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Conn. Gen. Stat.Title 53a — Penal CodeChapter 952 — Penal Code: Offenses

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-48 (2025)

Conspiracy. Renunciation

Edition and currency
laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1971–2026 1,006citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 1,006 opinions since 1971, 100 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (a) (25 cases).

(a) A person is guilty of conspiracy when, with intent that conduct constituting a crime be performed, he agrees with one or more persons to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct, and any one of them commits an overt act in pursuance of such conspiracy.

(b) It shall be a defense to a charge of conspiracy that the actor, after conspiring to commit a crime, thwarted the success of the conspiracy, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 48, 49; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 16.)

History: 1971 act amended Subsec. (b) to remove reference to “affirmative” defense.

See Sec. 53a-50 re effect of motivation on renunciation.

Cited. 169 C. 377; Id., 517; Id., 642. Generally, may prosecute and sentence defendant for both conspiracy to commit offense and offense itself; Wharton's rule: An agreement by two persons to commit crime which necessarily requires participation of two persons cannot be prosecuted as conspiracy; rule currently valid only as presumption of legislative intent; exception to rule when more persons than required participate; abuse of conspiracy charge to bring in otherwise improper evidence. 171 C. 105. Cited. Id., 524; 172 C. 74; 174 C. 135; Id., 338; Id., 376; 176 C. 131; 177 C. 370; 178 C. 67; Id., 163; Id., 649. Defendant is entitled to a theory of defense instruction as a matter of law when evidence under section is before jury. Id., 704. Cited. 180 C. 481; 182 C. 262; Id., 595; 184 C. 369; 186 C. 426; Id., 648; Id., 696; 187 C. 109; Id., 264; Id., 513; 188 C. 515; Id., 542; Id., 671; 189 C. 201; Id., 337; 190 C. 259; 191 C. 360; 194 C. 18; Id., 361; 195 C. 128; Id., 183; Id., 598; 196 C. 115; Id., 567; 197 C. 201; Id., 326; Id., 413; Id., 644. There is no such thing as a conspiracy to commit a crime which is defined in terms of recklessly or negligently causing a result, therefore conspiracy to commit arson in the third degree in violation of this statute and Sec. 53a-113 is not crime cognizable under state law. 199 C. 1. Cited. Id., 14; 200 C. 113; Id., 310; 201 C. 489; 202 C. 520; 204 C. 240; Id., 630; 207 C. 323; 209 C. 1; 210 C. 435; 211 C. 289; 212 C. 195; Id., 387; Id., 593; 213 C. 233. Conspiracy charge against defendant is barred after acquittal of sole alleged coconspirator; conspiracy statute as “bilateral” in nature discussed. Id., 243. Cited. Id., 422; Id., 708; 215 C. 716; Id., 739; 216 C. 801; 218 C. 349; Id., 432; 220 C. 602; Id., 765; 221 C. 447; Id., 595; 223 C. 243; Id., 384; 224 C. 322; 225 C. 270; Id., 347; 227 C. 1; Id., 32; Id., 207; 235 C. 397; Id., 679; Id., 748; 236 C. 176; Id., 514; 237 C. 518; 238 C. 380; 239 C. 56; Id., 481; 240 C. 210; Id., 708; 241 C. 322; 242 C. 93. The requisite evidence of an agreement between individuals accused as coconspirators may be provided by a coconspirator's conduct at the scene. 290 C. 816. Conspiracy to commit a reckless act is not a cognizable crime in this state because it is legally impossible to conspire to commit or achieve an unintentional or reckless act. 305 C. 101, but see 318 C. 1. To satisfy specific intent requirements for a conviction of conspiracy to distribute drugs, state must proffer evidence of an agreement to distribute drugs, in addition to mere buyer-seller relationship. 311 C. 1.

Cited. 1 CA 524; 3 CA 503; 5 CA 347; Id., 491; Id., 599; 8 CA 119; Id., 478; Id., 667; 9 CA 548; 10 CA 130; Id., 147; Id., 447; 11 CA 397; Id., 621; 14 CA 205; Id., 445; Id., 605; Id., 807; 15 CA 122; Id., 328; Id., 539; 16 CA 18; Id., 601; 17 CA 247; Id., 648; 19 CA 554; Id., 640; 21 CA 299; Id., 386; Id., 519; 22 CA 449; Id., 567; 23 CA 502; Id., 615; Id., 667; 24 CA 316; Id., 493; 26 CA 94; Id., 667; Id., 779; 27 CA 596; 28 CA 34; Id., 126; Id., 416; 29 CA 359; Id., 843; 30 CA 190; Id., 232; Id., 550; Id., 654; Id., 712; 32 CA 224; 33 CA 253; Id., 409; 34 CA 751; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211; 35 CA 714; Id., 839; 36 CA 59; Id., 190; Id., 454; Id., 556; Id., 631; Id., 672; Id., 753; Id., 774; 37 CA 219; Id., 456; judgment reversed, see 236 C. 176; 38 CA 481; Id., 536; Id., 581; Id., 777; Id., 868; 39 CA 224; Id., 333; Id., 526; Id., 550; 40 CA 515; Id., 789; 41 CA 47; Id., 147; Id., 495; 42 CA 472; Id., 500; Id., 555; Id., 687; 43 CA 142; Id., 252; Id., 555; 44 CA 338; 45 CA 110; Id., 282; Id., 455; 46 CA 684; Id., 791. Elements of crime of conspiracy under section discussed. 63 CA 82. Statute is bilateral in nature in that conspiracy requires a showing that two or more coconspirators intended to engage in or cause conduct that constitutes a crime. 64 CA 384. Conviction and sentencing for multiple conspiracy offenses based on a single agreement is double jeopardy violation. 65 CA 788. Elements of crime of conspiracy discussed. 70 CA 393. There was sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knowingly entered into a conspiracy to possess a narcotic substance with intent to sell. 75 CA 223. Jury instructions on conspiracy to commit murder must indicate that state was required to prove intent to agree or conspire to commit murder and intent to cause murder. 92 CA 92. Attempt to commit robbery in first degree in violation of Sec. 53a-49 and conspiracy to commit robbery in violation of this section are separate and distinct offenses for purposes of double jeopardy. 118 CA 35. Defendant's sentences on four separate conspiracy charges arising from two incidents constituted double jeopardy. 124 CA 9. Conviction for two conspiracy charges arising from same agreement constituted double jeopardy. 125 CA 307. Conspiracy is a specific intent crime, with the intent divided into two elements: The intent to agree or conspire, and the intent to commit the offense which is the object of the conspiracy. 126 CA 192. Conviction of conspiracy to possess narcotics under Sec. 21a-279(a) and conspiracy to possess narcotics with intent to sell under Sec. 21a-277(a) constitutes double jeopardy. 137 CA 733. Conviction for conspiracy to commit false statement under Sec. 53a-157b and conspiracy to fabricate physical evidence under Sec. 53a-155 pursuant to the same unlawful agreement violates constitutional protection against double jeopardy. 138 CA 420; judgment reversed in part, see 325 C. 399. Multiple sentences for 3 separate conspiracies arising out of a single unlawful agreement violates prohibition against double jeopardy. 144 CA 731; judgment affirmed, see 320 C. 781. Evidence insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant or alleged coconspirator stole headphones, either as a substantive crime or as overt act in furtherance of conspiracy. 164 CA 25.

Cited. 29 CS 344; 30 CS 211. Overt act is essential element of offense and must be alleged in information charging conspiracy. 35 CS 96. Cited. 36 CS 603; 37 CS 527; Id., 853; 38 CS 301; Id., 374; Id., 593.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 177 C. 243; 189 C. 752; 192 C. 383; 199 C. 389; 200 C. 586; 201 C. 289; 203 C. 420; 207 C. 118; 210 C. 78; Id., 619; 212 C. 50; Id., 485; 213 C. 243; 214 C. 122; Id., 344; 215 C. 570; 217 C. 243; 218 C. 151; 223 C. 635; 227 C. 363; 230 C. 351; 232 C. 431; judgment superseded by en banc reconsideration, see 235 C. 502; Id., 537; 235 C. 502; 239 C. 235; Id., 467; 240 C. 727; 241 C. 1; Id., 502; 242 C. 125; Id., 296. Appellate Court in 41 CA 495 reversed trial court's judgment on grounds of insufficient evidence to convict, judgment of Appellate Court reversed. Id., 485. Evidence was sufficient to support conspiracy conviction. 253 C. 354. Where two defendants were tried separately and their respective juries were presented with separate, independent evidence of their agreement to commit the crime in question, acquittal of defendant's coconspirator did not nullify defendant's conviction of the same charge. 257 C. 587. To prove defendant guilty of conspiracy to commit robbery in the second degree in violation of Subsec. and Sec. 53a-135(a)(2), state needs to prove defendant specifically agreed that there would be the display or threatened use of what was represented as a deadly weapon or dangerous object during the robbery or immediate flight therefrom. 315 C. 451.

Cited. 7 CA 701; 9 CA 313; 14 CA 309; judgment reversed, see 212 C. 50; Id., 688; 15 CA 416; 16 CA 245; Id., 402; 18 CA 134; 19 CA 179; Id., 195; 20 CA 665; 22 CA 340; 23 CA 602; Id., 746; judgment reversed, see 221 C. 595; 25 CA 3; Id., 21; Id., 318; 26 CA 279; 27 CA 558; Id., 161; Id., 306; Id., 474; Id., 645; Id., 721; 29 CA 59; Id., 207; 31 CA 370; 32 CA 842; 33 CA 122; Id., 339; judgment reversed, see 235 C. 502; Id., 647; 34 CA 58; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 537; Id., 96; judgment reversed, see 232 C. 537; Id., 595; 35 CA 740; 36 CA 41; Id., 483; Id., 488; 37 CA 156; Id., 360; Id., 574; 38 CA 434; 39 CA 63; Id., 242; Id., 579; Id., 645; 40 CA 47; Id., 526; 43 CA 488; Id., 830; 44 CA 499; 45 CA 270; 46 CA 640. Conviction for conspiracy to sell a controlled substance within one thousand five hundred feet of a public housing project reversed where trial court instructed that jury must find that conspiracy occurred within one thousand five hundred feet of public housing project; the law is not concerned with where the plan was hatched, but with where conspirators proposed to carry out its unlawful purpose. 73 CA 386. The nexus between defendant's role in the conspiracy and illegal conduct of his coconspirators was not so attenuated or remote that it would be unjust to hold him responsible for the criminal conduct of his coconspirators. 107 CA 413. Nothing in Subsec. requires state to prove future or past criminal acts; federal “buyer-seller exception” not applicable to charge of conspiracy to sell narcotics. 131 CA 433; judgment affirmed, see 311 C. 1. Existence of formal agreement between conspirators need not be proved and may be inferred from proof of the separate acts of the alleged coconspirators and the circumstances surrounding the commission of the acts. 147 CA 53. Defendant's conviction of and sentencing under Subsec. and Secs. 53a-123(a)(3) and 53a-124(a)(2) constitute multiple punishments for the same offense and violate defendant's right against double jeopardy. 176 CA 687.

Cited. 44 CS 490.

Subsec. (b):

Cited. 40 CA 526. Breakdown of an agreement does not end a conspiracy or disqualify previous overt acts. 131 CA 433.

The 20 cases that cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-48 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. Padua, 869 A.2d 192 (Conn. 2005).
cites § 53a-48 17×cited by 162 cases
Where it cites § 53a-48
“General Statutes §§ 53a-8 5 and 21a-277 (b); 6 (2) possession of more than four ounces of marijuana in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-8 and 2 la-279 (b); 7 (3) possession of marijuana with intent to sell within 1500 feet of a public housing project in violation of General…”
The case’s holding
A reviewing court must address a defendant's insufficiency of the evidence claim before remanding a matter for retrial due to trial error to promote judicial efficiency and fairness.
Later courts cite it for
“ijnterests of judicial efficiency, sound appellate policy and fundamental fairness require a reviewing court to address a defendant's insufficiency of the evidence claim prior to remanding a matter for retrial because of trial error” · 4 citing courts
2
GREENState v. Millan, 966 A.2d 699 (Conn. 2009).
cites § 53a-48 24×cited by 34 cases
Where it cites § 53a-48
“, appeals [1] from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59(a)(1) [2] and conspiracy to commit assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 [3] and 53a-59(a)(1).”
The case’s holding
A coconspirator's conduct at the scene provides sufficient evidence of an agreement to commit a crime.
Later courts cite it for
“a coconspirator's conduct at the scene can provide the requisite evidence of an agreement” · 2 citing courts
3
REDState v. Correa, 197 A.3d 393 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018).
cites § 53a-48 22×cited by 10 cases
Reversed by State v. Correa (2021): the Supreme Court of Connecticut's own opinion in this case.
Where it cites § 53a-48
“Following a conditional plea of nolo contendere, entered pursuant to General Statutes § 54-94a, 1 the defendant, Ricardo Correa, appeals from the judgment of conviction of conspiracy to possess a controlled substance with intent to sell in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48…”
4
GREENState v. Salamon, 949 A.2d 1092 (Conn. 2008).
cites § 53a-48 8×cited by 242 cases
Where it cites § 53a-48
“2d 875 (overruling this court's prior interpretation of General Statutes § 53a-48 [a]). For several reasons, we are persuaded that it is appropriate to reexamine our interpretation of the kidnapping statutes in accordance with the defendant's request.”
The case’s holding
To commit kidnapping in conjunction with another crime, a defendant must intend to prevent the victim's liberation more extensively than is necessary to commit that other crime.
Later courts cite it for
“to commit a kidnapping in conjunction with another crime, a defendant must intend to prevent the victim's liberation for a longer period of time or to a greater degree than that which is necessary to commit the other crime.” · 6 citing courts
5
GREENState v. Stevenson, 849 A.2d 626 (Conn. 2004).
cites § 53a-48 7×cited by 229 cases
Where it cites § 53a-48
“The state charged the defendant, Jimmy Stevenson, with burglary in the second degree as an accessory in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-8 2 and 53a-102, 3 conspiracy to commit burglary in the second degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 4 and 53a-102, larceny in…”
The case’s holding
A court determines whether prosecutorial misconduct violates due process by evaluating whether the conduct infected the trial with unfairness by considering the entire trial context and specific factors.
Later courts cite it for
“it is not improper for a prosecutor to remark on the motives that a witness may have to lie, or not to lie, as the case may be.” · 3 citing courts
6
GREENState v. Pond, 50 A.3d 950 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012).
cites § 53a-48 22×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 53a-48
“” The inchoate crime of conspiracy in violation of General Statutes § 53a-48 (a) 3 provides that “[a] person is guilty of conspiracy when, with intent that conduct constituting a crime be performed, he agrees with one or more persons to engage in or cause the performance of such…”
The case’s holding
To convict a defendant of conspiracy to commit a crime with aggravating elements, the state must prove the defendant specifically intended to bring about those elements.
7
GREENState v. Colon, 778 A.2d 875 (Conn. 2001).
cites § 53a-48 16×cited by 22 cases
Where it cites § 53a-48
“A jury found the defendant, Jose Colon, guilty of one count of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a) 1 and one count of conspiracy to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 2 and 53a-54a (a).”
The case’s holding
A conspiracy conviction may be upheld despite the acquittal of a sole alleged coconspirator in a separate trial if sufficient evidence exists to prove the defendant's guilt.
Later courts cite it for
“legislative inaction is not always the best of guides to legislative intent.” · 1 citing court
8
GREENState v. Estrella, 893 A.2d 348 (Conn. 2006).
cites § 53a-48 11×subsections: (a) 4×cited by 34 cases
Where it cites § 53a-48
“" [3] General Statutes § 53a-48 provides: "(a) A person is guilty of conspiracy when, with intent that conduct constituting a crime be performed, he agrees with one or more persons to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct, and any one of them commits an overt act in…”
The case’s holding
Testimonial hearsay from an unavailable witness is admissible if the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant at a probable cause hearing.
Later courts cite it for
“evidence is material when it is offered to prove a fact directly in issue or a fact probative of a matter in issue” · 1 citing court
9
GREENState v. Oquendo, 613 A.2d 1300 (Conn. 1992).
cites § 53a-48 8×cited by 218 cases
Where it cites § 53a-48
“After a trial to a jury, the defendant, Ferdinand Oquendo, was convicted of the crimes of felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c, robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (4), burglary in the second degree in violation of…”
The case’s holding
A seizure occurs when a reasonable person would feel they are not free to leave due to a restraint of movement by physical force or a show of authority (State v. Oquendo).
Later courts cite it for
“we decline to adopt the restricted definition of a seizure employed by the united states supreme court in hodari d. and adhere to our precedents in determining what constitutes a seizure under the state constitution.” · 2 citing courts
10
GREENState v. Correa, 696 A.2d 944 (Conn. 1997).
cites § 53a-48 10×cited by 86 cases
Where it cites § 53a-48
“…Js., concurred. The defendant was convicted of one count each of conspiracy to commit capital felony in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 and 53a-54b (8), conspiracy to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 and 53a-54a, capital felony in violation of…”
The case’s holding
A jury need not unanimously agree on whether a defendant acted as a principal or an accessory when the statutory alternatives are mere means of committing a single offense.
Later courts cite it for
“in schad, the united states supreme court deferred to the states' determination that certain statutory alternatives are mere means of committing a single offense.” · 1 citing court
11
GREENState v. Hampton, 988 A.2d 167 (Conn. 2009).
cites § 53a-48 6×cited by 97 cases
Where it cites § 53a-48
“The defendant, Travis Hampton, appeals 1 from the judgment of the trial court rendered *438 after a jury trial, convicting him of attempt to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a), 53a-8 and 53a-54a, conspiracy to commit minder in violation of General…”
The case’s holding
An appellate claim regarding a motion to suppress is not preserved if the specific argument is not distinctly raised in the motion or during the suppression hearing.
Later courts cite it for
“although salamon was not decided until july 1, 2008, nearly two years after the trial in the present case, it is still applicable to our consideration of the defendant's appeal because of the general rule that judgments that are not by their terms limited to prospective application are presumed to apply retroactively ... to cases that are pending” · 1 citing court
12
GREENState v. Coward, 972 A.2d 691 (Conn. 2009).
cites § 53a-48 7×cited by 65 cases
Where it cites § 53a-48
“nt each of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a), 2 manslaughter in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-55 (a) (3), 3 robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (2), burglary in the first degree in violation of…”
The case’s holding
A defendant is vicariously liable for a coconspirator's reckless manslaughter if the act is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the conspiracy.
Later courts cite it for
“with respect to golding review, the defendant concedes that he induced the claimed error by requesting the very jury charge that he now claims was improper” · 1 citing court
13
GREENState v. Greene, 874 A.2d 750 (Conn. 2005).
cites § 53a-48 8×cited by 47 cases
Where it cites § 53a-48
“The defendant, Mashawn Greene, was convicted after a jury trial of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm as an accessory in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-8 (a) 1 and 53a-55a, 2 conspir *137 acy to commit manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm in…”
The case’s holding
A court may modify a judgment of conviction to a lesser included offense if the record establishes the jury necessarily found all essential elements of that offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
Later courts cite it for
“this court previously has modified a judgment of conviction after reversal, if the record establishes that the jury necessarily found, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the essential elements required to convict the defendant of a lesser included offense.” · 5 citing courts
14
REDState v. Ledbetter, 881 A.2d 290 (Conn. 2005).
cites § 53a-48 5×cited by 147 cases
Overruled by State v. Harris on other grounds: 2 citing opinions limit it to other grounds.
Where it cites § 53a-48
“The defendant, Laquan Ledbetter, appeals from the trial court’s judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of two counts of robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-134 (a) (3) 1 and 53a-8 (a), 2 and two counts of conspiracy to commit robbery…”
The case’s holding
Courts lack the authority to replace the established factors for evaluating the reliability of eyewitness identification with different criteria.
Later courts cite it for
“we ordinarily invoke our supervisory powers to enunciate a rule that is not constitutionally required but that we think is preferable as a matter of policy.” · 4 citing courts
15
GREENState v. Breton, 824 A.2d 778 (Conn. 2003).
cites § 53a-48 9×cited by 35 cases
Where it cites § 53a-48
“…life in prison. “The defendant was convicted of one count each of conspiracy to commit capital felony in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 and 53a-54b (8), conspiracy to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 and 53a-54a, capital felony in violation of…”
The case’s holding
A trial court does not abuse its discretion by denying a continuance to introduce mitigating evidence that is merely cumulative or speculative.
Later courts cite it for
“pervasive and insidious influence of race and poverty in the administration of the death penalty.” · 2 citing courts
16
GREENState v. Stuart, 967 A.2d 532 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009).
cites § 53a-48 13×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 53a-48
“The defendant was convicted of nine counts of possessing a vehicle with altered vehicle identification numbers in violation of § 14-149 (a) and nine counts of conspiracy to possess a vehicle with altered vehicle identification numbers in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48…”
Later courts cite it for
“in most cases involving error, constitutional or otherwise . . . harmless error analysis applies” · 1 citing court
17
GREENState v. Holley, 175 A.3d 514 (Conn. 2018).
cites § 53a-48 4×cited by 56 cases
Where it cites § 53a-48
“We note that the defendant was also convicted of conspiracy to commit home invasion in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 (a) and 53a-100aa (a) (1), and burglary in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-101 (a) (2).”
The case’s holding
A defendant fails to preserve a constitutional claim when the record lacks an offer of proof demonstrating the specific admissible evidence excluded by a conditional ruling.
Later courts cite it for
“the state has not presented this court with any authority that would permit a court to condition a defendant's right of confrontation on the defendant's not exercising his right to challenge the state's evidence” · 1 citing court
18
GREENState v. Pinnock, 601 A.2d 521 (Conn. 1992).
cites § 53a-48 7×cited by 151 cases
Where it cites § 53a-48
“The defendant was charged with conspiracy to commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 and 53a-54a, and attempted murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 1 and 53a-54a.”
The case’s holding
A trial court should permit reference only to an unspecified crime carrying a penalty of more than one year when a felony does not directly bear on veracity.
Later courts cite it for
“to avoid unwarranted prejudice to the witness, when a party seeks to introduce evidence of a felony that does not directly bear on veracity, a trial court ordinarily should permit reference only to an unspecified crime carrying a penalty of greater than one year that occurred at a certain time and place.” · 4 citing courts
19
GREENState v. Ortiz, 911 A.2d 1055 (Conn. 2006).
cites § 53a-48 6×cited by 69 cases
Where it cites § 53a-48
“The defendant, Hipólito Ortiz, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of conspiracy to commit burglary in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-48 and 53a-101 (a) (2), aiding and abetting burglary in the first degree in violation…”
The case’s holding
Prosecutorial disobedience of a trial court order constitutes improper conduct but does not require reversal unless the misconduct is so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.
Later courts cite it for
“it is well settled that prosecutorial disobedience of a trial court order, even one that the prosecutor considers legally incorrect, constitutes improper conduct.” · 3 citing courts
20
GREENState v. Grullon, 562 A.2d 481 (Conn. 1989).
cites § 53a-48 9×cited by 72 cases
Where it cites § 53a-48
“A Our examination of the definition of the crime of conspiracy in § 53a-48 convinces us that the legislature has determined that conspiracy requires a showing that two or more coconspirators intended to engage in or cause conduct that constitutes a crime.”
The case’s holding
The conspiracy statute is bilateral in nature and requires proof that two or more coconspirators intended to engage in criminal conduct.
Later courts cite it for
“held in states v. grullon, 212 conn. 195, 199 , 562 a.2d 481 (1989), that our conspiracy statute is bilateral in nature: 'our examination of the definition of the crime of conspiracy in 53a-48 convinces us that the legislature has determined that conspiracy requires a showing that two or more coconspirators intended to engage in or cause conduct that constitutes a crime.” · 3 citing courts

Show all 1,006 citing cases (list view) →

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
197119982026

One bar per year. Tallest: 45 cases in 2002. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Conn. App. Ct.673Conn.301D. Conn.14Conn. Super. Ct.92d Cir.39th Cir.21st Cir.15th Cir.1

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 10 courts in all.

By subsection
(a)25 cases
State v. Estrella, 893 A.2d 348 (Conn. 2006).“" [3] General Statutes § 53a-48 provides: "(a) A person is guilty of conspiracy when, with intent that conduct constituting a crime be performed, he agrees with one or more persons to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct, and any one of them commits an overt act in…”
State v. Moore, 981 A.2d 1030 (Conn. 2009).
State v. Raynor, 167 A.3d 1076 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
State v. Donald, 157 A.3d 1134 (Conn. 2017).
State v. Holmes, 169 A.3d 264 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
Showing the top 5 of 25. More in the list view →
(b)1 case
Commonwealth v. Nee, 935 N.E.2d 1276 (Mass. 2010).

Show all 1,006 citing cases (list view) →

Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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