scheduled hearing in New York

2016Although there is no requirement that a trial court obtain such transcripts on a defendant’s behalf, we conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, the court should not have proceeded to sentencing without at least attempting to obtain the transcripts sought by defendant and providing defendant a hearing on his constitutional challenge to the predicate felony conviction (see People v Gonzalez, 108 AD2d 622, 624 [1985]; cf. People v Ruscito, 206 AD2d 841, 842 [1994], lv denied 84 NY2d 872 [1994]; see also People v Zeoli, 212 AD2d 935, 935 [1995], lv denied 85 NY2d 916 [1995]).

2016Although there is no requirement that a trial court obtain such transcripts on a defendant’s behalf, we conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, the court should not have proceeded to sentencing without at least attempting to obtain the transcripts sought by defendant and providing defendant a hearing on his constitutional challenge to the predicate felony conviction (see People v Gonzalez, 108 AD2d 622, 624 [1985]; cf. People v Ruscito, 206 AD2d 841, 842 [1994], lv denied 84 NY2d 872 [1994]; see also People v Zeoli, 212 AD2d 935, 935 [1995], lv denied 85 NY2d 916 [1995]).

2020Since the County failed to reschedule the hearing for the earliest possible date available, and the 90-day period had elapsed, the plaintiff was entitled to commence this action before a hearing was conducted ( see General Municipal Law § 50-h[5]; Page v City of Niagara Falls , 277 AD2d 1047, 1048 ; Ambroziak v County of Erie , 177 AD2d 974 ).

2010Under the circumstances of this case, the failure of Peter Billman to appear for a hearing did not warrant dismissal of the complaint insofar as asserted by him (see Vargas v City of Yonkers, 65 AD3d 585, 586 [2009]; October v Town of Greenburgh, 55 AD3d 704 [2008]; Page v City of Niagara Falls, 277 AD2d 1047, 1048 [2000]; Ramos v New York City Hous.

2016Although there is no requirement that a trial court obtain such transcripts on a defendant’s behalf, we conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, the court should not have proceeded to sentencing without at least attempting to obtain the transcripts sought by defendant and providing defendant a hearing on his constitutional challenge to the predicate felony conviction (see People v Gonzalez, 108 AD2d 622, 624 [1985]; cf. People v Ruscito, 206 AD2d 841, 842 [1994], lv denied 84 NY2d 872 [1994]; see also People v Zeoli, 212 AD2d 935, 935 [1995], lv denied 85 NY2d 916 [1995]).

2016Although there is no requirement that a trial court obtain such transcripts on a defendant’s behalf, we conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, the court should not have proceeded to sentencing without at least attempting to obtain the transcripts sought by defendant and providing defendant a hearing on his constitutional challenge to the predicate felony conviction (see People v Gonzalez, 108 AD2d 622, 624 [1985]; cf. People v Ruscito, 206 AD2d 841, 842 [1994], lv denied 84 NY2d 872 [1994]; see also People v Zeoli, 212 AD2d 935, 935 [1995], lv denied 85 NY2d 916 [1995]).

2016Although there is no requirement that a trial court obtain such transcripts on a defendant’s behalf, we conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, the court should not have proceeded to sentencing without at least attempting to obtain the transcripts sought by defendant and providing defendant a hearing on his constitutional challenge to the predicate felony conviction (see People v Gonzalez, 108 AD2d 622, 624 [1985]; cf. People v Ruscito, 206 AD2d 841, 842 [1994], lv denied 84 NY2d 872 [1994]; see also People v Zeoli, 212 AD2d 935, 935 [1995], lv denied 85 NY2d 916 [1995]).

2016Although there is no requirement that a trial court obtain such transcripts on a defendant’s behalf, we conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, the court should not have proceeded to sentencing without at least attempting to obtain the transcripts sought by defendant and providing defendant a hearing on his constitutional challenge to the predicate felony conviction (see People v Gonzalez, 108 AD2d 622, 624 [1985]; cf. People v Ruscito, 206 AD2d 841, 842 [1994], lv denied 84 NY2d 872 [1994]; see also People v Zeoli, 212 AD2d 935, 935 [1995], lv denied 85 NY2d 916 [1995]).

2015Upon review, it does not appear that, at the time of the scheduled hearing, respondent’s counsel had either communicated directly with him or advised him of the hearing date. * Generally, a party who seeks to vacate a default judgment must demonstrate a reasonable excuse for his or her failure to appear and a meritorious defense (see Matter of Prince CC., 66 AD3d 1167, 1167-1168 [2009]; Matter of Shaune TT., 251 AD2d 758, 758 [1998]).

2015Upon review, it does not appear that, at the time of the scheduled hearing, respondent’s counsel had either communicated directly with him or advised him of the hearing date. * Generally, a party who seeks to vacate a default judgment must demonstrate a reasonable excuse for his or her failure to appear and a meritorious defense (see Matter of Prince CC., 66 AD3d 1167, 1167-1168 [2009]; Matter of Shaune TT., 251 AD2d 758, 758 [1998]).

2015No such showing is required, however, where a party’s fundamental due process rights have been denied (see Matter of Hohenforst v DeMagistris, 44 AD3d 1114, 1116 [2007]).

2015No such showing is required, however, where a party’s fundamental due process rights have been denied (see Matter of Hohenforst v DeMagistris, 44 AD3d 1114, 1116 [2007]).

2015Upon review, it does not appear that, at the time of the scheduled hearing, respondent’s counsel had either communicated directly with him or advised him of the hearing date. * Generally, a party who seeks to vacate a default judgment must demonstrate a reasonable excuse for his or her failure to appear and a meritorious defense (see Matter of Prince CC., 66 AD3d 1167, 1167-1168 [2009]; Matter of Shaune TT., 251 AD2d 758, 758 [1998]).

2015Upon review, it does not appear that, at the time of the scheduled hearing, respondent’s counsel had either communicated directly with him or advised him of the hearing date. * Generally, a party who seeks to vacate a default judgment must demonstrate a reasonable excuse for his or her failure to appear and a meritorious defense (see Matter of Prince CC., 66 AD3d 1167, 1167-1168 [2009]; Matter of Shaune TT., 251 AD2d 758, 758 [1998]).

2013We discern no error or abuse of discretion, particularly given that no good cause was offered for their absence. 3 Further, the request was untimely in that the notice of hearing had clearly advised petitioner and counsel that any requests for adjournments, among other requirements, had to be made “at least five days prior to the scheduled hearing date,” and they were informed at the outset of the first hearing that it could continue in their absence (see Matter of Kosich v New York State Dept. of Health, 49 AD3d at 982-983 ; Matter of Lawrence v DeBuono, 251 AD2d 700, 702 [1998]; Matter of Ro

2013We discern no error or abuse of discretion, particularly given that no good cause was offered for their absence. 3 Further, the request was untimely in that the notice of hearing had clearly advised petitioner and counsel that any requests for adjournments, among other requirements, had to be made “at least five days prior to the scheduled hearing date,” and they were informed at the outset of the first hearing that it could continue in their absence (see Matter of Kosich v New York State Dept. of Health, 49 AD3d at 982-983 ; Matter of Lawrence v DeBuono, 251 AD2d 700, 702 [1998]; Matter of Ro

2013We discern no error or abuse of discretion, particularly given that no good cause was offered for their absence. 3 Further, the request was untimely in that the notice of hearing had clearly advised petitioner and counsel that any requests for adjournments, among other requirements, had to be made “at least five days prior to the scheduled hearing date,” and they were informed at the outset of the first hearing that it could continue in their absence (see Matter of Kosich v New York State Dept. of Health, 49 AD3d at 982-983 ; Matter of Lawrence v DeBuono, 251 AD2d 700, 702 [1998]; Matter of Ro

2013We discern no error or abuse of discretion, particularly given that no good cause was offered for their absence. 3 Further, the request was untimely in that the notice of hearing had clearly advised petitioner and counsel that any requests for adjournments, among other requirements, had to be made “at least five days prior to the scheduled hearing date,” and they were informed at the outset of the first hearing that it could continue in their absence (see Matter of Kosich v New York State Dept. of Health, 49 AD3d at 982-983 ; Matter of Lawrence v DeBuono, 251 AD2d 700, 702 [1998]; Matter of Ro

2013We discern no error or abuse of discretion, particularly given that no good cause was offered for their absence. 3 Further, the request was untimely in that the notice of hearing had clearly advised petitioner and counsel that any requests for adjournments, among other requirements, had to be made “at least five days prior to the scheduled hearing date,” and they were informed at the outset of the first hearing that it could continue in their absence (see Matter of Kosich v New York State Dept. of Health, 49 AD3d at 982-983 ; Matter of Lawrence v DeBuono, 251 AD2d 700, 702 [1998]; Matter of Ro

2013We discern no error or abuse of discretion, particularly given that no good cause was offered for their absence. 3 Further, the request was untimely in that the notice of hearing had clearly advised petitioner and counsel that any requests for adjournments, among other requirements, had to be made “at least five days prior to the scheduled hearing date,” and they were informed at the outset of the first hearing that it could continue in their absence (see Matter of Kosich v New York State Dept. of Health, 49 AD3d at 982-983 ; Matter of Lawrence v DeBuono, 251 AD2d 700, 702 [1998]; Matter of Ro

2013Her failure to appear at the scheduled hearing dates did not constitute a default inasmuch as her counsel was present, stated that she wished to proceed, and affirmed that she had respondent’s authorization to do so (see Matter of Bradley M.M. [Michael M. — Cindy M.], 98 AD3d 1257 [4th Dept 2012]; Matter of Shemeco D., 265 AD2d 860 [4th Dept 1999]; cf. Matter of Aaron C. [Grace C.], 105 AD3d 548 , 548-549 [1st Dept 2013]; Matter of Jaquan Tieran B. [Latoya B.], 105 AD3d 498 , 499 [1st Dept 2013]).

2013Her failure to appear at the scheduled hearing dates did not constitute a default inasmuch as her counsel was present, stated that she wished to proceed, and affirmed that she had respondent’s authorization to do so (see Matter of Bradley M.M. [Michael M. — Cindy M.], 98 AD3d 1257 [4th Dept 2012]; Matter of Shemeco D., 265 AD2d 860 [4th Dept 1999]; cf. Matter of Aaron C. [Grace C.], 105 AD3d 548 , 548-549 [1st Dept 2013]; Matter of Jaquan Tieran B. [Latoya B.], 105 AD3d 498 , 499 [1st Dept 2013]).

2022Moreover, contrary to the defendant's contention, the County Court was not required to conduct further inquiry into the defendant's concerns about assigned counsel given that the defendant "failed to make the requisite specific factual allegations of 'serious complaints about counsel'" ( People v Smart , 142 AD3d 513, 514 , affd 29 NY3d 1098 , quoting People v Porto , 16 NY3d 93, 100 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Tatum , 204 AD3d 1400, 1401 ; People v Ward , 121 AD3d 1026, 1027 ).

2022Moreover, contrary to the defendant's contention, the County Court was not required to conduct further inquiry into the defendant's concerns about assigned counsel given that the defendant "failed to make the requisite specific factual allegations of 'serious complaints about counsel'" ( People v Smart , 142 AD3d 513, 514 , affd 29 NY3d 1098 , quoting People v Porto , 16 NY3d 93, 100 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Tatum , 204 AD3d 1400, 1401 ; People v Ward , 121 AD3d 1026, 1027 ).