Connecticut General Statutes

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-8 (2026)

Criminal liability for acts of another

✓ current as of May 2026

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(a) A person, acting with the mental state required for commission of an offense, who solicits, requests, commands, importunes or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable for such conduct and may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender.

(b) A person who sells, delivers or provides any firearm, as defined in subdivision (19) of section 53a-3, to another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense knowing or under circumstances in which he should know that such other person intends to use such firearm in such conduct shall be criminally liable for such conduct and shall be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 8; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 2; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-2.)

History: 1971 act specified that person who requests, commands, aids, etc. another in the commission of an offense “may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender”; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 92-2 added Subsec. (b) re criminal liability for the conduct of another person with a firearm.

Passive acquiescence or doing of innocent acts which in fact aid in commission of crime, is insufficient to support conviction under accessory statute. 169 C. 581. To establish guilt of accused as accessory under section governing criminal liability for conduct of another, state must prove criminality of intent and community of unlawful purpose. 170 C. 332. Cited. Id., 417; 172 C. 322; 174 C. 500; 175 C. 155; 176 C. 131. Propriety of a charge on aiding and abetting predicated on sufficiency of evidence heard during trial. Id., 508. Cited. 177 C. 140; 178 C. 163; Id., 689; 179 C. 1. Jury instruction an intent under statute discussed. 182 C. 366. Cited. Id., 501; 184 C. 369; 185 C. 163; Id., 260; 187 C. 513; 188 C. 432; Id., 542; 189 C. 337; Id., 383; 190 C. 822; 191 C. 27; Id., 659; 192 C. 383; 194 C. 96; Id., 198; 195 C. 128; Id., 598; 196 C. 225; 197 C. 436; 198 C. 158; Id., 255; Id., 328; 199 C. 14; Id., 473; Id., 591; Id., 693; 200 C. 9; Id., 523; Id., 685; 201 C. 125; Id., 289; Id., 395; Id., 489; 202 C. 520; Id., 615; 203 C. 420; 204 C. 240; Id., 630; 207 C. 323; 208 C. 38; 209 C. 75; Id., 290; Id., 458; 210 C. 435; 211 C. 1; Id., 289; Id., 398; 212 C. 593; 213 C. 708; 214 C. 122; Id., 344; Id., 454; 215 C. 570; Id., 716; Id., 739; 216 C. 367; Id., 492; 217 C. 243; 219 C. 596; 220 C. 270; 221 C. 430; Id., 925; 222 C. 469; 223 C. 243; Id., 384; Id., 595; Id., 703; 225 C. 270; Id., 347; 227 C. 32; Id., 207; Id., 231; 228 C. 582; Id., 918; 230 C. 351; Id., 608; Id., 686; Id., 698; 231 C. 545; 232 C. 455; 233 C. 304; 234 C. 683; 235 C. 402; Id., 473; Id., 748; 236 C. 514; 237 C. 518; 238 C. 784; 239 C. 235; 240 C. 395; Id., 727; 241 C. 1; Id., 322; Id., 502; Id., 702; 242 C. 125; Id., 211; Id., 409; Id., 666. Conviction under section requires state to prove defendant's dual intent first that accessory have the intent to aid the principal and second that in so aiding he intends to commit offense with which he is charged. 252 C. 714. Principles of accessorial liability may be used to prove aggravating factors in penalty phase of a capital case. 271 C. 338. In accordance with 95 CA 362, to establish accessorial liability for manslaughter in first degree with firearm in violation of Sec. 53a-55a, state must prove that defendant, acting with intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, intentionally aided a principal offender in causing the death of such person or of a third person, and that the principal, in committing the act, used, carried or threatened to use a firearm. 300 C. 490. Defendant, having been hired to kill the victim, could be held accessorily liable for capital felony under Sec. 53a-54b(2) even if jury found that a codefendant, who was not a party to any hiring relationship, was the principal actor who killed the victim. 305 C. 101, but see 318 C. 1.

Cited. 4 CA 676; 7 CA 503; Id., 701; 9 CA 161; Id., 228; 11 CA 575; Id., 621; Id., 699; Id., 805; 12 CA 1. Being an accessory to breach of the peace is a cognizable crime. Id., 74. Cited. Id., 343; 13 CA 76; Id., 554; 14 CA 1; Id., 205; Id., 445; Id., 472; Id., 493; 15 CA 122; Id., 416; 16 CA 89; Id., 333; Id., 455; 17 CA 50; 18 CA 175; Id., 184; Id., 730; 19 CA 179; 20 CA 410; Id., 665; 22 CA 216; Id., 329; Id., 340; 23 CA 123; 25 CA 318; Id., 565; Id., 646; 26 CA 33; Id., 641; Id., 779; 27 CA 1; Id., 558; 28 CA 126; Id., 306; Id., 474; Id., 575; Id., 721; 29 CA 59; Id., 304; Id., 499; 30 CA 190; Id., 232; 31 CA 47; Id., 614; 32 CA 224; Id., 831; 33 CA 143; Id., 288; 34 CA 223; Id., 717, see 37 CA 509; 35 CA 138; Id., 360; Id., 527; Id., 781; 36 CA 190; Id., 454; Id., 473; Id., 753; Id., 774; 37 CA 35; Id., 40; Id., 276; Id., 509; Id., 574; 38 CA 777; 39 CA 224; Id., 242; Id., 579; 40 CA 47; Id., 470; Id., 526; Id., 789; 41 CA 47; Id., 565; 42 CA 555; 44 CA 499; Id., 790; 45 CA 270; 46 CA 269; Id., 640; Id., 778. Statute does not provide for a separate, substantive offense but provides alternate means by which the underlying substantive crime may be committed. 49 CA 121. Fact that defendant not formally charged as accessory does not preclude a conviction as such. Id., 183. State must prove that accused shared both the criminal intent and community of unlawful purpose with principal perpetrator of the crime. 63 CA 466. Court's charge re accessorial liability properly tracks language of section and correctly explained that acting as accessory merely is an alternative means of committing the substantive offense. 81 CA 152. When defendant is charged with manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm as an accessory, state must prove that defendant intended to inflict serious physical injury and to aid the principal in doing so, but does not have to also prove that defendant intended the use, carrying or threatened use of the firearm. 95 CA 362. There is no meaningful distinction between principal and accessory liability and defendant may be convicted as accessory even if charged as a principal. 105 CA 862. Evidence introduced at trial was sufficient to establish intent and defendant's identity with respect to charges stemming from drug transaction. 110 CA 70. Conviction as accessory to attempted robbery in the first degree pursuant to section does not require state to demonstrate that accused intended for an accomplice to possess a deadly weapon. 184 CA 24. Prohibition against double jeopardy is not always automatically violated simply because of contemporaneous convictions of the same offense as both a principal and as an accessory; double jeopardy is not implicated if a jury reasonably could find on the basis of the evidence presented that each charged offense was the result of a distinct act of independent legal significance, one committed as a principal and another as an accessory; trial court not constitutionally required to vacate defendant's conviction of two counts of assault in the first degree as an accessory because defendant's multiple punishments for assault as to each victim were premised not on a single criminal act but distinct repetitions of the same crime. 185 CA 1.

Defendant who operated boat while brother stole lobsters was criminally liable for intentionally aiding brother in the conduct that constituted the liable for intentionally aiding brother in the conduct that constituted the offense. 37 CS 809. Cited. 38 CS 301; 40 CS 38.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 242 C. 485. Jury did not have to find that defendant actually wielded knife during robbery; it had to find that defendant was a participant in the robbery. 275 C. 534. Trial court properly rejected defendant's claim that a defense of duress, if credited, would negate the required mental state governing accessorial liability, specific intent and duress can coexist. 282 C. 281. Statute deems the accessory to be the same as the principal for purposes of criminal liability and punishment. 336 C. 219.

Cited. 37 CA 464; 39 CA 333. To be guilty as accessory, one must share the criminal intent and community of unlawful purpose with perpetrator of the crime and must knowingly and willfully assist perpetrator in the acts which prepare for, facilitate or consummate it. 77 CA 80. Although the evidence did not reveal whether it was defendant or a coparticipant who had fired the fatal shot, the jury reasonably could have determined that there was sufficient concert of action between defendant and the coparticipant to support the accessory allegation. 136 CA 197; judgment reversed in part, see 336 C. 219..

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Notes of Decisions

Cited in 511 cases (39 in the last 5 years), 1975–2026 · leading case: State v. Peeler, 857 A.2d 808 (Conn. 2004).

Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment

State v. Peeler, 857 A.2d 808 (Conn. 2004). · cites it 16× “75 To *431 support this claim, the defendant argues that: (1) the plain language of General Statutes § 53a-8 76 indicates that principles of accessorial liability cannot be used to prove aggravating factors; (2) the plain language of General Statutes (Rev.”

State v. Foster, 522 A.2d 277 (Conn. 1987). · cites it 25× “Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-8, Commission Comment.”

State v. Padua, 869 A.2d 192 (Conn. 2005). · cites it 12× “The defendants were charged with: (1) possession of marijuana with intent to sell in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-8 5 and 21a-277 (b); 6 (2) possession of more than four ounces of marijuana in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-8 and 2 la-279 (b); 7 (3) possession of…”

State v. Stevenson, 849 A.2d 626 (Conn. 2004). · cites it 10× “The state charged the defendant, Jimmy Stevenson, with burglary in the second degree as an accessory in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-8 2 and 53a-102, 3 conspiracy to commit burglary in the second degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 4 and 53a-102, larceny in…”

State v. McCalpine, 463 A.2d 545 (Conn. 1983). · cites it 32× “The defendants' next claim of error focuses on the court's instructions to the jury regarding the defendants' status as aiders and abettors under General Statutes § 53a-8. [3] The record indicates that at trial the defendants neither filed an appropriate request to charge nor…”

State v. Adams, 623 A.2d 42 (Conn. 1993). · cites it 15× “The state requested that the jury be charged on felony murder, which included a charge on accessorial liability under General Statutes § 53a-8. 9 The defendant subsequently requested that the jury be charged on the defense of renunciation under § 53a-10, a defense which is only…”

State v. Gonzalez, 15 A.3d 1049 (Conn. 2011). · cites it 24× “1 General Statutes § 53a-8 provides in relevant part: “(a) A person, acting with the mental state required for commission of an offense, who solicits, requests, commands, importunes or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be…”

State v. Fleming, 502 A.2d 886 (Conn. 1986). · cites it 12× “The defendant’s next challenge to the jury instructions concerns that portion of the charge that dealt with *271 accessorial liability under General Statutes § 53a-8. General Statutes § 53a-8 provides in relevant part: “A person, acting with the mental state required for…”

State v. Smith, 344 Conn. 229 (Conn. 2022). · cites it 17× “In the first case, the defendant was charged with robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-8 (a) and 53a-134 (a) (4) and conspiracy to com- mit robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 (a) and 53a-134 (a) (4) for the…”

State v. Greene, 874 A.2d 750 (Conn. 2005). · cites it 10× “The defendant, Mashawn Greene, was convicted after a jury trial of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm as an accessory in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-8 (a) 1 and 53a-55a, 2 conspir *137 acy to commit manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm in…”

State v. Smith, 563 A.2d 671 (Conn. 1989). · cites it 14× “*598 I The defendant first claims that the trial court erred in charging the jury under General Statutes § 53a-8, 3 criminal liability for acts of another, because there was insufficient evidence to support the charge.”

State v. Heinemann, 920 A.2d 278 (Conn. 2007). · cites it 12× “The defendant was charged in a ten count substitute information with conspiracy to commit robbery in the second degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 (a) 1 and 53a-135 (a) (2); 2 accessory to robbery in the *284 second degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-8…”

Show all 511 citing cases →

— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-8(a) — 8 cases

Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007).

State v. Lopez, 911 A.2d 1099 (Conn. 2007).

State v. Frasier, 150 A.3d 1176 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016).

State v. Raynor, 167 A.3d 1076 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).

State v. Hamlett, 939 A.2d 1256 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008).

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.