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Conn. Gen. Stat.Title 31 — LaborChapter 568 — Workers' Compensation Act

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-301 (2025)

Appeals to the Compensation Review Board. Payment of award during pendency of appeal

Edition and currency
laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1968–2022 120citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 120 opinions since 1968, 2 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (a) (4 cases).

(a) At any time within twenty days after entry of an award by the administrative law judge, after a decision of the administrative law judge upon a motion or after an order by the administrative law judge according to the provisions of section 31-299b, either party may appeal therefrom to the Compensation Review Board by filing in the office of the administrative law judge from which the award or the decision on a motion originated an appeal petition and five copies thereof. The administrative law judge within three days thereafter shall mail the petition and three copies thereof to the chief of the Compensation Review Board and a copy thereof to the adverse party or parties. If a party files a motion subsequent to the finding and award, order or decision, the twenty-day period for filing an appeal of an award or an order by the administrative law judge shall commence on the date of the decision on such motion.

(b) The appeal shall be heard by the Compensation Review Board as provided in section 31-280b. The Compensation Review Board shall hear the appeal on the record of the hearing before the administrative law judge, provided, if it is shown to the satisfaction of the board that additional evidence or testimony is material and that there were good reasons for failure to present it in the proceedings before the administrative law judge, the Compensation Review Board may hear additional evidence or testimony.

(c) Upon the final determination of the appeal by the Compensation Review Board, but no later than one year after the date the appeal petition was filed, the Compensation Review Board shall issue its decision, affirming, modifying or reversing the decision of the administrative law judge. The decision of the Compensation Review Board shall include its findings, conclusions of law and award.

(d) When any appeal is pending, and it appears to the Compensation Review Board that any part of the award appealed from is not affected by the issues raised by the appeal, the Compensation Review Board may, on motion or of its own motion, render a judgment directing compliance with any portion of the award not affected by the appeal; or if the only issue raised by the appeal is the amount of the average weekly wage for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation, as provided in section 31-310, the administrative law judge shall, on motion of the claimant, direct the payment of the portion of the compensation payable under his award that is not in dispute, if any, pending final adjudication of the disputed portion thereof. In all appeals in which one of the parties is not represented by counsel, and in which the party taking the appeal does not prosecute the case within a reasonable time from the date of appeal, the Compensation Review Board may, of its own motion, affirm, reverse or modify the award.

(e) When an appeal is taken to the Compensation Review Board, the chief clerk thereof shall notify the administrative law judge from whose award the appeal was taken, in writing, of any action of the Compensation Review Board thereon and of the final disposition of the appeal, whether by judgment, withdrawal or otherwise, and shall upon the decision of the appeal, furnish the administrative law judge with a copy of the decision. Whenever any appeal is pending, if it appears to the Compensation Review Board that justice so requires, the Compensation Review Board shall order a certified copy of the evidence for the use of the employer, the employee or both, and the certified copy shall be made a part of the record on the appeal. The procedure in appealing from an award of the administrative law judge shall be the same as the procedure employed in an appeal from the Superior Court to the Supreme Court, where applicable. The chairperson of the Workers' Compensation Commission shall adopt regulations, in accordance with the provisions of chapter 54, to establish rules, methods of procedure and forms as the chairperson deems expedient for the purposes of this chapter.

(f) During the pendency of any appeal of an award made pursuant to this chapter, the claimant shall receive all compensation and medical treatment payable under the terms of the award to the extent the compensation and medical treatment are not being paid by any health insurer or by any insurer or employer who has been ordered, pursuant to the provisions of subsection (a) of this section, to pay a portion of the award. The compensation and medical treatment shall be paid by the employer or its insurer.

(g) If the final adjudication results in the denial of compensation to the claimant, and he has previously received compensation on the claim pursuant to subsection (f) and this subsection, the claimant shall reimburse the employer or its insurer for all sums previously expended, plus interest at the rate of ten per cent per annum. Upon any such denial of compensation, the administrative law judge who originally heard the case or his successor shall conduct a hearing to determine the repayment schedule for the claimant.

(1949 Rev., S. 7450; 1958 Rev., S. 31-177; 1961, P.A. 491, S. 23; 1963, P.A. 642, S. 85; 1967, P.A. 692, S. 2; 1972, P.A. 108, S. 6; P.A. 74-183, S. 268, 291; P.A. 76-436, S. 231, 681; P.A. 78-280, S. 1, 127; P.A. 79-540, S. 3; P.A. 81-155, S. 2; 81-472, S. 144, 159; P.A. 84-133; P.A. 86-27; 86-56; P.A. 91-32, S. 19, 41; 91-339, S. 20, 55; P.A. 95-277, S. 9, 19; P.A. 01-22, S. 1; P.A. 07-31, S. 2; P.A. 21-18, S. 1; P.A. 22-89, S. 22.)

History: 1961 act entirely replaced previous provisions; 1963 act allowed appeals after commissioner's decision upon a motion and required that appeals be made to court for county where injury occurred rather than county where award was filed, adding provision re court for appeal when injury occurred outside state; 1967 act deleted references to findings of commissioners and specified that appeal procedure is same as for appeals from superior court to supreme court; 1972 act replaced superior court with court of common pleas throughout section, effective September 1, 1972, except that courts with cases pending retain jurisdiction; P.A. 74-183 added references to judicial districts and made appeal procedure same as for appeals from court of common pleas to superior court, effective December 31, 1974; P.A. 76-436 replaced court of common pleas with superior court and deleted provision re appeal procedure, effective July 1, 1978; P.A. 78-280 deleted references to counties; P.A. 79-540 replaced provisions re appeals to superior court with new provisions re appeals to compensation review division; P.A. 81-155 permitted the appeal of orders made by the commissioner according to the provisions of Sec. 31-299b; P.A. 81-472 made technical changes; P.A. 84-133 added Subsec. (b), providing for the payment of compensation and benefits due under an occupational disease award during the pendency of any appeal of such award; P.A. 86-27 provided that compensation and benefits due under any award made pursuant to this chapter shall be paid by the second injury fund during the pendency of any appeal of the award; P.A. 86-56 required the compensation review division to issue its decision on any appeal within one year of the filing of the appeal petition, except that any decision on an appeal pending on October 1, 1986, shall be issued within one year of said date; P.A. 91-32 divided existing Subsec. (a) into Subsecs. (a) to (e), inclusive, divided existing Subsec. (b) into Subsecs. (f) and (g) and made technical changes; P.A. 91-339 changed “compensation review division” to “compensation review board”, changed “chairman” to “chief” of the board, added reference to Sec. 31-380b in Subsec. (b) and authorized the chairman of the workers' compensation commission to adopt regulations in Subsec. (e); P.A. 95-277 amended Subsec. (f) to provide that the compensation and medical treatment of the injured employee be paid by the employer or its insurer rather than Second Injury Fund and, in Subsec. (g) substituted references to “Second Injury Fund” with “employer or its insurer” to reflect the closing of the Second Injury Fund and deleted provision re reimbursement of Second Injury Fund by employer, effective July 1, 1995; P.A. 01-22 amended Subsec. (a) by increasing the time to take an appeal from 10 to 20 days; P.A. 07-31 amended Subsec. (a) by commencing 20-day period for filing appeal, where motion filed subsequent to finding and award, order or decision, on date of decision on motion; pursuant to P.A. 21-18, “commissioner” was changed editorially by the Revisors to “administrative law judge” throughout, effective October 1, 2021; P.A. 22-89 made technical changes in Subsec. (e), effective May 24, 2022.

Appeal does not open the case for trial de novo. 89 C. 143, 150; Id., 370; 92 C. 90. Commissioner's finding is part of the record and may be corrected by the Superior Court in the same manner as the finding of a trial court by the Supreme Court. 90 C. 446; 91 C. 531; 92 C. 90; 93 C. 94; 95 C. 673; 96 C. 634; 98 C. 287; Id., 755; 99 C. 355; 103 C. 429; 104 C. 537; 107 C. 251. Reasons of appeal and answer thereto should be filed in the court. 91 C. 227. What justifies setting award aside. 93 C. 83; 94 C. 9; 96 C. 299. If the court materially alters the finding, it should recommit it to commissioner to decide on the altered facts. 97 C. 77; 106 C. 254. Conclusion of fact based on subordinate facts is reviewable by the court. 100 C. 347; 102 C. 5; Id., 237; Id., 472. There is no appeal from refusal of commissioner to rehear the case or alter his finding. 101 C. 358; 108 C. 161. Where the facts found are too indefinite to support the award, finding should be recommitted to commissioner. 102 C. 238; 106 C. 215; Id., 253; 107 C. 171; Id., 647. Nature of the appeal and correction of finding by Superior Court fully reviewed. 102 C. 514. Court should not set aside award because it differs with commissioner as to preponderance of evidence. 106 C. 109. There is no appeal from an award of commissioner made in compliance with the decision of the Superior Court on a former appeal; appeal must be to the Supreme Court from the Superior Court decision. 108 C. 159. Expense of printing testimony not taxable as costs on appeal. 109 C. 737. Superior Court cannot change finding unless commissioner has found facts without evidence or has reached unreasonable conclusions. 120 C. 606; 121 C. 56; Id., 483; Id., 541; Id., 708; 122 C. 129. When entire transcript may properly be filed; when testimony necessary for proper determination of case is not presented, case remanded for further hearing. 121 C. 274. Motion to erase proper method to raise question whether there was a judgment from which appeal might be taken. 123 C. 103. Cited. 132 C. 209. Where motion to open award is made by party who intends to appeal from award if motion is denied, he may postpone the filing of the appeal until the motion is determined. 134 C. 269. Where commissioner failed to pass upon specific claim potentially decisive of the case, it should be returned for further proceedings. 138 C. 482. Cited. 141 C. 321. Section affects the court to which appeal is taken, not employee's right to compensation; appeal brought to Superior Court after September 1, 1972 was brought to wrong court and Superior Court has no jurisdiction. 169 C. 646. Cited. 179 C. 662; 207 C. 420; 213 C. 54; 217 C. 143; 220 C. 739; 227 C. 333; 231 C. 287; 232 C. 758; 233 C. 14; 235 C. 790; 239 C. 408; 240 C. 788. Provision re payment deadline applies when payment is due under an award by compensation review board. 249 C. 365. 10-day appeal period tolled when aggrieved party establishes that, through no fault of his own, he did not receive notice of commissioner's decision within 10 days of the date it was sent. 250 C. 581. Provision re 10-day period for appeal commences on the date notice is sent to a party's counsel. Id., 592.

Cited. 1 CA 142; 7 CA 142; 11 CA 693; 16 CA 138; 33 CA 695; judgment reversed, see 231 C. 469; 36 CA 150; Id., 298; 38 CA 1; 39 CA 717; 45 CA 199. In matter where the issue was causation of injury, board did not improperly substitute its factual findings for those of commissioner but rather determined that commissioner's finding could not stand without the support of expert medical testimony and properly refused to remand the case for further proceedings. 62 CA 440.

Authority to extend time for taking an appeal. 9 CS 38. Imposes on party seeking order the burden of showing (1) inability to pay and (2) that justice requires the action of commissioner be appealed from. Id., 379. A plea in abatement and not a motion to expunge is appropriate remedy to attack appeal not brought within 10 days. 15 CS 33. Cited. 17 CS 288; 27 CS 410. Amendment of October 1, 1967, applied to pending appeal which was then dismissed for failure to prosecute with due diligence. 24 CS 411. Cited. 38 CS 648.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 206 C. 242; 207 C. 535; 212 C. 441; 228 C. 535; 231 C. 469; 237 C. 1; 241 C. 282. Failure to take an appeal within the 20 day appeal limitation in Subsec. deprives board of subject matter jurisdiction, a defect which may be raised at any time. 299 C. 346. Sec. 31-355(b) is inapplicable for purposes of determining when appeal period begins to run under Subsec. re Second Injury Fund claim because the fund had already been participating in proceedings before Workers' Compensation Commission. Id., 376. Appellate Court improperly concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction for lack of a final judgment in matter in which defendant challenged commissioner's initial finding of plaintiff's total disability, but after remand by the board to commissioner, did not challenge commissioner's subsequent findings and award specifying amounts to be paid to plaintiff. 303 C. 238.

Cited. 33 CA 495. Proper interpretation of limitation period contained in section is that 10-day period begins to run on day on which party wanting appeal is sent meaningful notice of commissioner's decision. 36 CA 298. Cited. 37 CA 392; 46 CA 298. 10-day appeal period begins to run on day on which party wanting to appeal is sent meaningful notice of commissioner's decision. 49 CA 1. Notice must be sent directly to plaintiff, not plaintiff's attorney, in order for appeal period to commence. 51 CA 92. Appeal taken from a supplemental order directing the Second Injury Fund to compensate plaintiff is not a timely appeal challenging the findings and awards preceding that order if that appeal was taken outside the mandated 20 days from the issuing of the operative finding and award. 114 CA 58. The time limitation on an appeal from the finding and award of commissioner imposed by Subsec. does not deprive the appellate tribunal of subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal. Id., 81; judgment reversed, see 299 C. 346.

Subsec. (c):

It is implicit in statutory authority to reverse a decision of the trial commissioner that board may remand a case for a new hearing; legislature did not intend to impose unstated limitations on review board's discretion to order appropriately adjudicated new hearings. 251 C. 153.

Cited. 34 CA 673.

Subsec. (f):

Should be applied retroactively to all cases not actually transferred to the fund prior to the date provision became effective; concurring opinion based on legislative intent. 243 C. 311.

The 20 cases that cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-301 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENStec v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 10 A.3d 1 (Conn. 2010).
cites § 31-301 61×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 31-301
“The sole issue in this certified appeal 1 is whether the failure to file an appeal from the decision of a workers’ compensation commissioner (commissioner) within the twenty day limit set forth in General Statutes § 31-301 (a) 2 deprives the compensation review *349 board…”
2
GREENDechio v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 968 A.2d 450 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009).
cites § 31-301 48×subsections: (a) 9× (e) 5×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 31-301
“This case presents an issue of first impression for this court regarding the time limitation for appeal from a decision of a workers' compensation commissioner (commissioner) to the compensation review board (board) by the second injury fund (fund) under General Statutes §…”
3
GREENStec v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 968 A.2d 960 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009).
cites § 31-301 56×subsections: (a) 19×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 31-301
“In another example, the statute was amended several times between 1972 and 1979.”
4
GREENDechio v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 10 A.3d 20 (Conn. 2010).
cites § 31-301 35×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 31-301
“The sole issue in this certified appeal is whether, in cases wherein the defendant, the second injury fund (fund), has participated in proceedings before the workers’ compensation commission (com *379 mission), the twenty day appeal period provided by General Statutes § 31-301…”
5
GREENHatt v. Burlington Coat Factory, 819 A.2d 260 (Conn. 2003).
cites § 31-301 13×cited by 90 cases
Where it cites § 31-301
“to 1999) § 31-301 (a). 8 Atlantic Mutual also makes two apportionment claims that are conceptually related, despite having bases on distinct statutory grounds.”
The case’s holding
The statutory apportionment scheme for occupational diseases and repetitive trauma does not apply to separate and distinct injuries under the workers' compensation act.
Later courts cite it for
“so as to create a rational, coherent and consistent body of law” · 2 citing courts
6
GREENColey v. Camden Assocs., Inc., 702 A.2d 1180 (Conn. 1997).
cites § 31-301 21×cited by 40 cases
Where it cites § 31-301
“95-277, § 9 [f]), now codified at General Statutes § 31-301 (f), 1 applies prospectively only.”
The case’s holding
A procedural statute that changes the method of benefit payment applies retroactively unless the legislature expresses a clear intent to the contrary.
Later courts cite it for
“in a manner that will not thwart their intended purpose or lead to absurd results.” · 3 citing courts
7
GREENKudlacz v. Lindberg Heat Treating Co., 738 A.2d 135 (Conn. 1999).
cites § 31-301 29×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 31-301
“Under General Statutes § 31-301 (a), 1 a party aggrieved by a decision of a workers’ compensation commissioner (commissioner) has ten days within which to appeal that decision to the compensation review board (board).”
8
GREENHummel v. Marten Transports, Ltd., 923 A.2d 657 (Conn. 2007).
cites § 31-301 10×subsections: (f) 5×cited by 69 cases
Where it cites § 31-301
“In addition to the calculation of [survivor’s] benefits, the plaintiff sought an order pursuant to General Statutes § 31-301 (f) 6 that the defen *483 dants pay her benefits [during the pendency of] this appeal and sought the imposition of penalties under General Statutes §§…”
The case’s holding
Statutory interpretation does not require a court to overrule prior judicial interpretations of a statute under the clean slate doctrine established by General Statutes section 1-2z.
Later courts cite it for
“there is nothing in the legislative history to suggest that the legislature also intended to overrule every other case in which our courts, prior to the passage of l-2z, had interpreted a statute in a manner inconsistent with the plain meaning rule, as that rule is articulated in l-2z” · 3 citing courts
9
GREENCastro v. Viera, 541 A.2d 1216 (Conn. 1988).
cites § 31-301 8×cited by 397 cases
Where it cites § 31-301
“General Statutes § 31-301. 3 The compensation *424 review division decided that the commissioner had erred in denying the plaintiffs’ motion to preclude under § 32-297 (b).”
The case’s holding
Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be created through consent or waiver and must be established as a threshold requirement before a tribunal can exercise its power.
Later courts cite it for
“once the question of lack of jurisdiction of a court is raised, it must be disposed of no matter in what form it is presented . . . and the court must fully resolve it before proceeding further with the case” · 18 citing courts
10
GREENHummel v. Marten Transp., Ltd., 970 A.2d 834 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009).
cites § 31-301 29×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 31-301
“On November 18,2003, following a formal hearing, Amado J. Vargas, workers’ compensation commissioner for the fifth district, calculated the widow’s benefits that the plaintiff was due under § 31-306, entered the § 31-301 (f) order and held open the issues of §§ 31-300 and 31-303…”
11
GREENHall v. Gilbert & Bennett Mfg. Co., 695 A.2d 1051 (Conn. 1997).
cites § 31-301 12×cited by 82 cases
Where it cites § 31-301
“That inquiry initially requires us to answer two questions: First, we must determine whether the board had subject matter jurisdiction over Travelers’ appeal pursuant to General Statutes § 31-301 (a). 7 Next, we must determine whether the board’s decision constituted an…”
The case’s holding
Legislative inaction regarding a statute constitutes acquiescence to the court's interpretation of that statute.
Later courts cite it for
“our consideration of these claims is hindered, however, by the procedural posture in which the present case arrived at our doorstep” · 1 citing court
12
GREENSchreck v. City of Stamford, 737 A.2d 916 (Conn. 1999).
cites § 31-301 19×cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 31-301
“In this certified appeal, we must decide whether the Appellate Court properly concluded that, under General Statutes § 31-301 (a), 1 the ten day period for a party to appeal to the compensation review board (board) from an adverse decision of a workers’ compensation commissioner…”
The case’s holding
Recognizing the value of legal counsel in workers' compensation proceedings, particularly those with complex legal or factual issues, a represented party's ten-day appeal period runs from notice sent to counsel.
Later courts cite it for
“at any time within ten days after entry of an award by the commissioner . . . either party may appeal therefrom to the compensation review board by filing in the office of the commissioner from which the award or the decision on a motion originated an appeal petition and five copies thereof. . . .” · 2 citing courts
13
GREENFair v. People's Sav. Bank, 542 A.2d 1118 (Conn. 1988).
cites § 31-301 9×cited by 87 cases
Where it cites § 31-301
“A decision of a commissioner granting or denying an award may be appealed to the review division pursuant to General Statutes § 31-301 (a), which provides in pertinent part: “At any time within ten days after entry of such award by the commissioner .”
The case’s holding
An assault does not arise out of employment if the animosity is imported from the victim's private life and not exacerbated by the employment.
Later courts cite it for
“conclusions drawn . . . from the facts found must stand unless they result from an incorrect application of the law to the subordinate facts” · 1 citing court
14
GREENConaci v. Hartford Hosp., 650 A.2d 613 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994).
cites § 31-301 16×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 31-301
“On appeal to this court, 1 the plaintiff claims that the review board improperly determined that her *299 appeal was jurisdictionally defective because it was not timely filed pursuant to General Statutes § 31-301 (a). 2 The following facts are relevant to this appeal.”
Later courts cite it for
“the ten day period begins to run on the day on which the party wanting to appeal is sent meaningful notice of the commissioner's decision.” · 3 citing courts
15
GREENDowling v. Slotnik, 712 A.2d 396 (Conn. 1998).
cites § 31-301 5×cited by 169 cases
Where it cites § 31-301
“9 The respondents appealed from the order of the commissioner to the compensation review board (board) pursuant to General Statutes § 31-301. 10 The board *786 affirmed the commissioner’s order.”
The case’s holding
The federal Immigration Reform and Control Act does not diminish a state's authority to award workers' compensation benefits to undocumented alien workers.
Later courts cite it for
“it is in order to effectuate an underlying public policy, rather than to sanction a party seeking to enforce an 'illegal' contract, that courts refuse to lend assistance to those who have contributed to the illegality that taints the contract.” · 3 citing courts
16
GREENFantasia v. Milford Fastening Sys., 860 A.2d 779 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004).
cites § 31-301 6×subsections: (e) 2×cited by 29 cases
Where it cites § 31-301
“General Statutes § 31-301(e) provides in relevant part that “ [t]he procedure in appealing from an award of the commissioner shall be the same as the procedure employed in an appeal from the Superior Court to the Supreme Court, where applicable.”
The case’s holding
An articulation is not an opportunity for a trial court to substitute a new decision nor to change the reasoning or basis of a prior decision.
Later courts cite it for
“an articulation is not an opportunity for a trial court to substitute a new decision nor to change the reasoning or basis of a prior decision. ... a trial court may not alter its initial findings by way of a further articulation . . . .” · 3 citing courts
17
GREENCrochiere v. Bd. of Educ. of Town of Enfield, 630 A.2d 1027 (Conn. 1993).
cites § 31-301 5×cited by 123 cases
Where it cites § 31-301
“to 1989) § 31-301 (b), the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 4023 and General Statutes § 51-199 (c).”
The case’s holding
Mental disorders constitute a compensable injury under the workers' compensation act even if they are not accompanied by physical trauma to the body.
Later courts cite it for
“before collateral estoppel applies there must be an identity of issues between the prior and subsequent proceedings. to invoke collateral estoppel the issues sought to be litigated in the new proceeding must be identical to those considered in the prior proceeding.” · 3 citing courts
cites § 31-301 6×cited by 72 cases
Where it cites § 31-301
“General Statutes § 31-301, as amended by Public Acts 1972, No.”
The case’s holding
Statutory provisions governing the right to appeal administrative decisions are mandatory and failure to comply with service requirements results in dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Later courts cite it for
“such provisions are mandatory, and, if not complied with, the appeal is subject to dismissal.” · 6 citing courts
19
GREENSix v. Thomas O'Connor & Co., 669 A.2d 1214 (Conn. 1996).
cites § 31-301 7×cited by 37 cases
Where it cites § 31-301
“5 *795 Pursuant to General Statutes § 31-301 (a), 6 the defendant appealed from this decision to the compensation review board (board), which reversed the commissioner’s ruling.”
The case’s holding
A reviewing court must sustain a workers' compensation commissioner's factual conclusion if it is reasonably based on the evidence.
Later courts cite it for
“bjecause we are required to afford great deference to the workers' compensation commissioner's conclusion . . . provided that it is reasonably based on the evidence before him, we must interpret his finding . . . with the goal of sustaining that conclusion in light of all of the other supporting evidence” · 1 citing court
20
GREENChieppo v. Robert E. McMichael, Inc., 363 A.2d 1085 (Conn. 1975).
cites § 31-301 11×cited by 44 cases
Where it cites § 31-301
“The clerk of the Court of Common Pleas notifies the adverse party of the appeal.”
The case’s holding
An appeal from a compensation commissioner award is not a civil action and cannot be transferred to a court via statutory authority governing civil actions.
Later courts cite it for
“to establish a speedy, effective and inexpensive method for determining claims for compensation.” · 4 citing courts

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
196819952022

One bar per year. Tallest: 14 cases in 1999. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Conn.58Conn. App. Ct.55Conn. Super. Ct.3D. Conn.3Alaska1
By subsection
(a)4 cases
Stec v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 968 A.2d 960 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009).“In another example, the statute was amended several times between 1972 and 1979.”
Dechio v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 968 A.2d 450 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009).“This case presents an issue of first impression for this court regarding the time limitation for appeal from a decision of a workers' compensation commissioner (commissioner) to the compensation review board (board) by the second injury fund (fund) under General Statutes §…”
Gyadu v. Workers' Comp. Comm'n, 930 F. Supp. 738 (D. Conn. 1996).
Graham v. Olson Wood Assocs., Inc., 150 A.3d 1123 (Conn. 2016).
(b)1 case
Diaz v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 195 A.3d 400 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018).
(e)3 cases
Dechio v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 968 A.2d 450 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009).
Fantasia v. Milford Fastening Sys., 860 A.2d 779 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004).“General Statutes § 31-301(e) provides in relevant part that “ [t]he procedure in appealing from an award of the commissioner shall be the same as the procedure employed in an appeal from the Superior Court to the Supreme Court, where applicable.”
Graham v. Olson Wood Assocs., Inc., 150 A.3d 1123 (Conn. 2016).
(f)2 cases
Hummel v. Marten Transports, Ltd., 923 A.2d 657 (Conn. 2007).“In addition to the calculation of [survivor’s] benefits, the plaintiff sought an order pursuant to General Statutes § 31-301 (f) 6 that the defen *483 dants pay her benefits [during the pendency of] this appeal and sought the imposition of penalties under General Statutes §§…”
Gyadu v. Workers' Comp. Comm'n, 47 F. Supp. 2d 272 (D. Conn. 1999).

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Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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