unjust enrichment claim in Washington

2026An unjust enrichment claim requires: “‘a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; an appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; and the acceptance or retention by the defendant of the benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without the payment of its value.’” Id. (quoting Bailie Commc’ns, Ltd. v. Trend Bus.

2026To establish an unjust enrichment claim, the plaintiff must show, “[1] a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; [2] an appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; and [3] the acceptance or retention by the defendant of the benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without the payment of its value.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Young v. Young, 164 Wn.2d 477, 484 , 191 P.3d 1258 (2008)). “ ‘Unjust enrichment is a basis for recovering the value of a benefit conferred

2021App. 560, 576 , 161 P.3d 473 (2007), an unjust enrichment claim requires the unjust retention of a benefit, and Raven did not unjustly retain the benefit of his work until she expressly refused to pay him in 2015.

2009Id. ¶ 35 In analyzing the Coxes' claim for unjust enrichment, the trial court noted that the existence of an inequity does not necessarily trigger the doctrine of unjust enrichment. *689 The trial court ruled that the doctrine did not apply under the circumstances, and, even if it did apply, the Coxes failed to meet the elements necessary to show unjust enrichment.

2026App. 2d 134 , 144, 510 P.3d 373 (2022) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Bircumshaw v. Wash. State, Health Care Auth., 194 Wn.

2025“Unjust enrichment is a basis for recovering the value of a benefit conferred on another party in the absence of a contractual relationship.” Bircumshaw v. State, 194 Wn.

2015Unjust enrichment is an equitable remedy not dissimilar to the constructive trust imposed by the trial court and disapproved of by the Ninth Circuit in Carmona. 603 F.3d at 1062 . 6 We also deny the parties' various motions to strike and impose sanctions.

2015Unjust enrichment is an equitable remedy not dissimilar to the constructive trust imposed by the trial court and disapproved of by the Ninth Circuit in Carmona. 603 F.3d at 1062 .

2014App. 540, 546 , 463 P.2d 207 (1969) (quoting Lautenbach v. Meredith, 240 Iowa 166 , 35 N.W.2d 870,871 (1949). 11 Thus, before addressing the elements for an unjust enrichment claim, the question is whether the express contract covers the 11 DSHS quotes Young for the proposition that unjust enrichment may only be applied "'absent any contractual relationship."' Appellant's Reply/Cross Response Br. at 52 (quoting Young, 164 Wn.2d at 484 ).

2014App. 540, 546 , 463 P.2d 207 (1969) (quoting Lautenbach v. Meredith, 240 Iowa 166 , 35 N.W.2d 870, 871 (1949)). 14 Thus, before addressing the elements for an unjust enrichment claim, the question is whether the express contract covers the matter at issue: the total amount of authorized hours DSHS agreed to pay the provider. 15 ¶93 The contract clearly contemplates this point.

2007Although the unjust enrichment claim may have merit, the trial court could have reasonably determined that RV Associates' delay in bringing the claim would be unfairly prejudicial. ¶ 51 "When a motion to amend is made after the adverse granting of summary judgment, the normal course of proceedings is disrupted and the trial court should consider whether the motion could have been timely made earlier in the litigation." Doyle v. Planned Parenthood, 31 Wash.App. 126, 130-31 , 639 P.2d 240 (1982).

2007Although the unjust enrichment claim may have merit, the trial court could have reasonably determined that RV Associates’ delay in bringing the claim would be unfairly prejudicial. ¶51 “When a motion to amend is made after the adverse granting of summary judgment, the normal course of proceedings is disrupted and the trial court should consider whether the motion could have been timely made earlier in the litigation.” Doyle v. Planned Parenthood of Seattle-King County, Inc., 31 Wn.

1954Ernst v. Schmidt, 66 Wash. 452 , 119 Pac. 828 , Ann.

1954Ernst v. Schmidt, 66 Wash. 452 , 119 Pac. 828 , Ann.

2026To establish an unjust enrichment claim, the plaintiff must show, “[1] a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; [2] an appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; and [3] the acceptance or retention by the defendant of the benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without the payment of its value.” Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Young v. Young, 164 Wn.2d 477, 484 , 191 P.3d 1258 (2008)). “ ‘Unjust enrichment is a basis for recovering the value of a benefit conferred

2026App. 82 , 286 P.3d 85 (2012), is instructive regarding this third prong of an unjust enrichment claim— whether circumstances exist that make it unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit.

2025The doctrine of unjust enrichment provides “that [a] person shall not be allowed to profit or enrich [them]self inequitably at another’s expense.” Lloyd v. Ridgefield Lumber Ass’n, 38 Wn.2d 723, 735-36 , 231 P.2d 613 (1951).

2025The doctrine of unjust enrichment provides “that [a] person shall not be allowed to profit or enrich [them]self inequitably at another’s expense.” Lloyd v. Ridgefield Lumber Ass’n, 38 Wn.2d 723, 735-36 , 231 P.2d 613 (1951).

2025The court also rejected an unjust enrichment claim because “one party frequently retains the benefit of an illegal contract [and] [u]njust enrichment alone is an insufficient reason for the courts to assist in the enforcement of an illegal agreement.” Luster, 84 Wn.

2024App. 2d 425 , 428 n.1, 499 P.3d 984 (2021). 5 No. 85465-8-I/6 [Benshoof] did or didn’t pay even in 2020, 2021, and 2022, I think there’s a context for the home and where he was living, and I think that we have the right to establish that context.” The trial court stated it was “only considering the past three years from when the complaint was filed” for the purposes of unjust enrichment, “but for all intents and purposes, it would really start from when [Owen] moved out.” The trial court confirmed it was “only looking from September of 2020 forward for the unjust enrichment claim,” and sustain

2024To the extent Benshoof argued the evidence was relevant because it should be considered as a setoff to the unjust enrichment claim, Benshoof did not affirmatively plead setoff. “ ‘Generally, affirmative defenses are waived unless they are (1) affirmatively pleaded, (2) asserted in a motion under CR 12(b), or (3) tried by the express or implied consent of the parties.’ ” Henderson v. Tyrrell, 80 Wn.

2024App. 592, 624 , 910 P.2d 522 (1996) (quoting Bernsen v. Big Bend Elec.

2020Norcon Builders, LLC v. GMP Homes VG, LLC, 161 Wn.

2018App. 394, 411 , 41 P.3d 495 , review denied, 147 Wn.2d 1024 (2002), for the proposition that “if a tort action is based on a contract central to the dispute including an attorney fee provision, the prevailing party may receive attorney fees.” But the Bellerives’ unjust enrichment claim was not a tort action based on a contract.

2018App. 285 , 310- 11, 143 P.3d 630 (2006), review denied, 161 Wn.2d 1005 (2007).3 Here, the Bellerives’ unjust enrichment claim arose outside of the agreements in equity, and the agreements were not central to this equitable dispute.

2018App. 285 , 310- 11, 143 P.3d 630 (2006), review denied, 161 Wn.2d 1005 (2007).3 Here, the Bellerives’ unjust enrichment claim arose outside of the agreements in equity, and the agreements were not central to this equitable dispute.

2018Because the claims in question were not brought to enforce the partnership agreement and the agreement was not central to the dispute, the trial court correctly concluded that the agreement does not provide a basis for awarding prevailing party attorney fees to Burns. 135 Wn.

2017App. at 680 (affirming quantum meruit award on basis of contract implied in fact); Lester N. Johnson Co. v. Spokane. 22 Wn.

2017FSS argues the trial court erred in denying FSS's motion in limine "and objections concerning [Air Serv]'s untimely disclosure of its disgorgement theory."74 But the record demonstrates FSS had long been informed that Air Serv intended to seek the benefit conferred on FSS.75 Therefore, it was not manifestly unreasonable to allow Air Serv to pursue a disgorgement of profit theory.76 72 T.S. v. Boy Scouts of America, 157 Wn.2d 416, 423 , 138 P.3d 1053 (2006) (quoting State ex rel.