Connecticut General Statutes

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-55 (2026)

Manslaughter in the first degree: Class B felony

✓ current as of May 2026

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(a) A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when: (1) With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person; or (2) with intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person under circumstances which do not constitute murder because he committed the proscribed act or acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, as provided in subsection (a) of section 53a-54a, except that the fact that homicide was committed under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance constitutes a mitigating circumstance reducing murder to manslaughter in the first degree and need not be proved in any prosecution initiated under this subsection; or (3) under circumstances evincing an extreme indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person, and thereby causes the death of another person.

(b) Manslaughter in the first degree is a class B felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 56; P.A. 73-137, S. 9; P.A. 83-486, S. 5.)

History: P.A. 73-137 substituted reference to Sec. 53a-54a for reference to Sec. 53a-54 in Subdiv. (2); P.A. 83-486 amended Subsec. (a)(2) by replacing “acts” with “committed the proscribed act or acts”.

Cited. 168 C. 610; 169 C. 309; 170 C. 81; 180 C. 171; 181 C. 406; 182 C. 66; 188 C. 542; 190 C. 639; 192 C. 85; 193 C. 632; Id., 646; Id., 695. Manslaughter is not a lesser included offense of felony murder. 196 C. 421. Cited. 200 C. 553; 201 C. 174; 202 C. 429; 210 C. 78; Id., 652; 211 C. 591; 213 C. 38; 215 C. 695; 216 C. 699; 217 C. 498; 223 C. 273; 225 C. 559; 226 C. 237; 233 C. 174; 234 C. 139; 236 C. 342. A conviction of reckless manslaughter pursuant to a robbery conspiracy is permitted under the Pinkerton doctrine because the commission of a reckless crime may be a reasonably foreseeable consequence of such conspiracy. 292 C. 296. While manslaughter in the first degree under this section is a lesser included offense of murder under Sec. 53a-54a despite the fact that the elements of manslaughter are not included in the elements of murder, the states of minds required by the two offenses are mutually exclusive; a jury finding guilty verdicts on both offenses are inconsistent verdicts and both verdicts must be vacated. 325 C. 236.

Cited. 7 CA 223; 8 CA 307; 15 CA 74; judgment reversed, see 211 C. 591; 16 CA 223; 24 CA 115; 37 CA 722; 40 CA 189; Id., 374; 41 CA 565; Id., 604; 42 CA 348; 44 CA 62; 46 CA 216.

Cited. 33 CS 28.

Subsec. (a):

Subdiv. (1): It is incumbent upon the state to prove a specific intent to cause serious physical injury as intent to achieve a result is an element of the crime charged. 165 C. 400. Cited. 174 C. 89; 176 C. 107. Subdiv. (3): The conduct proscribed does not require infliction of a physical blow. Id., 227. Cited. 177 C. 538; 179 C. 381. Subdivs. (1) and (3): Manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder although the state of mind required is different. 180 C. 382. Cited. 181 C. 187; 182 C. 403; 183 C. 394; 185 C. 63; 188 C. 237; Id., 653. Subdiv. (1): Attempt to commit is not cognizable. 189 C. 303. Cited. 190 C. 219; Id., 576; 194 C. 119; Id., 279; Id., 376; Id., 408; 196 C. 519; 198 C. 53; Id., 209; Id., 220; Id., 273; Id., 454; 199 C. 155; Id., 383; Id., 417; 200 C. 224; Id., 453; 201 C. 534; Id., 598; 202 C. 520; Id., 520. Subdiv. (3): Not unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant. Id., 629. Cited. 203 C. 466; 204 C. 120; 205 C. 279; 206 C. 278; 207 C. 276; 209 C. 133; 211 C. 441; 212 C. 612; 213 C. 500; Id., 579; 214 C. 57; Id., 77; 216 C. 220; 218 C. 766; 219 C. 16; 220 C. 169; Id., 285; 222 C. 444; 224 C. 546; 225 C. 55; 227 C. 456; Id., 566; Id., 611; 228 C. 118; Id., 147; Id., 281; 229 C. 193; Id., 397; 230 C. 183; 231 C. 115; Id., 484; 233 C. 106; Id., 215; Id., 517; 235 C. 413; Id., 473; Id., 595; 236 C. 189; 238 C. 253; Id., 313; 240 C. 395; Id., 727; Id., 743; Id., 799; 241 C. 502. Motion to dismiss on grounds that Subdiv. (3) is unconstitutionally vague because legislature failed to define phrases “extreme indifference to human life” and “grave risk of death” and defendant was not given “fair warning” and statute is susceptible to “arbitrary enforcement” fails to meet burden of proof because person of ordinary intelligence would have had fair warning that defendant's actions were proscribed and was properly denied by trial court; based on established principles concerning how evidence is construed, and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, evidence was sufficient to support trial court's verdict of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm. 257 C. 544. Defendant who was convicted of murder pursuant to Sec. 53a-54a(a) was entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of manslaughter as set forth in Subdiv. (1). 262 C. 453. Subdiv. (1): Crime of intentional manslaughter, unlike reckless manslaughter under Subdiv. (3), or criminally negligent operation, under Sec. 53a-57(a), does not require proof of the defendant's mental state with respect to the risk of death. 342 C. 538.

Subdiv. (3): To be guilty of violating statute, a person must have the general intent to engage in the proscribed conduct. 5 CA 571. Cited. 7 CA 457; Id., 656; 8 CA 273; 9 CA 147; judgment reversed, see 206 C. 278; 11 CA 425; Id., 628; 13 CA 175; 17 CA 502; judgment reversed, see 213 C. 579; Id., 602; 18 CA 423; 19 CA 576; Id., 609; Id., 674; 20 CA 410; 21 CA 138; 22 CA 265; Id., 321; Id., 340; Id., 507; Id., 521; Id., 669; 23 CA 431; Id., 502; 24 CA 586; Id., 692; 25 CA 456; Id., 734; 26 CA 165; Id., 242; Id., 259; 27 CA 1; Id., 520; Id., 643; 28 CA 34; Id., 81; Id., 231; Id., 771; Id., 825; 29 CA 68; judgment reversed, see 227 C. 566; Id., 162; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 397; Id., 394; Id., 452; Id., 533; Id., 754; Id., 773; 30 CA 26; Id., 232; 31 CA 385; 32 CA 687; Id., 854; 33 CA 116; Id., 782; 34 CA 236; Id., 368, see also 233 C. 517; 35 CA 138; Id., 374; judgment reversed, see 235 C. 413; Id., 438; 37 CA 180; Id., 404; Id., 473; 38 CA 801; Id., 815; 39 CA 224; Id., 242; 40 CA 151; 41 CA 831; 42 CA 41; Id., 382; 43 CA 252; Id., 488; 44 CA 790; Id., 731. Evidence presented at trial concerning a healthy 1-year-old left in defendant's care was sufficient to support conviction. 47 CA 188. Subdiv. (1): Criminal liability as an accessory to manslaughter in the first degree has long been recognized under this state's jurisprudence. 49 CA 121. To be guilty under Subsec., it must be established that defendant must have had the general intent to engage in the proscribed conduct. 56 CA 742. Subdiv. (3): Action of defendant in entering house, after car chase, obtaining loaded shotgun, walking 100 feet to edge of driveway and shooting victim showed an extreme indifference to human life. 61 CA 463. Evidence insufficient to find that defendant demonstrated an extreme indifference to human life to support conviction of manslaughter in the first degree when defendant himself ingested fentanyl lollipops, there was no evidence that he or anyone to whom he had given the lollipops had an adverse reaction to them, risks associated with ingestion of methadose and fentanyl not commonly known by laypeople, and defendant immediately called 9-1-1 upon hearing the victim was unresponsive. 106 CA 467. Subdiv. (3): Conviction under Subdiv. and Sec. 53a-59(a)(3) constituted double jeopardy violation because there was no conceivable circumstance in which defendant could have caused victim's death without also having caused victim “serious physical injury” as defined in Sec. 53a-3(4). 187 CA 725. The mens rea elements in the two provisions, namely, the “intent to cause serious physical injury” in Subdiv. (1) and “recklessly engaging in conduct which creates a grave risk of death” in Subdiv. (3), do not relate to the same result; the mental state elements in the two provisions - failing to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that your manner of operation would cause death under Sec. 53a-57(a) and an intent to cause serious physical injury under Subdiv. (1) - do not relate to the same result; the mental state element under Subdiv. (3) and under Sec. 53a-57(a) is mutually exclusive and relate to the same result, thus guilty verdicts as to the crimes of reckless manslaughter and criminally negligent operation were legally inconsistent. 191 CA 33; judgment reversed in part, see 342 C. 538. Subdiv. (1): As charged, defendant's rights to be free from double jeopardy violated as the offenses of manslaughter in the first degree under Subdiv. and risk of injury to a child under Sec. 53-21 arose from the same actions and constituted the same offense, and the offense of risk of injury to a child is a lesser included offense of manslaughter in the first degree. 197 CA 302; judgment reversed, see 340 C. 425.

Cited. 44 CS 417.

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Notes of Decisions

Cited in 474 cases (44 in the last 5 years), 1973–2026 · leading case: State v. Almeda, 455 A.2d 1326 (Conn. 1983).

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State v. Almeda, 455 A.2d 1326 (Conn. 1983). · cites it 37× “[1] After a trial to the jury, the defendant was found guilty of murder as charged in the indictment and was found guilty of attempted manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) (1) as a lesser offense included in the charge of attempted…”

State v. McMahon, 778 A.2d 847 (Conn. 2001). · cites it 27× “, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a trial to the court, of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-55 (a) (3) 1 and 53a-55a, 2 in connection with a hunting incident that resulted in the death of the victim,…”

State v. Kirsch, 820 A.2d 236 (Conn. 2003). · cites it 15× “The defendant, Randy Kirsch, appeals 1 from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) (3), 2 manslaughter in the second degree with a motor vehicle in violation of General Statutes §…”

State v. Chicano, 584 A.2d 425 (Conn. 1990). · cites it 15× “5 After a trial before a three judge panel, the defendant was convicted of three counts of felony murder, three counts of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) (2), 6 *702 one count of injury to a child and one count of burglary in the…”

State v. Colon, 864 A.2d 666 (Conn. 2004). · cites it 8× “” General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) provides in relevant part: “A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when .”

State v. Maselli, 437 A.2d 836 (Conn. 1980). · cites it 21× “After a jury trial the defendant was found guilty of manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55 as a lesser offense included in the charge of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a).”

State v. Silveira, 503 A.2d 599 (Conn. 1986). · cites it 19× “or (3) such factual mistake is of a kind that supports a defense of justification.”

State v. Greene, 874 A.2d 750 (Conn. 2005). · cites it 13× “” General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) provides: “A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when: (1) With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person; or (2) with intent to cause the death of another…”

State v. Rodriguez, 429 A.2d 919 (Conn. 1980). · cites it 11× “Therefore, for purposes of this defendant’s sixth amendment right to notice, the *403 question presented to ns is whether the two sections of the first degree manslaughter statute; General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) (1) and (3) ; 14 the second degree manslaughter statute; General…”

State v. Asherman, 478 A.2d 227 (Conn. 1984). · cites it 9× “General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) (2). 8 The grounds of the defendant’s objection are that there was an insufficient evidential basis for the submission of this crime to the jury and that the illustration given to the jury for their consideration of this case was legally…”

State v. Reid, 480 A.2d 463 (Conn. 1984). · cites it 12× “” At the time of the offense, General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) provided: “A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when: (1) With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person; or (2) with intent to…”

State v. Flowers, 898 A.2d 789 (Conn. 2006). · cites it 14× “, was convicted of attempt to commit manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55 (a)(1) and § 53a-49 (a)(2).”

Show all 474 citing cases →

— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-55(a) — 3 cases

State v. Chyung, 157 A.3d 628 (Conn. 2017).

State v. Grant, 178 A.3d 437 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018).

State v. Cassino, 449 A.2d 154 (Conn. 1982).

— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-55(a)(1) — 4 cases

Bryant v. Comm'r of Corr., 964 A.2d 1186 (Conn. 2009).

State v. Holmes, 169 A.3d 264 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).

State v. Grant, 178 A.3d 437 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018).

State v. Holmes, 189 A.3d 151 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018).

— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-55(a)(2) — 2 cases

Asherman v. Meachum, 739 F. Supp. 718 (D. Conn. 1990).

State v. Ames, 157 A.3d 660 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).

— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-55(a)(3) — 5 cases

Giuseppe Spina v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 470 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2006).

Poulin v. Comm'r of Corr., 928 A.2d 556 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007).

Tyus v. State, 845 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).

Weaving v. Comm'r of Corr., 179 A.3d 1272 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).

Blackmon v. United States (D. Conn. 2019).

— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-55(a)(l) — 2 cases

Luis Vargas-Sarmiento v. United States Dep't of Just., Bureau of Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 448 F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2006).

Benjamin v. Bureau of Customs, 383 F. Supp. 2d 344 (D. Conn. 2005).

— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-55(b) — 1 case

Benjamin v. Bureau of Customs, 383 F. Supp. 2d 344 (D. Conn. 2005).

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