43 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1972–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hayes v. Spartan Chemical Co., Inc.green2 sentences2026Co., 622 So. 2d 1352, 1354 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (“There are occasions when the adequacy of a warning is a question of law for the judge to decide. 2012Co., 622 So.2d 1352 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (reversing summary judgment entered in favor of the defendant and remanding for the jury to determine the adequacy of the warnings even though the Second District determined that the Clearwater Police Department was not a learned intermediary). | 2 | 4 |
City of Tampa v. Addisongreen2 sentences2011See City of Tampa v. Addison, 979 So.2d 246, 255 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). 2009The adequacy requirement of paragraph (a) is no exception, and the fulfillment of this requirement “is not to be presumed in the absence of specific proof to the contrary.” City of Tampa v. Addison, 979 So.2d 246, 253-54 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). | 2 | 2 |
Department of Transportation v. Webbgreen2 sentences1986Cf. Osorio v. Metropolitan Dade County, 459 So.2d 332 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); see also Department of Transportation v. Webb, 438 So.2d 780, 781 (Fla. 1983) (the failure to place warning signs at a railroad crossing known to be dangerous is an operational-level function). [2] In regard to DOT's argument that its actions were planning-level functions in that they complied with DOT's manual by placing warning signs in the work site area, we answer that governmental immunity cannot be invoked by simply showing that DOT formulated and adhered to a schedule of road maintenance at an accident site. 1985Cf. Osorio v. Metropolitan Dade County, 459 So.2d 332 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); see also Department of Transportation v. Webb, 438 So.2d 780, 781 (Fla. 1983) (the failure to place warning signs at a railroad crossing known to be dangerous is an operational-level function). | 2 | 2 |
Felix v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc.green2 sentences2026These occasions, however, are limited to circumstances in which the warning is ‘accurate, clear, and unambiguous.’” (quoting Felix v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 540 So. 2d 102, 105 (Fla. 1989))). 1993These occasions, however, are limited to circumstances in which the warning is "accurate, clear, and unambiguous." Felix v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 540 So.2d 102 (Fla. 1989); Adams v. G.D. | 1 | 3 |
Donaldson v. Stategreen2 sentences2018The present case is unique "in that the adequacy of the rule itself was challenged ... as opposed to the noncompliance with a rule." Id. at 954 n.4 (citing Albritton v. State , 561 So.2d 19 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) ; Donaldson v. State , 561 So.2d 648 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) ). 2000See, e.g., Albritton v. State, 561 So.2d 19, 20 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) ("The state failed to prove that at the time the blood was withdrawn in this case, the technologist was in fact licensed."); Donaldson v. State, 561 So.2d 648, 650 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) ("For the state to totally omit evidence concerning half of the approved testing process cannot be substantial compliance."). [5] The defense expert ultimately concluded that in order to maintain the integrity of a sample, the anticoagulant and preservative should be used, and the sample should be kept as refrigerated as possible before testing. | 1 | 2 |
Albritton v. Stategreen2 sentences2018The present case is unique "in that the adequacy of the rule itself was challenged ... as opposed to the noncompliance with a rule." Id. at 954 n.4 (citing Albritton v. State , 561 So.2d 19 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) ; Donaldson v. State , 561 So.2d 648 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) ). 2000See, e.g., Albritton v. State, 561 So.2d 19, 20 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) ("The state failed to prove that at the time the blood was withdrawn in this case, the technologist was in fact licensed."); Donaldson v. State, 561 So.2d 648, 650 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) ("For the state to totally omit evidence concerning half of the approved testing process cannot be substantial compliance."). [5] The defense expert ultimately concluded that in order to maintain the integrity of a sample, the anticoagulant and preservative should be used, and the sample should be kept as refrigerated as possible before testing. | 1 | 2 |
Papas v. The Upjohn Companygreen2 sentences2004If a pesticide manufacturer places EPA-approved warnings on the label and packaging of its product, its duty to warn is satisfied, and the adequate warning issue ends.[ [4] ] 985 F.2d at 519 . 1994See Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516, 519 (11th Cir.1993) ("Because claims challenging the adequacy of warnings on materials other than the label or package of a product necessarily imply that the labeling and packaging failed to warn the user, we conclude that these claims are also preempted by FIFRA."). | 1 | 2 |
IRC v. Stategreen1 sentence2019I.R.C. v. State, 968 So. 2d 583, 588 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) (recognizing that an appellate court may “ordinarily reverse only on the basis of the specific arguments presented by the appellant”). | 1 | 1 |
Brooks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.green1 sentence2018Co., 133 F.R.D. 54, 58 (S.D. | 1 | 1 |
McBean v. City of New Yorkgreen1 sentence2017Ascertainability The additional requirement of ascertainability is met when the class is “readily identifiable, such that the court can determine who is in the class and, thus, bound by the ruling.” McBean v. City of N.Y., 260 F.R.D. 120, 132-33 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). | 1 | 1 |
cluster 793870green1 sentence2017Sept. 23, 2016) (quoting Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253, 268 (2d Cir. 2006)). | 1 | 1 |
Wyche v. Stategreen1 sentence2017See Cruz v. State, 189 So. 3d 822, 831 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (holding that “the standard instruction on the justifiable use of deadly force is a correct statement of the law”); Wyche v. State, 170 So. 3d 898, 905 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (“Jury Instruction 3.6(f) is an accurate statement of the law on the use of deadly force, and there is no conflict between any of the sections contained in Chapter 776 or any conflict within Jury Instruction 3.6(f).”). | 1 | 1 |
Anthony Cruz v. State of Floridagreen1 sentence2017See Cruz v. State, 189 So. 3d 822, 831 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (holding that “the standard instruction on the justifiable use of deadly force is a correct statement of the law”); Wyche v. State, 170 So. 3d 898, 905 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (“Jury Instruction 3.6(f) is an accurate statement of the law on the use of deadly force, and there is no conflict between any of the sections contained in Chapter 776 or any conflict within Jury Instruction 3.6(f).”). | 1 | 1 |
Sosa v. SAFEWAY PREMIUM FINANCE CO.green1 sentence2016Sosa, 73 So.3d at 114-15 (explaining that typicality is satisfied “when the claims of the class representative and class members are not antagonistic to one another” and “[t]he second prong [of the adequacy requirement] pertains to whether the class representative’s interests are antagonistic to the interests of the class members”). | 1 | 1 |
Lee v. Kemnagreen2 sentences2014Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 862 , 375, 122 S.Ct. 877 , 151 L.Ed.2d 820 (2002); Douglas v. Alabama, " 380 U.S. 415, 422 , 85 S.Ct. 1074 , 13 L.Ed.2d 934 (1965). 2014Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 862 , 375, 122 S.Ct. 877 , 151 L.Ed.2d 820 (2002); Douglas v. Alabama, " 380 U.S. 415, 422 , 85 S.Ct. 1074 , 13 L.Ed.2d 934 (1965). | 1 | 1 |
Douglas v. Alabamagreen2 sentences2014Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 862 , 375, 122 S.Ct. 877 , 151 L.Ed.2d 820 (2002); Douglas v. Alabama, " 380 U.S. 415, 422 , 85 S.Ct. 1074 , 13 L.Ed.2d 934 (1965). 2014Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 862 , 375, 122 S.Ct. 877 , 151 L.Ed.2d 820 (2002); Douglas v. Alabama, " 380 U.S. 415, 422 , 85 S.Ct. 1074 , 13 L.Ed.2d 934 (1965). | 1 | 1 |
Ownby v. Citrus Countygreen1 sentence2011See Ownby v. Citrus Cnty., 13 So.3d 136 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009); Browning v. Angelfish Swim Sch., Inc., 1 So.3d 355 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009). | 1 | 1 |
| Hall v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| MacMurdo v. Upjohn Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Krug v. Sterling Drug, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Goodson v. Searle Laboratoriesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Guenter H. Schoeller v. Walter Dunbar, Director, California Department of Correctionsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Tyus v. Apalachicola Northern Railroad Companygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Tampa Drug Company v. Wait
green
2 sentences1993Although the supreme court receded from Tampa Drug Co. v. Wait, 103 So.2d 603 (Fla. 1958), in Felix , we do not read that decision to alter the general rule that the adequacy of a warning is frequently a jury question. 1983It is not for judges but it is for *451 the jury to determine if a particular warning is adequate under the circumstances. [2] In Tampa Drug Company v. Wait, 103 So.2d 603 (Fla. 1958), the Supreme Court considered, among other things, the adequacy of the warning contained on a label on a product, carbon tetrachloride, and determined that same was a jury question. | 5 | 1976–1993 |
Lake v. Konstantinu
green
2 sentences1988In a previous appeal Judge Walden pinpointed the legal standard to be utilized in determining whether the case should go to a jury: In Lake v. Konstantinu, 189 So.2d 171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966), the adequacy of the warning furnished by the manufacturer of the drug, Chloromycetin, was at issue. 1983In Lake v. Konstantinu, 189 So.2d 171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966), the adequacy of the warning furnished by the manufacturer of the drug, Chloromycetin, was at issue. | 2 | 1983–1988 |
Dunkin v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc.
green
2 sentences1987See Goodson v. Searle Laboratories, 471 F. Supp. 546 (D.Conn. 1978); Dunkin v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 121 (W.D.Tenn. 1977); Brick v. Barnes-Hines Pharmaceutical Co., 428 F. Supp. 496 (D.D.C. 1977); Wolfgruber v. Upjohn, 72 A.D.2d 59 , 423 N.Y.S.2d 95 (N.Y. 1983That the adequacy of a warning required to be given to health care providers rather than to the general public may become a question of law is illustrated by the cases of Dunkin v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 121 (W.D.Tenn. 1977) and Chambers v. G.D. | 2 | 1983–1987 |
Osorio v. Metropolitan Dade County
green
2 sentences1986Cf. Osorio v. Metropolitan Dade County, 459 So.2d 332 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); see also Department of Transportation v. Webb, 438 So.2d 780, 781 (Fla. 1983) (the failure to place warning signs at a railroad crossing known to be dangerous is an operational-level function). [2] In regard to DOT's argument that its actions were planning-level functions in that they complied with DOT's manual by placing warning signs in the work site area, we answer that governmental immunity cannot be invoked by simply showing that DOT formulated and adhered to a schedule of road maintenance at an accident site. 1985Cf. Osorio v. Metropolitan Dade County, 459 So.2d 332 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); see also Department of Transportation v. Webb, 438 So.2d 780, 781 (Fla. 1983) (the failure to place warning signs at a railroad crossing known to be dangerous is an operational-level function). | 2 | 1985–1986 |
Morissette v. United States
green
2 sentences2021The Supreme Court considered the adequacy of the instruction in light of Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 , 72 S. Ct. 240 , 96 L. 2021The Supreme Court considered the adequacy of the instruction in light of Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 , 72 S. Ct. 240 , 96 L. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Elonis v. United States
green
2 sentences2021Ed. 288 (1952), and the fact “that a defendant must be ‘blameworthy in mind’ before . . . found guilty.” Elonis, 575 U.S. at 723 , 135 S. Ct. at 2009 . 2021Ed. 288 (1952), and the fact “that a defendant must be ‘blameworthy in mind’ before . . . found guilty.” Elonis, 575 U.S. at 723 , 135 S. Ct. at 2009 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Faretta v. California
green
1 sentence2019Appellant never challenged the adequacy of the hearing during any trial level * Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). proceedings or the briefs in this appeal. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Miles
green
1 sentence2018The present case is unique "in that the adequacy of the rule itself was challenged ... as opposed to the noncompliance with a rule." Id. at 954 n.4 (citing Albritton v. State , 561 So.2d 19 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) ; Donaldson v. State , 561 So.2d 648 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Altria Group, Inc. v. Good
green
1 sentence2017Id. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Tidik v. Michigan Court of Appeals Judges
green
1 sentence2014Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 862 , 375, 122 S.Ct. 877 , 151 L.Ed.2d 820 (2002); Douglas v. Alabama, " 380 U.S. 415, 422 , 85 S.Ct. 1074 , 13 L.Ed.2d 934 (1965). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Browning v. Angelfish Swim School, Inc.
green
1 sentence2011See Ownby v. Citrus Cnty., 13 So.3d 136 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009); Browning v. Angelfish Swim Sch., Inc., 1 So.3d 355 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor
green
2 sentences2008The relationship between the class and class representatives must be free from conflicts of interest, and the adequacy analysis "serves to uncover conflicts of interest between named parties and the class they seek to represent." Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 , 117 S.Ct. 2231 , 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997). 2008The relationship between the class and class representatives must be free from conflicts of interest, and the adequacy analysis "serves to uncover conflicts of interest between named parties and the class they seek to represent." Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 , 117 S.Ct. 2231 , 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Mickens v. Taylor
green
2 sentences2008The present case bears scant resemblance to Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 , 122 S.Ct. 1237 , 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002), where trial counsel failed to seek a ruling from the trial court on a putative conflict of interest, asserted only after the trial had concluded and for the first time collaterally. 2008The present case bears scant resemblance to Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 , 122 S.Ct. 1237 , 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002), where trial counsel failed to seek a ruling from the trial court on a putative conflict of interest, asserted only after the trial had concluded and for the first time collaterally. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Duckworth v. Eagan green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| California v. Prysock green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Brito v. County of Palm Beach green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Robertson v. State green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Upjohn Company v. MacMurdo green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Lewis v. Gulf Power Co. green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Felix v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc. green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| TALQUIN ELEC. CO-OP., INC. v. Amchem Products, Inc. green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Wolfgruber v. Upjohn Co. green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Brick v. Barnes-Hines Pharmaceutical Co., Inc. green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Ralph v. City of Daytona Beach green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Chambers v. G. D. Searle & Co. green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Dusky v. United States green | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Edwards v. California Chemical Company green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| CALIFORNIA CHEMICAL COMPANY v. Edwards neutral | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Miranda v. Arizona green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.