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Conn. Gen. Stat.Title 53a — Penal CodeChapter 952 — Penal Code: Offenses

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-49 (2025)

Criminal attempt: Sufficiency of conduct; renunciation as defense

Edition and currency
laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1976–2026 947citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 947 opinions since 1976, 70 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (a)(2) (20 cases).

(a) A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of mental state required for commission of the crime, he: (1) Intentionally engages in conduct which would constitute the crime if attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be; or (2) intentionally does or omits to do anything which, under the circumstances as he believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime.

(b) Conduct shall not be held to constitute a substantial step under subdivision (2) of subsection (a) of this section unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose. Without negating the sufficiency of other conduct, the following, if strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose, shall not be held insufficient as a matter of law: (1) Lying in wait, searching for or following the contemplated victim of the crime; (2) enticing or seeking to entice the contemplated victim of the crime to go to the place contemplated for its commission; (3) reconnoitering the place contemplated for the commission of the crime; (4) unlawful entry of a structure, vehicle or enclosure in which it is contemplated that the crime will be committed; (5) possession of materials to be employed in the commission of the crime, which are specially designed for such unlawful use or which can serve no lawful purpose of the actor under the circumstances; (6) possession, collection or fabrication of materials to be employed in the commission of the crime, at or near the place contemplated for its commission, where such possession, collection or fabrication serves no lawful purpose of the actor under the circumstances; (7) soliciting an innocent agent to engage in conduct constituting an element of the crime.

(c) When the actor's conduct would otherwise constitute an attempt under subsection (a) of this section, it shall be a defense that he abandoned his effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevented its commission, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 50; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 17; P.A. 92-260, S. 25.)

History: 1971 act amended Subsec. (c) to remove reference to “affirmative” defense; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes.

See Sec. 53a-50 re effect of motivation on renunciation.

Cited. 169 C. 377; Id., 581; 173 C. 254; Id., 317; Id., 360; 174 C. 16; Id., 142; 175 C. 398; 179 C. 1; 180 C. 481; 182 C. 207; Id., 430; Id., 595; 183 C. 29; 184 C. 157; 185 C. 163; Id., 199; 186 C. 261; 187 C. 681; 189 C. 383; 193 C. 70; Id., 602; 194 C. 233; Id., 241; Id., 408; 195 C. 611; 196 C. 36; Id., 567; 198 C. 124; 199 C. 14; Id., 155; Id., 591; 200 C. 30; 201 C. 174; Id., 190; Id., 289; Id., 605; 202 C. 259; Id., 509; Id., 520; 203 C. 445; Id., 484; 204 C. 630; 205 C. 61; Id., 616; 206 C. 213; 207 C. 1; 209 C. 34; 210 C. 519; Id., 652; 214 C. 454; 215 C. 695; Id., 716; 216 C. 585; Id., 647; 218 C. 747; 220 C. 384; Id., 765; 221 C. 109; 222 C. 117; Id., 718; 226 C. 497; 227 C. 301; 228 C. 384; Id., 393; 229 C. 125; 231 C. 235; 232 C. 455; 235 C. 397; Id., 40; Id., 469; Id., 502; Id., 748; 236 C. 266; 237 C. 501; Id., 518; Id., 748; 238 C. 389; 241 C. 1; Id., 413; Id., 502; 242 C. 125; Id., 389; Id., 648. In charge of attempt to commit sexual assault, conduct of a suspect who, for the purpose ultimately of having sex with a person whom the suspect believes to be a child, travels to a prearranged place to meet that child, is sufficient to constitute a substantial step in furtherance of the planned crime even if the person to be met is in fact an undercover officer and section is not unconstitutionally vague based on these facts. 277 C. 155. It is possible to commit the crime of home invasion without committing the crime of attempt to commit assault in the first degree, therefore home invasion in violation of Sec. 53a-100aa(a)(2) and attempt to commit assault in the first degree in violation of section and Sec. 53a-59(a)(1) are not the same offense for purposes of double jeopardy. 343 C. 470.

Cited. 1 CA 344; 2 CA 333; 3 CA 166; 6 CA 24; 7 CA 1; Id., 257; Id., 367; Id., 503; Id., 701; 8 CA 351; Id., 496; Id., 545; Id., 631; 9 CA 169; judgment reversed, see 205 C. 370; Id., 587; 10 CA 130; Id., 503; 12 CA 32; Id., 163; Id., 217; Id., 395; Id., 604; Id., 685; 13 CA 69; 14 CA 526; 15 CA 531; Id., 704; 16 CA 38; Id., 284; 17 CA 359; 19 CA 618; Id., 631; 20 CA 27; 21 CA 326; Id., 386; 22 CA 199; Id., 340; Id., 449; 23 CA 160; Id., 315; 24 CA 13; Id., 624; Id., 697; 25 CA 104; Id., 298; Id., 334; Id., 433; Id., 578; Id., 725; 27 CA 73; Id., 403; Id., 601; 28 CA 34; Id., 64; Id., 469; 30 CA 26; Id., 406; judgment reversed, see 228 C. 335; 31 CA 370; 33 CA 339; judgment reversed in part, see 232 C. 431; judgment reversed on issues of sufficiency of evidence and jury misconduct, see 235 C. 502; 34 CA 103; Id., 223; 35 CA 51; Id., 138; Id., 740; 36 CA 161; Id., 336; Id., 641; Id., 680; Id., 805; Id., 831; 37 CA 62; judgment reversed, see 237 C. 501; Id., 733; 38 CA 777; Id., 581; 39 CA 1; Id., 18; Id., 267; Id., 333; Id., 789; Id., 810; 40 CA 60; Id., 374; Id., 483; 41 CA 515; Id., 751; 42 CA 472; 43 CA 61; Id., 252; Id., 599; 44 CA 6; Id., 70; Id., 231; Id., 476; 45 CA 390; 46 CA 684; Id., 691; Id., 734. Jury was within its right to conclude that defendant, armed with dangerous instrument, entered apartment unlawfully with intent to commit a robbery, but once inside, did not do anything which constituted a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in a robbery or that he abandoned his attempt. 87 CA 251. To be guilty of attempt, defendant's conscious objective must be to cause result which would constitute the substantive crime. 107 CA 517. Attempt to commit robbery in first degree in violation of this section and conspiracy to commit robbery in violation of Sec. 53a-48 are separate and distinct offenses for purposes of double jeopardy. 118 CA 35. Threats, in connection with holding knife and advancing towards victim, are sufficient evidence for jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant took a substantial step toward the commission of assault in the first degree. 127 CA 1.

Cited. 33 CS 599; 37 CS 755; 38 CS 464; 39 CS 347.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 177 C. 140; 178 C. 689; 182 C. 176; Id., 585; part of ruling in 182 C. 585, in which court had ruled that defendant was entitled on remand to a direction of acquittal with respect to a count improperly added to other charges of which defendant had had proper notice, overruled, see 224 C. 1; 188 C. 574; 189 C. 303; 190 C. 822; 194 C. 258; 195 C. 651; 198 C. 53; 199 C. 255; 200 C. 44; Id., 607; 205 C. 528; Id., 673; 207 C. 646; 208 C. 202; 209 C. 416; Id., 733; 211 C. 18; Id., 441; Id., 555; 212 C. 31; Id., 50; 216 C. 492; 217 C. 243; 220 C. 408; Id., 652; Id., 928; 221 C. 402; Id., 915; 222 C. 556; 224 C. 397; 225 C. 524; 227 C. 616; 228 C. 234; 229 C. 60; Id., 839; 232 C. 431; judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502; 233 C. 502; 238 C. 313; 240 C. 395; 241 C. 322; Id., 802; 242 C. 485. Evidence that defendant merely solicited a murder by mailing a coded letter from the correctional facility where he was incarcerated, without any accompanying or following act of perpetration, was insufficient to support conviction for attempted murder. 262 C. 295. An instruction on Subdiv. (1) should be given when evidence indicates that perpetrator failed to accomplish or complete all elements of a particular crime solely because attendant circumstances were not as perpetrator believed them to be, rendering commission of the crime impossible, while an instruction under Subdiv. (2) should be given when perpetrator's conduct falls short of completed offense for reasons other than impossibility; under unique circumstances of case, where information was not specific to which part of attempt statute state was alleging, evidence presented did not clarify this omission, and trial court instructed jury only on Subdiv. (1), there was insufficient evidence to convict. 293 C. 234, but see 317 C. 292. Subdiv. (2): Because there were two separate and distinct transactions, defendant could be convicted of attempted robbery in the first degree and robbery in the first degree without offending the prohibition on double jeopardy. 299 C. 640. Attendant circumstances provision in Subdiv. (1) is not limited to situation where it is impossible for defendant to commit the crime, and applied where defendant admitted to assaulting victim with intent to kill her and believed that he had killed her; substantial step provision in Subdiv. (2) criminalizes certain conduct that would not violate attendant circumstances provision in Subdiv. (1), and both provisions ensure elimination of the impossibility defense. 317 C. 292. Determination of what conduct constitutes a substantial step focuses on what the actor has already done rather than what the actor has left to do to complete the substantive crime. 331 C. 1.

Cited. 5 CA 586; 6 CA 164; Id., 476; 7 CA 149; Id., 257; 10 CA 217; Id., 462; 11 CA 80; 12 CA 221; 13 CA 12; Id., 237; 14 CA 309; judgment reversed, see 212 C. 50; 15 CA 222; Id., 416; 23 CA 663; Id., 692; 24 CA 27; judgment reversed, see 220 C. 652; Id., 264; 26 CA 52; Id., 65; Id., 114; Id., 242; Id., 367; Id., 433; Id., 779; 28 CA 290; Id., 306; Id., 402; Id., 548; 29 CA 39; Id., 262; 30 CA 9; Id., 68; Id., 470; Id., 606; 31 CA 120; Id., 385; 33 CA 368; Id., 647; Id., 743; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 502; 35 CA 279; Id., 699; 36 CA 41; Id., 718; 38 CA 536; 39 CA 224; Id., 242; 40 CA 387; Id., 624; 41 CA 47; Id., 287; 42 CA 264; 43 CA 488; Id., 578; Id., 619; Id., 680; Id., 785; 44 CA 499; 45 CA 658; Id., 756. Proof of prior plan or premeditation not necessary to establish criminal liability for attempted murder. 47 CA 401. Subdiv. (2) cited re testimony of sole witness sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and re showing that victim had custody or control over appropriated property is sufficient to support a charge of larceny. 49 CA 486. Subdiv. (2): Defendant took substantial step in hiring an agent to commit an arson even though agent was not actually paid; to constitute a substantial step, consummation of the deed is not required. 59 CA 362. Statutory provisions codified common law distinction between the acts of solicitation and attempt and an attempt not a solicitation under Sec. 53a-179a. 65 CA 145. On basis of the evidence, jury could reasonably conclude that defendant intended to force victim to have sexual intercourse with him and intended to compel sexual intercourse by use of force or the threat of use of force. 75 CA 447. To be guilty of crime of attempt to commit assault in the first degree, defendant must be shown to have had the mental state required to commit assault in the first degree and fact that the wounds actually inflicted by defendant were relatively minor does not mean that there was insufficient evidence to find that he intended to inflict serious injury. 78 CA 646. Evidence which established that defendant arranged for sale of heroin to undercover police officer then left his residence and traveled in the direction of designated meeting place for the sale was sufficient to find defendant guilty of attempt to commit a crime, in particular, the sale of narcotics by a person who is not drug dependent in violation of Sec. 21a-278(b). 82 CA 111. Intent required for crime of attempted assault of a peace officer is the intent to prevent the officer from performing duties, regardless of whether injury is intended. 96 CA 634. Subdiv. (2): Conviction as accessory to attempted robbery in the first degree does not require state to demonstrate that accused intended for accomplice to possess a deadly weapon. “Circumstances as he believes them to be” language does not establish additional specific intent element necessitating proof that defendant believed one of his accomplices was armed with deadly weapon during attempted robbery. 184 CA 24. Attempted murder under this section and assault in the first degree under Sec. 53a-59(a) are not the same offense for purposes of double jeopardy. 204 CA 207.

Cited. 41 CS 229; 43 CS 46.

Subsec. (b):

Cited. 194 C. 258; 211 C. 555.

Court rejected defendant's argument that “following” must have a predatory thrust and requires proximity in space as well as in time; the jury could reasonably have concluded that defendant followed the intended victim. 105 CA 335.

Subsec. (c):

Cited. 221 C. 915.

Cited. 17 CA 128. Renunciation by defendant found not to be voluntary where defendant failed to continue course of criminal conduct because of circumstances of fellow inmate's early release and rumors that defendant's conversations were being recorded. 59 CA 362.

The 20 cases that cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-49 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. Daniel B., 201 A.3d 989 (Conn. 2019).
cites § 53a-49 63×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 53a-49
“I disagree that those preliminary discussions, without more, constitute a substantial step under General Statutes § 53a-49 and, therefore, I respectfully dissent.”
2
GREENState v. Sorabella, 891 A.2d 897 (Conn. 2006).
cites § 53a-49 30×cited by 78 cases
Where it cites § 53a-49
“” Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-49 ( West 2001 ), comment of the commission to revise the criminal statutes.”
The case’s holding
A defendant may be convicted of attempted sexual assault even if they have not yet physically met the victim (attempted sexual assault).
Later courts cite it for
“because a trial court's 46 ruling under porter involves the admissibility of evidence, we review that ruling on appeal for an abuse of discretion.” · 2 citing courts
3
GREENSmall v. Comm'r of Corr., 909 A.2d 533 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006).
cites § 53a-49 46×subsections: (a)(2) 18× (a) 3× (b)cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 53a-49
“In this case, the trial court instructed the jury on the elements of robbery in the first degree and the elements of felony murder, but it never explained the concept of attempt as an element of the crime of attempt to commit robbery, nor did it provide the jury with the…”
Later courts cite it for
“an expert witness is not essential to show that an attorney's performance was so deficient that it fell below the standard of reasonably effective assistance, but in many cases, expert testimony is useful.” · 2 citing courts
4
GREENState v. Flowers, 898 A.2d 789 (Conn. 2006).
cites § 53a-49 30×cited by 27 cases
Where it cites § 53a-49
“" The second count of the information charged the defendant with attempt to commit assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a)(2) and 53a-59 (a)(4), [2] specifically alleging that on the same date the defendant had entered 163-4 Mark Lane at…”
The case’s holding
A trial court may cure an improper intent instruction during a burglary charge through curative closing argument under specific circumstances (clarifying proper intent instruction and circumstances for curative argument).
Later courts cite it for
“a person cannot be charged with entering a building intending the specific result of failing to commit a crime” · 1 citing court
5
GREENState v. Gonzalez, 609 A.2d 1003 (Conn. 1992).
cites § 53a-49 43×cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 53a-49
“3; see Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-49, commission comment (West 1983); see also D.”
The case’s holding
A mislabeled attempt instruction is harmless where the charge as a whole conveys every element of attempted murder under the substantial-step subdivision.
6
GREENState v. O'neil, 782 A.2d 209 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001).
cites § 53a-49 34×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 53a-49
“The defendant, Caesar O’Neil, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of attempt to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a) (2) 1 and 53a-54a (a).”
Later courts cite it for
“there has been much debate whether mere solicitation constitutes an attempt . . . . most courts will answer 'no.” · 2 citing courts
7
GREENSmall v. Comm'r of Corr., 946 A.2d 1203 (Conn. 2008).
cites § 53a-49 13×cited by 127 cases
Where it cites § 53a-49
“First, the petitioner claimed that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he failed to seek a jury instruction on “[c]riminal attempt” as defined in General Statutes § 53a-49 and failed to object to the trial court’s omission of such an instruction in its charge…”
The case’s holding
To establish ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a petitioner must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error, he would have prevailed on his direct appeal.
Later courts cite it for
“a criminal defendant's right to the effective assistance of counsel extends through the first appeal of right and is guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the united states constitution and by article first, 8, of the connecticut constitution.” · 3 citing courts
8
GREENState v. Brown, 668 A.2d 1288 (Conn. 1995).
cites § 53a-49 18×cited by 169 cases
Where it cites § 53a-49
“After a jury trial, the defendant, Lionel Brown, was convicted of, inter alia, 1 forgery in the third degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-140 (a) 2 and attempted larceny *505 in the third degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a) and 53a-124 (a) (2).”
The case’s holding
A trial court must conduct a preliminary inquiry on the record whenever it is presented with allegations of jury misconduct in a criminal case regardless of counsel requests.
Later courts cite it for
“a trial court must conduct a preliminary inquiry, on the record, whenever it is presented with any allegations of jury misconduct in a criminal case, regardless of whether an inquiry is requested by counsel.” · 6 citing courts
9
REDState v. Flowers, 858 A.2d 827 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004).
cites § 53a-49 22×subsections: (a)(2) 9× (a) 2×cited by 17 cases
Reversed by State v. Flowers (2006): the Supreme Court of Connecticut's own opinion in this case.
Where it cites § 53a-49
“1 On appeal, the defendant raises the following claims: (1) there was insufficient evidence to convict him of burglary; (2) his burglary conviction is inconsistent with the jury’s inability to reach a verdict on two charges of attempt to commit assault in the first degree in…”
10
GREENState v. Almeda, 455 A.2d 1326 (Conn. 1983).
cites § 53a-49 18×cited by 59 cases
Where it cites § 53a-49
“The defendant was further charged by information with the crime of attempt to commit the murder of one Ricky Wynn by the use of a firearm in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a) (2) and 53a-54a.”
The case’s holding
A defendant must raise a claim of juror bias from the realm of speculation to the realm of fact to succeed on such a claim.
Later courts cite it for
“to succeed on a claim of bias the defendant must raise his contention of bias from the realm of speculation to the realm of fact.” · 4 citing courts
11
GREENState v. Fagan, 905 A.2d 1101 (Conn. 2006).
cites § 53a-49 8×subsections: (a)(2) 2×cited by 120 cases
Where it cites § 53a-49
“one count of second degree harassment in violation of General Statutes § 53a-183 (a)(3), one count of criminal violation of a protective order in violation of § 53a-223, one count of reckless driving in violation of § 14-222, one count of attempt to escape or elude a police…”
The case’s holding
A defendant's status as being on release at the time of an offense is a legal determination rather than a factual inquiry requiring a jury trial.
Later courts cite it for
“the first two golding requirements involve whether the claim is reviewable, and the second two involve whether there was constitutional error requiring a new trial.” · 4 citing courts
12
GREENState v. Cox, 977 A.2d 614 (Conn. 2009).
cites § 53a-49 25×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 53a-49
“3 General Statutes § 53a-49 (a) provides: “A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of mental state required for commission of the crime, he: (1) Intentionally engages in conduct which would constitute the crime if attendant circumstances were…”
13
GREENState v. Hinton, 630 A.2d 593 (Conn. 1993).
cites § 53a-49 10×cited by 156 cases
Where it cites § 53a-49
“A jury convicted the defendant, Ronnie Hinton, of three counts of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a, 1 one count of capital felony in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54b, 2 one count of attempted murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 and 53a-54a,…”
The case’s holding
The successful killing of an intended victim does not prevent the transfer of intent to an unintended victim (transferred intent).
Later courts cite it for
“the existence of the essential elements for one offense negates the existence of the essential elements for another offense of which the defendant also stands convicted.” · 6 citing courts
14
GREENState v. Washington, 546 A.2d 911 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988).
cites § 53a-49 24×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 53a-49
“instruct the jury adequately on all the essential elements of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (1); (3) whether the court’s instruction with respect to General Statutes § 53a-49 (b) unconstitutionally limited the jury in its role as factfinder of an essential element of the crime…”
15
GREENState v. Tok, 945 A.2d 558 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008).
cites § 53a-49 15×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 53a-49
“Though the circumstances may be misapprehended, if one purposely engages in conduct which would constitute the elements of the crime if the attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be the actor is guilty of criminal attempt.”
16
YELLOWState v. James, 560 A.2d 426 (Conn. 1989).
cites § 53a-49 9×cited by 120 cases
Overruled by State v. Douglas C. on other grounds: 2 citing opinions limit it to other grounds.
Where it cites § 53a-49
“After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of attempted sexual assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a) (2) and 53a-71 (a) (1); sexual assault in the fourth degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-73a (a) (1) (A); and risk of injury…”
The case’s holding
A statute declaring child victims of assault or abuse competent to testify without prior qualification is constitutional and does not infringe upon judicial power.
Later courts cite it for
“the state might well have complained that such a charge imposed a far greater burden upon it than the standard requirement that only the inference of guilt as to each element of the crime, as distinguished from the totality of the subordinate facts from which the inference is to be drawn, need be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” · 3 citing courts
17
GREENLuurtsema v. Comm'r of Corr., 12 A.3d 817 (Conn. 2011).
cites § 53a-49 8×cited by 53 cases
Where it cites § 53a-49
“On February 17, 2000, the petitioner was convicted, after a jury trial, of attempted sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a)(2) and 53a-70 (a)(1), kidnapping in the first degree in violation of § 53a-92 (a)(2)(A), assault in the second…”
The case’s holding
A general presumption in favor of full retroactivity applies to judicial decisions that narrow the scope of liability of a criminal statute.
Later courts cite it for
“a general presumption in favor of full retroactivity for judicial decisions that narrow the scope of liability of a criminal statute.” · 2 citing courts
18
GREENState v. Green, 480 A.2d 526 (Conn. 1984).
cites § 53a-49 11×cited by 68 cases
Where it cites § 53a-49
“Under General Statutes § 53a-49 (a), “[a] person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of mental state required for commission of the crime he: (1) Intentionally engages in conduct which would constitute the crime if attendant circumstances were as…”
The case’s holding
A person is guilty of an attempt if they intentionally perform a substantial step toward committing a crime based on their perception of the circumstances.
Later courts cite it for
“a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of mental state required for commission of the crime he . . . intentionally does or omits to do anything which, under the circumstances as he believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime.” · 2 citing courts
19
GREENState v. Gilchrist, 591 A.2d 131 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991).
cites § 53a-49 17×cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 53a-49
“The defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction of two counts of attempted murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 and 53a-54a (a), two counts of assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60 (a) (1), and one count of assault in the first…”
Later courts cite it for
“a presumption under blockburger that there are two crimes which may warrant two punishments may be rebutted ' "by showing a clear legislative intent that the two statutes be treated as one for double jeopardy purposes.” · 2 citing courts
20
GREENState v. John, 557 A.2d 93 (Conn. 1989).
cites § 53a-49 8×cited by 138 cases
Where it cites § 53a-49
“VIII A The defendants next claim that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on alternative theories of robbery, under General Statutes § 53a-133, larceny, under General Statutes § 53a-119, and attempt, under General Statutes § 53a-49 (a), when there was no evidence or…”
The case’s holding
No rule of law declares the precise facts that must be proved before an expert opinion may be received in evidence.
Later courts cite it for
“there is no rule of law declaring the precise facts which must be proved before his opinion may be received in evidence.” · 1 citing court

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
197620012026

One bar per year. Tallest: 38 cases in 2008. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Conn. App. Ct.660Conn.259D. Conn.13Conn. Super. Ct.6Ala.1BIA1Colo.1D.C.1

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 13 courts in all.

By subsection
(a)12 cases
State v. Lopez, 911 A.2d 1099 (Conn. 2007).
State v. Moore, 981 A.2d 1030 (Conn. 2009).
State v. Adams, 173 A.3d 943 (Conn. 2017).
Small v. Comm'r of Corr., 909 A.2d 533 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006).“In this case, the trial court instructed the jury on the elements of robbery in the first degree and the elements of felony murder, but it never explained the concept of attempt as an element of the crime of attempt to commit robbery, nor did it provide the jury with the…”
State v. Flowers, 858 A.2d 827 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004).“1 On appeal, the defendant raises the following claims: (1) there was insufficient evidence to convict him of burglary; (2) his burglary conviction is inconsistent with the jury’s inability to reach a verdict on two charges of attempt to commit assault in the first degree in…”
Showing the top 5 of 12. More in the list view →
(a)(2)20 cases
Small v. Comm'r of Corr., 909 A.2d 533 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006).
State v. Flowers, 858 A.2d 827 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004).
State v. Vega, 187 A.3d 424 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018).
State v. Fagan, 905 A.2d 1101 (Conn. 2006).“one count of second degree harassment in violation of General Statutes § 53a-183 (a)(3), one count of criminal violation of a protective order in violation of § 53a-223, one count of reckless driving in violation of § 14-222, one count of attempt to escape or elude a police…”
State v. Burgos, 155 A.3d 246 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
Showing the top 5 of 20. More in the list view →
(b)2 cases
State v. Juarez, 180 A.3d 1015 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018).
Small v. Comm'r of Corr., 909 A.2d 533 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006).
(b)(7)1 case
State v. Juarez, 180 A.3d 1015 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018).

Show all 947 citing cases (list view) →

Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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