Butner v. Whitlow, 201 N. C., 749 , 161 S. E., 389 ; Waller v. Hipp, 208 N. C., 117 , 179 S. E., 428 ; Taylor v. Rierson, 210 N. C., 185 , 185 S. E., 627 ; Hewitt v. Urich, supra; Clodfeller v. Wells, 212 N. C., 823 , 195 S. E., 11 ; Williams v. Thomas, 219 N. C., 727 | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Butner v. . Whitlow
green
2 sentences1947Sharpe, would be guilty of any negligence in this case.” The general rule, as stated in Huddy (7 Ed.), Section 373, is as follows: “The mere fact of skidding of a car is not of itself such evidence of negligence as to render the owner liable for an injury in consequence thereof.” Springs v. Doll, 197 N. C., 240 , 148 S. E., 251 ; Butner v. Whitlow, 201 N. C., 749 , 161 S. E., 389 ; Waller v. Hipp, 208 N. C., 117 , 179 S. E., 428 ; Taylor v. Rierson, 210 N. C., 185 , 185 S. E., 627 ; Hewitt v. Urich, supra; Clodfeller v. Wells, 212 N. C., 823 , 195 S. E., 11 ; Williams v. Thomas, 219 N. C., 727 1947Sharpe, would be guilty of any negligence in this case.” The general rule, as stated in Huddy (7 Ed.), Section 373, is as follows: “The mere fact of skidding of a car is not of itself such evidence of negligence as to render the owner liable for an injury in consequence thereof.” Springs v. Doll, 197 N. C., 240 , 148 S. E., 251 ; Butner v. Whitlow, 201 N. C., 749 , 161 S. E., 389 ; Waller v. Hipp, 208 N. C., 117 , 179 S. E., 428 ; Taylor v. Rierson, 210 N. C., 185 , 185 S. E., 627 ; Hewitt v. Urich, supra; Clodfeller v. Wells, 212 N. C., 823 , 195 S. E., 11 ; Williams v. Thomas, 219 N. C., 727 | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.