scheduled hearing in Florida

2020However, we have explained that “courts should ordinarily refrain from determining a termination of parental rights by default where an absent parent is making reasonable effort to be present at the scheduled hearing and is delayed by forces or circumstances beyond the parent’s control.” A.M. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 853 So. 2d 1084, 1085 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (quoting R.P. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 835 So. 2d 1212, 1214 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)).

2017Therefore, “courts should ordinarily refrain from determining a termination of parental rights by default where an absent parent is making reasonable effort to be present at the scheduled hearing and is delayed by forces or circumstances beyond the parent’s control.” A.H., 22 So.3d at 803 (quoting R.P. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 835 So.2d 1212, 1214 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)).

2008However, “courts should ordinarily refrain from determining a termination of parental rights by default where an absent parent is making reasonable effort to be present at the scheduled hearing and is delayed by forces or circumstances beyond the parent’s control.” R.P. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 835 So.2d 1212, 1214 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); see also V.M. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 941 So.2d 1255, 1256 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (citing R.P.); B.H. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 882 So.2d 1099, 1100-01 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (“courts have made a distinction between parents who fail to appe

2008However, "courts should ordinarily refrain from determining a termination of parental rights by default where an absent parent is making reasonable effort to be present at the scheduled hearing and is delayed by forces or circumstances beyond the parent's control." R.P. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 835 So.2d 1212, 1214 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); see also V.M. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 941 So.2d 1255, 1256 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (citing R.P. ); B.H. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 882 So.2d 1099, 1100-01 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) ("courts have made a distinction between parents who fail to app

2020Cf. State v. Dixon, 217 So. 3d 1115, 1122 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (“A trial judge’s announced intention before a scheduled hearing to make a specific ruling regardless of any evidence or argument to the contrary, is the paradigm of judicial bias and prejudice.”) (quoting Gonzalez v. Goldstein, 633 So. 2d 1183, 1184 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)) (emphasis added).

2019See Van Hoven v. Burk, 71 So. 2d 158, 158 (Fla. 1954) (holding trial court erred by directing a verdict for one party or another or ruling on a claim after an opening statement but before presentation of the evidence or testimony); Kates v. Seidenman, 881 So. 2d 56, 58 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) ("While a trial judge may form mental impressions and opinions during the course of hearing evidence in a case, the judge is not permitted to pre-judge the case."); Perez v. State, 771 So. 2d 1285, 1285 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (finding statements made by trial court judge provided a "well founded fear" the defenda

2020However, we have explained that “courts should ordinarily refrain from determining a termination of parental rights by default where an absent parent is making reasonable effort to be present at the scheduled hearing and is delayed by forces or circumstances beyond the parent’s control.” A.M. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 853 So. 2d 1084, 1085 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (quoting R.P. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 835 So. 2d 1212, 1214 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)).

2003See A.M. v. Dep’t of Children and Families, 853 So.2d 1084 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (holding that trial court erred in refusing to vacate default judgment against parents who were one hour late to hearing because they were mistaken about the public transportation schedule).

2025Ass’n, Inc. v. 4 Bennett, 321 So. 3d 315 , 317 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) (“We read this rather unambiguous rule as requiring that both a claimant’s motion to amend – which, by virtue of rule 1.190(a), must include the proposed amended complaint – and any evidence . . . be filed and served no later than twenty days before the scheduled hearing on the motion.” (second emphasis added)); Taylor v. City of Lake Worth, 964 So. 2d 243, 244 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (holding that attachment under 1.190(a) is “a mandatory requirement”).

2025Ass’n, Inc. v. 4 Bennett, 321 So. 3d 315 , 317 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) (“We read this rather unambiguous rule as requiring that both a claimant’s motion to amend – which, by virtue of rule 1.190(a), must include the proposed amended complaint – and any evidence . . . be filed and served no later than twenty days before the scheduled hearing on the motion.” (second emphasis added)); Taylor v. City of Lake Worth, 964 So. 2d 243, 244 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (holding that attachment under 1.190(a) is “a mandatory requirement”).

2008However, “courts should ordinarily refrain from determining a termination of parental rights by default where an absent parent is making reasonable effort to be present at the scheduled hearing and is delayed by forces or circumstances beyond the parent’s control.” R.P. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 835 So.2d 1212, 1214 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); see also V.M. v. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 941 So.2d 1255, 1256 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (citing R.P.); B.H. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 882 So.2d 1099, 1100-01 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (“courts have made a distinction between parents who fail to appe

2008However, "courts should ordinarily refrain from determining a termination of parental rights by default where an absent parent is making reasonable effort to be present at the scheduled hearing and is delayed by forces or circumstances beyond the parent's control." R.P. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 835 So.2d 1212, 1214 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); see also V.M. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 941 So.2d 1255, 1256 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) (citing R.P. ); B.H. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 882 So.2d 1099, 1100-01 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) ("courts have made a distinction between parents who fail to app

2006(In re A.N.D.) , 883 So.2d 910, 914 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (citing R.P. ).

2006(In re A.N.D.), 883 So.2d 910, 914 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (citing R.P.).

2026This appeal followed. 3 DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS Simply put, we hold the trial court violated U.S. Bank’s due process rights when it “changed the nature and expanded the scope of the scheduled hearing without proper notice.” Shah v. Shah, 178 So. 3d 70, 71 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (“Due process requires proper notice and an opportunity to be heard.”) (citing Epic Metals Corp. v. Samari Lake E.

2017In Shah v. Shah, 178 So.3d 70 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015), this Court reversed the trial court’s entry of final judgment after finding that the Wife’s due process rights were violated when the trial court expanded the scope of the scheduled hearing into a final hearing without proper notice.

2025See Stambaugh v. State, 891 So. 2d 1136, 1139 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (“Without the issuance of an arrest warrant [or a notice to appear], the January 28, 2004 VOP affidavit did not toll the probationary period.”).

2020Cf. State v. Dixon, 217 So. 3d 1115, 1122 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (“A trial judge’s announced intention before a scheduled hearing to make a specific ruling regardless of any evidence or argument to the contrary, is the paradigm of judicial bias and prejudice.”) (quoting Gonzalez v. Goldstein, 633 So. 2d 1183, 1184 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)) (emphasis added).

2019See Van Hoven v. Burk, 71 So. 2d 158, 158 (Fla. 1954) (holding trial court erred by directing a verdict for one party or another or ruling on a claim after an opening statement but before presentation of the evidence or testimony); Kates v. Seidenman, 881 So. 2d 56, 58 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) ("While a trial judge may form mental impressions and opinions during the course of hearing evidence in a case, the judge is not permitted to pre-judge the case."); Perez v. State, 771 So. 2d 1285, 1285 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (finding statements made by trial court judge provided a "well founded fear" the defenda

2019See Capuzzo v. State, 596 So. 2d 438, 440 (Fla. 1992).

2019See Van Hoven v. Burk, 71 So. 2d 158, 158 (Fla. 1954) (holding trial court erred by directing a verdict for one party or another or ruling on a claim after an opening statement but before presentation of the evidence or testimony); Kates v. Seidenman, 881 So. 2d 56, 58 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) ("While a trial judge may form mental impressions and opinions during the course of hearing evidence in a case, the judge is not permitted to pre-judge the case."); Perez v. State, 771 So. 2d 1285, 1285 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (finding statements made by trial court judge provided a "well founded fear" the defenda

2019See Van Hoven v. Burk, 71 So. 2d 158, 158 (Fla. 1954) (holding trial court erred by directing a verdict for one party or another or ruling on a claim after an opening statement but before presentation of the evidence or testimony); Kates v. Seidenman, 881 So. 2d 56, 58 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) ("While a trial judge may form mental impressions and opinions during the course of hearing evidence in a case, the judge is not permitted to pre-judge the case."); Perez v. State, 771 So. 2d 1285, 1285 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (finding statements made by trial court judge provided a "well founded fear" the defenda

2019Inc. v. Nunziata, 159 So. 3d 850, 862 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) ("Trial judges must be fair, impartial, and disinterested participants in the proceedings."); Lee v. State, 264 So. 3d 225, 226 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (noting judges should not only be impartial, but should also leave the impression of impartiality upon all those who appear in court).

2019See Van Hoven v. Burk, 71 So. 2d 158, 158 (Fla. 1954) (holding trial court erred by directing a verdict for one party or another or ruling on a claim after an opening statement but before presentation of the evidence or testimony); Kates v. Seidenman, 881 So. 2d 56, 58 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) ("While a trial judge may form mental impressions and opinions during the course of hearing evidence in a case, the judge is not permitted to pre-judge the case."); Perez v. State, 771 So. 2d 1285, 1285 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (finding statements made by trial court judge provided a "well founded fear" the defenda

2019Inc. v. Nunziata, 159 So. 3d 850, 862 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) ("Trial judges must be fair, impartial, and disinterested participants in the proceedings."); Lee v. State, 264 So. 3d 225, 226 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (noting judges should not only be impartial, but should also leave the impression of impartiality upon all those who appear in court).

2018State v. Diaz de la Portilla, 177 So. 3d 965, 972 (Fla. 2015).