14 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1950–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Fishbein v. Kozlowskigreen2 sentences2016See Fishbein v. Kozlowski, 252 Conn. 38 , 47, 743 A.2d 1110 (2000[1999] ) ; [see also] General Statutes § 14-227b (g). 2016See Fishbein v. Kozlowski, 252 Conn. 38 , 47, 743 A.2d 1110 (2000[1999] ) ; [see also] General Statutes § 14-227b (g). | 1 | 1 |
12 Fair empl.prac.cas. 451, 11 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 10,741 John Senter, Cross-Appellee v. General Motors Corporation, Cross-Appellantgreen1 sentence2005Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 525 [(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 870 , 97 S. Ct. 182 , 50 L. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Colemangreen2 sentences2004See State v. Coleman, 83 Conn. App. 672 , 691 n.12, 851 A.2d 329 (2004). 11 The defendant has provided no authority for his assertion that, in addition to an instruction regarding the specific intent of the defendant, a conspiracy charge must also include an explicit instruction that the jury must find that the coconspirator possessed the intent to cause the death of the victim. 2004See State v. Coleman, 83 Conn. App. 672 , 691 n.12, 851 A.2d 329 (2004). 11 The defendant has provided no authority for his assertion that, in addition to an instruction regarding the specific intent of the defendant, a conspiracy charge must also include an explicit instruction that the jury must find that the coconspirator possessed the intent to cause the death of the victim. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Robert Anthony Lamiagreen2 sentences1974United States v. Lamia, 429 F.2d 373 , *429 376 (2d Cir.). 1974United States v. Lamia, 429 F.2d 373, 376 (2d Cir.). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor
green
2 sentences1999Rule 23 (a) (4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a finding that “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” “The adequacy inquiry under Rule 23(a)(4) serves to uncover conflicts of interest between named parties *87 and the class they seek to represent.” Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 , 117 S. Ct. 2231 , 138 L. 1999Rule 23 (a) (4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a finding that “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” “The adequacy inquiry under Rule 23(a)(4) serves to uncover conflicts of interest between named parties *87 and the class they seek to represent.” Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 , 117 S. Ct. 2231 , 138 L. | 3 | 1999–1999 |
State v. Salgado
green
1 sentence2006Finally, the plaintiffs contend that the trial court improperly rejected the application of the exceptions to the learned intermediary doctrine set forth in Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., supra, 257 Conn. 394 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Carter v. American Bar Ass'n
green
1 sentence2005Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 525 [(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 870 , 97 S. Ct. 182 , 50 L. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Senter v. General Motors Corp.
green
1 sentence2005Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 525 [(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 870 , 97 S. Ct. 182 , 50 L. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Golding
green
2 sentences2004He concedes that an attack on the adequacy of the warnings was not raised at trial and therefore asks this court to review his claim pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989). 2004He concedes that an attack on the adequacy of the warnings was not raised at trial and therefore asks this court to review his claim pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Sharp v. Wyatt, Inc.
green
2 sentences2001According to the plaintiff, the determination of the adequacy of the warnings and of the proper recipient of the warnings should be made by the trier of fact because the Appellate Court, in construing § 52-572q (b) in cases involving the analogous common-law “sophisticated user” defense; see Gajewski v. Pavelo, supra, 36 Conn. App. 612 -13; Sharp v. Wyatt, Inc., 31 Conn. App. 824, 849 , 627 A.2d 1347 (1993), aff'd, 230 Conn. 12 , 644 A.2d 871 (1994); has held that that defense does not, as a matter of law, absolve the manufacturer of its obligation to provide direct warnings to the ultimate co 2001According to the plaintiff, the determination of the adequacy of the warnings and of the proper recipient of the warnings should be made by the trier of fact because the Appellate Court, in construing § 52-572q (b) in cases involving the analogous common-law “sophisticated user” defense; see Gajewski v. Pavelo, supra, 36 Conn. App. 612 -13; Sharp v. Wyatt, Inc., 31 Conn. App. 824, 849 , 627 A.2d 1347 (1993), aff'd, 230 Conn. 12 , 644 A.2d 871 (1994); has held that that defense does not, as a matter of law, absolve the manufacturer of its obligation to provide direct warnings to the ultimate co | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Sharp v. Wyatt, Inc.
green
2 sentences2001According to the plaintiff, the determination of the adequacy of the warnings and of the proper recipient of the warnings should be made by the trier of fact because the Appellate Court, in construing § 52-572q (b) in cases involving the analogous common-law “sophisticated user” defense; see Gajewski v. Pavelo, supra, 36 Conn. App. 612 -13; Sharp v. Wyatt, Inc., 31 Conn. App. 824, 849 , 627 A.2d 1347 (1993), aff'd, 230 Conn. 12 , 644 A.2d 871 (1994); has held that that defense does not, as a matter of law, absolve the manufacturer of its obligation to provide direct warnings to the ultimate co 2001According to the plaintiff, the determination of the adequacy of the warnings and of the proper recipient of the warnings should be made by the trier of fact because the Appellate Court, in construing § 52-572q (b) in cases involving the analogous common-law “sophisticated user” defense; see Gajewski v. Pavelo, supra, 36 Conn. App. 612 -13; Sharp v. Wyatt, Inc., 31 Conn. App. 824, 849 , 627 A.2d 1347 (1993), aff'd, 230 Conn. 12 , 644 A.2d 871 (1994); has held that that defense does not, as a matter of law, absolve the manufacturer of its obligation to provide direct warnings to the ultimate co | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Papas v. The Upjohn Company
green
2 sentences2000It cited Papas v. Upjohn , 985 F.2d 516 (Ca. 11, 1993), which held that 136v(b) of FIFRA preempts failure to warn claims based upon "point of sale signs, consumer notices, or other information or materials that are `unrelated' to labeling and packaging," stating: "[A]ny claims that point of sale-signs, consumer notices, or other informational materials failed adequately to warn the plaintiff necessarily challenge the adequacy of the warnings provided on the product's labeling or packaging . . . 2000Because claims challenging the adequacy of warnings on materials other than the label or package of the product necessarily imply that the labeling and packaging failed to warn the user, we conclude that these claims are also preempted by FIFRA." Id. at 519 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Harrell
green
2 sentences1991State v. Pollitt, 205 Conn. 132, 152 , 531 A.2d 125 (1987); State v. Harrell, 199 Conn. 255, 268-69 , 506 A.2d 1041 (1986). 1991State v. Pollitt, 205 Conn. 132, 152 , 531 A.2d 125 (1987); State v. Harrell, 199 Conn. 255, 268-69 , 506 A.2d 1041 (1986). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
State v. Pollitt
green
2 sentences1991State v. Pollitt, 205 Conn. 132, 152 , 531 A.2d 125 (1987); State v. Harrell, 199 Conn. 255, 268-69 , 506 A.2d 1041 (1986). 1991State v. Pollitt, 205 Conn. 132, 152 , 531 A.2d 125 (1987); State v. Harrell, 199 Conn. 255, 268-69 , 506 A.2d 1041 (1986). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
State v. Harden
green
2 sentences1991While we have used the model Telfaire charge as an aid in determining the adequacy of an instruction on eyewitness identification; id.; State v. McKnight, supra, 582 ; State v. Harden, 175 Conn. 315, 321 , 398 A.2d 1169 (1978); we have never required that it be given verbatim in order to ensure that the jury is properly guided. 1991While we have used the model Telfaire charge as an aid in determining the adequacy of an instruction on eyewitness identification; id.; State v. McKnight, supra, 582 ; State v. Harden, 175 Conn. 315, 321 , 398 A.2d 1169 (1978); we have never required that it be given verbatim in order to ensure that the jury is properly guided. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
State v. Cosby
green
2 sentences1988“The trial judge presiding over a criminal case is not engaged in taking a Kafkaesque academic test which he may be determined on appeal to have failed because of questions never asked of him or issues never clearly presented to him.” State v. Cosby, 6 Conn. App. 164, 174 , 504 A.2d 1071 (1986); State v. Vasquez, supra, 653 . 1988“The trial judge presiding over a criminal case is not engaged in taking a Kafkaesque academic test which he may be determined on appeal to have failed because of questions never asked of him or issues never clearly presented to him.” State v. Cosby, 6 Conn. App. 164, 174 , 504 A.2d 1071 (1986); State v. Vasquez, supra, 653 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Miner v. McNamara
green
1 sentence1950Miner v. McNamara, 82 Conn. 578, 582 . | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.