unjust enrichment doctrine in Texas

2025This claim “belongs conceptually to the doctrine of unjust enrichment.” Id.

2019Co. v. Smith, 946 S.W.2d 162, 164 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1997, no writ) (the unjust enrichment doctrine applies the principles of restitution to disputes which are 41 not governed by a contract between the contending parties).

2018“The claim ‘belongs conceptually to the doctrine of unjust enrichment.’” Id. (quoting Amoco Prod.

2018Money Had and Received Money had and received is a cause of action that is equitable in nature and “belongs conceptually to the doctrine of unjust enrichment.” Edwards v. Mid- Continent Office Distribs., L.P., 252 S.W.3d 833, 837 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied) (quoting Amoco Prod.

2026While Defendants’ original summary judgment motion sought to attack all of Plaintiffs’ claims, Defendants failed to specifically address the two-year statute applicable to Plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim (see generally Defs’ PSJ Mtn.; see also Elledge v. Friberg-Cooper Water Supply Corp., 240 S.W.3d 869, 870 (Tex. 2007) (stating that “two-year limitations period applies to unjust enrichment claims”)); consequently, the Court asked the parties to address it under Rule 166.

2024Id. § 16.003(a); Elledge v. Friberg–Cooper Water Supply Corp., 240 S.W.3d 869, 871 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam) (holding Section 16.003’s limitations for cause of action for “taking or detaining the personal property of another” applies to 16 unjust-enrichment claims).

2004Unjust Enrichment The defendants further contend that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on their equitable counterclaim of unjust enrichment against the plaintiffs and Prince because the evidence indicated that the proceeds of the 1993 settlement agreement were obtained “as a result of their scheme to commit insurance fraud.” The defendants note that “[a]n action for unjust enrichment is based upon the equitable principle that a person receiving benefits which were unjust for him to retain ought to make restitution.” Bramson v. Standard Hardware, Inc. , 874 S.W.2d 919, 927 (Te

2004Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and Prince on the defendants’ counterclaims for fraud and conspiracy to commit fraud. 23 Unjust Enrichment The defendants further contend that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on their equitable counterclaim of unjust enrichment against the plaintiffs and Prince because the evidence indicated that the proceeds of the 1993 settlement agreement were obtained “as a result of their scheme to commit insurance fraud.” The defendants note that “[a]n action for unjust enrichm

2026“Unjust enrichment occurs when a person has wrongfully secured a benefit or has passively received one which it would be unconscionable to retain.” Eun Bok Lee v. Ho Chang Lee, 311 S.W.3d 95 , 111 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (citing Heldenfels Bros., Inc. v. City of Corpus Christi, 832 S.W.2d 39, 41 (Tex. 1992)).

2005Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to recover the amounts assessed as service charges for Extended Limited Warranties during the Limited Warranty period so that ADT will not be unjustly enriched." Hawa asserts his unjust enrichment count as an alternative to his breach of contract claim, because Hawa's pleadings state that the unjust enrichment claim is made "[i]n the event that the [Residential Service Contract is] determined to be vague or not [to] control the issue of the lawsuit." "A party may recover under the unjust enrichment theory when one person has obtained a benefit from another

2014Conversion Conversion is the “unauthorized and wrongful assumption and exercise of dominion and control over the personal property of another, to the exclusion of or inconsistent with the owner’s rights.” Waisath v. Lack’s Stores, Inc., 474 S.W.2d 444, 447 (Tex. 1971); accord Tex. Integrated Conveyor Sys., Inc. v. Innovative Conveyor Concepts, Inc., 300 S.W.3d 348, 365 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2009, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g).

2014Conversion Conversion is the “unauthorized and wrongful assumption and exercise of dominion and control over the personal property of another, to the exclusion of or inconsistent with the owner’s rights.” Waisath v. Lack’s Stores, Inc., 474 S.W.2d 444, 447 (Tex.1971); accord Tex. Integrated Conveyor Sys., Inc. v. Innovative Conveyor Concepts, Inc., 300 S.W.3d 348, 365 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2009, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g).

2014Conversion Conversion is the “unauthorized and wrongful assumption and exercise of dominion and control over the personal property of another, to the exclusion of or inconsistent with the owner’s rights.” Waisath v. Lack’s Stores, Inc., 474 S.W.2d 444, 447 (Tex. 1971); accord Tex. Integrated Conveyor Sys., Inc. v. Innovative Conveyor Concepts, Inc., 300 S.W.3d 348, 365 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2009, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g).

2014Conversion Conversion is the “unauthorized and wrongful assumption and exercise of dominion and control over the personal property of another, to the exclusion of or inconsistent with the owner’s rights.” Waisath v. Lack’s Stores, Inc., 474 S.W.2d 444, 447 (Tex.1971); accord Tex. Integrated Conveyor Sys., Inc. v. Innovative Conveyor Concepts, Inc., 300 S.W.3d 348, 365 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2009, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g).

2013See Lone Star Steel Co. v. Scott, 759 S.W.2d 144, 154 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1988, writ denied).

2013See Lone Star Steel Co. v. Scott, 759 S.W.2d 144, 154 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1988, writ denied).

2026See Christus Health v. Quality Infusion Care, Inc., 359 S.W.3d 719, 724 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.) (explaining that an express contract bars recoveries under quasi- contract theories).

2020Christus Health v. Quality Infusion Care, Inc., 359 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, no pet.); see Ryland Enter., Inc. v. Weatherspoon, No. 01-10-00715-CV, 2012 WL 6754966 , at *11 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 28, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (noting that the plaintiff could not have pursued a quantum meruit theory of recovery had a valid contract existed); see also Glass v. Gilbert, No. 01-14-00643-CV, 2015 WL 3905907 , at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 25, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (explaining that although a fact issue existed as to the plaintiff’s unjust enr

2013See Best Buy Co. v. Barrera, 248 S.W.3d 160, 162 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam); Edwards v. Mid-Continent Office Dist., L.P., 252 S.W.3d 833, 837 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied) (quoting Amoco Prod.

2013See Best Buy Co. v. Barrera, 248 S.W.3d 160, 162 (Tex.2007) (per curiam); Edwards v. Mid-Continent Office Dist., L.P., 252 S.W.3d 833, 837 (Tex.App.Dallas 2008, pet. denied) (quoting Amoco Prod.

2014Id. at 685 .

2014Fortune Prod., 52 S.W.3d at 684 .

2025“The unjust enrichment doctrine applies principles of restitution to disputes where there is no actual contract and is based on the equitable principle that one who receives benefits which would be unjust for him to retain ought to make restitution.” Walker, 181 S.W.3d at 900 (citations omitted).

2016Id.

2017Co., 925 S.W.2d at 97 .

2013See, e.g., Fortune Prod., 52 S.W.3d at 684-85 (unjust enrichment claim for sale of part of gas stream barred by contracts with defendant specifying payments for gas); Ledig v. Duke Energy Corp., 193 S.W.3d 167, 176 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (unjust enrichment claim for bonus exchanged for stock options barred by contract agreeing to exchange of bonus for stock options); Burlington N. R.R., 925 S.W.2d at 98 (unjust enrichment claim for excessively high shipping rates barred by contract completely governing the issue of shipping rates).

1992Pounded on the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment, quantum meruit provides a remedy “when nonpayment for the services rendered would ‘result in an unjust enrichment to the party benefitted by the work.’ ” Vortt Exploration v. Chevron U.S.A., 787 S.W.2d 942, 944 (Tex.1990) (citing City of Ingleside v. Stewart, 554 S.W.2d 939, 943 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.)).

1992Founded on the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment, quantum meruit provides a remedy "when nonpayment for the services rendered would `result in an unjust enrichment to the party benefitted by the work.'" Vortt Exploration v. Chevron U.S.A., 787 S.W.2d 942, 944 (Tex.1990) (citing City of Ingleside v. Stewart, 554 S.W.2d 939, 943 (Tex.Civ.

2025See In re Int’l Profit Assocs., Inc., 274 S.W.3d 672, 678 (Tex. 2009) (concluding that no matter how artfully Tropicpak pleaded its claims, its claims and alleged damages arose from contractual relationship between parties).

2024See Phillips v. Bramlett, 288 S.W.3d 876, 883 (Tex. 2009). argument under the second issue discussing the elements of a basic unjust enrichment claim, but they only pursued such a claim against Layne and not against Waltley.

2024See, e.g., Bonnema v. Builders Carpet & Design Ctr., Inc., No. 05-08-01149-CV, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 1829 , *11–13 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 16, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (denying claim for attorney’s fees based on unjust enrichment claim); Mason v. Mason, No. 07-12-00007-CV, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 413 , at *1–2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Jan. 13, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (observing that appellees agreed that “attorney’s fees are not recoverable in a claim for unjust enrichment”); Mobil Producing Tex. & N.M., Inc. v. Cantor, 93 S.W.3d 916, 920 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2002, no pet.) (“Section 38

2024See id. at 388, 390 .4 Unjust Enrichment claim The Commission also contends that any unjust enrichment counterclaim, insofar as one may have been raised by Westmoreland, would be barred by sovereign immunity.

2024See, e.g., Merry Homes, Inc. v. Luc Dao, No. 14-16-00724-CV, 2017 WL 4159206 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 19, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“A claim for money had and received generally accrues when money is paid.” (citing, inter alia, City of Beaumont v. Moore, 202 S.W.2d 448, 452 (Tex. 1947))).

2023Eun Bok Lee v. Ho Chang Lee, 411 S.W.3d 95, 111 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.).

2023See id. 35 The First Petition in Intervention also included as intervenors: R.

2022See Mansions in the Forest, L.P. v. Montgomery Cty., 365 S.W.3d 314, 317 (Tex. 2012) (per curiam) (complaint must be preserved for appellate review). 10 We assume without deciding that our conclusions regarding Article 9’s application do not preclude consideration of Mingtel’s claim for money had and received. –13– conceptually to the doctrine of unjust enrichment.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).

2022See Mansions in the Forest, L.P. v. Montgomery Cty., 365 S.W.3d 314, 317 (Tex. 2012) (per curiam) (complaint must be preserved for appellate review). 10 We assume without deciding that our conclusions regarding Article 9’s application do not preclude consideration of Mingtel’s claim for money had and received. –13– conceptually to the doctrine of unjust enrichment.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).

2022See Hill v. Shamoun & Norman, LLP, 544 S.W.3d 724, 733 (Tex. 2018) (“The measure of damages for recovery under a quantum[ ]meruit theory is the reasonable value of the work performed and the materials furnished.”). 16 Ameriflow and Crescent’s arguments do not persuade us why they have a viable basis to invoke equitable remedies in a breach-of-contract case.

2021Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam) (“When a party attacks the factual sufficiency of an adverse finding on an issue on which [h]e has the burden of proof, [h]e must demonstrate on appeal that the adverse finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the 12 the trial court to grant his claim for equitable relief under the doctrine of unjust enrichment.

2019“When a party attacks the legal sufficiency of an adverse finding on which it did not have the burden of proof, it must demonstrate that there is no evidence to support the adverse finding.” O’Brien v. Daboval, 388 S.W.3d 826 , 837–38 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (citing Croucher v. Croucher, 660 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex. 1983); Bellino v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 124 S.W.3d 380, 385 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. denied)).

2019“When a party attacks the legal sufficiency of an adverse finding on which it did not have the burden of proof, it must demonstrate that there is no evidence to support the adverse finding.” O’Brien v. Daboval, 388 S.W.3d 826 , 837–38 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (citing Croucher v. Croucher, 660 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex. 1983); Bellino v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 124 S.W.3d 380, 385 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. denied)).