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Conn. Gen. Stat.Title 52 — Civil ActionsChapter 926 — Statute of Limitations

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-577 (2025)

Action founded upon a tort

Edition and currency
laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1961–2026 558citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 558 opinions since 1961, 136 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (n) (2 cases).

No action founded upon a tort shall be brought but within three years from the date of the act or omission complained of.

(1949 Rev., S. 8316.)

See Sec. 52-555 re actions for injuries resulting in death.

See Sec. 52-584 re limitation of action for injury to person or property caused by negligence, misconduct or malpractice.

When right of action accrues. 26 C. 334. Applies to action for a fire communicated by a locomotive engine. 56 C. 24. Statute runs in favor of bank directors who have been negligent in control of bank. 89 C. 475. Action by lower riparian proprietor for pollution of stream is within section. 80 C. 185. History of section. 82 C. 580. When statute begins to run in favor of an administrator. 90 C. 569. Relation of this section to Sec. 52-584. 91 C. 36. Prior to barring of alienation of affections action, recovery could be had for loss of consortium occurring within statutory period. 117 C. 213; 133 C. 662, 663. Applied to action for fraudulent confinement. 123 C. 651. Action against officer and director of corporation for breach of duty to corporation and stockholders is within statute. 129 C. 674. Under Sec. 52-590, limitation begins to run when defendant moves into state. 131 C. 675. Cited. 149 C. 326. Limitation applicable to all actions founded upon a tort which do not fall within those causes of action enumerated in Sec. 52-584 or another section; tort of invasion of plaintiffs' usufructuary and property rights in diversion of waters of stream is within limitation. 155 C. 477. Cited. 159 C. 502; 162 C. 247; 168 C. 329. Action based on strict liability must, by section, be brought within 3 years of date of sale of product claim to be defective, and an allegation of continuing failure to warn of product's claimed danger does not alter that requirement. 170 C. 289. Cited. 178 C. 258; 180 C. 230; 183 C. 504; 189 C. 162; 190 C. 8; 191 C. 150; 192 C. 327. Must be pleaded as a special defense. 197 C. 9. Cited. 198 C. 660; 202 C. 57; Id., 234; 204 C. 303; 205 C. 1; Id., 93; 207 C. 204. Applies to common law fraudulent conveyance actions. 209 C. 437. Cited. 212 C. 509; 214 C. 464; 218 C. 512; 219 C. 363; 221 C. 384; 223 C. 436; 224 C. 483; 226 C. 652; 229 C. 256; 232 C. 527; 235 C. 559; 238 C. 800. Statute of limitations applicable to legal malpractice case was tolled under newly adopted continuous representation doctrine. 263 C. 588. In the case of an action for malicious prosecution brought pursuant to 42 USC 1983, the appropriate limit is the 3-year limitations period applicable to tort actions. 286 C. 384. Section is an occurrence statute and its limitation period does not begin when plaintiff discovers an injury but rather the date when the conduct of defendant occurs. 289 C. 383. The existence of an original duty is not necessary to apply the continuing course of conduct doctrine to toll statute of limitations in a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 301 C. 575. Doctrine of nullum tempus occurrit regi, i.e. no time runs against the king, exempts state from operation of section. 307 C. 412. Statute of limitations for tort action and not breach of contract action applies to claims against defendant law firm where complaint contained no allegation that defendant breached specific contract provision and relied on language typically used in negligence cases. 311 C. 282. Claimed violations of the Common Interest Ownership Act relating to the construction process alleged only statutory, as opposed to contractual, violations and as such were subject to the three-year limitation period prescribed by statute and would have commenced at the time the units were purchased. 348 C. 726.

Annotations to former statute limiting action for trespass or slander. In trespass for mesne profits, they will not be awarded for over 3 years. 2 R. 440. Action of trespass is not the appropriate one to recover for a fire communicated by a railway locomotive. 56 C. 24. In case of continuing trespass, recovery may be had for damages accruing for 3 years next preceding the action. 76 C. 316. History of section. 82 C. 581. Section applies where cause of action is founded on absolute liability from ultrahazardous activity of blasting. 137 C. 577. Cited. 139 C. 222; 142 C. 452. Such defense must be pleaded. 143 C. 31. The date of the act or omission complained of is the date when the negligent conduct of defendant occurs and is not the date when plaintiff first sustains damages. 144 C. 170.

Cited. 1 CA 123; Id., 550; Id., 652; 2 CA 322; 5 CA 473. The nature of the right sued upon and not the form of action nor the relief demanded determines applicability of statute of limitations. 6 CA 187. Cited. 15 CA 458; Id., 677; 18 CA 525; 25 CA 360; 31 CA 235; Id., 750; 32 CA 384; Id., 786; 33 CA 422; Id., 842; Id., 702; 35 CA 31; 39 CA 183. Statute as applied to plaintiff not unconstitutional. Id., 289. Cited. 40 CA 449; 42 CA 712; 45 CA 554; 46 CA 199. In the case of special relation between attorney and client who were family, malpractice in deeds and escrow acts not barred by 3-year limitation since continuing course of conduct and special relationship. 65 CA 813. Court properly concluded that tolling claim was not barred by collateral estoppel doctrine where defendant was neither a party nor in privity with a party to the earlier cause of action; continuing course of conduct and continuous representation doctrines may apply in a legal malpractice action to toll statute of limitations. 69 CA 151. Applicable to claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 78 CA 865. Does not apply to case where defendant negligently misidentified plaintiff's property as belonging to another, but rather such case concerns negligent injury to property and therefore statute of limitations in Sec. 52-584 applies. 79 CA 290. Pendency of a first action did not toll statute of limitations for a second action arising from the same wrong. 83 CA 442. Limitation period begins with date of the act or omission complained of, not date when plaintiff first discovers the injury. 85 CA 145. If a legal malpractice case is not ripe for adjudication until damage caused by the alleged malpractice becomes evident upon final judgment in the underlying action, the statute is tolled until such final judgment is rendered. 89 CA 690. Section applies to, and bars, defendant's fraudulent conveyance counterclaim since claim was filed more than 3 years after date of property transfer; section is an occurrence statute, meaning that the time period within which plaintiff must commence an action begins to run at moment the act or omission complained of occurs, not date when plaintiff first discovers the injury. 95 CA 436. Each distinct cause of action arising from the same wrong is governed by the statute of limitations appropriate to it and therefore plaintiff's second and third counts, which alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress and civil conspiracy, respectively, and are unquestionably tort actions, are governed by section. Id., 454. In a matter involving plaintiff investor who alleged a breach of fiduciary duty by defendant investment professionals, trial court properly refused to extend the continuous representation doctrine to all fiduciary relationships. 112 CA 441. For malicious prosecution claim, 3-year limitation period starts to toll from date criminal matter is dismissed, not date of arrest. 113 CA 131. For continuing course of conduct doctrine to apply to toll statute of limitations, a duty must have existed at time of original wrong and trial court improperly applied doctrine in context of an alleged duty arising simply because of the existence of a relationship between the parents of minor children. 115 CA 404; judgment reversed, see 301 C. 575. The 3-year period begins on date the act or omission complained of occurs, not date the cause of action accrues or date the injury occurs. 117 CA 129. Legal malpractice claim which sounds in tort is governed by the 3-year statute of limitations. 134 CA 785; judgment affirmed, see 311 C. 282. Statute of limitations is tolled where attorney, in legal malpractice action, breached continuing duty to his clients to apprise them of his negligence in drafting deed and to cure problems resulting from such negligence while the opportunity existed. 142 CA 97. In time barred situation involving legal malpractice claims, burden is on plaintiff to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the statute of limitations was tolled by the continuous representation doctrine. 167 CA 691.

Cited. 4 CS 222; Id., 293; 8 CS 302. Application of statute of limitations is that of the forum and not where the cause of action arose. 12 CS 477. Sec. 22-357, making the owner or keeper of a dog liable for any damage to person or property done by the dog, is controlled by a 3-year statute of limitations for an action founded upon a tort. 14 CS 428; 26 CS 294, 296. Action for inducing entry into a mental institution by fraud falls within 3-year statute of limitations. 15 CS 434. Where action charges breach of contract for failure to procure insurance coverage against damage to plaintiff's property, cause of action is in tort but is not one for injury to property under Sec. 52-584. 17 CS 62. Cited. 17 CS 114; Id., 407; 18 CS 225; Id., 310. Cause of action based on nuisance when not arising from negligence based on 3-year statute of limitations. 20 CS 35. Cited. 22 CS 300. Controlling statute of limitations for parents sued under Sec. 52-572. 24 CS 320. Impleading under Sec. 52-102a barred by statute of limitations; claim against manufacturer for injuries caused by defective skates held tort liability, not breach of implied warranty under Sec. 42a-2-725 of Uniform Commercial Code, and therefore barred by statute of limitations. 27 CS 46. Statute of limitations for tort actions applies to personal injury action based on breach of warranty. 28 CS 160. Action for tort limited to 3-year statute of limitations. 29 CS 71. Cited. Id., 72. Mental incompetence does not toll the time limitation, but imprisonment may. 31 CS 46. Cited. 34 CS 22; Id., 643, 646. 3-year statute of limitations for tort actions applies to fraud or deception action. 36 CS 277. Cited. Id., 357; 39 CS 458; 44 CS 207; Id., 477; Id., 527. Plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege fraudulent concealment to toll statute; defendant's assertion of statute of limitations in motion to strike rather than as a special defense was acceptable in this case; plaintiff failed to allege intent to conceal as is required to toll statute. 46 CS 386. Statutes of repose allow defendants at some point to be free from liability, absent unclean or fraudulent conduct, and logical conclusion is that legislature intended state to abide by statutes of repose. 51 CS 265.

Cause of action brought under Sec. 52-572 is governed by 3-year limitation imposed by this section. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 379.

The 20 cases that cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-577 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENDoe v. Boy Scouts of Am. Corp., 147 A.3d 104 (Conn. 2016).
cites § 52-577 33×cited by 26 cases
Where it cites § 52-577
“The defendant claimed by way of special defenses that the plaintiff's negligence and recklessness claims were barred by § 52-584 or, in the alternative, by General Statutes § 52-577, that Hepp's intentional criminal acts were intervening causes that superseded any negligence by…”
The case’s holding
An actor is not liable for the intentional misconduct of a third party unless the actor's own conduct created or increased the risk of such harm.
Later courts cite it for
“recklessness requires a conscious choice of a course of action either with knowledge of the serious danger to others involved in it or with knowledge of facts which would disclose this danger to any reasonable man, and the actor must recognize that his conduct involves a risk substantially greater . . . than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent.” · 3 citing courts
2
GREENValentine v. LaBow, 897 A.2d 624 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006).
cites § 52-577 29×cited by 38 cases
Where it cites § 52-577
“Moreover, our Supreme Court has stated that [i]n construing our general tort statute of limitations, General Statutes § 52-577, which allows an action to be brought within three years from the date of the act or omission complained of, we have concluded that the history of that…”
The case’s holding
The three-year statute of limitations for tort actions applies to common-law fraudulent conveyance claims.
Later courts cite it for
“because we conclude that the motion for summary hohorst v. easton judgment properly was granted, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to reconsider or her motion to reargue” · 1 citing court
3
GREENTunick v. Tunick, 242 A.3d 1011 (Conn. App. Ct. 2020).
cites § 52-577 41×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 52-577
“1 On appeal, the plaintiff contends that (1) the court improperly granted DiPreta’s motion to strike a breach of contract count, (2) the court improperly rejected the plaintiff’s claim that his causes of action as a remainder beneficiary did not become ripe until the death of…”
4
GREENSanborn v. Greenwald, 664 A.2d 803 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995).
cites § 52-577 22×cited by 103 cases
Where it cites § 52-577
“On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly held that General Statutes § 52-577 (1) was not tolled by an alleged continuing course of conduct on the part of the defendant and (2) was constitutional as applied to her.”
The case’s holding
Legal malpractice actions based on negligence are subject to the applicable statute of limitations without violating the state constitution's open courts provision.
Later courts cite it for
“the doctrine of continuing course of conduct as used to toll a statute of limitations is better suited to claims where the situation keeps evolving after the act complained of is complete ... rather than one where the situation cannot change....” · 3 citing courts
5
GREENLaBow v. Rubin, 897 A.2d 136 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006).
cites § 52-577 25×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 52-577
“sis of collateral estoppel, (2) concluded that her pending appeal from a partition judgment did not act as a bar to the application of collateral estoppel to her quiet title count, and (3) granted the defendants’ motions for summary judgment as to her intentional infliction of…”
Later courts cite it for
“issue preclusion arises when an issue is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and that determination is essential to the judgment.” · 2 citing courts
6
GREENRivera v. Double A Transp., Inc., 727 A.2d 204 (Conn. 1999).
cites § 52-577 13×cited by 260 cases
Where it cites § 52-577
“The plaintiff argued in response that because she had not sustained “bodily injuries,” the three year limitation period of General Statutes § 52-577 4 should control.”
The case’s holding
Mental suffering constitutes an injury to the person under the two-year statute of limitations even when unaccompanied by physical trauma.
Later courts cite it for
“the court shall not be bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at the trial or arose subsequent to the trial. . . .” · 2 citing courts
7
GREENReclaimant Corp. v. Deutsch, 211 A.3d 976 (Conn. 2019).
cites § 52-577 12×cited by 27 cases
Where it cites § 52-577
“(2) the plaintiff's claims are barred by the three-year statute of limitations in § 17-607 (c) of DRULPA; (3) the plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted because SV Fund "could have prevented and/or addressed any potential alleged…”
The case’s holding
Unjust enrichment is an equitable claim subject to the doctrine of laches rather than a statute of limitations.
Later courts cite it for
“not subject to a statute of limitations.” · 3 citing courts
8
GREENOrticelli v. Powers, 495 A.2d 1023 (Conn. 1985).
cites § 52-577 15×cited by 140 cases
Where it cites § 52-577
“The trial court rendered summary judgment for the board on the grounds that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to when the plaintiff’s cause of action accrued and that his cause of action was barred by both the two year statute of limitations contained in General…”
The case’s holding
A statute of limitations is procedural and waived if the right of action exists independently of the statute containing the limitation unless the limitation is specially pleaded.
Later courts cite it for
“in deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court is limited to considering the pleadings, affidavits and other documentary proof submitted by the parties.” · 13 citing courts
9
GREENVaccaro v. Shell Beach Condo., Inc., 148 A.3d 1123 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016).
cites § 52-577 15×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 52-577
“18 B The plaintiff next argues that, even if the court properly determined that count one alleging a violation of § 47-75 is subject to a statute of limitations, it improperly determined that count one was subject to the three year limitations period set forth in General…”
10
GREENPagan v. Gonzalez, 965 A.2d 582 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009).
cites § 52-577 22×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 52-577
“[3] On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly granted the motion for summary judgment with respect to whether (1) the action was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, General Statutes § 52-577, and (2) the plaintiff was required to present expert…”
Later courts cite it for
“when conducting an analysis under 52-577, the only facts material to the trial court's decision on a motion for summary judgment are the date of the wrongful conduct alleged in the complaint and the date the action was filed.” · 2 citing courts
cites § 52-577 10×cited by 273 cases
Where it cites § 52-577
“Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the trial court should have recognized the “continuous representation rule” and found that the plaintiff s cause of action was not time barred by Connecticut’s three year statute of limitations for tort actions, General Statutes § 52-577.”
The case’s holding
A motion to strike must be denied if the facts provable in the pleading would support a cause of action.
Later courts cite it for
“a claim under cutpa must be pleaded with particularity to allow evaluation of the legal theory upon which the claim is based.” · 34 citing courts
12
GREENGiulietti v. Giulietti, 784 A.2d 905 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001).
cites § 52-577 9×cited by 101 cases
Where it cites § 52-577
“*832 I THE LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTION A Attorney Giulietti first claims that the court improperly failed to find that any action against him either for legal malpractice or fraud was time barred by General Statutes § 52-577, 19 the general statute of limitations for tort actions.”
The case’s holding
A continuing course of conduct involving ongoing wrongful omissions tolls the statute of limitations for tort claims.
Later courts cite it for
“the question of whether a party's claim is barred by the statute of limitations is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo.” · 7 citing courts
13
GREENStraw Pond Assocs., LLC v. Fitzpatrick, Mariano & Santos, P.C., 145 A.3d 292 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016).
cites § 52-577 13×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 52-577
“In their special defenses, the defendants alleged that all three counts of the complaint were barred by General Statutes § 52-577 in that the action was commenced more than three years after the act or omission complained of.”
Later courts cite it for
“when a court, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, is confronted with conflicting facts, resolution and interpretation of which would require determinations of credibility, summary judgment is not appropriate.” · 2 citing courts
14
GREENRosato v. Mascardo, 844 A.2d 893 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004).
cites § 52-577 11×cited by 60 cases
Where it cites § 52-577
“First, the statute at issue in DeLeo , General Statutes § 52-577, 5 is not at issue in this case.”
The case’s holding
The continuing course of conduct doctrine does not toll the statute of limitations once a plaintiff has discovered the actionable harm.
Later courts cite it for
“the continuing course of conduct doctrine has no application after the plaintiff has discovered the harm” · 5 citing courts
15
GREENBellemare v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 931 A.2d 916 (Conn. 2007).
cites § 52-577 10×cited by 65 cases
Where it cites § 52-577
“The principal issue in this certified appeal is whether the trial court properly applied the three year statute of limitations set forth in General Statutes § 52-577 3 to the plaintiffs claim for damages arising from the defendant’s failure to provide a release of mortgage to…”
The case’s holding
An action for damages arising from a breach of a statutory duty sounds in tort and is subject to the tort statute of limitations.
Later courts cite it for
“would lead to multiple statutes of limitation being applicable” · 2 citing courts
16
GREENBellemare v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 894 A.2d 335 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006).
cites § 52-577 13×cited by 36 cases
Where it cites § 52-577
“In response to competing motions for summary judgment filed by the parties, the court concluded that General Statutes § 52-577 barred both a claim under General Statutes § 49-8 and a common-law claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and that a…”
The case’s holding
The statutory prohibition against attorney fees under the Unfair Trade Practices Act applies to claims arising from the failure to issue a timely mortgage release (statutory provision § 42-110g [f]).
Later courts cite it for
“cutpa provides a statutory cause of action for any person who has suffered an ascertainable loss of money or property as a result of an unfair trade practice.” · 5 citing courts
17
GREENGeiger v. Carey, 154 A.3d 1093 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
cites § 52-577 14×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 52-577
“The defendant has denied that he is liable under all counts of the plaintiffs' complaint, has asserted that the statute of limitations, General Statutes § 52-577, bars, as untimely, the allegations of the first two counts, and has filed a counterclaim.”
18
GREENProtter v. Brown Thompson & Co., 593 A.2d 524 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991).
cites § 52-577 17×cited by 48 cases
Where it cites § 52-577
“The fourth party plaintiff in this personal injury action appeals from a decision of the trial court granting a fourth party defendant’s motion to strike *362 the first count of the fourth party complaint on the ground that the cause of action is barred by the applicable statute…”
The case’s holding
An action founded upon a tort must be brought within three years from the date of the act or omission complained of, regardless of whether the claim is for indemnification.
Later courts cite it for
“no action founded upon a tort shall be brought but within three years from the date of the act or omission complained of.” · 3 citing courts
19
GREENDoty v. Mucci, 679 A.2d 945 (Conn. 1996).
cites § 52-577 8×cited by 328 cases
Where it cites § 52-577
“” 2 In his amended answer to the plaintiffs’ complaint, the defendant raised a special defense alleging that the plaintiffs’ claim was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, namely, either General Statutes § 52-577 or General Statutes § 52-584.”
The case’s holding
A claim for damages is barred by the statute of limitations if the contamination falls within the petroleum exclusion of the hazardous pollutant statute.
Later courts cite it for
“summary judgment may be granted where the claim is barred by the statute of limitations.” · 94 citing courts
20
GREENMountaindale Condo. Ass'n v. Zappone, 757 A.2d 608 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000).
cites § 52-577 15×cited by 54 cases
Where it cites § 52-577
“All parties submitted affidavits and evidence in support of their various positions. The court granted in part the defendants’ motions for summary judgment because the plaintiffs causes of action were barred by § 52-584 or General Statutes § 52-577.”
The case’s holding
The statute of limitations begins when a plaintiff discovers actionable harm, and failing to object to the defense waives it.

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
196019932026

One bar per 2 years. Tallest: 60 cases in 2020–2021. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
D. Conn.254Conn. App. Ct.162Conn.77Conn. Super. Ct.232d Cir.19Bankr. D. Conn.8S.D.N.Y.49th Cir.2

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 15 courts in all.

By subsection
(n)2 cases
Colon v. Eulizier, No. 3:21-cv-00175 (D. Conn. Aug. 14, 2023).
Colon v. Eulizier, No. 3:21-cv-00175 (D. Conn. Aug. 11, 2023).

Show all 558 citing cases (list view) →

Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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