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Conn. Gen. Stat.Title 53a — Penal CodeChapter 952 — Penal Code: Offenses

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-55 (2025)

Manslaughter in the first degree: Class B felony

Edition and currency
laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1973–2026 474citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 474 opinions since 1973, 44 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (a)(1) (6 cases).

(a) A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when: (1) With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person; or (2) with intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person under circumstances which do not constitute murder because he committed the proscribed act or acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, as provided in subsection (a) of section 53a-54a, except that the fact that homicide was committed under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance constitutes a mitigating circumstance reducing murder to manslaughter in the first degree and need not be proved in any prosecution initiated under this subsection; or (3) under circumstances evincing an extreme indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person, and thereby causes the death of another person.

(b) Manslaughter in the first degree is a class B felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 56; P.A. 73-137, S. 9; P.A. 83-486, S. 5.)

History: P.A. 73-137 substituted reference to Sec. 53a-54a for reference to Sec. 53a-54 in Subdiv. (2); P.A. 83-486 amended Subsec. (a)(2) by replacing “acts” with “committed the proscribed act or acts”.

Cited. 168 C. 610; 169 C. 309; 170 C. 81; 180 C. 171; 181 C. 406; 182 C. 66; 188 C. 542; 190 C. 639; 192 C. 85; 193 C. 632; Id., 646; Id., 695. Manslaughter is not a lesser included offense of felony murder. 196 C. 421. Cited. 200 C. 553; 201 C. 174; 202 C. 429; 210 C. 78; Id., 652; 211 C. 591; 213 C. 38; 215 C. 695; 216 C. 699; 217 C. 498; 223 C. 273; 225 C. 559; 226 C. 237; 233 C. 174; 234 C. 139; 236 C. 342. A conviction of reckless manslaughter pursuant to a robbery conspiracy is permitted under the Pinkerton doctrine because the commission of a reckless crime may be a reasonably foreseeable consequence of such conspiracy. 292 C. 296. While manslaughter in the first degree under this section is a lesser included offense of murder under Sec. 53a-54a despite the fact that the elements of manslaughter are not included in the elements of murder, the states of minds required by the two offenses are mutually exclusive; a jury finding guilty verdicts on both offenses are inconsistent verdicts and both verdicts must be vacated. 325 C. 236.

Cited. 7 CA 223; 8 CA 307; 15 CA 74; judgment reversed, see 211 C. 591; 16 CA 223; 24 CA 115; 37 CA 722; 40 CA 189; Id., 374; 41 CA 565; Id., 604; 42 CA 348; 44 CA 62; 46 CA 216.

Cited. 33 CS 28.

Subsec. (a):

Subdiv. (1): It is incumbent upon the state to prove a specific intent to cause serious physical injury as intent to achieve a result is an element of the crime charged. 165 C. 400. Cited. 174 C. 89; 176 C. 107. Subdiv. (3): The conduct proscribed does not require infliction of a physical blow. Id., 227. Cited. 177 C. 538; 179 C. 381. Subdivs. (1) and (3): Manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder although the state of mind required is different. 180 C. 382. Cited. 181 C. 187; 182 C. 403; 183 C. 394; 185 C. 63; 188 C. 237; Id., 653. Subdiv. (1): Attempt to commit is not cognizable. 189 C. 303. Cited. 190 C. 219; Id., 576; 194 C. 119; Id., 279; Id., 376; Id., 408; 196 C. 519; 198 C. 53; Id., 209; Id., 220; Id., 273; Id., 454; 199 C. 155; Id., 383; Id., 417; 200 C. 224; Id., 453; 201 C. 534; Id., 598; 202 C. 520; Id., 520. Subdiv. (3): Not unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant. Id., 629. Cited. 203 C. 466; 204 C. 120; 205 C. 279; 206 C. 278; 207 C. 276; 209 C. 133; 211 C. 441; 212 C. 612; 213 C. 500; Id., 579; 214 C. 57; Id., 77; 216 C. 220; 218 C. 766; 219 C. 16; 220 C. 169; Id., 285; 222 C. 444; 224 C. 546; 225 C. 55; 227 C. 456; Id., 566; Id., 611; 228 C. 118; Id., 147; Id., 281; 229 C. 193; Id., 397; 230 C. 183; 231 C. 115; Id., 484; 233 C. 106; Id., 215; Id., 517; 235 C. 413; Id., 473; Id., 595; 236 C. 189; 238 C. 253; Id., 313; 240 C. 395; Id., 727; Id., 743; Id., 799; 241 C. 502. Motion to dismiss on grounds that Subdiv. (3) is unconstitutionally vague because legislature failed to define phrases “extreme indifference to human life” and “grave risk of death” and defendant was not given “fair warning” and statute is susceptible to “arbitrary enforcement” fails to meet burden of proof because person of ordinary intelligence would have had fair warning that defendant's actions were proscribed and was properly denied by trial court; based on established principles concerning how evidence is construed, and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, evidence was sufficient to support trial court's verdict of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm. 257 C. 544. Defendant who was convicted of murder pursuant to Sec. 53a-54a(a) was entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of manslaughter as set forth in Subdiv. (1). 262 C. 453. Subdiv. (1): Crime of intentional manslaughter, unlike reckless manslaughter under Subdiv. (3), or criminally negligent operation, under Sec. 53a-57(a), does not require proof of the defendant's mental state with respect to the risk of death. 342 C. 538.

Subdiv. (3): To be guilty of violating statute, a person must have the general intent to engage in the proscribed conduct. 5 CA 571. Cited. 7 CA 457; Id., 656; 8 CA 273; 9 CA 147; judgment reversed, see 206 C. 278; 11 CA 425; Id., 628; 13 CA 175; 17 CA 502; judgment reversed, see 213 C. 579; Id., 602; 18 CA 423; 19 CA 576; Id., 609; Id., 674; 20 CA 410; 21 CA 138; 22 CA 265; Id., 321; Id., 340; Id., 507; Id., 521; Id., 669; 23 CA 431; Id., 502; 24 CA 586; Id., 692; 25 CA 456; Id., 734; 26 CA 165; Id., 242; Id., 259; 27 CA 1; Id., 520; Id., 643; 28 CA 34; Id., 81; Id., 231; Id., 771; Id., 825; 29 CA 68; judgment reversed, see 227 C. 566; Id., 162; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 397; Id., 394; Id., 452; Id., 533; Id., 754; Id., 773; 30 CA 26; Id., 232; 31 CA 385; 32 CA 687; Id., 854; 33 CA 116; Id., 782; 34 CA 236; Id., 368, see also 233 C. 517; 35 CA 138; Id., 374; judgment reversed, see 235 C. 413; Id., 438; 37 CA 180; Id., 404; Id., 473; 38 CA 801; Id., 815; 39 CA 224; Id., 242; 40 CA 151; 41 CA 831; 42 CA 41; Id., 382; 43 CA 252; Id., 488; 44 CA 790; Id., 731. Evidence presented at trial concerning a healthy 1-year-old left in defendant's care was sufficient to support conviction. 47 CA 188. Subdiv. (1): Criminal liability as an accessory to manslaughter in the first degree has long been recognized under this state's jurisprudence. 49 CA 121. To be guilty under Subsec., it must be established that defendant must have had the general intent to engage in the proscribed conduct. 56 CA 742. Subdiv. (3): Action of defendant in entering house, after car chase, obtaining loaded shotgun, walking 100 feet to edge of driveway and shooting victim showed an extreme indifference to human life. 61 CA 463. Evidence insufficient to find that defendant demonstrated an extreme indifference to human life to support conviction of manslaughter in the first degree when defendant himself ingested fentanyl lollipops, there was no evidence that he or anyone to whom he had given the lollipops had an adverse reaction to them, risks associated with ingestion of methadose and fentanyl not commonly known by laypeople, and defendant immediately called 9-1-1 upon hearing the victim was unresponsive. 106 CA 467. Subdiv. (3): Conviction under Subdiv. and Sec. 53a-59(a)(3) constituted double jeopardy violation because there was no conceivable circumstance in which defendant could have caused victim's death without also having caused victim “serious physical injury” as defined in Sec. 53a-3(4). 187 CA 725. The mens rea elements in the two provisions, namely, the “intent to cause serious physical injury” in Subdiv. (1) and “recklessly engaging in conduct which creates a grave risk of death” in Subdiv. (3), do not relate to the same result; the mental state elements in the two provisions - failing to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that your manner of operation would cause death under Sec. 53a-57(a) and an intent to cause serious physical injury under Subdiv. (1) - do not relate to the same result; the mental state element under Subdiv. (3) and under Sec. 53a-57(a) is mutually exclusive and relate to the same result, thus guilty verdicts as to the crimes of reckless manslaughter and criminally negligent operation were legally inconsistent. 191 CA 33; judgment reversed in part, see 342 C. 538. Subdiv. (1): As charged, defendant's rights to be free from double jeopardy violated as the offenses of manslaughter in the first degree under Subdiv. and risk of injury to a child under Sec. 53-21 arose from the same actions and constituted the same offense, and the offense of risk of injury to a child is a lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree. 197 CA 302; judgment reversed, see 340 C. 425.

Cited. 44 CS 417.

The 20 cases that cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-55 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. Almeda, 455 A.2d 1326 (Conn. 1983).
cites § 53a-55 37×cited by 59 cases
Where it cites § 53a-55
“[1] After a trial to the jury, the defendant was found guilty of murder as charged in the indictment and was found guilty of attempted manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) (1) as a lesser offense included in the charge of attempted…”
The case’s holding
A defendant must raise a claim of juror bias from the realm of speculation to the realm of fact to succeed on such a claim.
Later courts cite it for
“to succeed on a claim of bias the defendant must raise his contention of bias from the realm of speculation to the realm of fact.” · 4 citing courts
2
GREENState v. McMahon, 778 A.2d 847 (Conn. 2001).
cites § 53a-55 27×cited by 30 cases
Where it cites § 53a-55
“, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a trial to the court, of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-55 (a) (3) 1 and 53a-55a, 2 in connection with a hunting incident that resulted in the death of the victim,…”
The case’s holding
A manslaughter statute is not unconstitutionally vague if its terms can be understood through their plain meaning and prior judicial interpretations.
3
GREENState v. Kirsch, 820 A.2d 236 (Conn. 2003).
cites § 53a-55 15×cited by 58 cases
Where it cites § 53a-55
“The defendant, Randy Kirsch, appeals 1 from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) (3), 2 manslaughter in the second degree with a motor vehicle in violation of General Statutes §…”
The case’s holding
The Blockburger test is a rule of statutory construction that is not controlling where there is a clear indication of contrary legislative intent.
Later courts cite it for
“the blockburger test is a rule of statutory construction, and because it serves as a means of discerning legislative purpose the rule should not be controlling where, for example, there is a clear indication of contrary legislative intent.” · 2 citing courts
4
REDState v. Chicano, 584 A.2d 425 (Conn. 1990).
cites § 53a-55 15×cited by 162 cases
Overruled by State v. Paige on other grounds: 3 citing opinions limit it to other grounds and 1 says in part.
Where it cites § 53a-55
“5 After a trial before a three judge panel, the defendant was convicted of three counts of felony murder, three counts of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) (2), 6 *702 one count of injury to a child and one count of burglary in the…”
The case’s holding
A defendant cannot be convicted of both felony murder and first-degree manslaughter for a single homicide without violating the double jeopardy clause.
Later courts cite it for
“if double jeopardy claims arising in the context of a single trial are raised for the first time on appeal, these claims are reviewable . . . .” · 3 citing courts
5
GREENState v. Colon, 864 A.2d 666 (Conn. 2004).
cites § 53a-55 8×cited by 227 cases
Where it cites § 53a-55
“” General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) provides in relevant part: “A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when .”
The case’s holding
The state constitution does not guarantee a defendant the right to allocution during a capital sentencing hearing (rejecting claim that state constitution provides for right of allocution at capital sentencing hearing).
Later courts cite it for
“defense counsel did not object to this line of questioning at trial on the basis of the attorney-client privilege, suggesting that he did not view the line of questioning to be seriously prejudicial at the time” · 1 citing court
6
GREENState v. Maselli, 437 A.2d 836 (Conn. 1980).
cites § 53a-55 21×cited by 57 cases
Where it cites § 53a-55
“After a jury trial the defendant was found guilty of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55 as a lesser offense included in the charge of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a).”
The case’s holding
A murder indictment serves as notice of any lesser included homicide offense, and jury instructions regarding intent are valid if they are adequately qualified to prevent misinterpretation.
7
GREENState v. Silveira, 503 A.2d 599 (Conn. 1986).
cites § 53a-55 19×cited by 56 cases
Where it cites § 53a-55
“or (3) such factual mistake is of a kind that supports a defense of justification.”
The case’s holding
A claim that a defendant did not know a victim would move into the line of fire constitutes a denial of intent rather than a recognized mistake-of-fact defense.
Later courts cite it for
“an interpretation of 53a-19 (b) requiring a defendant acting in defense of another to retreat, without regard to the ability to retreat of the person defended, would be inconsistent with the general right to defense of others set forth in subsection a” · 1 citing court
8
GREENState v. Greene, 874 A.2d 750 (Conn. 2005).
cites § 53a-55 13×cited by 47 cases
Where it cites § 53a-55
“” General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) provides: “A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when: (1) With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person; or (2) with intent to cause the death of another…”
The case’s holding
A court may modify a judgment of conviction to a lesser included offense if the record establishes the jury necessarily found all essential elements of that offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
Later courts cite it for
“this court previously has modified a judgment of conviction after reversal, if the record establishes that the jury necessarily found, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the essential elements required to convict the defendant of a lesser included offense.” · 5 citing courts
9
GREENState v. Rodriguez, 429 A.2d 919 (Conn. 1980).
cites § 53a-55 11×cited by 155 cases
Where it cites § 53a-55
“Therefore, for purposes of this defendant’s sixth amendment right to notice, the *403 question presented to ns is whether the two sections of the first degree manslaughter statute; General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) (1) and (3) ; 14 the second degree manslaughter statute; General…”
The case’s holding
A judicial admission is conclusive upon the party making it and prohibits any further dispute of the fact or the use of evidence to contradict it.
Later courts cite it for
“for purposes of the second condition of whistnant, we conclude . . . that an offense that would be a lesser included offense but for its requirement of a less culpable state of mind than that required for the greater, will be deemed a lesser included offense” · 3 citing courts
10
GREENState v. Asherman, 478 A.2d 227 (Conn. 1984).
cites § 53a-55 9×cited by 256 cases
Where it cites § 53a-55
“General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) (2). 8 The grounds of the defendant’s objection are that there was an insufficient evidential basis for the submission of this crime to the jury and that the illustration given to the jury for their consideration of this case was legally…”
The case’s holding
The privilege against self-incrimination does not extend to non-testimonial physical evidence such as dental impressions because such evidence does not compel communicative testimony.
Later courts cite it for
“no person shall be compelled to give evidence against himself . . . .” · 3 citing courts
11
GREENState v. Reid, 480 A.2d 463 (Conn. 1984).
cites § 53a-55 12×cited by 107 cases
Where it cites § 53a-55
“” At the time of the offense, General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) provided: “A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when: (1) With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person; or (2) with intent to…”
The case’s holding
Statements made by an accused after a criminal act are admissible to demonstrate consciousness of guilt if they may be fairly inferred to have been influenced by that act.
Later courts cite it for
“in a criminal trial, it is relevant to show the conduct of an accused, as well as any statement made by him subsequent to the alleged criminal act, which may fairly be inferred to have been influenced by the criminal act.” · 2 citing courts
12
GREENState v. Flowers, 898 A.2d 789 (Conn. 2006).
cites § 53a-55 14×cited by 27 cases
Where it cites § 53a-55
“, was convicted of attempt to commit manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55 (a)(1) and § 53a-49 (a)(2).”
The case’s holding
A trial court may cure an improper intent instruction during a burglary charge through curative closing argument under specific circumstances (clarifying proper intent instruction and circumstances for curative argument).
Later courts cite it for
“a person cannot be charged with entering a building intending the specific result of failing to commit a crime” · 1 citing court
13
GREENAetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Jones, 596 A.2d 414 (Conn. 1991).
cites § 53a-55 8×cited by 257 cases
Where it cites § 53a-55
“2 That verdict required the jury to have found that the state had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Manfredi had intentionally caused the death of his wife, and also to have found that he suffered from an extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the killing.”
The case’s holding
A third party derives legal interest and establishes privity with an insured defendant when they derive rights to collect insurance proceeds directly from the insured's rights.
Later courts cite it for
“collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prohibits the relitigation of an issue when that issue was actually litigated and necessarily determined in a prior action.” · 14 citing courts
14
GREENState v. Austin, 710 A.2d 732 (Conn. 1998).
cites § 53a-55 11×cited by 98 cases
Where it cites § 53a-55
“Specifically, the defendant claims that the court improperly instructed the jury concerning: (1) the element of intent; (2) consideration of his mitigating evidence of intoxication; (3) manslaughter in the first degree pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) (3) by describing…”
The case’s holding
Evidence of a defendant's intoxication is relevant to negate specific intent in a murder prosecution.
Later courts cite it for
“a one-to-one confrontation between a victim and the suspect presented to him for identification is inherently and significantly suggestive because it conveys the message to the victim that the police believe the suspect is guilty.” · 4 citing courts
15
GREENState v. Spates, 405 A.2d 656 (Conn. 1978).
cites § 53a-55 14×cited by 54 cases
Where it cites § 53a-55
“The defendant was charged in a four-count information with first degree manslaughter, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) (3), with second degree robbery, in violation of General Statutes § 53a-135 (a) (2), and with two counts of first degree unlawful restraint, in…”
The case’s holding
Manslaughter liability attaches when emotional stress or trauma proximately causes death, even if the conduct does not involve direct physical injury.
Later courts cite it for
“extreme indifference to human life” · 3 citing courts
16
GREENState v. Singleton, 974 A.2d 679 (Conn. 2009).
cites § 53a-55 9×cited by 45 cases
Where it cites § 53a-55
“The defendant was charged with murder under General Statutes § 53a-54 (a), but the trial court also instructed the jury on the lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree under General Statutes § 53a-55 (a), of which the defendant was found guilty.”
The case’s holding
A challenge to the validity of jury instructions presents a question of law subject to plenary review.
Later courts cite it for
“a challenge to the validity of jury instructions presents a question of law over which we have plenary review.” · 2 citing courts
17
GREENState v. Thompson, 832 A.2d 626 (Conn. 2003).
cites § 53a-55 5×cited by 148 cases
Where it cites § 53a-55
“3 After a jury trial, the jury found the defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of reckless manslaughter in the first degree with a fire *444 arm in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-55 (a) (3) and 53a-55a.”
The case’s holding
An improper evidentiary ruling regarding witness credibility constitutes harmless error when substantial evidence of guilt exists and the prosecutor does not rely on the testimony during closing arguments.
Later courts cite it for
“reserved a place in hell for themselves” · 3 citing courts
18
GREENState v. Dyson, 586 A.2d 610 (Conn. 1991).
cites § 53a-55 13×cited by 41 cases
Where it cites § 53a-55
“This is the appeal of the defendant, Lome Dyson, from his conviction of accessory to manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) (3). 1 The issues presented are: (1) did the trial court properly instruct the jury regarding the mental state…”
The case’s holding
A jury charge is not improper if, considered as a whole, it accurately presents the case to the jury and no injustice results from the instructions.
19
GREENState v. Bunkley, 522 A.2d 795 (Conn. 1987).
cites § 53a-55 9×cited by 94 cases
Where it cites § 53a-55
“The first count charged the defendant with engaging police in pursuit in violation of General Statutes § 14-223 (b); the next three counts charged the defendant with manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) (3); 1 and the fifth and sixth…”
The case’s holding
Disqualification of a prosecutor's office requires a showing that the relationship between the issues in the prior and present cases is patently clear or essentially the same.
Later courts cite it for
“under the substantial relationship portion of the test, disqualification is the proper sanction only upon a showing that the relationship between the issues in the prior and present cases is patently clear or where the issues are essentially the same.” · 4 citing courts
20
GREENState v. Wade, 942 A.2d 1085 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008).
cites § 53a-55 14×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 53a-55
“See General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) (3). As a matter of law, we conclude that, under the factual circumstances of this case, the elements of the statute have not been met but that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction of manslaughter in the second degree.”
Later courts cite it for
“a subjective realization of a risk and a conscious decision to ignore that risk . . . .” · 1 citing court

Show all 474 citing cases (list view) →

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
197319992026

One bar per year. Tallest: 19 cases in 2001. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Conn. App. Ct.270Conn.1932d Cir.4D. Conn.4Conn. Super. Ct.2Fla. Dist. Ct. App.1
By subsection
(a)3 cases
State v. Chyung, 157 A.3d 628 (Conn. 2017).
State v. Grant, 178 A.3d 437 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018).
State v. Cassino, 449 A.2d 154 (Conn. 1982).
(a)(1)6 cases
Bryant v. Comm'r of Corr., 558 U.S. 938 (2009).
State v. Holmes, 169 A.3d 264 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
State v. Grant, 178 A.3d 437 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018).
Benjamin v. Bureau of Customs, 383 F. Supp. 2d 344 (D. Conn. 2005).
Showing the top 5 of 6. More in the list view →
(a)(2)2 cases
Asherman v. Meachum, 739 F. Supp. 718 (D. Conn. 1990).
State v. Ames, 157 A.3d 660 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
(a)(3)5 cases
Giuseppe Spina v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 470 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2006).
Poulin v. Comm'r of Corr., 928 A.2d 556 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007).
Tyus v. State, 845 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).
Weaving v. Comm'r of Corr., 179 A.3d 1272 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
Blackmon v. United States, No. 3:16-cv-01080 (D. Conn. Aug. 9, 2019).
(b)1 case
Benjamin v. Bureau of Customs, 383 F. Supp. 2d 344 (D. Conn. 2005).

Show all 474 citing cases (list view) →

Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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