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Va. CodeTitle 20. Domestic RelationsChapter 6. Divorce, Affirmation and Annulment

Va. Code Ann. § 20-107.3 (2026)

Court may decree as to property and debts of the parties

Edition and currency
laws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1982–2026 1,166citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 1,166 opinions since 1982, 86 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (E) (423 cases).

A. Upon decreeing the dissolution of a marriage, and also upon decreeing a divorce from the bond of matrimony, or upon the filing with the court as provided in subsection J of a certified copy of a final divorce decree obtained outside the Commonwealth, the court, upon request of either party, (i) shall determine the legal title as between the parties, and the ownership and value of all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, of the parties and shall consider which of such property is separate property, which is marital property, and which is part separate and part marital property in accordance with subdivision 3 and (ii) shall determine the nature of all debts of the parties, or either of them, and shall consider which of such debts is separate debt and which is marital debt. The court shall determine the value of any such property as of the date of the evidentiary hearing on the evaluation issue. The court shall determine the amount of any such debt as of the date of the last separation of the parties, if at such time or thereafter at least one of the parties intends that the separation be permanent, and the extent to which such debt has increased or decreased from the date of separation until the date of the evidentiary hearing. Upon motion of either party made no less than 21 days before the evidentiary hearing the court may, for good cause shown, in order to attain the ends of justice, order that a different valuation date be used. The court, on the motion of either party, may retain jurisdiction in the final decree of divorce to adjudicate the remedy provided by this section when the court determines that such action is clearly necessary, and all decrees heretofore entered retaining such jurisdiction are validated.

1. Separate property is (i) all property, real and personal, acquired by either party before the marriage; (ii) all property acquired during the marriage by bequest, devise, descent, survivorship or gift from a source other than the other party; (iii) all property acquired during the marriage in exchange for or from the proceeds of sale of separate property, provided that such property acquired during the marriage is maintained as separate property; and (iv) that part of any property classified as separate pursuant to subdivision 3. Income received from separate property during the marriage is separate property if not attributable to the personal effort of either party. The increase in value of separate property during the marriage is separate property, unless marital property or the personal efforts of either party have contributed to such increases and then only to the extent of the increases in value attributable to such contributions. The personal efforts of either party must be significant and result in substantial appreciation of the separate property if any increase in value attributable thereto is to be considered marital property.

2. Marital property is (i) all property titled in the names of both parties, whether as joint tenants, tenants by the entirety or otherwise, except as provided by subdivision 3, (ii) that part of any property classified as marital pursuant to subdivision 3, or (iii) all other property acquired by each party during the marriage which is not separate property as defined above. All property including that portion of pensions, profit-sharing or deferred compensation or retirement plans of whatever nature, acquired by either spouse during the marriage, and before the last separation of the parties, if at such time or thereafter at least one of the parties intends that the separation be permanent, is presumed to be marital property in the absence of satisfactory evidence that it is separate property. For purposes of this section marital property is presumed to be jointly owned unless there is a deed, title or other clear indicia that it is not jointly owned.

3. The court shall classify property as part marital property and part separate property as follows:

a. In the case of income received from separate property during the marriage, such income shall be marital property only to the extent it is attributable to the personal efforts of either party. In the case of the increase in value of separate property during the marriage, such increase in value shall be marital property only to the extent that marital property or the personal efforts of either party have contributed to such increases, provided that any such personal efforts must be significant and result in substantial appreciation of the separate property.

For purposes of this subdivision, the nonowning spouse shall bear the burden of proving that (i) contributions of marital property or personal effort were made and (ii) the separate property increased in value. Once this burden of proof is met, the owning spouse shall bear the burden of proving that the increase in value or some portion thereof was not caused by contributions of marital property or personal effort.

"Personal effort" of a party shall be deemed to be labor, effort, inventiveness, physical or intellectual skill, creativity, or managerial, promotional or marketing activity applied directly to the separate property of either party.

b. In the case of any pension, profit-sharing, or deferred compensation plan or retirement benefit, the marital share as defined in subsection G shall be marital property.

c. In the case of any personal injury or workers' compensation recovery of either party, the marital share as defined in subsection H shall be marital property.

d. When marital property and separate property are commingled by contributing one category of property to another, resulting in the loss of identity of the contributed property, the classification of the contributed property shall be transmuted to the category of property receiving the contribution. However, to the extent the contributed property is retraceable by a preponderance of the evidence and was not a gift, such contributed property shall retain its original classification.

e. When marital property and separate property are commingled into newly acquired property resulting in the loss of identity of the contributing properties, the commingled property shall be deemed transmuted to marital property. However, to the extent the contributed property is retraceable by a preponderance of the evidence and was not a gift, the contributed property shall retain its original classification.

f. When separate property is retitled in the joint names of the parties, the retitled property shall be deemed transmuted to marital property. However, to the extent the property is retraceable by a preponderance of the evidence and was not a gift, the retitled property shall retain its original classification.

g. When the separate property of one party is commingled into the separate property of the other party, or the separate property of each party is commingled into newly acquired property, to the extent the contributed property is retraceable by a preponderance of the evidence and was not a gift, each party shall be reimbursed the value of the contributed property in any award made pursuant to this section.

h. Subdivisions 3 d, e and f shall apply to jointly owned property. No presumption of gift shall arise under this section where (i) separate property is commingled with jointly owned property; (ii) newly acquired property is conveyed into joint ownership; or (iii) existing property is conveyed or retitled into joint ownership. For purposes of this subdivision 3, property is jointly owned when it is titled in the name of both parties, whether as joint tenants, tenants by the entireties, or otherwise.

4. Separate debt is (i) all debt incurred by either party before the marriage, (ii) all debt incurred by either party after the date of the last separation of the parties, if at such time or thereafter at least one of the parties intends that the separation be permanent, and (iii) that part of any debt classified as separate pursuant to subdivision 5. However, to the extent that a party can show by a preponderance of the evidence that the debt was incurred for the benefit of the marriage or family, the court may designate the debt as marital.

5. Marital debt is (i) all debt incurred in the joint names of the parties before the date of the last separation of the parties, if at such time or thereafter at least one of the parties intends that the separation be permanent, whether incurred before or after the date of the marriage, and (ii) all debt incurred in either party's name after the date of the marriage and before the date of the last separation of the parties, if at such time or thereafter at least one of the parties intends that the separation be permanent. However, to the extent that a party can show by a preponderance of the evidence that the debt, or a portion thereof, was incurred, or the proceeds secured by incurring the debt were used, in whole or in part, for a nonmarital purpose, the court may designate the entire debt as separate or a portion of the debt as marital and a portion of the debt as separate.

B. For the purposes of this section only, both parties shall be deemed to have rights and interests in the marital property. However, such interests and rights shall not attach to the legal title of such property and are only to be used as a consideration in determining a monetary award, if any, as provided in this section.

C. Except as provided in subsection G, the court shall have no authority to order the division or transfer of separate property or marital property, or separate or marital debt, which is not jointly owned or owed. However, upon a finding that separate property of one party is in the possession or control of the other party, the court may order that the property be transferred to the party whose separate property it is. The court may, based upon the factors listed in subsection E, divide or transfer or order the division or transfer, or both, of jointly owned marital property, jointly owed marital debt, or any part thereof. The court shall also have the authority to apportion and order the payment of the debts of the parties, or either of them, that are incurred prior to the dissolution of the marriage, based upon the factors listed in subsection E.

As a means of dividing or transferring the jointly owned marital property, the court may transfer or order the transfer of real or personal property or any interest therein to one of the parties, permit either party to purchase the interest of the other and direct the allocation of the proceeds, provided the party purchasing the interest of the other agrees to assume any indebtedness secured by the property, or order its sale by private sale by the parties, through such agent as the court shall direct, or by public sale as the court shall direct without the necessity for partition. All decrees entered prior to July 1, 1991, which are final and not subject to further proceedings on appeal as of that date, which divide or transfer or order the division or transfer of property directly between the parties are hereby validated and deemed self-executing. All orders or decrees which divide or transfer or order division or transfer of real property between the parties shall be recorded and indexed in the names of the parties in the appropriate grantor and grantee indexes in the land records in the clerk's office of the circuit court of the county or city in which the property is located.

D. In addition, based upon (i) the equities and the rights and interests of each party in the marital property, and (ii) the factors listed in subsection E, the court has the power to grant a monetary award, payable either in a lump sum or over a period of time in fixed amounts, to either party. The party against whom a monetary award is made may satisfy the award, in whole or in part, by conveyance of property, subject to the approval of the court. An award entered pursuant to this subsection shall constitute a judgment within the meaning of § 8.01-426 and shall not be docketed by the clerk unless the decree so directs. An award entered pursuant to this subsection may be enforceable in the same manner as any other money judgment. The provisions of § 8.01-382, relating to interest on judgments, shall apply unless the court orders otherwise.

Any marital property, which has been considered or ordered transferred in granting the monetary award under this section, shall not thereafter be the subject of a suit between the same parties to transfer title or possession of such property.

E. The amount of any division or transfer of jointly owned marital property, and the amount of any monetary award, the apportionment of marital debts, and the method of payment shall be determined by the court after consideration of the following factors:

1. The contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party to the well-being of the family;

2. The contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, of each party in the acquisition and care and maintenance of such marital property of the parties;

3. The duration of the marriage;

4. The ages and physical and mental condition of the parties;

5. The circumstances and factors which contributed to the dissolution of the marriage, specifically including any ground for divorce under the provisions of subdivision A (1), (3) or (6) of § 20-91 or § 20-95;

6. How and when specific items of such marital property were acquired;

7. The debts and liabilities of each spouse, the basis for such debts and liabilities, and the property which may serve as security for such debts and liabilities;

8. The liquid or nonliquid character of all marital property;

9. The tax consequences to each party;

10. The use or expenditure of marital property by either of the parties for a nonmarital separate purpose or the dissipation of such funds, when such was done in anticipation of divorce or separation or after the last separation of the parties; and

11. Such other factors as the court deems necessary or appropriate to consider in order to arrive at a fair and equitable monetary award.

F. The court shall determine the amount of any such monetary award without regard to maintenance and support awarded for either party or support for the minor children of both parties and shall, after or at the time of such determination and upon motion of either party, consider whether an order for support and maintenance of a spouse or children shall be entered or, if previously entered, whether such order shall be modified or vacated.

G. In addition to the monetary award made pursuant to subsection D, and upon consideration of the factors set forth in subsection E:

1. The court may direct payment of a percentage of the marital share of any pension, profit-sharing or deferred compensation plan, or retirement benefits, whether vested or nonvested, that constitutes marital property and whether payable in a lump sum or over a period of time. The court may order direct payment of such percentage of the marital share by direct assignment to a party from the employer trustee, plan administrator, or other holder of the benefits. However, the court shall only direct that payment be made as such benefits are payable. No such payment shall exceed 50 percent of the marital share of the cash benefits actually received by the party against whom such award is made. "Marital share" means that portion of the total interest, the right to which was earned during the marriage and before the last separation of the parties, if at such time or thereafter at least one of the parties intended that the separation be permanent. Any determination of military retirement benefits shall be in accordance with the federal Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act (10 U.S.C. 1408 et seq.). If the court enters an order to distribute any Virginia Retirement System managed defined contribution plan, the Virginia Retirement System shall, if ordered by the court, calculate and include in such distribution gains and losses from the valuation date specified in the order through the date of distribution of the benefits, but only to the extent possible based on the information available to the Virginia Retirement System.

2. To the extent permitted by federal or other applicable law, the court may order a party to designate a spouse or former spouse as irrevocable beneficiary during the lifetime of the beneficiary of all or a portion of any survivor benefit or annuity plan of whatsoever nature, but not to include a life insurance policy except to the extent permitted by § 20-107.1:1. The court, in its discretion, shall determine as between the parties, who shall bear the costs of maintaining such plan.

H. In addition to the monetary award made pursuant to subsection D, and upon consideration of the factors set forth in subsection E, the court may direct payment of a percentage of the marital share of any personal injury or workers' compensation recovery of either party, whether such recovery is payable in a lump sum or over a period of time. However, the court shall only direct that payment be made as such recovery is payable, whether by settlement, jury award, court award, or otherwise. "Marital share" means that part of the total personal injury or workers' compensation recovery attributable to lost wages or medical expenses to the extent not covered by health insurance accruing during the marriage and before the last separation of the parties, if at such time or thereafter at least one of the parties intended that the separation be permanent.

I. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the affirmation, ratification and incorporation in a decree of an agreement between the parties pursuant to §§ 20-109 and 20-109.1. Agreements, otherwise valid as contracts, entered into between spouses prior to the marriage shall be recognized and enforceable.

J. A court of proper jurisdiction under § 20-96 may exercise the powers conferred by this section after a court of a foreign jurisdiction has decreed a dissolution of a marriage or a divorce from the bond of matrimony, if (i) one of the parties was domiciled in the Commonwealth when the foreign proceedings were commenced; (ii) the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the party domiciled in the Commonwealth; (iii) the proceeding is initiated within two years of receipt of notice of the foreign decree by the party domiciled in the Commonwealth or the other party, provided that the party domiciled in the Commonwealth is still domiciled in the Commonwealth as of the date of the commencement of an action pursuant to this section; and (iv) the court obtains personal jurisdiction over the parties pursuant to subdivision A 9 of § 8.01-328.1, or in any other manner permitted by law.

K. The court shall have the continuing authority and jurisdiction to make any additional orders necessary to effectuate and enforce any order entered pursuant to this section, including the authority to:

1. Order a date certain for transfer or division of any jointly owned property under subsection C or payment of any monetary award under subsection D;

2. Punish as contempt of court any willful failure of a party to comply with the provisions of any order made by the court under this section;

3. Appoint a special commissioner to transfer any property under subsection C where a party refuses to comply with the order of the court to transfer such property; and

4. Modify any order entered in a case filed on or after July 1, 1982, intended to affect or divide any pension, profit-sharing or deferred compensation plan or retirement benefits pursuant to the United States Internal Revenue Code or other applicable federal laws, only for the purpose of establishing or maintaining the order as a qualified domestic relations order or to revise or conform its terms so as to effectuate the expressed intent of the order.

L. If it appears upon or after the entry of a final decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony that neither party resides in the city or county of the circuit court that entered the decree, the court may, on the motion of any party or on its own motion, transfer to the circuit court for the city or county where either party resides the authority to make additional orders pursuant to subsection K or to carry out or enforce any stipulation, contract, or agreement between the parties that has been affirmed, ratified, and incorporated by reference pursuant to § 20-109.1.

1982, c. 309; 1984, c. 649; 1985, cc. 4, 442; 1986, cc. 533, 537; 1988, cc. 745, 746, 747, 825, 880; 1989, c. 70; 1990, cc. 636, 764; 1991, cc. 632, 640, 698; 1992, c. 88; 1993, c. 79; 2004, cc. 654, 757; 2006, c. 260; 2010, c. 506; 2011, c. 655; 2012, c. 144; 2016, c. 559; 2017, c. 797; 2019, c. 304; 2022, c. 438; 2026, c. 470.

The 20 cases that cite Va. Code Ann. § 20-107.3 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENGamble v. Gamble, 421 S.E.2d 635 (Va. Ct. App. 1992).
cites § 20-107.3 220×subsections: (G) 28× (E) 24× (D) 14× (A) 12×cited by 141 cases
Where it cites § 20-107.3
“72 From this marital property and pursuant to Code § 20-107.3, the chancellor granted Mrs.”
The case’s holding
A trial court abuses its discretion by using spousal support to compensate a spouse for mortgage obligations on marital property received through equitable distribution.
Later courts cite it for
“when the record discloses that the trial court considered all of the statutory factors, the court's ruling will not be disturbed on appeal unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion.” · 14 citing courts
2
GREENTheismann v. Theismann, 471 S.E.2d 809 (Va. Ct. App. 1996).
cites § 20-107.3 184×subsections: (E) 76× (D) 58× (A)(3)(d) 14× (A)(3)(g) 10×cited by 130 cases
Where it cites § 20-107.3
“Under Code § 20-107.3, "when separate property is retitled in the joint names of the parties, the retitled property shall be deemed transmuted to marital property, .”
The case’s holding
No presumption of gift arises from retitling separate property in joint names, and the recipient must prove the donor's intent to make a gift.
Later courts cite it for
“in making an equitable distribution, the court must classify the property, assign a value, and then distribute the property to the parties, taking into consideration the factors listed in code 20-107.3(e).” · 12 citing courts
3
GREENBarker v. Barker, 500 S.E.2d 240 (Va. Ct. App. 1998).
cites § 20-107.3 134×subsections: (E) 38× (E)(2) 12× (A)(3)(d) 8× (E)(7) 8×cited by 135 cases
Where it cites § 20-107.3
“Husband's contribution to support for wife's children, however, need only be considered under the factors outlined in Code § 20-107.3; he is not entitled to a dollar-for-dollar credit for contributions he may have made.”
The case’s holding
A trial court possesses discretion in determining the amount of spousal support and may consider the payment of separate debt with marital funds as a negative monetary contribution.
Later courts cite it for
“whether and how much spousal support will be awarded is a matter of discretion for the trial court.” · 25 citing courts
4
GREENRobinson v. Robinson, 621 S.E.2d 147 (Va. Ct. App. 2005).
cites § 20-107.3 103×subsections: (A)(3)(a) 19× (A)(1) 16× (A)(3) 16× (A) 8×cited by 59 cases
Where it cites § 20-107.3
“; see also Code § 20-107.1 (providing that, in awarding spousal support, the trial court "shall" consider "[t]he provisions made with regard to the marital property under § 20-107.”
The case’s holding
Property retraceable to separate property remains separate unless a spouse proves by clear and convincing evidence that the property was a gift or increased through significant personal efforts.
Later courts cite it for
“where an equitable distribution award is reversed on appeal and 'the provisions with regard to the marital property are to be considered on remand, the court must necessarily re-examine spousal support in the light of whatever new or different considerations flow from the additional proceedings.” · 11 citing courts
5
GREENDietz v. Dietz, 436 S.E.2d 463 (Va. Ct. App. 1993).
cites § 20-107.3 126×subsections: (G) 36× (A)(2) 22× (E) 12× (A)(1) 8×cited by 75 cases
Where it cites § 20-107.3
“Code § 20-107.3, providing for equitable distribution, is based on the notion that marriage is an economic partnership in which the parties, through varying contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, to the acquisition, maintenance, and care of property and to the well-being of…”
The case’s holding
Property acquired after the date of last separation using wages earned after that separation is separate property rather than marital property.
Later courts cite it for
“this division or transfer of jointly owned marital property and the amount of any monetary award, subject to the enumerated statutory factors, is within the sound discretion of the trial court.” · 4 citing courts
6
GREENCourembis v. Courembis, 595 S.E.2d 505 (Va. Ct. App. 2004).
cites § 20-107.3 92×subsections: (E) 20× (A)(3) 12× (A)(3)(a) 10× (A)(1)(iii) 8×cited by 46 cases
Where it cites § 20-107.3
“In fashioning that award, the trial court is guided by Code § 20-107.3. Code § 20-107.3 directs that the trial court determine that property which is separate, that which is marital, and that which is part marital and part separate.”
The case’s holding
Management of a spouse's separate funds by the other spouse does not constitute evidence that the funds lost their character as separate property (rejecting argument that management proves commingling).
Later courts cite it for
“the party claiming that property acquired during the marriage is separate property bears the burden of rebutting this presumption.” · 3 citing courts
7
GREENParra v. Parra, 336 S.E.2d 157 (Va. Ct. App. 1985).
cites § 20-107.3 102×subsections: (A) 60× (C) 8× (A)(2) 4× (H) 4×cited by 70 cases
Where it cites § 20-107.3
“3, after twenty-one days have elapsed from entry of a divorce decree, when a specific reservation of such a right is contained in the decree; and (2) whether in making its award of equitable distribution, the trial court should have honored the terms of a partial property…”
The case’s holding
Settlements remain enforceable unless their illegality is clear and certain.
Later courts cite it for
“no decree of equitable distribution can be made before the parties are divorced.” · 3 citing courts
8
GREENNancy Marcellette Friedman v. Mona Smith, 810 S.E.2d 912 (Va. Ct. App. 2018).
cites § 20-107.3 27×subsections: (A) 23×cited by 135 cases
Where it cites § 20-107.3
“2d at 134 (noting that, pursuant to Code § 20-107.3, “the trial court must make a specific finding of clear necessity for granting the divorce while retaining jurisdiction to decide equitable distribution issues”).”
The case’s holding
A trial court order that bifurcates a divorce proceeding and reserves ancillary matters for future adjudication is a final order subject to appellate jurisdiction.
Later courts cite it for
“the decision of whether to award attorney's fees and costs incurred on appeal is discretionary.” · 34 citing courts
9
GREENTrivett v. Trivett, 371 S.E.2d 560 (Va. Ct. App. 1988).
cites § 20-107.3 112×subsections: (D) 12× (E) 8× (E)(7) 8× (B) 4×cited by 41 cases
Where it cites § 20-107.3
“In Hodges , we held: "Where the marital property is encumbered with indebtedness which equals or exceeds its value, then for purposes of a monetary award [pursuant to Code § 20-107.3] it is essentially of no value.”
The case’s holding
A valid debt secured by marital property reduces the value of that property by the amount of the debt.
10
GREENWagner v. Wagner, 358 S.E.2d 407 (Va. Ct. App. 1987).
cites § 20-107.3 90×subsections: (A)(1)(ii) 10× (A)(2)(ii) 8× (B) 8× (G) 8×cited by 43 cases
Where it cites § 20-107.3
“Wagner (husband) both appeal from a decree in which the trial court awarded the husband a divorce based on desertion, provided a monetary award to the wife pursuant to Code § 20-107.3, ordered partition and sale of the marital home, and set child support payments.”
The case’s holding
Marital property cannot become the separate property of one spouse without a valid, express agreement between the parties.
Later courts cite it for
“the character of property classified pursuant to code 20-107.3(a) is initially ascertained as of the date that it is acquired.” · 3 citing courts
11
GREENRanney v. Ranney, 608 S.E.2d 485 (Va. Ct. App. 2005).
cites § 20-107.3 41×subsections: (E) 10× (A)(3) 4× (E)(1) 4× (E)(5) 4×cited by 94 cases
Where it cites § 20-107.3
“” As husband testified, had wife not made her various misrepresentations, there would have been no marriage, and therefore no marital estate to divide. We further note that the fact that these misrepresentations occurred before the marriage does not bar their consideration, for…”
The case’s holding
Property acquired during marriage is presumed marital unless proven separate, and a trial court may consider fraudulent inducement of marriage as a factor in equitable distribution.
Later courts cite it for
“because the trial court's classification of property is a finding of fact, that classification will not be reversed on appeal unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” · 36 citing courts
12
GREENThea Rachel Anthony v. Paul Skolnick-Lozano, 754 S.E.2d 549 (Va. Ct. App. 2014).
cites § 20-107.3 54×subsections: (A)(3)(g) 18× (A) 8× (A)(1) 2× (A)(3) 2×cited by 37 cases
Where it cites § 20-107.3
“In Floyd , this Court held that “Code § 20-107.3 does not prevent the trial court from considering premarital contributions to the acquisition or maintenance of property later deemed marital property in fashioning an equitable distribution.”
Holding on this section
Circuit courts may consider pre-marital commingling of separate property when fashioning an equitable distribution award under Code § 20-107.3, with contributed property valued as of the evidentiary hearing date.
13
GREENLaura McGahey Roberts White v. David Carlton Wright, 737 S.E.2d 519 (Va. Ct. App. 2013).
cites § 20-107.3 36×subsections: (A) 10× (G) 2× (G)(1) 2×cited by 91 cases
Where it cites § 20-107.3
“Issues Relating to Equitable Distribution Among the requirements of the equitable distribution statute, Code § 20-107.3, a trial court shall “determine the legal title as between the parties, and the ownership and value of all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible,…”
The case’s holding
A trial court must limit equitable distribution awards of nonvested retirement benefits to the marital share calculated via a coverture fraction and must specify the duration of spousal support reservations.
Later courts cite it for
“under settled principles, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party in the trial court, granting to that party the benefit of any reasonable inferences.” · 5 citing courts
14
GREENDuva v. Duva, 685 S.E.2d 842 (Va. Ct. App. 2009).
cites § 20-107.3 46×subsections: (A)(3)(d) 9× (A) 8× (A)(3) 4× (A)(3)(a) 4×cited by 50 cases
Where it cites § 20-107.3
“The Court concluded that because (at that time) Code § 20-107.3 only contemplated two kinds of property, marital or separate, the statute did not recognize hybrid property.”
The case’s holding
The character of property is determined by the date title is obtained rather than the date equity is realized.
Later courts cite it for
“because the record does not show that the trial court ruled on appellant's argument, there is no ruling of the trial court for this court to review on appeal.” · 13 citing courts
15
GREENCirrito v. Cirrito, 605 S.E.2d 268 (Va. Ct. App. 2004).
cites § 20-107.3 33×subsections: (A)(3)(a) 9× (A)(3)(f) 4× (A)(3)(g) 4× (A) 2×cited by 102 cases
Where it cites § 20-107.3
“It is clear that the payment for not competing with Telco is within the definition of marital property since the right to receive the money was acquired during the marriage and is not separate property as defined in Code § 20-107.3. As to this issue, we remand to the trial court…”
The case’s holding
Appellate courts will not consider arguments that are not included in the designated questions presented for appeal.
Later courts cite it for
“the burden of proof that the transfer was a gift is upon the party seeking to establish the gift by clear and convincing evidence.” · 4 citing courts
16
GREENPrizzia v. Prizzia, 707 S.E.2d 461 (Va. Ct. App. 2011).
cites § 20-107.3 58×subsections: (A) 12× (E) 10× (J) 6× (K)(4) 4×cited by 24 cases
Where it cites § 20-107.3
“Jurisdiction over Equitable Distribution We requested the parties to provide supplemental briefs on the following issues: (1) whether the trial court had jurisdiction under Code § 20-107.3 to make an equitable distribution *160 award; and (2) if the trial court did not have…”
The case’s holding
A qualified domestic relations order cannot alter the method for valuing the marital share of a retirement plan established in an equitable distribution order.
Later courts cite it for
“any child-care costs incurred on behalf of the child or children due to employment of the custodial parent shall be added to the basic child support obligation.” · 3 citing courts
17
GREENKeyser v. Keyser, 374 S.E.2d 698 (Va. Ct. App. 1988).
cites § 20-107.3 70×subsections: (E) 36× (G) 14× (B) 12× (D) 4×cited by 31 cases
Where it cites § 20-107.3
“[T]he chancellor is necessarily vested with broad discretion in the discharge of the duties the statute [Code § 20-107.3] imposes upon him. Unless it appears from the record that the chancellor has abused his discretion, that he has not considered or has misapplied one of the…”
The case’s holding
A court may not deny a monetary award based on marital property solely because a spouse's financial condition remained stable during the marriage.
Later courts cite it for
“pension plans, by their nature and diversity, present unique problems when making a division of marital wealth under any equitable distribution statute.” · 1 citing court
18
GREENArthur G. Kahn v. Eileen McNicholas, 795 S.E.2d 485 (Va. Ct. App. 2017).
cites § 20-107.3 38×subsections: (D) 18× (K) 2× (K)(2) 2×cited by 15 cases
Where it cites § 20-107.3
“Alternatively, the circuit court could have enforced its final decree of divorce pursuant to Code § 20-107.3. Code § 20-107.3 provides the statutory framework regarding the equitable distribution of the property and debts of divorcing parties.”
19
GREENErickson-Dickson v. Erickson-Dickson, 404 S.E.2d 388 (Va. Ct. App. 1991).
cites § 20-107.3 66×cited by 31 cases
Where it cites § 20-107.3
“Here, the trial court granted a divorce and retained jurisdiction to consider the equitable distribution issues without a joint motion of the parties and without a determination that such action was clearly necessary because of the complexities of the property interests.”
The case’s holding
A trial court's erroneous ruling to retain jurisdiction for equitable distribution after granting a final divorce is voidable and subject to challenge on direct appeal rather than void.
Later courts cite it for
“did not object to or appeal the decree of divorce or the ruling in the decree which deferred adjudication of the equitable distribution issues.” · 4 citing courts
20
GREENAdam H. Fox v. Jessica C. Fox, 734 S.E.2d 662 (Va. Ct. App. 2012).
cites § 20-107.3 31×subsections: (A) 6× (C) 4× (E) 4×cited by 61 cases
Where it cites § 20-107.3
“The issue before this Court is whether, pursuant to Code § 20-107.3, the trial court must include property that has no value in its equitable distribution analysis.”
The case’s holding
A trial court does not abuse its discretion by declining to divide jointly owned marital property with negative equity when the statutory language is permissive.
Later courts cite it for
“rule 5a:20(c) requires us to hold that this issue is waived because it is not part of appellant's assignment of error.” · 6 citing courts

Show all 1,166 citing cases (list view) →

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198220042026

One bar per year. Tallest: 54 cases in 1997. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Va. Ct. App.975Fairfax Cir. Ct.29Va.20Bankr. E.D. Va.16Va. Cir. Ct.13Spotsylvania Cir. Ct.11Loudoun Cir. Ct.9Henrico Cir. Ct.8

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 44 courts in all.

By subsection
(A)282 cases
Nancy Marcellette Friedman v. Mona Smith, 810 S.E.2d 912 (Va. Ct. App. 2018).“2d at 134 (noting that, pursuant to Code § 20-107.3, “the trial court must make a specific finding of clear necessity for granting the divorce while retaining jurisdiction to decide equitable distribution issues”).”
Parra v. Parra, 336 S.E.2d 157 (Va. Ct. App. 1985).“3, after twenty-one days have elapsed from entry of a divorce decree, when a specific reservation of such a right is contained in the decree; and (2) whether in making its award of equitable distribution, the trial court should have honored the terms of a partial property…”
Laura McGahey Roberts White v. David Carlton Wright, 737 S.E.2d 519 (Va. Ct. App. 2013).“Issues Relating to Equitable Distribution Among the requirements of the equitable distribution statute, Code § 20-107.3, a trial court shall “determine the legal title as between the parties, and the ownership and value of all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible,…”
Gamble v. Gamble, 421 S.E.2d 635 (Va. Ct. App. 1992).“72 From this marital property and pursuant to Code § 20-107.3, the chancellor granted Mrs.”
Thomas C. Shooltz v. Jane Hoffman Shooltz, 498 S.E.2d 437 (Va. Ct. App. 1998).
Showing the top 5 of 282. More in the list view →
(A)(1)135 cases
Robinson v. Robinson, 621 S.E.2d 147 (Va. Ct. App. 2005).“; see also Code § 20-107.1 (providing that, in awarding spousal support, the trial court "shall" consider "[t]he provisions made with regard to the marital property under § 20-107.”
W. Pettus Gilman v. Judith Cochrane Gilman, 526 S.E.2d 763 (Va. Ct. App. 2000).
Dietz v. Dietz, 436 S.E.2d 463 (Va. Ct. App. 1993).“Code § 20-107.3, providing for equitable distribution, is based on the notion that marriage is an economic partnership in which the parties, through varying contributions, monetary and nonmonetary, to the acquisition, maintenance, and care of property and to the well-being of…”
Lambert v. Lambert, 367 S.E.2d 184 (Va. Ct. App. 1988).
Barker v. Barker, 500 S.E.2d 240 (Va. Ct. App. 1998).“Husband's contribution to support for wife's children, however, need only be considered under the factors outlined in Code § 20-107.3; he is not entitled to a dollar-for-dollar credit for contributions he may have made.”
Showing the top 5 of 135. More in the list view →
(A)(1)(e)1 case
Wiese v. Wiese, 617 S.E.2d 427 (Va. Ct. App. 2005).
(A)(1)(h)1 case
Wagner v. Wagner, 358 S.E.2d 407 (Va. Ct. App. 1987).“Wagner (husband) both appeal from a decree in which the trial court awarded the husband a divorce based on desertion, provided a monetary award to the wife pursuant to Code § 20-107.3, ordered partition and sale of the marital home, and set child support payments.”
(A)(1)(i)21 cases
Vilseck v. Vilseck, 612 S.E.2d 746 (Va. Ct. App. 2005).
Cirrito v. Cirrito, 605 S.E.2d 268 (Va. Ct. App. 2004).“It is clear that the payment for not competing with Telco is within the definition of marital property since the right to receive the money was acquired during the marriage and is not separate property as defined in Code § 20-107.3. As to this issue, we remand to the trial court…”
Ranney v. Ranney, 608 S.E.2d 485 (Va. Ct. App. 2005).“” As husband testified, had wife not made her various misrepresentations, there would have been no marriage, and therefore no marital estate to divide. We further note that the fact that these misrepresentations occurred before the marriage does not bar their consideration, for…”
Duva v. Duva, 685 S.E.2d 842 (Va. Ct. App. 2009).“The Court concluded that because (at that time) Code § 20-107.3 only contemplated two kinds of property, marital or separate, the statute did not recognize hybrid property.”
Linda S. Frazer v. James Douglas Frazer, 477 S.E.2d 290 (Va. Ct. App. 1996).
Showing the top 5 of 21. More in the list view →
(A)(1)(ii)35 cases
Wagner v. Wagner, 358 S.E.2d 407 (Va. Ct. App. 1987).
Vilseck v. Vilseck, 612 S.E.2d 746 (Va. Ct. App. 2005).
Courembis v. Courembis, 595 S.E.2d 505 (Va. Ct. App. 2004).“In fashioning that award, the trial court is guided by Code § 20-107.3. Code § 20-107.3 directs that the trial court determine that property which is separate, that which is marital, and that which is part marital and part separate.”
Earl F. Layman v. Dorothy J. Layman, 742 S.E.2d 890 (Va. Ct. App. 2013).
Sara Rahbaran v. Kamran Rahbaran, 494 S.E.2d 135 (Va. Ct. App. 1997).
Showing the top 5 of 35. More in the list view →
(A)(1)(iii)24 cases
Courembis v. Courembis, 595 S.E.2d 505 (Va. Ct. App. 2004).
Sara Rahbaran v. Kamran Rahbaran, 494 S.E.2d 135 (Va. Ct. App. 1997).
Lambert v. Lambert, 367 S.E.2d 184 (Va. Ct. App. 1988).
Robbins v. Robbins, 632 S.E.2d 615 (Va. Ct. App. 2006).
Earl F. Layman v. Dorothy J. Layman, 742 S.E.2d 890 (Va. Ct. App. 2013).
Showing the top 5 of 24. More in the list view →
(A)(1)(iv)7 cases
Sara Rahbaran v. Kamran Rahbaran, 494 S.E.2d 135 (Va. Ct. App. 1997).
Vilseck v. Vilseck, 612 S.E.2d 746 (Va. Ct. App. 2005).
Moran v. Moran, 512 S.E.2d 834 (Va. Ct. App. 1999).
Martin v. Martin, 489 S.E.2d 727 (Va. Ct. App. 1997).
John Hvozdovic v. Sarah McGuire, No. 1146174 (Va. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2018).
Showing the top 5 of 7. More in the list view →
(A)(2)154 cases
Dietz v. Dietz, 436 S.E.2d 463 (Va. Ct. App. 1993).
Robinson v. Robinson, 621 S.E.2d 147 (Va. Ct. App. 2005).
Courembis v. Courembis, 595 S.E.2d 505 (Va. Ct. App. 2004).
Shiembob v. Shiembob, 685 S.E.2d 192 (Va. Ct. App. 2009).
Rexrode v. Rexrode, 339 S.E.2d 544 (Va. Ct. App. 1986).
Showing the top 5 of 154. More in the list view →
(A)(2)(h)1 case
Wagner v. Wagner, 358 S.E.2d 407 (Va. Ct. App. 1987).
(A)(2)(i)17 cases
Dietz v. Dietz, 436 S.E.2d 463 (Va. Ct. App. 1993).
Wagner v. Wagner, 358 S.E.2d 407 (Va. Ct. App. 1987).
Lightburn v. Lightburn, 472 S.E.2d 281 (Va. Ct. App. 1996).
Morris v. Morris, 349 S.E.2d 661 (Va. Ct. App. 1986).
Marie Holt Hart v. James P. Hart, III, 497 S.E.2d 496 (Va. Ct. App. 1998).
Showing the top 5 of 17. More in the list view →
(A)(2)(ii)10 cases
Dietz v. Dietz, 436 S.E.2d 463 (Va. Ct. App. 1993).
Wagner v. Wagner, 358 S.E.2d 407 (Va. Ct. App. 1987).
Lambert v. Lambert, 367 S.E.2d 184 (Va. Ct. App. 1988).
Brown v. Brown, 361 S.E.2d 364 (Va. Ct. App. 1987).
Booth v. Booth, 371 S.E.2d 569 (Va. Ct. App. 1988).
Showing the top 5 of 10. More in the list view →
(A)(2)(iii)29 cases
Courembis v. Courembis, 595 S.E.2d 505 (Va. Ct. App. 2004).
Cirrito v. Cirrito, 605 S.E.2d 268 (Va. Ct. App. 2004).
Ranney v. Ranney, 608 S.E.2d 485 (Va. Ct. App. 2005).
Budnick v. Budnick, 595 S.E.2d 50 (Va. Ct. App. 2004).
Robinson v. Robinson, 621 S.E.2d 147 (Va. Ct. App. 2005).
Showing the top 5 of 29. More in the list view →
(A)(3)79 cases
Robinson v. Robinson, 621 S.E.2d 147 (Va. Ct. App. 2005).
Courembis v. Courembis, 595 S.E.2d 505 (Va. Ct. App. 2004).
Marie Holt Hart v. James P. Hart, III, 497 S.E.2d 496 (Va. Ct. App. 1998).
Steven Allen Starr v. Margaret Anne Starr, 828 S.E.2d 257 (Va. Ct. App. 2019).
Ranney v. Ranney, 608 S.E.2d 485 (Va. Ct. App. 2005).
Showing the top 5 of 79. More in the list view →
(A)(3)(a)65 cases
Robinson v. Robinson, 621 S.E.2d 147 (Va. Ct. App. 2005).
Cirrito v. Cirrito, 605 S.E.2d 268 (Va. Ct. App. 2004).
Courembis v. Courembis, 595 S.E.2d 505 (Va. Ct. App. 2004).
Congdon v. Congdon, 578 S.E.2d 833 (Va. Ct. App. 2003).
W. Pettus Gilman v. Judith Cochrane Gilman, 526 S.E.2d 763 (Va. Ct. App. 2000).
Showing the top 5 of 65. More in the list view →
(A)(3)(a)(ii)1 case
Martin v. Martin, 501 S.E.2d 450 (Va. Ct. App. 1998).
(A)(3)(b)10 cases
Ranney v. Ranney, 608 S.E.2d 485 (Va. Ct. App. 2005).
Giso Asgari v. Abbas Asgari, 533 S.E.2d 643 (Va. Ct. App. 2000).
Mann v. Mann, 470 S.E.2d 605 (Va. Ct. App. 1996).
Linda S. Frazer v. James Douglas Frazer, 477 S.E.2d 290 (Va. Ct. App. 1996).
Steven Douglas Moore v. Bridget Monica Moore, No. 0314204 (Va. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 2020).
Showing the top 5 of 10. More in the list view →
(A)(3)(c)1 case
James G. Calmes, Jr. v. Teresa H. Calmes, No. 2820951 (Va. Ct. App. June 11, 1996).
(A)(3)(d)82 cases
Theismann v. Theismann, 471 S.E.2d 809 (Va. Ct. App. 1996).“Under Code § 20-107.3, "when separate property is retitled in the joint names of the parties, the retitled property shall be deemed transmuted to marital property, .”
Duva v. Duva, 685 S.E.2d 842 (Va. Ct. App. 2009).
Barker v. Barker, 500 S.E.2d 240 (Va. Ct. App. 1998).
Sara Rahbaran v. Kamran Rahbaran, 494 S.E.2d 135 (Va. Ct. App. 1997).
Shiembob v. Shiembob, 685 S.E.2d 192 (Va. Ct. App. 2009).
Showing the top 5 of 82. More in the list view →
(A)(3)(e)42 cases
Robinson v. Robinson, 621 S.E.2d 147 (Va. Ct. App. 2005).
Barker v. Barker, 500 S.E.2d 240 (Va. Ct. App. 1998).
W. Pettus Gilman v. Judith Cochrane Gilman, 526 S.E.2d 763 (Va. Ct. App. 2000).
Prizzia v. Prizzia, 707 S.E.2d 461 (Va. Ct. App. 2011).“Jurisdiction over Equitable Distribution We requested the parties to provide supplemental briefs on the following issues: (1) whether the trial court had jurisdiction under Code § 20-107.3 to make an equitable distribution *160 award; and (2) if the trial court did not have…”
Moran v. Moran, 512 S.E.2d 834 (Va. Ct. App. 1999).
Showing the top 5 of 42. More in the list view →
(A)(3)(f)44 cases
Utsch v. Utsch, 581 S.E.2d 507 (Va. 2003).
Robinson v. Robinson, 621 S.E.2d 147 (Va. Ct. App. 2005).
Theismann v. Theismann, 471 S.E.2d 809 (Va. Ct. App. 1996).
Cirrito v. Cirrito, 605 S.E.2d 268 (Va. Ct. App. 2004).
Courembis v. Courembis, 595 S.E.2d 505 (Va. Ct. App. 2004).
Showing the top 5 of 44. More in the list view →
(A)(3)(g)25 cases
Thea Rachel Anthony v. Paul Skolnick-Lozano, 754 S.E.2d 549 (Va. Ct. App. 2014).“In Floyd , this Court held that “Code § 20-107.3 does not prevent the trial court from considering premarital contributions to the acquisition or maintenance of property later deemed marital property in fashioning an equitable distribution.”
Theismann v. Theismann, 471 S.E.2d 809 (Va. Ct. App. 1996).
Robinson v. Robinson, 621 S.E.2d 147 (Va. Ct. App. 2005).
Cirrito v. Cirrito, 605 S.E.2d 268 (Va. Ct. App. 2004).
Utsch v. Utsch, 581 S.E.2d 507 (Va. 2003).
Showing the top 5 of 25. More in the list view →
(A)(3)(g)(iii)2 cases
Betty Barnard v. Russell H. Barnard, No. 0593052 (Va. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2005).
Betty Barnard v. Russell H. Barnard, No. 0168052 (Va. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2005).
(A)(3)(h)8 cases
Reza Hajiha v. Colleen Leyrer, No. 1302234 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2025).
Kyle Pritchett Macione v. Beatriz Huarte Irujo Macione, No. 2027123 (Va. Ct. App. July 30, 2013).
Steven Douglas Nack v. Debra Dickerson Edwards Nack, No. 2219063 (Va. Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2007).
Debra Dickerson Edwards Nack v. Steven Douglas Nack, No. 2288063 (Va. Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2007).
Lowell F. Smith v. Alice L. Thornton-Smith, No. 1165064 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2007).
Showing the top 5 of 8. More in the list view →
(A)(4)4 cases
Eric Lisann v. Elizabeth Lisann, 890 S.E.2d 672 (Va. Ct. App. 2023).
Ruby R. Vaughan v. Kenneth N. Vaughan, Sr., No. 0444242 (Va. Ct. App. Oct. 7, 2025).
Tammy T. Ware v. Sudarsan Srinivasan, No. 1568172 (Va. Ct. App. July 31, 2018).
In re Holland, 562 B.R. 305 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2016).
(A)(5)15 cases
Steven T. Russell v. Karen A. Russell, 759 S.E.2d 1 (Va. Ct. App. 2014).
Jordan Alexander Price v. Natasha Yvonne Peek, 851 S.E.2d 749 (Va. Ct. App. 2020).
Eric Lisann v. Elizabeth Lisann, 890 S.E.2d 672 (Va. Ct. App. 2023).
Liza Marie Pence v. Gregory Allen Pence, No. 1567154 (Va. Ct. App. Oct. 18, 2016).
Gregory Allen Pence v. Liza Marie Pence, No. 1813154 (Va. Ct. App. Oct. 18, 2016).
Showing the top 5 of 15. More in the list view →
(A)(5)(ii)1 case
Kathryne Hampshire Foster v. Larry Allen Foster, Jr, No. 1141212 (Va. Ct. App. June 21, 2022).
(A)(8)(a)2 cases
Courembis v. Courembis, 595 S.E.2d 505 (Va. Ct. App. 2004).
Martin v. Martin, 489 S.E.2d 727 (Va. Ct. App. 1997).
(A)(8)(d)2 cases
Theismann v. Theismann, 471 S.E.2d 809 (Va. Ct. App. 1996).
Sara Rahbaran v. Kamran Rahbaran, 494 S.E.2d 135 (Va. Ct. App. 1997).
(A)(8)(g)1 case
Utsch v. Utsch, 565 S.E.2d 345 (Va. Ct. App. 2002).
(B)27 cases
Gamble v. Gamble, 421 S.E.2d 635 (Va. Ct. App. 1992).
Keyser v. Keyser, 374 S.E.2d 698 (Va. Ct. App. 1988).“[T]he chancellor is necessarily vested with broad discretion in the discharge of the duties the statute [Code § 20-107.3] imposes upon him. Unless it appears from the record that the chancellor has abused his discretion, that he has not considered or has misapplied one of the…”
Wagner v. Wagner, 358 S.E.2d 407 (Va. Ct. App. 1987).
Morris v. Morris, 349 S.E.2d 661 (Va. Ct. App. 1986).
Bowers v. Bowers, 359 S.E.2d 546 (Va. Ct. App. 1987).
Showing the top 5 of 27. More in the list view →
(B)(4)1 case
Williams v. Williams, 526 S.E.2d 301 (Va. Ct. App. 2000).
(C)145 cases
Gamble v. Gamble, 421 S.E.2d 635 (Va. Ct. App. 1992).
Gaynor v. Hird, 400 S.E.2d 788 (Va. Ct. App. 1991).
Parra v. Parra, 336 S.E.2d 157 (Va. Ct. App. 1985).
Marion v. Marion, 401 S.E.2d 432 (Va. Ct. App. 1991).
Douglas R. Linton v. Debra A. Linton, 759 S.E.2d 14 (Va. Ct. App. 2014).
Showing the top 5 of 145. More in the list view →
(D)86 cases
Theismann v. Theismann, 471 S.E.2d 809 (Va. Ct. App. 1996).
Arthur G. Kahn v. Eileen McNicholas, 795 S.E.2d 485 (Va. Ct. App. 2017).“Alternatively, the circuit court could have enforced its final decree of divorce pursuant to Code § 20-107.3. Code § 20-107.3 provides the statutory framework regarding the equitable distribution of the property and debts of divorcing parties.”
Gamble v. Gamble, 421 S.E.2d 635 (Va. Ct. App. 1992).
Johnson v. Johnson, 694 S.E.2d 797 (Va. Ct. App. 2010).
Trivett v. Trivett, 371 S.E.2d 560 (Va. Ct. App. 1988).“In Hodges , we held: "Where the marital property is encumbered with indebtedness which equals or exceeds its value, then for purposes of a monetary award [pursuant to Code § 20-107.3] it is essentially of no value.”
Showing the top 5 of 86. More in the list view →
(D)(10)1 case
Rinaldi v. Rinaldi, 669 S.E.2d 359 (Va. Ct. App. 2008).
(E)423 cases
Theismann v. Theismann, 471 S.E.2d 809 (Va. Ct. App. 1996).
Barker v. Barker, 500 S.E.2d 240 (Va. Ct. App. 1998).
Gamble v. Gamble, 421 S.E.2d 635 (Va. Ct. App. 1992).
Courembis v. Courembis, 595 S.E.2d 505 (Va. Ct. App. 2004).
Pommerenke v. Pommerenke, 372 S.E.2d 630 (Va. Ct. App. 1988).
Showing the top 5 of 423. More in the list view →
(E)(1)37 cases
Barker v. Barker, 500 S.E.2d 240 (Va. Ct. App. 1998).
Ranney v. Ranney, 608 S.E.2d 485 (Va. Ct. App. 2005).
Budnick v. Budnick, 595 S.E.2d 50 (Va. Ct. App. 2004).
Watts v. Watts, 581 S.E.2d 224 (Va. Ct. App. 2003).
McGinnis v. McGinnis, 338 S.E.2d 159 (Va. Ct. App. 1985).
Showing the top 5 of 37. More in the list view →
(E)(2)38 cases
Barker v. Barker, 500 S.E.2d 240 (Va. Ct. App. 1998).
Booth v. Booth, 371 S.E.2d 569 (Va. Ct. App. 1988).
Mir v. Mir, 571 S.E.2d 299 (Va. Ct. App. 2002).
Joseph A. Wiencko, Jr. v. Akemi Takayama, 745 S.E.2d 168 (Va. Ct. App. 2013).
Marion v. Marion, 401 S.E.2d 432 (Va. Ct. App. 1991).
Showing the top 5 of 38. More in the list view →
(E)(3)3 cases
Floyd v. Floyd, 436 S.E.2d 457 (Va. Ct. App. 1993).
Robert C. Lightburn v. Sheila Jones Lightburn, No. 2445972 (Va. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 1998).
Robert E. Olsen v. Barbara E. MacKay, No. 1553094 (Va. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2010).
(E)(4)16 cases
White v. White, 692 S.E.2d 289 (Va. Ct. App. 2010).
James Carlton Craig, Jr. v. Thelma Ruth Markham Craig, 721 S.E.2d 24 (Va. Ct. App. 2012).
Woolley v. Woolley, 349 S.E.2d 422 (Va. Ct. App. 1986).
Schwartz v. Schwartz, 616 S.E.2d 59 (Va. Ct. App. 2005).
Watts v. Watts, 581 S.E.2d 224 (Va. Ct. App. 2003).
Showing the top 5 of 16. More in the list view →
(E)(5)59 cases
Ranney v. Ranney, 608 S.E.2d 485 (Va. Ct. App. 2005).
Morrill v. Morrill, 613 S.E.2d 821 (Va. Ct. App. 2005).
Klein v. Klein, 396 S.E.2d 866 (Va. Ct. App. 1990).
Northcutt v. Northcutt, 571 S.E.2d 912 (Va. Ct. App. 2002).
O'Loughlin v. O'Loughlin, 458 S.E.2d 323 (Va. Ct. App. 1995).
Showing the top 5 of 59. More in the list view →
(E)(6)17 cases
Theismann v. Theismann, 471 S.E.2d 809 (Va. Ct. App. 1996).
Srinivasan v. Srinivasan, 396 S.E.2d 675 (Va. Ct. App. 1990).
Robinette v. Robinette, 393 S.E.2d 629 (Va. Ct. App. 1990).
Duva v. Duva, 685 S.E.2d 842 (Va. Ct. App. 2009).
Mary Anne Rowe v. Charles S. Rowe, 480 S.E.2d 760 (Va. Ct. App. 1997).
Showing the top 5 of 17. More in the list view →
(E)(7)22 cases
Barker v. Barker, 500 S.E.2d 240 (Va. Ct. App. 1998).
Trivett v. Trivett, 371 S.E.2d 560 (Va. Ct. App. 1988).
Stumbo v. Stumbo, 460 S.E.2d 591 (Va. Ct. App. 1995).
Smith v. Smith, 597 S.E.2d 250 (Va. Ct. App. 2004).
Marion v. Marion, 401 S.E.2d 432 (Va. Ct. App. 1991).
Showing the top 5 of 22. More in the list view →
(E)(8)27 cases
Gamble v. Gamble, 421 S.E.2d 635 (Va. Ct. App. 1992).
Mitchell v. Mitchell, 355 S.E.2d 18 (Va. Ct. App. 1987).
Zipf v. Zipf, 382 S.E.2d 263 (Va. Ct. App. 1989).
Holmes v. Holmes, 375 S.E.2d 387 (Va. Ct. App. 1989).
McGinnis v. McGinnis, 338 S.E.2d 159 (Va. Ct. App. 1985).
Showing the top 5 of 27. More in the list view →
(E)(9)17 cases
Owens v. Owens, 589 S.E.2d 488 (Va. Ct. App. 2003).
Alphin v. Alphin, 424 S.E.2d 572 (Va. Ct. App. 1992).
Linda S. Frazer v. James Douglas Frazer, 477 S.E.2d 290 (Va. Ct. App. 1996).
Arbuckle v. Arbuckle, 500 S.E.2d 286 (Va. Ct. App. 1998).
Arbuckle v. Arbuckle, 470 S.E.2d 146 (Va. Ct. App. 1996).
Showing the top 5 of 17. More in the list view →
(E)(10)24 cases
Barker v. Barker, 500 S.E.2d 240 (Va. Ct. App. 1998).
Mir v. Mir, 571 S.E.2d 299 (Va. Ct. App. 2002).
Matthews v. Matthews, 496 S.E.2d 126 (Va. Ct. App. 1998).
Smith v. Smith, 597 S.E.2d 250 (Va. Ct. App. 2004).
Watts v. Watts, 581 S.E.2d 224 (Va. Ct. App. 2003).
Showing the top 5 of 24. More in the list view →
(E)(11)29 cases
Ranney v. Ranney, 608 S.E.2d 485 (Va. Ct. App. 2005).
Gamble v. Gamble, 421 S.E.2d 635 (Va. Ct. App. 1992).
Morrill v. Morrill, 613 S.E.2d 821 (Va. Ct. App. 2005).
Booth v. Booth, 371 S.E.2d 569 (Va. Ct. App. 1988).
White v. White, 692 S.E.2d 289 (Va. Ct. App. 2010).
Showing the top 5 of 29. More in the list view →
(E)(12)1 case
Brian Gay v. Laura Ann Gay, No. 1539031 (Va. Ct. App. Jan. 20, 2004).
(F)24 cases
Williams v. Williams, 354 S.E.2d 64 (Va. Ct. App. 1987).
Venable v. Venable, 342 S.E.2d 646 (Va. Ct. App. 1986).
In re MacYs, 115 B.R. 883 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990).
Smith v. Smith, 331 S.E.2d 682 (N.C. 1985).
Heath v. Heath, 568 S.E.2d 408 (Va. Ct. App. 2002).
Showing the top 5 of 24. More in the list view →
(G)106 cases
Dietz v. Dietz, 436 S.E.2d 463 (Va. Ct. App. 1993).
Gamble v. Gamble, 421 S.E.2d 635 (Va. Ct. App. 1992).
Robinette v. Robinette, 393 S.E.2d 629 (Va. Ct. App. 1990).
Mitchell v. Mitchell, 355 S.E.2d 18 (Va. Ct. App. 1987).
Moreno v. Moreno, 480 S.E.2d 792 (Va. Ct. App. 1997).
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(G)(1)79 cases
Steven Allen Starr v. Margaret Anne Starr, 828 S.E.2d 257 (Va. Ct. App. 2019).
Caudle v. Caudle, 447 S.E.2d 247 (Va. Ct. App. 1994).
Stubblebine v. Stubblebine, 473 S.E.2d 72 (Va. Ct. App. 1996).
Laura McGahey Roberts White v. David Carlton Wright, 737 S.E.2d 519 (Va. Ct. App. 2013).
McGinniss v. McGinniss, 638 S.E.2d 697 (Va. Ct. App. 2006).
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(G)(2)20 cases
Lewis v. Lewis, 673 S.E.2d 888 (Va. Ct. App. 2009).
McGinniss v. McGinniss, 638 S.E.2d 697 (Va. Ct. App. 2006).
Horacio Eugenio Sobol v. Christine Marie Sobol, 867 S.E.2d 774 (Va. Ct. App. 2022).
Virginia Ret. Sys. v. Joan S. Shelton, 880 S.E.2d 820 (Va. Ct. App. 2022).
Adrienne Pederson v. Shawn D. Pederson, No. 2093154 (Va. Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2016).
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(H)10 cases
Westbrook v. Westbrook, 364 S.E.2d 523 (Va. Ct. App. 1988).
Gamble v. Gamble, 421 S.E.2d 635 (Va. Ct. App. 1992).
Parra v. Parra, 336 S.E.2d 157 (Va. Ct. App. 1985).
Chretien v. Chretien, 670 S.E.2d 45 (Va. Ct. App. 2008).
Aster v. Gross, 371 S.E.2d 833 (Va. Ct. App. 1988).
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(I)12 cases
Mary B. Giaquinto v. Nicholas A, Giaquinto, No. 0615201 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2020).
Timothy Wayne Amos v. Mary Lou Dooley Amos, No. 1779173 (Va. Ct. App. July 31, 2018).
Michael B. Eberhardt v. Kimberly A. Eberhardt, No. 0662181 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2018).
Deborah Clare Olson v. Scott Charles Olson, No. 0089084 (Va. Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2009).
Mansur Rahnema v. Shahla Rahnema, No. 1199051 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2006).
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(J)7 cases
Prizzia v. Prizzia, 707 S.E.2d 461 (Va. Ct. App. 2011).
Campbell v. Altizer, 453 S.E.2d 570 (Va. Ct. App. 1995).
Richardson v. Sasso, 49 Va. Cir. 242 (Fairfax Cir. Ct. 1999).
Jose Manuel Ramos-Fantauzzi v. Elizabeth Santa Matos, No. 2064164 (Va. Ct. App. Aug. 1, 2017).
Robinson v. Robinson, 52 Va. Cir. 193 (Fairfax Cir. Ct. 2000).
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(K)48 cases
Julio Fernando Cabral v. Debbie Ann Silveira Cabral, 751 S.E.2d 4 (Va. Ct. App. 2013).
Kevin Glen Monds v. Laura Marie Monds, 813 S.E.2d 1 (Va. Ct. App. 2018).
Arthur G. Kahn v. Eileen McNicholas, 795 S.E.2d 485 (Va. Ct. App. 2017).
Navas v. Navas, 599 S.E.2d 479 (Va. Ct. App. 2004).
Prizzia v. Prizzia, 707 S.E.2d 461 (Va. Ct. App. 2011).
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(K)(1)3 cases
James Alton Tucker v. Darlene Wilmoth-Tucker, No. 2008092 (Va. Ct. App. May 18, 2010).
Anne Boudwin v. J. Thomas Catania, No. 1501073 (Va. Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2008).
Carol A. Dielman v. Robert S. Dielman, No. 2520044 (Va. Ct. App. July 19, 2005).
(K)(2)7 cases
Arthur G. Kahn v. Eileen McNicholas, 795 S.E.2d 485 (Va. Ct. App. 2017).
Clyde Carleton Koons, IV v. Leslie Elizabeth Crane, 853 S.E.2d 524 (Va. Ct. App. 2021).
Tammy T. Ware v. Sudarsan Srinivasan, No. 1568172 (Va. Ct. App. July 31, 2018).
Jerrty Lee Stoneman v. Dana Grubb Stoneman, No. 3057073 (Va. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2008).
Farah Khakee v. David W. Rodenberger, No. 2001184 (Va. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2019).
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(K)(3)4 cases
Campbell v. Campbell, 528 S.E.2d 145 (Va. Ct. App. 2000).
JoAnn S. Tromza v. Robert Vossburg, No. 1184124 (Va. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2013).
James P. Hart III v. Marie Holt Hart (Pratt), No. 0952023 (Va. Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2003).
Sulta N. McElroy v. Donald H. McElroy, No. 0777994 (Va. Ct. App. June 22, 1999).
(K)(4)65 cases
Marie Dolores Jackson v. Dennis Michael Jackson, 817 S.E.2d 676 (Va. Ct. App. 2018).
James Carlton Craig, Jr. v. Thelma Ruth Markham Craig, 721 S.E.2d 24 (Va. Ct. App. 2012).
Caudle v. Caudle, 447 S.E.2d 247 (Va. Ct. App. 1994).
Hastie v. Hastie, 514 S.E.2d 800 (Va. Ct. App. 1999).
Irwin v. Irwin, 623 S.E.2d 438 (Va. Ct. App. 2005).
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(L)1 case
Cunningham v. Cunningham, 86 Va. Cir. 202 (Norfolk Cir. Ct. 2013).

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