adequacy instruction in California

2025Co. (4th Cir. 2010) 595 F.3d 164, 180 [“For a conflict of interest to defeat the adequacy requirement, ‘that conflict must be fundamental,’ ” and “[a] conflict is not fundamental when, as here, all class members ‘share common objectives and the same factual and legal positions [and] have the same interest in establishing the liability of [defendants].’ ”]; Sav-on Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 329-332 [certification upheld where substantial evidence supported trial court’s determination that common issues predominated over questions affecting individual class mem

2025Co. (4th Cir. 2010) 595 F.3d 164, 180 [“For a conflict of interest to defeat the adequacy requirement, ‘that conflict must be fundamental,’ ” and “[a] conflict is not fundamental when, as here, all class members ‘share common objectives and the same factual and legal positions [and] have the same interest in establishing the liability of [defendants].’ ”]; Sav-on Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 329-332 [certification upheld where substantial evidence supported trial court’s determination that common issues predominated over questions affecting individual class mem

2024(People v. Johnsen (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1116, 1170 ; People v. Allen and Johnson (2011) 53 Cal.4th 60 , 69–70 (Allen and Johnson); Clark, at p. 971.) Moreover, “failure to conduct a sufficient inquiry is ordinarily viewed as an abuse of discretion, 83 PEOPLE v. NADEY Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. rather than as constitutional error.” (People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 928 (Pinholster); see People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505 , 519–520.) The court’s inquiry here was sufficient, especially considering the innocuous content of the poems.26 Immediately upon learning that poems had

2024(People v. Johnsen (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1116 , 1170; People v. Allen and Johnson (2011) 53 Cal.4th 60 , 69–70 (Allen and Johnson); Clark, at p. 971.) Moreover, “failure to conduct a sufficient inquiry is ordinarily viewed as an abuse of discretion, 83 PEOPLE v. NADEY Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. rather than as constitutional error.” (People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 928 (Pinholster); see People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505 , 519–520.) The court’s inquiry here was sufficient, especially considering the innocuous content of the poems. 26 Immediately upon learning that poems ha

2024(People v. Johnsen (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1116, 1170 ; People v. Allen and Johnson (2011) 53 Cal.4th 60 , 69–70 (Allen and Johnson); Clark, at p. 971.) Moreover, “failure to conduct a sufficient inquiry is ordinarily viewed as an abuse of discretion, 83 PEOPLE v. NADEY Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. rather than as constitutional error.” (People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 928 (Pinholster); see People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505 , 519–520.) The court’s inquiry here was sufficient, especially considering the innocuous content of the poems.26 Immediately upon learning that poems had

2024(People v. Johnsen (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1116 , 1170; People v. Allen and Johnson (2011) 53 Cal.4th 60 , 69–70 (Allen and Johnson); Clark, at p. 971.) Moreover, “failure to conduct a sufficient inquiry is ordinarily viewed as an abuse of discretion, 83 PEOPLE v. NADEY Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. rather than as constitutional error.” (People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 928 (Pinholster); see People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505 , 519–520.) The court’s inquiry here was sufficient, especially considering the innocuous content of the poems. 26 Immediately upon learning that poems ha

2020(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 .) As for the completeness of the instruction on the kill zone theory, or the propriety of the prosecutor’s argument relating to the instruction, neither defendant objected to the adequacy of the instruction nor to the closing argument, so those issues were forfeited. 29 (People v. Buenrostro (2018) 6 Cal.5th 367, 428 , citing People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 503 [party may not argue on appeal that an instruction correct in law was too general or incomplete, and thus needed clarification, without first requesting such clarification at trial].

2019(People v. Buenrostro (2018) 6 Cal.5th 367, 428 , citing People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 503 [party may not argue on appeal that an instruction correct in law was too general or incomplete, and thus needed clarification, without first requesting such clarification at trial].) 29 The defendants’ original briefs on appeal and their petitions for review did not complain about the adequacy of the kill zone instructions; instead, they argued there was insufficient evidence to warrant an instruction on that theory.

2018(Cf. Hydro-Mill, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1165 [where defendant did not interpose demurrer to answer which properly cited statutory limitations period but did not specify any subdivision, limitations defense was not waived].) Moreover, Pep Boys’ assertion of that defense could not have come as a surprise to appellants, since, as appellants concede, other defendants in the same action had already raised the statute of limitations by way of both demurrer and summary judgment.

2018(Cf. Hydro-Mill, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 1165 [where defendant did not interpose demurrer to answer which properly cited statutory limitations period but did not specify any subdivision, limitations defense was not waived].) Moreover, Pep Boys’ assertion of that defense could not have come as a surprise to appellants, since, as appellants concede, other defendants in the same action had already raised the statute of limitations by way of both demurrer and summary judgment.

2014“We conduct independent review of issues pertaining to instructions.” (People v. Cooksey (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1411 , citing People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 733, 737 .) When the defendant challenges the adequacy of the instruction as ambiguous or potentially misleading, our principle task is to determine “whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that violates the Constitution” or California law.

2014“We conduct independent review of issues pertaining to instructions.” (People v. Cooksey (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1411 , citing People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 733, 737 .) When the defendant challenges the adequacy of the instruction as ambiguous or potentially misleading, our principle task is to determine “ ‘ “ ‘ “whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way” that violates the Constitution’ ” ’ ” or California law.

2003Cal 1994) 843 F.Supp. 1341, 1346-1347 .) “The adequacy inquiry . . . serves to uncover conflicts of interest between named parties and the class they seek to represent.” (Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor (1997) 521 U.S. 591, 625 [ 138 L.Ed.2d 689 , 117 S.Ct. 2231 ].) “ ‘[A] class representative must be part of the class and “possess the same interest and suffer the same injury” as the class members.’ [Citations.] To assure ‘adequate’ representation, the class representative’s personal claim must not be inconsistent with the claims of other members of the class. [Citation.]” (In re Beer Distrib

2003Cal 1994) 843 F.Supp. 1341, 1346-1347 .) “The adequacy inquiry . . . serves to uncover conflicts of interest between named parties and the class they seek to represent.” (Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor (1997) 521 U.S. 591, 625 [ 138 L.Ed.2d 689 , 117 S.Ct. 2231 ].) “ ‘[A] class representative must be part of the class and “possess the same interest and suffer the same injury” as the class members.’ [Citations.] To assure ‘adequate’ representation, the class representative’s personal claim must not be inconsistent with the claims of other members of the class. [Citation.]” (In re Beer Distrib

2021(Cf. People v. Ortiz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 975, 987 (Ortiz) [where the defendant requested new counsel after a mistrial and well before any second trial, the timing of the request reflected the defendant’s “genuine concern about the adequacy of his defense rather than any intent to delay the retrial”].) Further, Herrera implicitly conceded his request for more time and research by a new lawyer before sentencing lacked merit.

2018Indeed, in making this argument, the Attorney General does not cite any authority other than Ortiz , which merely held that the *185 request in that case, "made after [a] mistrial and well before any second trial, was sufficiently timely" because its "timing reflect[ed the] defendant's genuine concern about the adequacy of his defense rather than any intent to delay the retrial." ( Ortiz, supra , 51 Cal.3d at p. 987 , 275 Cal.Rptr. 191 , 800 P.2d 547 .) As we have said, however, there is no indication that Lopez had improper motives, and the case's age and the imminence of trial alone do not s

2024(Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 971 ; People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 274 .) However, the court enjoys broad discretion in determining whether and how to investigate potential misconduct, and we review the adequacy of its inquiry with deference.

2024(Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 971 ; People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 274 .) However, the court enjoys broad discretion in determining whether and how to investigate potential misconduct, and we review the adequacy of its inquiry with deference.

2014(People v. Ayala (2000) 24 Cal.4th 243, 289 , internal quotation marks omitted; Estelle v. McGuire, supra, 502 U.S. at p. 72 ; People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 662-663 .) We determine the correctness of the challenged instruction “in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record,” and not “ ‘in artificial isolation.’ ” (Estelle v. McGuire, supra, 502 U.S. at p. 72 .) Thus, for example, “ ‘ “[t]he absence of an essential element in one instruction may be supplied by another or cured in light of the instructions as a whole.” ’ ” (People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 121

2014(People v. Ayala (2000) 24 Cal.4th 243, 289 ; Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72 ; People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629 , 662–663.) We determine the correctness of the challenged instruction “in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record,” and not “ ‘in artificial isolation.’ ” (Estelle v. McGuire, at p. 72; People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1248 .) Thus, for example, “ ‘ “[t]he absence of an essential 7 element in one instruction may be supplied by another or cured in light of the instructions as a whole.” ’ ” (Musselwhite, at p. 1248.) A trial court ha

2014(People v. Ayala (2000) 24 Cal.4th 243, 289 , internal quotation marks omitted; Estelle v. McGuire, supra, 502 U.S. at p. 72 ; People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 662-663 .) We determine the correctness of the challenged instruction “in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record,” and not “ ‘in artificial isolation.’ ” (Estelle v. McGuire, supra, 502 U.S. at p. 72 .) Thus, for example, “ ‘ “[t]he absence of an essential element in one instruction may be supplied by another or cured in light of the instructions as a whole.” ’ ” (People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 121

2014(People v. Ayala (2000) 24 Cal.4th 243, 289 ; Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72 ; People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629 , 662–663.) We determine the correctness of the challenged instruction “in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record,” and not “ ‘in artificial isolation.’ ” (Estelle v. McGuire, at p. 72; People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1248 .) Thus, for example, “ ‘ “[t]he absence of an essential 7 element in one instruction may be supplied by another or cured in light of the instructions as a whole.” ’ ” (Musselwhite, at p. 1248.) A trial court ha

2024As our high court has made clear, the party seeking class certification has the burden to prove its representatives are adequate (Richmond, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 470 ), so ultimately it was the failure to satisfy this burden that caused the Jones court to affirm the trial court’s finding that the plaintiff had not satisfied the adequacy requirement.

2007P. Morgan & Co., Inc. v. Superior Court (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 195, 212 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.3d 214 ].) To resolve the adequacy question the court “will evaluate ‘the seriousness and extent of conflicts involved compared to the importance of issues uniting the class; the alternatives to class representation available; the procedures available to limit and prevent unfairness; and any other facts bearing on the fairness with which the absent class member is represented.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 213.) While it is true that the putative representative cannot adequately protect the class if his or her inte

2018The drafting of safe harbor warnings is a regulatory function assigned to the lead agency, the Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (OEHHA), and "[a]ny dissatisfaction with the adequacy of such a warning is a matter for consideration by OEHHA and the Legislature, rather than the court." ( Environmental Law Foundation v. Wykle Research , Inc. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 60 , 68, fn. 8, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 788 ( Environmental Law Foundation ).) *517 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Acting in their personal and representative capacities, plaintiffs Doris Charles, Alvin Jones, Jason Peltier, an

2018The drafting of safe harbor warnings is a regulatory function assigned to the lead agency, the Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (OEHHA), and "[a]ny dissatisfaction with the adequacy of such a warning is a matter for consideration by OEHHA and the Legislature, rather than the court." ( Environmental Law Foundation v. Wykle Research , Inc. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 60 , 68, fn. 8, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 788 ( Environmental Law Foundation ).) *517 FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Acting in their personal and representative capacities, plaintiffs Doris Charles, Alvin Jones, Jason Peltier, an

2016Co., Inc. (2016) 63 Cal.4th 167, 181 , fn. omitted.) “Under the ‘warning defect’ theory of strict liability, a perfectly made product is defective if it is unreasonably dangerous to place the product in the hands of a user without a suitable warning or if no warning is given.” (Oxford, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 717 .) “Conversely, to prevail on a claim for negligent failure to warn, the plaintiff must prove that the seller’s conduct fell below the standard of care. [Citation.] If a prudent seller would have acted reasonably in not giving a warning, the seller will not have been negligent.”

2016Co., Inc. (2016) 63 Cal.4th 167, 181 [ 202 Cal.Rptr.3d 460 , 370 P.3d 1022 ], fn. & italics omitted.) “Under the ‘warning defect’ theory of strict liability, a perfectly made product is defective if it is unreasonably dangerous to place the product in the hands of a user without a suitable warning or if no warning is given.” (Oxford, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 717.) “Conversely, to prevail on a claim for negligent failure to warn, the plaintiff must prove that the seller’s conduct fell below the standard of care. [Citation.] If a prudent seller would have acted reasonably in not giving a war

2016Co., Inc. (2016) 63 Cal.4th 167, 181 [ 202 Cal.Rptr.3d 460 , 370 P.3d 1022 ], fn. & italics omitted.) “Under the ‘warning defect’ theory of strict liability, a perfectly made product is defective if it is unreasonably dangerous to place the product in the hands of a user without a suitable warning or if no warning is given.” (Oxford, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 717.) “Conversely, to prevail on a claim for negligent failure to warn, the plaintiff must prove that the seller’s conduct fell below the standard of care. [Citation.] If a prudent seller would have acted reasonably in not giving a war

2016Co., Inc. (2016) 63 Cal.4th 167, 181 [ 202 Cal.Rptr.3d 460 , 370 P.3d 1022 ], fn. & italics omitted.) “Under the ‘warning defect’ theory of strict liability, a perfectly made product is defective if it is unreasonably dangerous to place the product in the hands of a user without a suitable warning or if no warning is given.” (Oxford, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 717.) “Conversely, to prevail on a claim for negligent failure to warn, the plaintiff must prove that the seller’s conduct fell below the standard of care. [Citation.] If a prudent seller would have acted reasonably in not giving a war