scheduled hearing in California

2024(Hall v. Superior Court (1955) 45 Cal.2d 377, 381 [“ ‘[A]n unqualified reversal remands the cause for a new trial . . . and places the parties in the trial court in the same position as if the cause had never been tried, with the exception that the opinion of the court on appeal must be followed so far as applicable’ ”]; Heinfelt v. Arth (1935) 4 Cal.App.2d 381, 383 [same rule].) The trial court shall notify the parties of the scheduled hearing.

2024(Hall v. Superior Court (1955) 45 Cal.2d 377, 381 [“ ‘[A]n unqualified reversal remands the cause for a new trial . . . and places the parties in the trial court in the same position as if the cause had never been tried, with the exception that the opinion of the court on appeal must be followed so far as applicable’ ”]; Heinfelt v. Arth (1935) 4 Cal.App.2d 381, 383 [same rule].) The trial court shall notify the parties of the scheduled hearing.

2024(Hall v. Superior Court (1955) 45 Cal.2d 377, 381 [“ ‘[A]n unqualified reversal remands the cause for a new trial . . . and places the parties in the trial court in the same position as if the cause had never been tried, with the exception that the opinion of the court on appeal must be followed so far as applicable’ ”]; Heinfelt v. Arth (1935) 4 Cal.App.2d 381, 383 [same rule].) The trial court shall notify the parties of the scheduled hearing.

2024(Hall v. Superior Court (1955) 45 Cal.2d 377, 381 [“ ‘[A]n unqualified reversal remands the cause for a new trial . . . and places the parties in the trial court in the same position as if the cause had never been tried, with the exception that the opinion of the court on appeal must be followed so far as applicable’ ”]; Heinfelt v. Arth (1935) 4 Cal.App.2d 381, 383 [same rule].) The trial court shall notify the parties of the scheduled hearing.

2026DISCUSSION A. Legal Principles “[A] bail bond . . . is a ‘ “contract between the surety and the government whereby the surety acts as a guarantor of the defendant’s appearance in court under the risk of forfeiture of the bond.” ’ [Citation.] When a defendant who posts bail fails to appear at a scheduled hearing, the forfeiture of bail implicates not just the defendant’s required presence, but constitutes a ‘breach of this contract’ between the surety and the government. [Citation.] Ultimately, if the defendant’s nonappearance is without sufficient excuse, it is the surety who ‘must suffer the

2025A. Relevant Legal Principles “ ‘The forfeiture of bail and related proceedings are a matter of statutory procedure governed by sections 1305 through 1308. [Citation.] “The object of bail and its forfeiture is to insure the attendance of the accused and his obedience to the orders and judgment of the court.” [Citation.] “While bail bond proceedings occur in connection with criminal prosecutions, they are independent from and collateral to the prosecutions and are civil in nature.” [Citation.] In that regard, the bail bond itself is a “ ‘contract between the surety and the government whereby the

2022(Ibid.) The 6 appellate court held: “ ‘Entry of default is not authorized where an answer is on file, even if the defendant fails to appear at the hearing. [Citations.]’ [Citations.] ‘The consequences of a parent’s failure to appear at a scheduled hearing . . . do not include the deprivation of the due process right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.’ (In re Dolly D. (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 440, 446 .)” (In re Nemis M., supra, at p. 1352 .) Based on this denial of constitutional due process, the appellate court reversed the jurisdictional and dispositional orders.

2022(Ibid.) The 6 appellate court held: “ ‘Entry of default is not authorized where an answer is on file, even if the defendant fails to appear at the hearing. [Citations.]’ [Citations.] ‘The consequences of a parent’s failure to appear at a scheduled hearing . . . do not include the deprivation of the due process right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.’ (In re Dolly D. (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 440, 446 .)” (In re Nemis M., supra, at p. 1352 .) Based on this denial of constitutional due process, the appellate court reversed the jurisdictional and dispositional orders.

2006(Id. at pp. 1352, 1355.) The Court of Appeal reversed. “ ‘The consequences of a parent’s failure to appear at a scheduled hearing ... do not include the deprivation of the due process right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.’ ” (Id. at p. 1352, quoting In re Dolly D. (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 440, 446 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 691 ]; accord, In re Wilford J. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 742, 750 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 317 ].) “[A] limitation on the parent’s right to present witnesses is equally unauthorized.” (In re Nemis M., at p. 1352.) There is no practical difference between the “default” procedure rejected

2006(Id. at pp. 1352, 1355.) The Court of Appeal reversed. “ ‘The consequences of a parent’s failure to appear at a scheduled hearing ... do not include the deprivation of the due process right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.’ ” (Id. at p. 1352, quoting In re Dolly D. (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 440, 446 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 691 ]; accord, In re Wilford J. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 742, 750 [ 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 317 ].) “[A] limitation on the parent’s right to present witnesses is equally unauthorized.” (In re Nemis M., at p. 1352.) There is no practical difference between the “default” procedure rejected

2022(Ibid.) The 6 appellate court held: “ ‘Entry of default is not authorized where an answer is on file, even if the defendant fails to appear at the hearing. [Citations.]’ [Citations.] ‘The consequences of a parent’s failure to appear at a scheduled hearing . . . do not include the deprivation of the due process right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.’ (In re Dolly D. (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 440, 446 .)” (In re Nemis M., supra, at p. 1352 .) Based on this denial of constitutional due process, the appellate court reversed the jurisdictional and dispositional orders.

2022(Ibid.) The 6 appellate court held: “ ‘Entry of default is not authorized where an answer is on file, even if the defendant fails to appear at the hearing. [Citations.]’ [Citations.] ‘The consequences of a parent’s failure to appear at a scheduled hearing . . . do not include the deprivation of the due process right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.’ (In re Dolly D. (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 440, 446 .)” (In re Nemis M., supra, at p. 1352 .) Based on this denial of constitutional due process, the appellate court reversed the jurisdictional and dispositional orders.

2025(Compare Bussard, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 865 [finding good cause for a continuance when the need to subpoena a witness was “an unexpected development” at the hearing].) The evidence here is that Cox received the Sheriff Department’s objection at least two months before the scheduled hearing date.

2025(Compare Bussard, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 865 [finding good cause for a continuance when the need to subpoena a witness was “an unexpected development” at the hearing].) The evidence here is that Cox received the Sheriff Department’s objection at least two months before the scheduled hearing date.

2022“Prima facie evidence is that which will support a ruling in favor of its proponent if no controverting evidence is presented. [Citations.] It may be slight evidence which creates a reasonable inference of fact sought to be established but need not eliminate all contrary inferences.” (Evans v. Paye (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 265, 280-281, fn. 13 ; accord, Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1098 .) The issue of whether good cause exists is ultimately resolved at the scheduled hearing.

2022“Prima facie evidence is that which will support a ruling in favor of its proponent if no controverting evidence is presented. [Citations.] It may be slight evidence which creates a reasonable inference of fact sought to be established but need not eliminate all contrary inferences.” (Evans v. Paye (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 265, 280-281, fn. 13 ; accord, Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1098 .) The issue of whether good cause exists is ultimately resolved at the scheduled hearing.

2022“Prima facie evidence is that which will support a ruling in favor of its proponent if no controverting evidence is presented. [Citations.] It may be slight evidence which creates a reasonable inference of fact sought to be established but need not eliminate all contrary inferences.” (Evans v. Paye (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 265, 280-281, fn. 13 ; accord, Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1098 .) The issue of whether good cause exists is ultimately resolved at the scheduled hearing.

2022“Prima facie evidence is that which will support a ruling in favor of its proponent if no controverting evidence is presented. [Citations.] It may be slight evidence which creates a reasonable inference of fact sought to be established but need not eliminate all contrary inferences.” (Evans v. Paye (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 265, 280-281, fn. 13 ; accord, Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1098 .) The issue of whether good cause exists is ultimately resolved at the scheduled hearing.

2015Refusal To Consider Late-Filed Opposition Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (b)(2), provides: “Any opposition to the motion shall be served and filed not less than 14 days preceding the noticed or continued date of hearing, unless the court for good cause orders otherwise. . . .” This subdivision “forbids the filing of any opposition papers less than 14 days prior to the scheduled hearing, and the case law has been strict in requiring good cause to be shown before late filed papers will be accepted.” (Hobson v. Raychem Corp. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 614, 624-625 , disapproved on a

2014“Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (b) . . . forbids the filing of any opposition papers less than 14 days prior to the scheduled hearing, and the case law has been strict in requiring good cause to be shown before late filed papers will be accepted.” (Hobson v. Raychem Corp. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 614, 624-625 , disapproved on other grounds in Colmenares v. Braemar Country Club, Inc. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1019, 1031, fn. 6 .) Having already ruled that Romero failed to show good cause for not filing his opposition papers within the time allowed under the summary judgment statute, th

2025A. Relevant Legal Principles “ ‘The forfeiture of bail and related proceedings are a matter of statutory procedure governed by sections 1305 through 1308. [Citation.] “The object of bail and its forfeiture is to insure the attendance of the accused and his obedience to the orders and judgment of the court.” [Citation.] “While bail bond proceedings occur in connection with criminal prosecutions, they are independent from and collateral to the prosecutions and are civil in nature.” [Citation.] In that regard, the bail bond itself is a “ ‘contract between the surety and the government whereby the

2025A. Relevant Legal Principles “ ‘The forfeiture of bail and related proceedings are a matter of statutory procedure governed by sections 1305 through 1308. [Citation.] “The object of bail and its forfeiture is to insure the attendance of the accused and his obedience to the orders and judgment of the court.” [Citation.] “While bail bond proceedings occur in connection with criminal prosecutions, they are independent from and collateral to the prosecutions and are civil in nature.” [Citation.] In that regard, the bail bond itself is a “ ‘contract between the surety and the government whereby the

2015The juvenile court is not required ultimately to grant a DEJ, but it “is required to at least follow specified procedures and exercise discretion to reach a final determination once the mandatory threshold eligibility determination is made.” (In re Luis B. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1123 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 581 ].) Where, as here, the prosecuting attorney filed a determination of eligibility but the accompanying citation failed to provide notice of a date when a suitability hearing would be conducted, we cannot conclude that the juvenile court met its obligations.

2015The juvenile court is not required ultimately to grant a DEJ, but it “is required to at least follow specified procedures and exercise discretion to reach a final determination once the mandatory threshold eligibility determination is made.” (In re Luis B. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1123 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 581 ].) Where, as here, the prosecuting attorney filed a determination of eligibility but the accompanying citation failed to provide notice of a date when a suitability hearing would be conducted, we cannot conclude that the juvenile court met its obligations.

2009For example, in Tire Distributors, Inc. v. Cobrae (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 538 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 761 ], a plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal of a defendant one day prior to the scheduled hearing on the defendant’s summary judgment motion was held to be timely because the dismissal was filed to implement a settlement agreement, and the plaintiff’s dismissal was actually motivated by that purpose and not as a bad faith tactic to avoid an adverse ruling.

2009For example, in Tire Distributors, Inc. v. Cobrae (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 538 [ 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 761 ], a plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal of a defendant one day prior to the scheduled hearing on the defendant’s summary judgment motion was held to be timely because the dismissal was filed to implement a settlement agreement, and the plaintiff’s dismissal was actually motivated by that purpose and not as a bad faith tactic to avoid an adverse ruling.

1996A parent who is ordered to appear in court and who willfully fails to appear is in contempt not "in default." "Entry of default is not authorized where an answer is on file, even if the defendant fails to appear at the hearing. [Citations.]" ( In re Brian W. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 429 , 433, fn. 3 [ 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 ]; see also § 213.) "The consequences of a parent's failure to appear at a scheduled hearing . . . do not include the deprivation of the due process right to confront and cross-examine witnesses." ( In re Dolly D. (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 440 , 446 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 691 ].) Furthermore,

1996A parent who is ordered to appear in court and who willfully fails to appear is in contempt not "in default." "Entry of default is not authorized where an answer is on file, even if the defendant fails to appear at the hearing. [Citations.]" ( In re Brian W. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 429 , 433, fn. 3 [ 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 ]; see also § 213.) "The consequences of a parent's failure to appear at a scheduled hearing . . . do not include the deprivation of the due process right to confront and cross-examine witnesses." ( In re Dolly D. (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 440 , 446 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 691 ].) Furthermore,

2026Co. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 456, 460 (International Fidelity).) “If the surety fails to obtain relief from the forfeiture within the appearance period, including extensions, the court shall enter summary judgment against the surety on the bond, plus costs.” (Id. at pp. 460-461.) Penal Code section 1305 “sets forth the statutory grounds for vacating forfeiture and exonerating a bond. [Citation.] Section 1305, however, does not set forth the exclusive bases for vacating a forfeiture.” (International Fidelity, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 461 .) A “unilateral change in the terms of the original cont

2026Co. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 456, 460 (International Fidelity).) “If the surety fails to obtain relief from the forfeiture within the appearance period, including extensions, the court shall enter summary judgment against the surety on the bond, plus costs.” (Id. at pp. 460-461.) Penal Code section 1305 “sets forth the statutory grounds for vacating forfeiture and exonerating a bond. [Citation.] Section 1305, however, does not set forth the exclusive bases for vacating a forfeiture.” (International Fidelity, supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 461 .) A “unilateral change in the terms of the original cont

2025Co. (1971) 5 Cal.3d 898, 907 [“failure to declare a forfeiture upon a nonappearance without sufficient excuse . . . deprives the court of jurisdiction to later declare a forfeiture”].) Although it does not expressly relate to bail, section 977(b)(1) requires a defendant’s personal presence at five specified proceedings — “arraignment, at the time of plea, during the preliminary hearing, during those portions of the trial when evidence is taken before the trier of fact, and at the time of the imposition of sentence” — and “at all other proceedings unless they waive their right to be . . . prese

2025(See, e.g., Baral v. Schnitt, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 382 [holding an anti-SLAPP motion may target allegations of protected activity without defeating a cause of action or reaching claims arising from unprotected activity].) This would frustrate the statutory deadline’s purpose to facilitate expeditious resolution of anti-SLAPP proceedings.