adequacy warning (Utah) · Go Syfert
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adequacy warning in Utah

11 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2024 3 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (7)

CaseFollowedCited
House v. Armour of America, Inc.green
utahctapp · 1994 · cited in 2 Utah opinions naming this issue, 2020–2021
2 sentences

2021INST. 1998) (―Product warnings and instructions can rarely communicate all potentially relevant information, and the ability of a plaintiff to imagine a hypothetical better warning in the aftermath of an accident does not establish that the warning actually accompanying the product was inadequate.‖). 25 House I, 886 P.2d at 551 (citation omitted). 9 FEASEL v. TRACKER MARINE Opinion of the Court House standard to require that adequate warnings be of an intensity and at a level of specificity ―justified by the magnitude of the risk.‖26 ¶29 Because the district court did not examine the specifici

2020Feasel asserts that Defendants had a duty to provide a specific warning regarding the risk of the circle of death and that the existing warnings exhorting users to 20180332-CA 13 2020 UT App 28 Feasel v. Tracker Marine wear the kill-switch lanyard were inadequate because they did not mention the circle of death. 5 The adequacy of a warning ordinarily “presents a question of fact, to be resolved by the trier of fact.” House v. Armour of Am., Inc. (House I), 886 P.2d 542, 551 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), aff’d, 929 P.2d 340 (Utah 1996). ¶21 Defendants maintain that the district court correctly rejected

22
Harry v. Weber County School Districtgreen
utahctapp · 1994 · cited in 2 Utah opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
2 sentences

2012T59 This court reached a similar conclusion in Smith v. Weber County School District, 877 P2d 1276 (Utah Ct.App.1994), where we determined that a school district was entitled to discretionary function immunity for its decision to locate a school bus stop on a particular side of a busy road.

2012Applying the Little test, the Duncan court concluded that “the evaluation of crossings and the assigning of priorities for upgrading the adequacy of warning devices . . . [was] essential to the improvement of public safety.”18 Id. at 835 . ¶59 This court reached a similar conclusion in Smith v. Weber County School District, 877 P.2d 1276 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), where we determined that a school district was entitled to discretionary function immunity for its decision to locate a school bus stop on a particular side of a busy road.

12
Christopher v. Larson Ford Sales, Inc.green
utah · 1976 · cited in 1 Utah opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021
1 sentence

2021For example, in State v. Apotex Corp., we considered the adequacy of a claim under Utah‘s False Claims Act.40 Although we concluded that claims under the False Claims Act were subject to our heightened pleading requirement, we explained that our ―heightened pleading standard may be applied less stringently when the specific factual information is peculiarly within the defendant‘s knowledge or control.‖41 For this reason, and ―to achieve the remedial purpose‖42 of the False Claims Act, we held that a claim was sufficient so long as it provided ―reliable indicia _________________________________

11
House v. Armour of America, Inc.green
utah · 1996 · cited in 1 Utah opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
2 sentences

2020Feasel asserts that Defendants had a duty to provide a specific warning regarding the risk of the circle of death and that the existing warnings exhorting users to 20180332-CA 13 2020 UT App 28 Feasel v. Tracker Marine wear the kill-switch lanyard were inadequate because they did not mention the circle of death. 5 The adequacy of a warning ordinarily “presents a question of fact, to be resolved by the trier of fact.” House v. Armour of Am., Inc. (House I), 886 P.2d 542, 551 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), aff’d, 929 P.2d 340 (Utah 1996). ¶21 Defendants maintain that the district court correctly rejected

2020We address each argument in turn. ¶22 Defendants’ assertion that “a reasonable consumer would ‘generally know’ and ‘recognize’ that the boat propeller could strike and seriously injure or kill them if they were ejected,” (citing House II, 929 P.2d at 343 (quotation simplified)), ignores the basis of Feasel’s claim—that consumers were unlikely to know that a driverless boat would spin into a circle of death.

11
Edwards v. Arizonagreen
scotus · 1981 · cited in 1 Utah opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
1 sentence

2019When a suspect invokes his right to counsel during custodial interrogation, “the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present” “unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485 (1981) (quotation simplified).

11
Kurrack v. American District Telegraph Co.green
illappct · 1993 · cited in 1 Utah opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013
2 sentences

2013Co., 252 Ill.App.3d 885 , 192 Ill.Dec. 520 , 625 N.E.2d 675, 681 (1993) (rejecting the plaintiff's request that the jury be instructed "that the insulating material was unreasonably unsafe merely because it contained asbestos"). 122 Thus, the question boils down to whether Calidria was defective based on the adequacy of the warnings provided.

2013Co., 252 Ill.App.3d 885 , 192 Ill.Dec. 520 , 625 N.E.2d 675, 681 (1993) (rejecting the plaintiff's request that the jury be instructed "that the insulating material was unreasonably unsafe merely because it contained asbestos"). 122 Thus, the question boils down to whether Calidria was defective based on the adequacy of the warnings provided.

11
Bochan v. La Fontainegreen
vaed · 1999 · cited in 1 Utah opinions naming this issue, 2004–2004
1 sentence

2004See Bochan v. La Fontaine, 68 F.Supp.2d 692, 695-96, 699 (E.D.Va.1999). 7 .

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (11)

CaseCitedYears
Duncan v. Union Pacific Railroad green
utah · 1992
2 sentences

2024And “the relevant question asks whether the discretionary act occurred at the operational level or required evaluation of broad policy factors.” Faucheaux v. Provo City, 2015 UT App 3, ¶ 36 , 343 P.3d 288 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 352 P.3d 106 (Utah 2015). ¶36 For example, in Duncan v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 842 P.2d 832 (Utah 1992), our supreme court concluded “that UDOT’s decision to defer improving the adequacy of warning devices at a [railroad] crossing” was a discretionary decision rather than an operational one.

2012Applying the Little test, the Duncan court concluded that "the evaluation of crossings and the assigning of priorities for upgrading the adequacy of warning devices ... [was] essential to the improvement of public safety." 19 Id. at 885 .

32012–2024
Faucheaux v. Provo City green
utahctapp · 2015
2 sentences

2024And “the relevant question asks whether the discretionary act occurred at the operational level or required evaluation of broad policy factors.” Faucheaux v. Provo City, 2015 UT App 3, ¶ 36 , 343 P.3d 288 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 352 P.3d 106 (Utah 2015). ¶36 For example, in Duncan v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 842 P.2d 832 (Utah 1992), our supreme court concluded “that UDOT’s decision to defer improving the adequacy of warning devices at a [railroad] crossing” was a discretionary decision rather than an operational one.

2024And “the relevant question asks whether the discretionary act occurred at the operational level or required evaluation of broad policy factors.” Faucheaux v. Provo City, 2015 UT App 3, ¶ 36 , 343 P.3d 288 (cleaned up), cert. denied, 352 P.3d 106 (Utah 2015). ¶36 For example, in Duncan v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 842 P.2d 832 (Utah 1992), our supreme court concluded “that UDOT’s decision to defer improving the adequacy of warning devices at a [railroad] crossing” was a discretionary decision rather than an operational one.

12024–2024
Berg v. Berg green
utahctapp · 2012
1 sentence

2021For example, in State v. Apotex Corp., we considered the adequacy of a claim under Utah‘s False Claims Act.40 Although we concluded that claims under the False Claims Act were subject to our heightened pleading requirement, we explained that our ―heightened pleading standard may be applied less stringently when the specific factual information is peculiarly within the defendant‘s knowledge or control.‖41 For this reason, and ―to achieve the remedial purpose‖42 of the False Claims Act, we held that a claim was sufficient so long as it provided ―reliable indicia _________________________________

12021–2021
State v. Harker green
utah · 2010
2 sentences

2021They argue the court of appeals too strictly interpreted the specificity needed under the adequacy standard we adopted in House v. Armour of America, Inc.10 Because the House standard lacks guidance on what level of specificity an adequate warning requires, we modify the third prong to include a specificity standard.11 Further, because the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Tracker and Brunswick based in part on its exclusion of Mr. Martinez‘s sworn statements, which exclusion the court of appeals concluded was error, we remand to the district court so that it might consider t

2021They argue the court of appeals too strictly interpreted the specificity needed under the adequacy standard we adopted in House v. Armour of America, Inc.10 Because the House standard lacks guidance on what level of specificity an adequate warning requires, we modify the third prong to include a specificity standard.11 Further, because the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Tracker and Brunswick based in part on its exclusion of Mr. Martinez‘s sworn statements, which exclusion the court of appeals concluded was error, we remand to the district court so that it might consider t

12021–2021
cluster 590916 green
ca5 · 1992
2 sentences

2021In determining whether these warnings must be issued directly or whether this duty may be satisfied by warning an 62 See id. 63See id. at 173–74.

2021In determining whether these warnings must be issued directly or whether this duty may be satisfied by warning an 62 See id. 63See id. at 173–74.

12021–2021
Rutherford v. Talisker Canyons Fin., Co. green
utah · 2019
2 sentences

2021They argue the court of appeals too strictly interpreted the specificity needed under the adequacy standard we adopted in House v. Armour of America, Inc.10 Because the House standard lacks guidance on what level of specificity an adequate warning requires, we modify the third prong to include a specificity standard.11 Further, because the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Tracker and Brunswick based in part on its exclusion of Mr. Martinez‘s sworn statements, which exclusion the court of appeals concluded was error, we remand to the district court so that it might consider t

2021They argue the court of appeals too strictly interpreted the specificity needed under the adequacy standard we adopted in House v. Armour of America, Inc.10 Because the House standard lacks guidance on what level of specificity an adequate warning requires, we modify the third prong to include a specificity standard.11 Further, because the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Tracker and Brunswick based in part on its exclusion of Mr. Martinez‘s sworn statements, which exclusion the court of appeals concluded was error, we remand to the district court so that it might consider t

12021–2021
Gudmundson v. Del Ozone green
utah · 2010
2 sentences

2021For example, in State v. Apotex Corp., we considered the adequacy of a claim under Utah‘s False Claims Act.40 Although we concluded that claims under the False Claims Act were subject to our heightened pleading requirement, we explained that our ―heightened pleading standard may be applied less stringently when the specific factual information is peculiarly within the defendant‘s knowledge or control.‖41 For this reason, and ―to achieve the remedial purpose‖42 of the False Claims Act, we held that a claim was sufficient so long as it provided ―reliable indicia _________________________________

2021For example, in State v. Apotex Corp., we considered the adequacy of a claim under Utah‘s False Claims Act.40 Although we concluded that claims under the False Claims Act were subject to our heightened pleading requirement, we explained that our ―heightened pleading standard may be applied less stringently when the specific factual information is peculiarly within the defendant‘s knowledge or control.‖41 For this reason, and ―to achieve the remedial purpose‖42 of the False Claims Act, we held that a claim was sufficient so long as it provided ―reliable indicia _________________________________

12021–2021
Feasel v. Tracker Marine green
utahctapp · 2020
2 sentences

2020Feasel asserts that Defendants had a duty to provide a specific warning regarding the risk of the circle of death and that the existing warnings exhorting users to 20180332-CA 13 2020 UT App 28 Feasel v. Tracker Marine wear the kill-switch lanyard were inadequate because they did not mention the circle of death. 5 The adequacy of a warning ordinarily “presents a question of fact, to be resolved by the trier of fact.” House v. Armour of Am., Inc. (House I), 886 P.2d 542, 551 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), aff’d, 929 P.2d 340 (Utah 1996). ¶21 Defendants maintain that the district court correctly rejected

2020Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s grant of Defendant’s motion to strike and motion for summary judgment with respect to Feasel’s failure-to-warn claim and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 20180332-CA 21 2020 UT App 28

12020–2020
State v. Smith green
utahctapp · 2019
1 sentence

2019Beyond his assertions regarding the adequacy of the warnings, Smith makes no argument on appeal asserting that he did not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive his Miranda rights by electing to answer Detective’s questions after receiving the warnings. 20170282-CA 10 2019 UT App 141 State v. Smith invocation of his right to counsel and that Detective should have clarified the request before proceeding with any questioning.

12019–2019
Nguyen v. IHC HEALTH SERVICES, INC. green
utahctapp · 2010
2 sentences

2014The loss of a surgical instrument or other paraphernalia, in the operating site, exemplifies this type of treatment."); Nguyen v. IHC Health Servs., Inc., 2010 UT App 85, ¶¶ 17-18 , 232 P.3d 529 (holding that no expert was needed to demonstrate inadequacy of disclosure in informed consent case when claim was that no disclosure was made). 15 But if the jury believes the thrust of Staker's version of events-that is, if the jury finds that there were at least some warning signs and devices in place over the route the McDowells traveled-and the question becomes the adequacy of the warning thus imp

2014The loss of a surgical instrument or other paraphernalia, in the operating site, exemplifies this type of treatment."); Nguyen v. IHC Health Servs., Inc., 2010 UT App 85, ¶¶ 17-18 , 232 P.3d 529 (holding that no expert was needed to demonstrate inadequacy of disclosure in informed consent case when claim was that no disclosure was made). 15 But if the jury believes the thrust of Staker's version of events-that is, if the jury finds that there were at least some warning signs and devices in place over the route the McDowells traveled-and the question becomes the adequacy of the warning thus imp

12014–2014
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce green
scotus · 1975
2 sentences

1989With respect to the adequacy of the factors articulated by the police as a basis for the stop, we note at the outset that the *509 officers were “entitled to assess the facts in light of [their] experience.” Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885 , 95 S.Ct. at 2582 .

1989With respect to the adequacy of the factors articulated by the police as a basis for the stop, we note at the outset that the *509 officers were “entitled to assess the facts in light of [their] experience.” Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885 , 95 S.Ct. at 2582 .

11989–1989

Where else courts name it

TX 172 (1935–2026) NY 130 (1953–2026) CA 78 (1954–2026) IL 57 (1970–2026) WA 48 (1968–2026) PA 46 (1971–2023) IN 43 (1979–2024) FL 43 (1972–2026) NJ 31 (1955–2025) LA 31 (1954–2024) MI 27 (1963–2022) MA 25 (1974–2025) OH 24 (1974–2026) MN 22 (1984–2024) OR 21 (1943–2024) NV 21 (1983–2022) MS 20 (1969–2017) CO 16 (1976–2021) WI 15 (1972–2026) MO 15 (1958–2019) CT 14 (1950–2016) AZ 14 (1947–2024) AL 13 (1983–2013) KS 13 (1984–2026) NM 13 (1975–2015) AR 12 (1992–2022) TN 11 (1985–2022) DC 11 (1968–2025) UT 11 (1989–2024) GA 10 (1982–2025) IA 10 (1986–2014) DE 9 (1985–2023) KY 9 (1968–2024) RI 9 (2000–2026) MD 8 (1968–2012) OK 7 (1975–2010) ID 6 (1979–2013) AK 6 (1973–2018) VA 5 (1985–2026) VT 5 (1990–2026) ND 5 (1909–1997) NC 4 (1975–2012) WY 4 (1992–2019) WV 4 (1979–2018) SC 4 (1973–2008) ME 3 (1981–2013) HI 3 (1999–2007) MT 3 (2000–2010) VI 2 (2002–2005)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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