adequacy defense in Texas

2005Garcia v. State , 887 S.W.2d 862, 880 (Tex. Crim.

1999The adequacy of defense counsel’s representation is based upon the totality of the representation rather than by isolated instances of error by defense counsel, Garcia v. State, 887 S.W.2d 862, 880 (Tex.Cr.App.1994), and is not to be judged by hindsight.

2015Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 814 (Tex.Crim.App.1999).

2007Thompson , 9 S.W.3d at 814 , citing Strickland , 466 U.S. at 700 .            The adequacy of defense counsel’s assistance is based upon the totality of the representation rather than by isolated acts or omissions of trial counsel.

2025App. 2011) (quoting Ripkowski v. State, 61 S.W.3d 378, 384 (Tex. Crim.

2020The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “[t]here are two facets to any inquiry” regarding the adequacy of a waiver of an accused’s Miranda rights: First, the waiver must be “voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.” Second the waiver must be made “with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Id. (quoting Ripkowski v. State, 61 S.W.3d 378, 384 (Tex. Crim.

1988The supreme court's remand directs this court: "... to consider Alcoa's factual insufficiency points regarding the adequacy of its warning of the hazard of cap blow off to JFW ...." Alm v. Aluminum Co. of America, 717 S.W.2d 588, 595 (Tex. 1986).

1988The supreme court's remand directs this court: “... to consider Alcoa’s factual insufficiency points regarding the adequacy of its warning of the hazard of cap blow off to JFW_” Alm v. Aluminum Co. of America, 717 S.W.2d 588, 595 (Tex. 1986).

2025Regarding the dictates of Miranda and article 38.22, the Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “[t]here are two facets to any inquiry” regarding the adequacy of a waiver of an accused’s rights: First, the waiver must be “voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.” Second the waiver must be made “with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Leza v. State, 351 S.W.3d 344, 349 (Tex. Crim.

2024Regarding the dictates of Miranda and article 38.22, the Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “[t]here are two facets to any inquiry” regarding the adequacy of a waiver of an accused’s Miranda rights: First, the waiver must be “voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception.” Second the waiver must be made “with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” 12 Leza v. State, 351 S.W.3d 344, 349 (Tex. Crim.

2023We review the trial court’s determination of an expert’s qualifications under an abuse-of-discretion standard and “[c]lose calls must go to the trial court.” Larson v. Downing, 197 SW.3d 303, 304 (Tex. 2006); see also E.D. by and through B.O. v. Tex. Health Care, P.L.L.C., 644 S.W.3d 660 , 664 (Tex. 2022) (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted) (“This adequacy inquiry is confined to the four corners of the report, taken as a whole, and under an abuse-of- discretion standard, close calls must go to the trial court.”).

2022See Tex. Health Care, 644 S.W.3d at 664 (“This adequacy inquiry is confined to the four corners of the report, taken as a whole, . . . and under an abuse-of-discretion standard, “‘[c]lose calls must go to the trial court.’” (quoting Larson v. Downing, 197 S.W.3d 303, 304 (Tex. 2006))). 3.

2008See Jernigan, 195 S.W.3d at 93 (limiting the adequacy analysis to the four corners of the timely-filed expert reports in determining whether the reports constitute a good faith effort to meet the statutory requirements).

2008See Jernigan , 195 S.W.3d at 93 (limiting the adequacy analysis to the four corners of the timely-filed expert reports in determining whether the reports constitute a good faith effort to meet the statutory requirements).

1981Co., supra. The adequacy of a warning cannot be evaluated apart from the knowledge and expertise of those who may reasonably be expected to use the product.

1979Maximum safe r. p. m.’s 6045.” The Dallas Court of Civil Appeals concluded that the adequacy of the warning presented a jury issue, and the court summarized the essential factors of a legally adequate warning as follows: (1) it must be in such form that it could reasonably be expected to catch the attention of the reasonably prudent man in the circumstances of its use; (2) the content of the warning must be of such a nature as to be comprehensible to the average user and to convey a fair indication of the nature and extent of the danger to the mind of a reasonably prudent person. *336 518 S.W.

2020App. Nov. 4, 2020) (explaining that to prevail on due-process “involuntary confession” claim, “a defendant must show (1) that police engaged in activity that was objectively coercive, (2) that the statement is causally related to the coercive government misconduct, and (3) that the coercion overbore the defendant’s will”); Contreras, 312 S.W.3d at 574 (explaining that coercive government misconduct renders statement involuntary if defendant’s “will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired” (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973))). 37

2020App. Nov. 4, 2020) (explaining that to prevail on due-process “involuntary confession” claim, “a defendant must show (1) that police engaged in activity that was objectively coercive, (2) that the statement is causally related to the coercive government misconduct, and (3) that the coercion overbore the defendant’s will”); Contreras, 312 S.W.3d at 574 (explaining that coercive government misconduct renders statement involuntary if defendant’s “will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired” (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973))). 37

2020App. Nov. 4, 2020) (explaining that to prevail on due-process “involuntary confession” claim, “a defendant must show (1) that police engaged in activity that was objectively coercive, (2) that the statement is causally related to the coercive government misconduct, and (3) that the coercion overbore the defendant’s will”); Contreras, 312 S.W.3d at 574 (explaining that coercive government misconduct renders statement involuntary if defendant’s “will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired” (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973))). 37

2020App. Nov. 4, 2020) (explaining that to prevail on due-process “involuntary confession” claim, “a defendant must show (1) that police engaged in activity that was objectively coercive, (2) that the statement is causally related to the coercive government misconduct, and (3) that the coercion overbore the defendant’s will”); Contreras, 312 S.W.3d at 574 (explaining that coercive government misconduct renders statement involuntary if defendant’s “will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired” (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973))). 37

2019If there is no disputed factual issue, the trial court must determine the adequacy of the warnings as a matter of law and no jury instruction is necessary. 26 Rodriguez, 2017 WL 3184744 , at *8; see Robinson v. State, 377 S.W.3d 712, 719 (Tex. Crim.

2015See id. at 177-78; see also Robinson v. State, 377 S.W.3d 712, 719 (Tex. Crim.

2017Henkel v. Norman, 441 S.W.3d 249, 252 (Tex. 2014) (per curiam).

2017Henkel v. Norman, 441 S.W.3d 249, 252 (Tex. 2014) (per curiam).

2006See Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC , 186 F.3d 620, 625-26 (5th Cir. 1999, cert. denied ); Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc. , 109 F.R.D. 269, 273 (E.D.

2006See Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC, 186 F.3d 620, 625-26 (5th Cir.1999, cert. denied); Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 109 F.R.D. 269, 273 (E.D.Tex.1985), aff'd, 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir.1986).

2006Co. v. Kirkland , 917 S.W.2d 836, 844 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ)).

2006Co. v. Kirkland, 917 S.W.2d 836, 844 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ)).

2006The adequacy requirement consists of the following two elements: (1) whether it appears that the class representative, through her attorneys, will vigorously prosecute the class claims; and (2) whether there is an absence of antagonism or conflict between the class representative's interests and those of the class members. (3) See Sun Coast Res., Inc. v. Cooper , 967 S.W.2d 525, 538 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. dism'd w.o.j.) (citing Reserve Life Ins.

2006The adequacy requirement consists of the following two elements: (1) whether it appears that the class representative, through her attorneys, will vigorously prosecute the class claims; and (2) whether there is an absence of antagonism or conflict between the class representative’s interests and those of the class members. 3 See Sun Coast Res., Inc. v. Cooper, 967 S.W.2d 525, 538 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. dism’d w.o.j.) (citing Reserve Life Ins.

2006See Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC , 186 F.3d 620, 625-26 (5th Cir. 1999, cert. denied ); Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc. , 109 F.R.D. 269, 273 (E.D.

2006See Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC, 186 F.3d 620, 625-26 (5th Cir.1999, cert. denied); Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 109 F.R.D. 269, 273 (E.D.Tex.1985), aff'd, 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir.1986).

1999Adams v. Reagan, 791 S.W.2d 284, 291 (Tex.App.— Fort Worth 1990, no writ).

1999Adams v. Reagan , 791 S.W.2d 284, 291 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1990, no writ).

1986Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Black & Decker Manufacturing Co., 518 S.W.2d 868, 873 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1974, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Muncy v. Magnolia Chemical Co., 437 S.W.2d 15, 19 (Tex.Civ.

1979Also see *915 Muncy v. Magnolia Chemical Co. (Amarillo, Tex.Civ.App.1968) 437 S.W.2d 15 , NRE, which held that the adequacy of the warning of a dangerous product, although in compliance with statute, presents a question of fact.

2022Johnson, 990 S.W.2d at 357 .

2017Rainbow Grp., Ltd., 990 S.W.2d at 357 .

2006Id.

2006Mitchell v. State, 68 S.W.3d 640, 642 (Tex.Cr.App. 2002). 3 The adequacy of defense counsel's assistance is based upon the totality of the representation rather than by isolated acts or omissions of trial counsel.

2003Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53 ( Tex.Cr.App. 1986). 2 Although counsel suggests other potential basis for consideration of an ineffective assistance claim, we agree, as she concedes, these potential grounds are not sufficiently founded in the record to merit consideration on direct appeal. 3 The adequacy of defense counsel’s assistance is based upon the totality of the representation rather than by isolated acts or omissions of trial counsel.

2002Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53, 55 (Tex.Cr.App. 1986). 2 The Court of Criminal Appeals has overruled both Ex parte Duffy, 607 S.W.2d 507, 516 (Tex.Cr.App. 1980) and Ex parte Cruz, 739 S.W.2d 53 (Tex.Cr.App. 1987) by its decision in Hernandez v. State, 988 S.W.2d 770 (Tex.Cr.App. 1999). 3 The adequacy of defense counsel’s assistance is based upon the totality of the representation rather than by isolated acts or omissions of trial counsel.

2001Alm, 717 S.W.2d at 592 ; Munoz, 732 S.W.2d at 65 ; see also Balbos, 604 A.2d at 464 .

2001Alm, 717 S.W.2d at 592 ; Munoz, 732 S.W.2d at 65 ; see also Balbos, 604 A.2d at 464 .