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Conn. Gen. Stat.Title 31 — LaborChapter 568 — Workers' Compensation Act

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-300 (2025)

Award as judgment. Interest. Attorney's fee. Procedure on discontinuance or reduction

Edition and currency
laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1967–2026 76citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 76 opinions since 1967, 7 of them in the last five years.

As soon as may be after the conclusion of any hearing, but no later than one hundred twenty days after such conclusion, the administrative law judge shall send to each party a written copy of the administrative law judge's findings and award. The administrative law judge shall, as part of the written award, inform the employee or the employee's dependent, as the case may be, of any rights the individual may have to an annual cost-of-living adjustment or to participate in a rehabilitation program administered by the Department of Aging and Disability Services under the provisions of this chapter. The administrative law judge shall retain the original findings and award in said administrative law judge's office. If no appeal from the decision is taken by either party within twenty days thereafter, such award shall be final and may be enforced in the same manner as a judgment of the Superior Court. The court may issue execution upon any uncontested or final award of an administrative law judge in the same manner as in cases of judgments rendered in the Superior Court; and, upon the filing of an application to the court for an execution, the administrative law judge in whose office the award is on file shall, upon the request of the clerk of said court, send to the clerk a certified copy of such findings and award. In cases where, through the fault or neglect of the employer or insurer, adjustments of compensation have been unduly delayed, or where through such fault or neglect, payments have been unduly delayed, the administrative law judge may include in the award interest at the rate prescribed in section 37-3a and a reasonable attorney's fee in the case of undue delay in adjustments of compensation and may include in the award in the case of undue delay in payments of compensation, interest at twelve per cent per annum and a reasonable attorney's fee. Payments not commenced within thirty-five days after the filing of a written notice of claim shall be presumed to be unduly delayed unless a notice to contest the claim is filed in accordance with section 31-297. In cases where there has been delay in either adjustment or payment, which delay has not been due to the fault or neglect of the employer or insurer, whether such delay was caused by appeals or otherwise, the administrative law judge may allow interest at such rate, not to exceed the rate prescribed in section 37-3a, as may be fair and reasonable, taking into account whatever advantage the employer or insurer, as the case may be, may have had from the use of the money, the burden of showing that the rate in such case should be less than the rate prescribed in section 37-3a to be upon the employer or insurer. In cases where the claimant prevails and the administrative law judge finds that the employer or insurer has unreasonably contested liability, the administrative law judge may allow to the claimant a reasonable attorney's fee. No employer or insurer shall discontinue or reduce payment on account of total or partial incapacity under any such award, if it is claimed by or on behalf of the injured person that such person's incapacity still continues, unless such employer or insurer notifies the administrative law judge and the employee of such proposed discontinuance or reduction in the manner prescribed in section 31-296 and the administrative law judge specifically approves such discontinuance or reduction in writing. The administrative law judge shall render the decision within fourteen days of receipt of such notice and shall forward to all parties to the claim a copy of the decision not later than seven days after the decision has been rendered. If the decision of the administrative law judge finds for the employer or insurer, the injured person shall return any wrongful payments received from the day designated by the administrative law judge as the effective date for the discontinuance or reduction of benefits. Any employee whose benefits for total incapacity are discontinued under the provisions of this section and who is entitled to receive benefits for partial incapacity as a result of an award, shall receive those benefits commencing the day following the designated effective date for the discontinuance of benefits for total incapacity. In any case where the administrative law judge finds that the employer or insurer has discontinued or reduced any such payment without having given such notice and without the administrative law judge having approved such discontinuance or reduction in writing, the administrative law judge shall allow the claimant a reasonable attorney's fee together with interest at the rate prescribed in section 37-3a on the discontinued or reduced payments.

(1949 Rev., S. 7449; 1951, S. 3049d; 1958 Rev., S. 31-176; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 22; 1967, P.A. 692, S. 1; 842, S. 10; P.A. 75-122; P.A. 79-80; P.A. 83-114, S. 2; P.A. 84-180, S. 2; 84-299, S. 3; P.A. 85-64, S. 1, 2; P.A. 88-106, S. 3; P.A. 89-17; 89-316, S. 1; P.A. 91-339, S. 19; P.A. 93-228, S. 13, 35; P.A. 01-22, S. 3; P.A. 11-44, S. 49; June 12 Sp. Sess. P.A. 12-1, S. 86; P.A. 19-157, S. 85; P.A. 21-18, S. 1.)

History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; 1967 acts deleted references to “original findings” and specified that claimant may be allowed reasonable attorneys fees where commissioner finds that employer or insurer has unreasonably contested liability; P.A. 75-122 added provisions re procedure for discontinuance of payments; P.A. 79-80 specified that 6% interest applies “in the case of undue delay in adjustments of compensation”, allowed 12% interest where there is undue delay in payments and defined undue delay; P.A. 83-114 provided that the commissioner shall inform the individual, as part of the written award, of his rights to an annual cost-of-living adjustment under this chapter; P.A. 84-180 required the commissioner to inform the employee in the award of his right to participate in a rehabilitation program; P.A. 84-299 provided that payments not made within 35 days after the filing of a claim shall be considered “unduly delayed” unless the claim has been timely contested; P.A. 85-64 required the commissioner to send each party a written copy of his award within 120 days of the conclusion of hearings on the claim; P.A. 88-106 added the provisions regarding reduction of benefits and provided for an award of attorneys' fees in cases of undue delay in adjustments and payments resulting from the fault or neglect of an employer or insurer; P.A. 89-17 increased the rate of interest from 6% to 10% for all cases except cases where payments are discontinued or reduced without notice and approval; P.A. 89-316 changed the rates of allowable interest from specific percentages enacted under P.A. 89-17 to the rate prescribed in Sec. 37-3a; P.A. 91-339 required the commissioner to send to each party a written copy of his findings; P.A. 93-228 added provisions modifying procedures re discontinuances or reductions in workers' compensation benefits, effective July 1, 1993; P.A. 01-22 increased time for taking an appeal from the decision of the commissioner from 10 to 20 days and made technical changes for the purpose of gender neutrality; P.A. 11-44 added provision re rehabilitation program administered by Bureau of Rehabilitative Services, effective July 1, 2011; June 12 Sp. Sess. P.A. 12-1 replaced “Bureau of Rehabilitative Services” with “Department of Rehabilitation Services”, effective July 1, 2012; P.A. 19-157 replaced “Department of Rehabilitation Services” with “Department of Aging and Disability Services”; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” and “commissioner's” were changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge” and “administrative law judge's” respectively, effective October 1, 2021.

What the finding should contain. 90 C. 540; 94 C. 262; Id., 627; 96 C. 354; 97 C. 78; 114 C. 393; 117 C. 603. Commissioner may make his memorandum of decision part of the finding. 100 C. 389; 103 C. 104; Id., 428. Prolix and evidential finding criticized. Id., 708. Commissioner must expressly find subordinate facts on which his conclusions rest. 104 C. 463. When award not appealed from, finding becomes final on subsequent hearing for further compensation. 109 C. 599. When award becomes final judgment. 112 C. 370. When it appears claimant may establish claim on retrial, case is remanded. 118 C. 29; 130 C. 1. Motion to erase proper method to raise question whether there was a judgment from which appeal might be taken. 123 C. 103. Finding as to causal connection. Id., 405. Correction of finding. 124 C. 296; 130 C. 423; Id., 478; Id., 482. Finding of incapacity must be based on extent and consequent loss of earning power due to susceptibility due to dermatitis. 125 C. 140. Award may be enforced in same manner as judgment of Superior Court. 126 C. 491. Judgment of Superior Court interlocutory ruling, not final. Id., 522. Cited. 165 C. 338. All appeals since 1972 amendments should be taken from Court of Common Pleas; hence reservation from Superior Court under Sec. 31-324 was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 168 C. 84. Cited. 169 C. 646; 208 C. 576; 212 C. 441; 219 C. 439; 224 C. 441; 237 C. 71; Id., 378. Attorney's fees awarded under section do not constitute “payments due under an award” pursuant to Sec. 31-303, and are not subject to penalty as a late payment thereunder. 260 C. 21.

Where no specific time limit set under statute for finding and award to be made, commissioner does not lose jurisdiction to render decision after certain lapse of time. 2 CA 689. Cited. 7 CA 142; 12 CA 138; 21 CA 464; 22 CA 539; judgment reversed, see 219 C. 439; 26 CA 194; 28 CA 113; 33 CA 667; 39 CA 717; 40 CA 36; 45 CA 324; Id., 499. Plaintiff's conduct constituted an implied waiver of her right to have commissioner's decision vacated for failure to issue decision within time limit. 49 CA 339. Court was within discretion to deny request to execute a voluntary agreement that was not a final settlement; section granted trial court subject matter jurisdiction in matter. 58 CA 45. Finding that employer or insurer acted in an unreasonable manner or caused undue delay is necessary to predicate an order to pay attorney's fees pursuant to statute. 65 CA 592. Where commissioner failed to issue decision within mandatory time period and defendant objected to decision on the day of its eventual issuance, it was held that defendant had not waived any objection to the late issuance since there is no requirement that a party object to a decision prior to its issuance. 72 CA 497. A challenge to commission's jurisdiction when employee and employer have entered into a voluntary agreement does not in itself constitute acting in an unreasonable manner, and a determination otherwise would discourage parties from quickly entering into such agreements. 123 CA 753. Award of “reasonable attorney's fees” issued under section may, at the discretion of commissioner, include fees accrued by paralegals. 152 CA 116.

Award has the force of judgment but execution on plaintiff's award was denied where defendant had action pending in Superior Court to determine whether plaintiff could keep award and retain proceeds from a Massachusetts death action based on same loss. 27 CS 382. Cited. 28 CS 5; 39 CS 386.

The 20 cases that cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-300 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENSchiano v. Bliss Exterminating Co., 792 A.2d 835 (Conn. 2002).
cites § 31-300 25×cited by 36 cases
Where it cites § 31-300
“The principal issue in this appeal is whether the defendant second injury fund (fund) maybe assessed *23 a penalty, pursuant to General Statutes § 31-303 1 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (act), on attorney’s fees it paid after the prescribed time limitation for “[p]ayments due…”
The case’s holding
The phrase payments due under an award in the Workers’ Compensation Act refers only to payments of compensation and excludes attorney fees.
Later courts cite it for
“in determining the meaning of a statute, however, we look not only at the provision at issue, but also to the broader statutory scheme to ensure the coherency of our construction.” · 3 citing courts
2
GREENPotvin v. Lincoln Serv. & Equip. Co., 6 A.3d 60 (Conn. 2010).
cites § 31-300 17×cited by 41 cases
Where it cites § 31-300
“Therefore, pursuant to § 31-300 . . . the . . . commissioner ordered [the defendant] to pay [the plaintiffs] counsel $8000 to compensate for [forty] hours of legal time occasioned by the unreasonable delay, and penalized [the defendant] $500 pursuant to § 31-288 (b) (1) .”
The case’s holding
The definition of a covered claim limits an insurance guaranty association's obligations to those found in the insolvent insurer's policy and excludes liabilities arising from claim handling conduct.
Later courts cite it for
“a trial court is required to follow the prior decisions of an appellate court to the extent that they are applicable to facts and issues in the case before it, and the trial court may not overturn or disregard binding precedent” · 2 citing courts
3
GREENStewart v. Tunxis Serv. Ctr., 676 A.2d 819 (Conn. 1996).
cites § 31-300 24×cited by 32 cases
Where it cites § 31-300
“The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the workers’ compensation review board (board) properly determined that the failure of a workers’ compensation commissioner (commissioner) to issue his finding and award within 120 days of a hearing, as set forth in General…”
The case’s holding
Failure to comply with a mandatory statutory time period invalidates an action unless the parties waive the noncompliance through express agreement or conduct.
Later courts cite it for
“if a statutory time period is mandatory in nature, a showing of prejudice is not necessary to a conclusion that a failure to comply with the time period will invalidate the untimely action” · 1 citing court
4
GREENBailey v. State, 783 A.2d 491 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001).
cites § 31-300 10×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 31-300
“The board noted that it declined to presume that the commissioner intended, at that time, to order the defendant to pay attorney’s fees under General Statutes § 31-300. The board concluded that, rather than ordering the payment of attorney’s fees, the commissioner invited the…”
Later courts cite it for
“absent an indication to the contrary, the legislature's choice of the mandatory term 'shall' rather than the permissive term 'may' indicates that the legislative directive is mandatory.” · 2 citing courts
5
GREENMenzies v. Fisher, 334 A.2d 452 (Conn. 1973).
cites § 31-300 14×cited by 43 cases
Where it cites § 31-300
“" It is plain that the court sustained the commissioner's decision on the authority of General Statutes § 31-300. That statute was amended by Public Acts 1967, No.”
The case’s holding
An employer is precluded from contesting the compensability of an injury if its notice of contest fails to state the specific grounds for the contest.
Later courts cite it for
“it did not arise out of and in the course of employment.” · 1 citing court
6
GREENHummel v. Marten Transports, Ltd., 923 A.2d 657 (Conn. 2007).
cites § 31-300 4×cited by 69 cases
Where it cites § 31-300
“In addition to the calculation of [survivor's] benefits, the plaintiff sought an order pursuant to General Statutes § 31-301(f) [6] that the defendants pay her benefits [during the pendency of] this appeal and sought the imposition of penalties under General Statutes §§ 31-300…”
The case’s holding
Statutory interpretation does not require a court to overrule prior judicial interpretations of a statute under the clean slate doctrine established by General Statutes section 1-2z.
Later courts cite it for
“there is nothing in the legislative history to suggest that the legislature also intended to overrule every other case in which our courts, prior to the passage of l-2z, had interpreted a statute in a manner inconsistent with the plain meaning rule, as that rule is articulated in l-2z” · 3 citing courts
7
GREENStec v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 10 A.3d 1 (Conn. 2010).
cites § 31-300 7×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 31-300
“In support of its claim, The Hartford asserts that: (1) the plain language of the twenty day appeal period set forth in § 31-301 (a), in concert with General Statutes § 31-300 12 and a regulation promulgated pursuant to § 31-301 (e), 13 demonstrates that the board must dismiss…”
8
GREENHummel v. Marten Transp., Ltd., 970 A.2d 834 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009).
cites § 31-300 11×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 31-300
“appeal and sought the imposition of penalties under General Statutes §§ 31-300 and 31-303.” Id.”
9
GREENDichello v. Holgrath Corp., 715 A.2d 765 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998).
cites § 31-300 11×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 31-300
“See General Statutes § 31-301. General Statutes § 31-300 provides in relevant part: “As soon as may be after the conclusion of any hearing, but not later than one hundred twenty days after such conclusion, the commissioner shall send to each party a written copy of his findings…”
10
GREENDechio v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 968 A.2d 450 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009).
cites § 31-300 8×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 31-300
“" Last, we note the mandate of General Statutes § 31-300 that "[i]f no appeal from the decision is taken by either party within twenty days thereafter, such award shall be final and may be enforced in the same manner as a judgment of the Superior Court.”
11
GREENSchreck v. City of Stamford, 737 A.2d 916 (Conn. 1999).
cites § 31-300 8×cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 31-300
“5 The defendant acknowledges that the relevant statutory provisions, namely, General Statutes §§ 31-300 and *596 31-301 (a), speak in terms of parties, and not attorneys.”
The case’s holding
Recognizing the value of legal counsel in workers' compensation proceedings, particularly those with complex legal or factual issues, a represented party's ten-day appeal period runs from notice sent to counsel.
Later courts cite it for
“at any time within ten days after entry of an award by the commissioner . . . either party may appeal therefrom to the compensation review board by filing in the office of the commissioner from which the award or the decision on a motion originated an appeal petition and five copies thereof. . . .” · 2 citing courts
12
GREENMorgan v. Town of East Haven, 546 A.2d 243 (Conn. 1988).
cites § 31-300 8×cited by 23 cases
Where it cites § 31-300
“78 per week; 135 weeks at $278.33 per week; and forty-six weeks at $154.”
The case’s holding
Statutory disability benefits for police and fire personnel are limited to the employee and their dependents and do not pass to the deceased recipient's estate.
13
GREENPantanella v. Enfield Ford, Inc., 782 A.2d 141 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001).
cites § 31-300 5×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 31-300
“rd to introduce the transcript of the deposition of Mazzara, (6) failed to conclude that CIGA was not liable for the claim because the plaintiff did not exhaust his rights under other insurance policies, and (7) failed to conclude that the plaintiffs claim for interest and…”
Later courts cite it for
“legislature is always presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent body of law . . . .” · 1 citing court
14
GREENMeadowbrook Ctr., Inc. v. Buchman, 181 A.3d 550 (Conn. 2018).
cites § 31-300 2×cited by 35 cases
Where it cites § 31-300
“2d 819 ( General Statutes § 31-300, requiring Workers' Compensation Commission to send written copy of award " '[a]s soon as may be after the conclusion of any hearing, but no later than one hundred twenty days after such conclusion' " has "negative terminology [that] suggests…”
The case’s holding
The deadline for filing a motion for attorney fees is directory, granting trial courts the discretion to entertain untimely motions.
Later courts cite it for
“the interpretation and application of a statute . . . involves a question of law over which appellate review is plenary” · 2 citing courts
15
GREENMatey v. Est. of Dember, 774 A.2d 113 (Conn. 2001).
cites § 31-300 4×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 31-300
“Second, we are not persuaded that the policy underlying the nonclaim statute, namely, the policy favoring the speedy administration of estates, should have less weight when a workers’ compensation claim is involved than when the statute is applied to other, equally valid, claims…”
The case’s holding
A workers' compensation commissioner retains jurisdiction to enter an award against an estate to establish Second Injury Fund liability even if the claim is barred by a nonclaim statute.
Later courts cite it for
“is to provide compensation for an injured employee when the employer fails to pay.” · 2 citing courts
16
GREENCummings v. Twin Tool Mfg. Co., 668 A.2d 1346 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996).
cites § 31-300 4×cited by 56 cases
Where it cites § 31-300
“The plaintiff argues that despite the facts that the award covered a specific time period and that all payments have been made, the defendants were required to file a Form 36 before discontinuing payments.”
The case’s holding
An employer is not required to file a notice of discontinuance when an award is limited by its own terms and all ordered payments have been made.
Later courts cite it for
“analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly.” · 6 citing courts
17
GREENPokorny v. Getta's Garage, 594 A.2d 446 (Conn. 1991).
cites § 31-300 5×cited by 34 cases
Where it cites § 31-300
“General Statutes § 31-300.” 8 Id. “The construction of a judgment is a question of law for the court.”
The case’s holding
An employer is not required to pay a workers' compensation claimant for medical bills already covered by a medical insurance carrier.
Later courts cite it for
“under our workers' compensation act the employee is relieved of any responsibility for his medical bills from the outset, leaving the employer and the provider of the medical care as the sole interested parties in any dispute concerning medical bills.” · 2 citing courts
18
GREENHyatt v. City of Milford, 600 A.2d 5 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991).
cites § 31-300 6×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 31-300
“The issue presented is whether the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by bringing an action under General Statutes § 31-300 1 instead of bringing his heart and hypertension claim before the workers’ compensation commissioner.”
19
GREENDeOliveira v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 870 A.2d 1066 (Conn. 2005).
cites § 31-300 4×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 31-300
“General Statutes § 31-300. Similarly, if a commissioner determines that, “through the fault or neglect of the employer or insurer,” payments or adjustments in payment have been delayed “unduly” or “unreasonably,” the commissioner may include interest and attorney’s fees in an…”
20
GREENDechio v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 10 A.3d 20 (Conn. 2010).
cites § 31-300 5×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 31-300
“” General Statutes § 31-300. The plaintiff and the carriers argue that the appeal period under § 31-301 (a) began to run with the commissioner’s issuance of the award on September 30, 2005, or, alternatively, on September 29, 2006, the date of the finding and award directing…”

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Citing cases by year
196719962026

One bar per year. Tallest: 4 cases in 1997. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

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Conn. App. Ct.40Conn.27Conn. Super. Ct.3D. Conn.2Alaska1Bankr. D. Conn.1Ind.1W. Va.1
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