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11 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
House v. Armour of America, Inc.green2 sentences2021INST. 1998) (―Product warnings and instructions can rarely communicate all potentially relevant information, and the ability of a plaintiff to imagine a hypothetical better warning in the aftermath of an accident does not establish that the warning actually accompanying the product was inadequate.‖). 25 House I, 886 P.2d at 551 (citation omitted). 9 FEASEL v. TRACKER MARINE Opinion of the Court House standard to require that adequate warnings be of an intensity and at a level of specificity ―justified by the magnitude of the risk.‖26 ¶29 Because the district court did not examine the specifici 2020Feasel asserts that Defendants had a duty to provide a specific warning regarding the risk of the circle of death and that the existing warnings exhorting users to 20180332-CA 13 2020 UT App 28 Feasel v. Tracker Marine wear the kill-switch lanyard were inadequate because they did not mention the circle of death. 5 The adequacy of a warning ordinarily “presents a question of fact, to be resolved by the trier of fact.” House v. Armour of Am., Inc. (House I), 886 P.2d 542, 551 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), aff’d, 929 P.2d 340 (Utah 1996). ¶21 Defendants maintain that the district court correctly rejected | 2 | 2 |
Harry v. Weber County School Districtgreen2 sentences2012T59 This court reached a similar conclusion in Smith v. Weber County School District, 877 P2d 1276 (Utah Ct.App.1994), where we determined that a school district was entitled to discretionary function immunity for its decision to locate a school bus stop on a particular side of a busy road. 2012Applying the Little test, the Duncan court concluded that “the evaluation of crossings and the assigning of priorities for upgrading the adequacy of warning devices . . . [was] essential to the improvement of public safety.”18 Id. at 835 . ¶59 This court reached a similar conclusion in Smith v. Weber County School District, 877 P.2d 1276 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), where we determined that a school district was entitled to discretionary function immunity for its decision to locate a school bus stop on a particular side of a busy road. | 1 | 2 |
Christopher v. Larson Ford Sales, Inc.green1 sentence2021For example, in State v. Apotex Corp., we considered the adequacy of a claim under Utah‘s False Claims Act.40 Although we concluded that claims under the False Claims Act were subject to our heightened pleading requirement, we explained that our ―heightened pleading standard may be applied less stringently when the specific factual information is peculiarly within the defendant‘s knowledge or control.‖41 For this reason, and ―to achieve the remedial purpose‖42 of the False Claims Act, we held that a claim was sufficient so long as it provided ―reliable indicia _________________________________ | 1 | 1 |
House v. Armour of America, Inc.green2 sentences2020Feasel asserts that Defendants had a duty to provide a specific warning regarding the risk of the circle of death and that the existing warnings exhorting users to 20180332-CA 13 2020 UT App 28 Feasel v. Tracker Marine wear the kill-switch lanyard were inadequate because they did not mention the circle of death. 5 The adequacy of a warning ordinarily “presents a question of fact, to be resolved by the trier of fact.” House v. Armour of Am., Inc. (House I), 886 P.2d 542, 551 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), aff’d, 929 P.2d 340 (Utah 1996). ¶21 Defendants maintain that the district court correctly rejected 2020We address each argument in turn. ¶22 Defendants’ assertion that “a reasonable consumer would ‘generally know’ and ‘recognize’ that the boat propeller could strike and seriously injure or kill them if they were ejected,” (citing House II, 929 P.2d at 343 (quotation simplified)), ignores the basis of Feasel’s claim—that consumers were unlikely to know that a driverless boat would spin into a circle of death. | 1 | 1 |
Edwards v. Arizonagreen1 sentence2019When a suspect invokes his right to counsel during custodial interrogation, “the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present” “unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485 (1981) (quotation simplified). | 1 | 1 |
Kurrack v. American District Telegraph Co.green2 sentences2013Co., 252 Ill.App.3d 885 , 192 Ill.Dec. 520 , 625 N.E.2d 675, 681 (1993) (rejecting the plaintiff's request that the jury be instructed "that the insulating material was unreasonably unsafe merely because it contained asbestos"). 122 Thus, the question boils down to whether Calidria was defective based on the adequacy of the warnings provided. 2013Co., 252 Ill.App.3d 885 , 192 Ill.Dec. 520 , 625 N.E.2d 675, 681 (1993) (rejecting the plaintiff's request that the jury be instructed "that the insulating material was unreasonably unsafe merely because it contained asbestos"). 122 Thus, the question boils down to whether Calidria was defective based on the adequacy of the warnings provided. | 1 | 1 |
Bochan v. La Fontainegreen1 sentence2004See Bochan v. La Fontaine, 68 F.Supp.2d 692, 695-96, 699 (E.D.Va.1999). 7 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Duncan v. Union Pacific Railroad
green
2 sentences2024And “the relevant question asks whether the discretionary act occurred at the operational level or required evaluation of broad policy factors.” Faucheaux v. Provo City, 2015 UT App 3, ¶ 36 , 343 P.3d 288 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 352 P.3d 106 (Utah 2015). ¶36 For example, in Duncan v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 842 P.2d 832 (Utah 1992), our supreme court concluded “that UDOT’s decision to defer improving the adequacy of warning devices at a [railroad] crossing” was a discretionary decision rather than an operational one. 2012Applying the Little test, the Duncan court concluded that "the evaluation of crossings and the assigning of priorities for upgrading the adequacy of warning devices ... [was] essential to the improvement of public safety." 19 Id. at 885 . | 3 | 2012–2024 |
Faucheaux v. Provo City
green
2 sentences2024And “the relevant question asks whether the discretionary act occurred at the operational level or required evaluation of broad policy factors.” Faucheaux v. Provo City, 2015 UT App 3, ¶ 36 , 343 P.3d 288 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 352 P.3d 106 (Utah 2015). ¶36 For example, in Duncan v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 842 P.2d 832 (Utah 1992), our supreme court concluded “that UDOT’s decision to defer improving the adequacy of warning devices at a [railroad] crossing” was a discretionary decision rather than an operational one. 2024And “the relevant question asks whether the discretionary act occurred at the operational level or required evaluation of broad policy factors.” Faucheaux v. Provo City, 2015 UT App 3, ¶ 36 , 343 P.3d 288 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 352 P.3d 106 (Utah 2015). ¶36 For example, in Duncan v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 842 P.2d 832 (Utah 1992), our supreme court concluded “that UDOT’s decision to defer improving the adequacy of warning devices at a [railroad] crossing” was a discretionary decision rather than an operational one. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Berg v. Berg
green
1 sentence2021For example, in State v. Apotex Corp., we considered the adequacy of a claim under Utah‘s False Claims Act.40 Although we concluded that claims under the False Claims Act were subject to our heightened pleading requirement, we explained that our ―heightened pleading standard may be applied less stringently when the specific factual information is peculiarly within the defendant‘s knowledge or control.‖41 For this reason, and ―to achieve the remedial purpose‖42 of the False Claims Act, we held that a claim was sufficient so long as it provided ―reliable indicia _________________________________ | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Harker
green
2 sentences2021They argue the court of appeals too strictly interpreted the specificity needed under the adequacy standard we adopted in House v. Armour of America, Inc.10 Because the House standard lacks guidance on what level of specificity an adequate warning requires, we modify the third prong to include a specificity standard.11 Further, because the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Tracker and Brunswick based in part on its exclusion of Mr. Martinez‘s sworn statements, which exclusion the court of appeals concluded was error, we remand to the district court so that it might consider t 2021They argue the court of appeals too strictly interpreted the specificity needed under the adequacy standard we adopted in House v. Armour of America, Inc.10 Because the House standard lacks guidance on what level of specificity an adequate warning requires, we modify the third prong to include a specificity standard.11 Further, because the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Tracker and Brunswick based in part on its exclusion of Mr. Martinez‘s sworn statements, which exclusion the court of appeals concluded was error, we remand to the district court so that it might consider t | 1 | 2021–2021 |
cluster 590916
green
2 sentences2021In determining whether these warnings must be issued directly or whether this duty may be satisfied by warning an 62 See id. 63See id. at 173–74. 2021In determining whether these warnings must be issued directly or whether this duty may be satisfied by warning an 62 See id. 63See id. at 173–74. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Rutherford v. Talisker Canyons Fin., Co.
green
2 sentences2021They argue the court of appeals too strictly interpreted the specificity needed under the adequacy standard we adopted in House v. Armour of America, Inc.10 Because the House standard lacks guidance on what level of specificity an adequate warning requires, we modify the third prong to include a specificity standard.11 Further, because the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Tracker and Brunswick based in part on its exclusion of Mr. Martinez‘s sworn statements, which exclusion the court of appeals concluded was error, we remand to the district court so that it might consider t 2021They argue the court of appeals too strictly interpreted the specificity needed under the adequacy standard we adopted in House v. Armour of America, Inc.10 Because the House standard lacks guidance on what level of specificity an adequate warning requires, we modify the third prong to include a specificity standard.11 Further, because the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Tracker and Brunswick based in part on its exclusion of Mr. Martinez‘s sworn statements, which exclusion the court of appeals concluded was error, we remand to the district court so that it might consider t | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Gudmundson v. Del Ozone
green
2 sentences2021For example, in State v. Apotex Corp., we considered the adequacy of a claim under Utah‘s False Claims Act.40 Although we concluded that claims under the False Claims Act were subject to our heightened pleading requirement, we explained that our ―heightened pleading standard may be applied less stringently when the specific factual information is peculiarly within the defendant‘s knowledge or control.‖41 For this reason, and ―to achieve the remedial purpose‖42 of the False Claims Act, we held that a claim was sufficient so long as it provided ―reliable indicia _________________________________ 2021For example, in State v. Apotex Corp., we considered the adequacy of a claim under Utah‘s False Claims Act.40 Although we concluded that claims under the False Claims Act were subject to our heightened pleading requirement, we explained that our ―heightened pleading standard may be applied less stringently when the specific factual information is peculiarly within the defendant‘s knowledge or control.‖41 For this reason, and ―to achieve the remedial purpose‖42 of the False Claims Act, we held that a claim was sufficient so long as it provided ―reliable indicia _________________________________ | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Feasel v. Tracker Marine
green
2 sentences2020Feasel asserts that Defendants had a duty to provide a specific warning regarding the risk of the circle of death and that the existing warnings exhorting users to 20180332-CA 13 2020 UT App 28 Feasel v. Tracker Marine wear the kill-switch lanyard were inadequate because they did not mention the circle of death. 5 The adequacy of a warning ordinarily “presents a question of fact, to be resolved by the trier of fact.” House v. Armour of Am., Inc. (House I), 886 P.2d 542, 551 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), aff’d, 929 P.2d 340 (Utah 1996). ¶21 Defendants maintain that the district court correctly rejected 2020Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s grant of Defendant’s motion to strike and motion for summary judgment with respect to Feasel’s failure-to-warn claim and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 20180332-CA 21 2020 UT App 28 | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Smith
green
1 sentence2019Beyond his assertions regarding the adequacy of the warnings, Smith makes no argument on appeal asserting that he did not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive his Miranda rights by electing to answer Detective’s questions after receiving the warnings. 20170282-CA 10 2019 UT App 141 State v. Smith invocation of his right to counsel and that Detective should have clarified the request before proceeding with any questioning. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Nguyen v. IHC HEALTH SERVICES, INC.
green
2 sentences2014The loss of a surgical instrument or other paraphernalia, in the operating site, exemplifies this type of treatment."); Nguyen v. IHC Health Servs., Inc., 2010 UT App 85, ¶¶ 17-18 , 232 P.3d 529 (holding that no expert was needed to demonstrate inadequacy of disclosure in informed consent case when claim was that no disclosure was made). 15 But if the jury believes the thrust of Staker's version of events-that is, if the jury finds that there were at least some warning signs and devices in place over the route the McDowells traveled-and the question becomes the adequacy of the warning thus imp 2014The loss of a surgical instrument or other paraphernalia, in the operating site, exemplifies this type of treatment."); Nguyen v. IHC Health Servs., Inc., 2010 UT App 85, ¶¶ 17-18 , 232 P.3d 529 (holding that no expert was needed to demonstrate inadequacy of disclosure in informed consent case when claim was that no disclosure was made). 15 But if the jury believes the thrust of Staker's version of events-that is, if the jury finds that there were at least some warning signs and devices in place over the route the McDowells traveled-and the question becomes the adequacy of the warning thus imp | 1 | 2014–2014 |
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce
green
2 sentences1989With respect to the adequacy of the factors articulated by the police as a basis for the stop, we note at the outset that the *509 officers were “entitled to assess the facts in light of [their] experience.” Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885 , 95 S.Ct. at 2582 . 1989With respect to the adequacy of the factors articulated by the police as a basis for the stop, we note at the outset that the *509 officers were “entitled to assess the facts in light of [their] experience.” Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885 , 95 S.Ct. at 2582 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.