8 Connecticut opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Mozellgreen2 sentences1996The defendant has failed to provide an analysis of any of the Barker factors; see State v. Mozell, 37 Conn. App. 574, 580-81 , 657 A.2d 686 , cert. denied, 234 Conn. 910 , 660 A.2d 355 (1995); and merely states that the fourteen month delay between the date of his arrest and the beginning of his trial prejudiced his defense. 1996The defendant has failed to provide an analysis of any of the Barker factors; see State v. Mozell, 37 Conn. App. 574, 580-81 , 657 A.2d 686 , cert. denied, 234 Conn. 910 , 660 A.2d 355 (1995); and merely states that the fourteen month delay between the date of his arrest and the beginning of his trial prejudiced his defense. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hendersongreen2 sentences1996The defendant has failed to provide an analysis of any of the Barker factors; see State v. Mozell, 37 Conn. App. 574, 580-81 , 657 A.2d 686 , cert. denied, 234 Conn. 910 , 660 A.2d 355 (1995); and merely states that the fourteen month delay between the date of his arrest and the beginning of his trial prejudiced his defense. 1996The defendant has failed to provide an analysis of any of the Barker factors; see State v. Mozell, 37 Conn. App. 574, 580-81 , 657 A.2d 686 , cert. denied, 234 Conn. 910 , 660 A.2d 355 (1995); and merely states that the fourteen month delay between the date of his arrest and the beginning of his trial prejudiced his defense. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Mozellgreen2 sentences1996The defendant has failed to provide an analysis of any of the Barker factors; see State v. Mozell, 37 Conn. App. 574, 580-81 , 657 A.2d 686 , cert. denied, 234 Conn. 910 , 660 A.2d 355 (1995); and merely states that the fourteen month delay between the date of his arrest and the beginning of his trial prejudiced his defense. 1996The defendant has failed to provide an analysis of any of the Barker factors; see State v. Mozell, 37 Conn. App. 574, 580-81 , 657 A.2d 686 , cert. denied, 234 Conn. 910 , 660 A.2d 355 (1995); and merely states that the fourteen month delay between the date of his arrest and the beginning of his trial prejudiced his defense. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gasparrogreen2 sentences1993See, e.g., State v. Gasparro, [ 194 Conn. 96 , 480 A.2d 509 (1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 828 , 106 S. Ct. 90 , 88 L. 1993See, e.g., State v. Gasparro, [ 194 Conn. 96 , 480 A.2d 509 (1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 828 , 106 S. Ct. 90 , 88 L. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. James Henry Simmonsgreen2 sentences1993“While prejudice in the nature of that asserted here is unfortunately present in every case of pretrial delay, general claims of anxiety are thought insufficient to invoke what has been termed ‘the unsatisfactorily severe remedy of dismissal.’ ...” (Citations omitted.) State v. Flowers, supra, 553 ; State v. Foshay, supra, 16-17 ; compare United States v. Simmons, 536 F.2d 827, 831-32 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 854 , 97 S. Ct. 148 , 50 L. 1993“While prejudice in the nature of that asserted here is unfortunately present in every case of pretrial delay, general claims of anxiety are thought insufficient to invoke what has been termed ‘the unsatisfactorily severe remedy of dismissal.’ ...” (Citations omitted.) State v. Flowers, supra, 553 ; State v. Foshay, supra, 16-17 ; compare United States v. Simmons, 536 F.2d 827, 831-32 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 854 , 97 S. Ct. 148 , 50 L. | 1 | 1 |
Cohen v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1993“While prejudice in the nature of that asserted here is unfortunately present in every case of pretrial delay, general claims of anxiety are thought insufficient to invoke what has been termed ‘the unsatisfactorily severe remedy of dismissal.’ ...” (Citations omitted.) State v. Flowers, supra, 553 ; State v. Foshay, supra, 16-17 ; compare United States v. Simmons, 536 F.2d 827, 831-32 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 854 , 97 S. Ct. 148 , 50 L. 1993“While prejudice in the nature of that asserted here is unfortunately present in every case of pretrial delay, general claims of anxiety are thought insufficient to invoke what has been termed ‘the unsatisfactorily severe remedy of dismissal.’ ...” (Citations omitted.) State v. Flowers, supra, 553 ; State v. Foshay, supra, 16-17 ; compare United States v. Simmons, 536 F.2d 827, 831-32 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 854 , 97 S. Ct. 148 , 50 L. | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. New Yorkgreen2 sentences1993“While prejudice in the nature of that asserted here is unfortunately present in every case of pretrial delay, general claims of anxiety are thought insufficient to invoke what has been termed ‘the unsatisfactorily severe remedy of dismissal.’ ...” (Citations omitted.) State v. Flowers, supra, 553 ; State v. Foshay, supra, 16-17 ; compare United States v. Simmons, 536 F.2d 827, 831-32 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 854 , 97 S. Ct. 148 , 50 L. 1993“While prejudice in the nature of that asserted here is unfortunately present in every case of pretrial delay, general claims of anxiety are thought insufficient to invoke what has been termed ‘the unsatisfactorily severe remedy of dismissal.’ ...” (Citations omitted.) State v. Flowers, supra, 553 ; State v. Foshay, supra, 16-17 ; compare United States v. Simmons, 536 F.2d 827, 831-32 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 854 , 97 S. Ct. 148 , 50 L. | 1 | 1 |
Etter v. Commissioner of Patents & Trademarksgreen2 sentences1993See, e.g., State v. Gasparro, [ 194 Conn. 96 , 480 A.2d 509 (1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 828 , 106 S. Ct. 90 , 88 L. 1993See, e.g., State v. Gasparro, [ 194 Conn. 96 , 480 A.2d 509 (1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 828 , 106 S. Ct. 90 , 88 L. | 1 | 1 |
Hammond v. Rapides Parish School Boardgreen2 sentences1993See, e.g., State v. Gasparro, [ 194 Conn. 96 , 480 A.2d 509 (1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 828 , 106 S. Ct. 90 , 88 L. 1993See, e.g., State v. Gasparro, [ 194 Conn. 96 , 480 A.2d 509 (1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 828 , 106 S. Ct. 90 , 88 L. | 1 | 1 |
Snaer v. Territory of Guamgreen2 sentences1993See, e.g., State v. Gasparro, [ 194 Conn. 96 , 480 A.2d 509 (1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 828 , 106 S. Ct. 90 , 88 L. 1993See, e.g., State v. Gasparro, [ 194 Conn. 96 , 480 A.2d 509 (1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 828 , 106 S. Ct. 90 , 88 L. | 1 | 1 |
Watkins v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R.green2 sentences1993“While prejudice in the nature of that asserted here is unfortunately present in every case of pretrial delay, general claims of anxiety are thought insufficient to invoke what has been termed ‘the unsatisfactorily severe remedy of dismissal.’ ...” (Citations omitted.) State v. Flowers, supra, 553 ; State v. Foshay, supra, 16-17 ; compare United States v. Simmons, 536 F.2d 827, 831-32 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 854 , 97 S. Ct. 148 , 50 L. 1993“While prejudice in the nature of that asserted here is unfortunately present in every case of pretrial delay, general claims of anxiety are thought insufficient to invoke what has been termed ‘the unsatisfactorily severe remedy of dismissal.’ ...” (Citations omitted.) State v. Flowers, supra, 553 ; State v. Foshay, supra, 16-17 ; compare United States v. Simmons, 536 F.2d 827, 831-32 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 854 , 97 S. Ct. 148 , 50 L. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gaines v. Manson
green
2 sentences2008Particularly, the petitioner claims that the court made “a decision on the petitioner’s appellate delay claim having considered only one of the four Barker factors before evidence was introduced on all the factors, and then the court precluded that evidence from being introduced.” The petitioner relies on Gaines v. Manson, supra, 194 Conn. 510 , to provide support for his claim that *322 he should have been permitted to offer evidence of appellate delay because the delay itself is prejudicial. 1990Gaines v. CT Page 1793 Manson, 194 Conn. at 527 . | 2 | 1990–2008 |
State v. Herring
green
2 sentences2018As the tolerable length of delay may vary greatly between cases, our inquiry into the length of the delay is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Roman , 320 Conn. 400 , 418-19, 133 A.3d 441 (2016). *390 On appeal, the defendant fails to analyze his claim pursuant to the Barker factors, and instead argues that "prejudice is presumed for failure to comply with IAD regulations." As the state asserts, however, the defendant's argument conflicts with established case law, which explicitly states that "cu 2018As the tolerable length of delay may vary greatly between cases, our inquiry into the length of the delay is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Roman , 320 Conn. 400 , 418-19, 133 A.3d 441 (2016). *390 On appeal, the defendant fails to analyze his claim pursuant to the Barker factors, and instead argues that "prejudice is presumed for failure to comply with IAD regulations." As the state asserts, however, the defendant's argument conflicts with established case law, which explicitly states that "cu | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Barker v. Wingo
green
2 sentences2014The habeas court concluded that “it was reasonable for [Ahem] not to file a second motion to dismiss under Barker v. Wingo [supra, 407 U.S. 514 ] days before the trial was set to begin, particularly since prior counsel had attended to the pretrial matters and he was retained to handle the trial of the case.” Ahem testified that he filed his appearance immediately before the trial commenced, and after the pretrial matters had concluded. 2014The habeas court concluded that “it was reasonable for [Ahem] not to file a second motion to dismiss under Barker v. Wingo [supra, 407 U.S. 514 ] days before the trial was set to begin, particularly since prior counsel had attended to the pretrial matters and he was retained to handle the trial of the case.” Ahem testified that he filed his appearance immediately before the trial commenced, and after the pretrial matters had concluded. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Pollard v. United States
green
2 sentences1993When both of these factors are resolved against the accused, it cannot be said that the pretrial delay violates the constitutional right to a speedy trial, which is intended to prevent delay that is “purposeful or oppressive.” Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 361 , 77 S. Ct. 481 , 1 L. 1993When both of these factors are resolved against the accused, it cannot be said that the pretrial delay violates the constitutional right to a speedy trial, which is intended to prevent delay that is “purposeful or oppressive.” Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 361 , 77 S. Ct. 481 , 1 L. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
State v. Davis
green
2 sentences1987See, e.g., State v. Gasparro, supra, (three and one-half years); State v. Davis, 192 Conn. 739 , 474 A.2d 776 (1984) (twenty-six months); State v. Cleary, 3 Conn. App. 349 , 488 A.2d 831 (1985) (thirty-six months). 4 We next consider the reasons for the delay in the defendant’s prosecution. 1987See, e.g., State v. Gasparro, supra, (three and one-half years); State v. Davis, 192 Conn. 739 , 474 A.2d 776 (1984) (twenty-six months); State v. Cleary, 3 Conn. App. 349 , 488 A.2d 831 (1985) (thirty-six months). 4 We next consider the reasons for the delay in the defendant’s prosecution. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
State v. Cleary
green
2 sentences1987See, e.g., State v. Gasparro, supra, (three and one-half years); State v. Davis, 192 Conn. 739 , 474 A.2d 776 (1984) (twenty-six months); State v. Cleary, 3 Conn. App. 349 , 488 A.2d 831 (1985) (thirty-six months). 4 We next consider the reasons for the delay in the defendant’s prosecution. 1987See, e.g., State v. Gasparro, supra, (three and one-half years); State v. Davis, 192 Conn. 739 , 474 A.2d 776 (1984) (twenty-six months); State v. Cleary, 3 Conn. App. 349 , 488 A.2d 831 (1985) (thirty-six months). 4 We next consider the reasons for the delay in the defendant’s prosecution. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
State v. L'HEUREUX
green
2 sentences1987See id., 552 (finding that the analysis of the first three Barker factors in that case provided no showing of misconduct on the part of the state sufficient to warrant a presumption of prejudice); State v. L’Heureux, 166 Conn. 312 , 348 A.2d 578 (1974). 1987See id., 552 (finding that the analysis of the first three Barker factors in that case provided no showing of misconduct on the part of the state sufficient to warrant a presumption of prejudice); State v. L’Heureux, 166 Conn. 312 , 348 A.2d 578 (1974). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.