unjust enrichment claim in Colorado

2026See Snow Basin, Ltd. v. Boettcher & Co., 805 P.2d 1151, 1154 (Colo. App. 1990) (“[P]romissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine,” not subject to a jury trial.); Lewis v. Lewis, 189 P.3d 1134, 1141 (Colo. 2008) (explaining that an unjust enrichment claim provides “an equitable remedy and does not depend on any contract, oral or written”); Rinker v. Colina-Lee, 2019 COA 45, ¶ 80 (“An injunction is an extraordinary and discretionary equitable remedy . . . intended to prevent future harm.” (citation omitted)); Wheat Ridge Urb.

2025An unjust enrichment claim, they urged, is "designed to undo the benefit to one party that comes at the unfair detriment of another." Id.

2025See Interbank Invs., 77 P.3d at 816 (reviewing de novo whether an express contract bars an unjust enrichment claim).

2022Mayer Real Est., Inc. , 849 P.2d 921 (Colo. App. 1993); see also Interbank I nvs., LLC v. Eagle River Water & Sanitation Dist. , 77 P.3d 814, 816 (Colo. A pp. 2003). ¶ 23 Because the unjust enrichment claim is barred by the terms of the mineral deed, summary judgment on that claim was p roperly granted.

2022Law Inst. 2011) (hereinafter Restatement)). ¶ 34 “To prevail on an unjust enrichment claim, a party ‘must prove that (1) the defendant received a benefit (2) at the plaintiff’s expense (3) under circumstances that would make it unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit without commensurate compensation.’” Pulte Home Corp. v. Countryside Cmty. Ass’n, 2016 CO 64, ¶ 63 (quoting Lewis v. Lewis, 189 P.3d 1134, 1141 (Colo. 2008)).7 7 The Frederiksens contend that, under DCB Construction Co. v. Central City Development, Co., 965 P.2d 115, 123 (Colo. 1998), a party must satisfy an additional elem

2022Law Inst. 2011) (hereinafter Restatement)). ¶ 34 “To prevail on an unjust enrichment claim, a party ‘must prove that (1) the defendant received a benefit (2) at the plaintiff’s expense (3) under circumstances that would make it unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit without commensurate compensation.’” Pulte Home Corp. v. Countryside Cmty. Ass’n, 2016 CO 64, ¶ 63 (quoting Lewis v. Lewis, 189 P.3d 1134, 1141 (Colo. 2008)).7 7 The Frederiksens contend that, under DCB Construction Co. v. Central City Development, Co., 965 P.2d 115, 123 (Colo. 1998), a party must satisfy an additional elem

1998Credit Ass’n v. Ed Duggan, Inc., 821 P.2d 788, 794-95 (Colo.1991) (characterizing an unjust enrichment claim as a contract implied in law).

1998Credit Ass’n v. Ed Duggan, Inc., 821 P.2d 788, 797 (Colo.1991) (holding that an unjust enrichment claim could prevail contrary to the UCC priority system); Frank M.

2025Edwards Contracting Co. v. Port of Tacoma, 514 P.2d 1381, 1386 (Wash. 1973) (applying the same principle and noting that “[t]he critical factor . . . is whether the [party] should have discovered or anticipated the changed condition”). ¶ 109 In Specialized Grading Enterprises, a subcontractor brought an unjust enrichment claim for extra work, and “[t]he contractor argued that the [extra work] was . . . expressly provided for in the general contract,” and the contract’s change order procedure provided “an adequate contractual remedy.” 181 P.3d at 355 .

2025Edwards Contracting Co. v. Port of Tacoma, 514 P.2d 1381, 1386 (Wash. 1973) (applying the same principle and noting that “[t]he critical factor . . . is whether the [party] should have discovered or anticipated the changed condition”). ¶ 39 In Specialized Grading Enterprises, a subcontractor brought an unjust enrichment claim for extra work, and “[t]he contractor argued that the [extra work] . . . was expressly provided for in the general contract” and that the contract’s change order procedure provided “an adequate contractual remedy.” 181 P.3d at 355 .

2009Because contribution prevents unjust enrichment, Colo. Dep't of Transp. v. Brown Group Retail, Inc., 182 P.3d 687, 691 (Colo.2008), this argument is foreclosed by Martinez v. Continental Enterprises, 730 P.2d 308, 317 (Colo.1986), where the supreme court held: When a court appropriately applies the doctrine of unjust enrichment, the unjustly enriched party is generally liable for interest on the benefits received.

2008Colo. Dep't of Transp. v. Brown Group Retail, Inc., 182 P.3d 687, 691 (Colo.2008) (noting that "Iwlhether a party has been unjustly (or unjustifiably) enriched ... becomes an issue only if it has been enriched by receiving a benefit at the expense of another").

2009Because contribution prevents unjust enrichment, Colo. Dep't of Transp. v. Brown Group Retail, Inc., 182 P.3d 687, 691 (Colo.2008), this argument is foreclosed by Martinez v. Continental Enterprises, 730 P.2d 308, 317 (Colo.1986), where the supreme court held: When a court appropriately applies the doctrine of unjust enrichment, the unjustly enriched party is generally liable for interest on the benefits received.

1990In order to recover under the doctrine of unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must demonstrate: “(1) that a benefit was conferred upon an adverse party; (2) that the benefit was appreciated by the adverse party; and (3) that the benefit was accepted by the adverse party under such circumstances that it would be inequitable for it to be *801 retained without payment of its value.” Martinez v. Continental Enterprises, 730 P.2d 308, 317 (Colo.1986).

1998Hall & Co. v. Southwest Properties Venture, 747 P.2d 688, 691 (Colo.App.1987) (holding that an unjust enrichment claim could exist where landlord took an active role in completion of construction work); Murdock-Bryant Constr., Inc. v. Pearson, 146 Ariz. 48 , 703 P.2d 1197, 1203 (Ariz.1985) (awarding restitution to subcontractor against parties who received a benefit); Commerce v. Equity Contracting Co., Inc., 695 So.2d 383 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1997) (stating that subcontractor could recover against owner if owner did not pay for benefit received); Idaho Lumber v. Buck, 109 Idaho 737 , 710 P.2d 647

1998In Hall, a case remarkably similar to this case, our court of appeals held that a contractor could recover on an unjust enrichment claim from a landlord where “the landlord not only gave its permission for the work but took an active role in its completion.” Hall, 747 P.2d at 691 .

2025Legal Principles of Quantum Meruit ¶ 20 A party asserting an unjust enrichment claim must prove “that (1) at the plaintiff’s expense (2) the defendant received a benefit (3) under circumstances that would make it unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit without paying.” Bd. of Governors of Colo. State Univ. v. Alderman, 2025 CO 9, ¶ 35 .

2025See Bd. of Governors of Colo. State Univ. v. Alderman, 2025 CO 9, ¶ 44 (“[A] party cannot properly state a claim for unjust enrichment when a legally enforceable contract exists that covers the same subject matter and that contract has not been abrogated or rescinded.”).

2025Pulte Home Corp. v. Countryside Cmty. Ass'n , 2016 CO 64, ¶ 64 , 382 P.3d 821, 833 .

2022Law Inst. 2011) (hereinafter Restatement)). ¶ 34 “To prevail on an unjust enrichment claim, a party ‘must prove that (1) the defendant received a benefit (2) at the plaintiff’s expense (3) under circumstances that would make it unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit without commensurate compensation.’” Pulte Home Corp. v. Countryside Cmty. Ass’n, 2016 CO 64, ¶ 63 (quoting Lewis v. Lewis, 189 P.3d 1134, 1141 (Colo. 2008)).7 7 The Frederiksens contend that, under DCB Construction Co. v. Central City Development, Co., 965 P.2d 115, 123 (Colo. 1998), a party must satisfy an additional elem

2024To prevail on an unjust enrichment claim the plaintiff must show that “(1) at the plaintiff’s expense, (2) the defendant received a benefit, [and] (3) under circumstances that would make it unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit without paying.” Id. ¶ 24 When a trial court resolves factual disputes to apply the elements of an unjust enrichment claim, we review such factual 11 findings for clear error.

2016Id. at 1140-41 ; Martinez v. Colo. Dep’t of Human Servs., 97 P.3d 152, 159 (Colo. App. 2003).

1995Bock v. Brody, 870 P.2d 530, 533-34 (Colo.App.1993).

1995Bock, 870 P.2d at 533 .

1991In rejecting the unjust enrichment claims of the unsecured creditors in Peerless Packing and Evans Products , the appellate courts reasoned that "[t]he purpose and effectiveness of the UCC [Uniform Commercial Code] would be substantially impaired if interests created in compliance with UCC procedure could be defeated by application of the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment." Evans Products, 421 P.2d at 983 ; Peerless Packing, 376 S.E.2d at 164 (quoting Evans Products, 421 P.2d at 983 ). [15] The leading case allowing an unsecured creditor asserting an unjust enrichment claim to prevail ag

1991In rejecting the unjust enrichment claims of the unsecured creditors in Peerless Packing and Evans Products , the appellate courts reasoned that "[t]he purpose and effectiveness of the UCC [Uniform Commercial Code] would be substantially impaired if interests created in compliance with UCC procedure could be defeated by application of the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment." Evans Products, 421 P.2d at 983 ; Peerless Packing, 376 S.E.2d at 164 (quoting Evans Products, 421 P.2d at 983 ). [15] The leading case allowing an unsecured creditor asserting an unjust enrichment claim to prevail ag

2026See Snow Basin, Ltd. v. Boettcher & Co., 805 P.2d 1151, 1154 (Colo. App. 1990) (“[P]romissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine,” not subject to a jury trial.); Lewis v. Lewis, 189 P.3d 1134, 1141 (Colo. 2008) (explaining that an unjust enrichment claim provides “an equitable remedy and does not depend on any contract, oral or written”); Rinker v. Colina-Lee, 2019 COA 45, ¶ 80 (“An injunction is an extraordinary and discretionary equitable remedy . . . intended to prevent future harm.” (citation omitted)); Wheat Ridge Urb.

2026See Snow Basin, Ltd. v. Boettcher & Co., 805 P.2d 1151, 1154 (Colo. App. 1990) (“[P]romissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine,” not subject to a jury trial.); Lewis v. Lewis, 189 P.3d 1134, 1141 (Colo. 2008) (explaining that an unjust enrichment claim provides “an equitable remedy and does not depend on any contract, oral or written”); Rinker v. Colina-Lee, 2019 COA 45, ¶ 80 (“An injunction is an extraordinary and discretionary equitable remedy . . . intended to prevent future harm.” (citation omitted)); Wheat Ridge Urb.

2025Therefore, a party entitled to restitution for unjust enrichment can generally recover “restitution in the amount of enrichment received, . . . [which] is often, but not always, coextensive with the [entitled] party’s loss.” Sterenbuch v. Goss, 266 P.3d 428, 437 (Colo. App. 2011) (citation omitted); see also Maupin v. Syrian Arab Republic, 405 F. Supp. 3d 75 , 89 (D.D.C. 2019) (noting that an award of prejudgment interest must “not overcompensate a plaintiff”) (citation omitted). ¶ 117 Divisions of this court have held that a party that prevails on an unjust enrichment claim is entitled to pre

2025We conclude that their reliance on Normandy Estates is misplaced. ¶ 89 In Normandy Estates, a special district approved and disbursed bond proceeds to acquire an existing swimming pool and the associated acreage, but the district did not pay the full purchase price to the seller. 553 P.2d at 387-88 .

2025Id. at 390 (citations omitted). ¶ 92 These conditions preclude the recognition of an unjust enrichment claim in this case.

2025City & Cnty. of Denver v. Qwest Corp. , 18 P.3d 748, 754 (Colo. 2001). ¶32 An unjust enrichment claim is an equitable cause of action.

2025See Murdock v. Cohen, 762 P.2d 691, 693 (Colo. App. 1988) (citing § 5- 57 12-102(3), C.R.S. 2024); M.G.

2024See id.

2022Corp. v. Main Elec., Ltd. , 949 P.2d 77, 82 (Colo. App. 1997) (if an express contract exists an d an implied contract is alleged to co-exist and relate to the same subject matter, the provisions of the express contract superse de the alleged terms of the implied contract), aff’d in part and rev’d in pa rt on other grounds , 980 P.2d 522 (Colo. 1999). ¶ 22 T he time bar that defeated Ward’s covenant of seisin claim is equally fatal to the unjust enrichment claim.

2018As discussed, the claims against Oakwood, except the unjust enrichment claim, should’ve been resolved under C.R.C.P. 56. 30 238 P.3d at 663 (statute “unequivocally mandate[s]” attorney fees); Gagne v. Gagne, 2014 COA 127, ¶ 74 (same).